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ABSTRACT 
In recent years the issue of ethnicity has become of increasing concern to students of 
southern Africa. In part this has been the result of the resurgence of local nationalisms and 
ethnicities within the region and also in other parts of the world. Up to the 1970s, the literature 
on South Africa was generally incurious about the history and nature of ethnicity in the 
country. The 'Homelands' policy pursued by the nationalist government encouraged 
commentators to believe that African ethnicity and regional identities were very largely 
imposed upon them. More broadly, critical literature on southern Africa-including Zimbabwe- 
tended to emphasise the history of resistance and nationalism or of the emergence of an 
African working class. During the late 1970s and early 1980s there is a significant 
historiographical shift. In part this derived from a new concern with ideology and 
consciousness amongst Southern Africanists. It also resulted from the reassertion of ethnic 
and regional political demands, especially the re-emergence of the Zulu cultural movement 
Inkatha. More broadly the conflict in Zimbabwe after independence was widely interpreted as 
being partly ethnic in character. And on a continent-wide and international scale there 
seemed to be a far clearer assertion of ethnic and sub-national consciousness. In South 
Africa itself, many of the violent incidents from*the mid-80s to the present have been seen to 
have an ethnic dimension-both within black communities and between them and Afrikaners. 
Here the legacy of the 'Homelands' policy has been taken much more seriously and deeper 
questions asked about regional languages, identities and their significance. 
A great deal of detailed research has now been done both on the history and recent 
manifestations of ethnicity in southern Africa. However there has as yet been little attempt to 
establish a conceptual base for understanding the unfolding of ethnic and regional identities. 
There have been many books and articles on specific expressions of ethnic identity but few 
examinations of the rise and fall of such manifestations through time. This thesis is an explicit 
attempt at a comparative and theoretical analysis of ethnicity, in relation to the emerging 
nationalisms of South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe. It aims to a significant extent 
to break new conceptual and analytical ground, rather than to develop a major new empirical 
case study. Through a critical analysis of the literature, including the related disciplines of 
Psychology, Sociology and Political Science as well as History, the thesis demonstrates that 
the development of ethnic identifications in southern Africa can be periodised. Furthermore, 
each period is demonstrated to exhibit differing levels of ethnic consciousness, interlinked with 
other forms of identity such as class and gender, and centred upon the entrenchment of the 
migrant labour process as well as the development of segregation and apartheid. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the issue of ethnicity has become of increasing concern to students of 
southern Africa. In part this has been the result of the resurgence of local nationalisms and 
ethnicities within the region and also in other areas of the world. Up to the 1970s, the 
literature on South Africa was generally incurious about the history and nature of ethnicity in 
the country. The 'Homelands' policy pursued by the nationalist government encouraged 
commentators to believe that African ethnicity and regional identities were very largely 
imposed upon them. More broadly, critical literature on southern Africa-including Zimbabwe- 
tended to emphasise the history of resistance and nationalism or of the emergence of an 
African working class. During the late 1970s and early 1980s there is a significant 
historiographical shift. In part this derived from a new concern with . _ideology and 
consciousness amongst Southern Africanists. It also resulted from the reassertion of ethnic 
and regional political demands, especially the re-emergence of the Zulu cultural movement 
Inkatha. More broadly the conflict in Zimbabwe after independence was widely interpreted as 
being partly ethnic in character. And on a continent-wide and international scale there 
seemed to be a far clearer assertion of ethnic and sub-national consciousness. In South 
Africa itself, many of the violent incidents from the mid-80s to the present have been seen to 
have an ethnic dimension-both within black communities and between them and Afrikaners. 
Here the legacy of the 'Homelands' policy has been taken much more seriously and deeper 
questions asked about regional languages, identities and their significance. 
A great deal of detailed research has now been done both on the history and recent 
manifestations of ethnicity in southern Africa. However there has as yet been little attempt to 
establish a conceptual base for understanding the unfolding of ethnic and regional identities. 
There have been many books and articles on specific expressions of ethnic identity but as yet 
there has been little attempt to examine the rise and fall of such manifestations through time. 
This thesis is an explicit attempt at a comparative and theoretical analysis of ethnicity, in 
relation to the emerging nationalisms of South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe. It 
aims to a significant extent to break new conceptual and analytical ground, rather than to 
develop a major new empirical case study. Material from related disciplines, such as Social 
Anthropology and Sociology, are drawn upon extensively, especially in the South African 
context. During the 1930s and 1960s social anthropologists working in South Africa produced 
a rich vein of material concerning issues of social, economic and cultural change in black 
communities. Although not specifically concerned with ethnic identities, their findings are 
shown to contribute to a greater understanding of the development of these phenomena over 
time. In particular, the work of Phillip and Iona Mayer in the Eastern Cape region of South 
Africa provides considerable material relating to how black communities re-worked identities in 
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the wake of institutionalised racism, migrant labour and gradual urbanisation and 
industrialisation. Previously unpublished material, produced by the Mayers themselves and 
their chief field assistant Percy Qayiso, is drawn upon heavily. ' These studies, when set 
within an historical context, demonstrate that black communities participated actively in the 
forging of differing levels of ethnic consciousness throughout the twentieth century. The 
material drawn from other anthropological research concerned with related issues provides 
similar insights. The work of two major historians in the field, Shula Marks and Terence 
Ranger, is also subjected to critical analysis. 
The first two chapters provide an overview of changing theoretical approaches to ethnicity 
throughout the twentieth century. Those receiving critical analysis include the major 
contributions from related disciplines such as Social Antropology, Sociology, Psychology and 
Political Science, as well as History. The first chapter examines the major works in this field 
from the early twentieth century up to the Structural Marxist analyses of the early 1970s. The 
second chapter takes this analysis from the early 1970s up to circa 1990. Anthropological 
works concerned with social and cultural change amongst southern African communities in the 
1930s and 1960s are implicitly demonstrated throughout these two chapters to contribute 
significantly to a greater understanding of the multiple levels of ethnic identities within the 
region. The overview concludes around 1990 due to the fact that academic studies 
concerned with ethnicity have proliferated considerably since then, and cannot be 
systematically analysed within the confines of one chapter. Works concerned with ethnicity 
and nationalism produced since 1990 receive critical attention throughout the rest of the 
thesis. 
Chapter three provides an historically contingent theoretical framework with which to analyse 
the rise, fall and development of ethnic identities in twentieth century South Africa, set within 
the specific region of the Eastern Cape. The conceptual model of John Lonsdale is adapted 
to the South African context2 and is shown, in conjunction with the anthropological work of the 
Mayers, to provide a useful theoretical tool with which to periodise and distinguish the various 
forms of ethnic mobilisations within the century concerned. This theoretical framework is 
applied throughout most of the rest of the thesis. 
The fourth chapter analyses the research of a major historian concerned with ethnicity and 
nationalism, Terence Ranger. Ranger's work is particularly useful in gaining a greater 
I P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth amongst the Xhosa-Speaking Peoples of the Ciskei and Transkei', 2 Vols, 
Unpublished Typescript, Cory Library, 1972; P. Qayiso, 'Xhosa Morality', Unpublished Typescript, MS 16891/5 Cory Library, 
c. 1964. 
2 J. Lonsdale, 'Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism', in P. Kaarsholm and J. Hultin (eds), Inventions and Boundaries: 
Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, International Development Studies 
Occasional Paper No 11, Roskilde, University, 1994. Also see J, Lonsdale and B. Berman, Unhappy Valley; Conflict in Kenya 
and Africa. Book 2. Violence and Ethnicity, London, 1992. 
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theoretical understanding of ethnic identities in southern Africa for several reasons. Firstly, his 
conceptual shift from 'invention' to 'imagination' exemplifies the way studies of ethnic identities 
have been reformulated in southern Africa in recent times. His depth and breadth of reading 
and research, together with his constant willingness to 'soak up' other theoretical trends and 
ideas and change his own approach accordingly, also justifies a case study. Finally, his work 
concerning ethnic identities in Zimbabwe is important in that it demonstrates that the divisions 
and conflicts amongst black Zimbabweans, both before and after independence, was not due 
to some form of primordial, ancient ethnic animosity. This latter misconception was very 
prominent amongst journalists and political commentators at the time, and is still prominent 
amongst many people today. This chapter does not develop the theoretical model in chapter 
three, as it is primarily concerned with the changing theoretical approaches of Ranger. 
However, the rest of the thesis is set within its conceptual paradigm. 
Chapter five has a dual function. Firstly, it analyses the development of Zulu ethnic 
nationalism in the twentieth century. This constructed form of identity has acquired special 
significance in the last two decades, and an historical examination of its development provides 
a more comprehensive understanding of politicised ethnicity in contemporary South Africa. 
Secondly, there is a concurrent analysis of the studies of Zulu ethnicity carried out by Shula 
Marks, a prominent historian of Zulu ethnicity. Her work is especially important in that it 
stresses the prominence of African agency in forging ethnic identities, as did earlier 
anthropological studies. Therefore her research provides a useful comparison with the 
theoretical model developed in chapter three. 
The sixth chapter analyses the development of Sotho identities both within and outside of the 
Lesotho nation-state. This allows a further examination of the relationship between differing 
levels of ethnicity, and those of nationalism, gender and class, and an analysis of a nation- 
state which has historically been economically dominated by South Africa. Sotho identities in 
former 'Homelands' such as QwaQwa are examined comparatively with those existing within 
the nation-state itself. 
Chapters seven and eight demonstrate the deeply gendered nature of ethnicised identities in 
South Africa throughout the twentieth century. Chapter seven analyses the specific roles 
conferred on women by nationalist and ethnic culture brokers, both within African and 
Afrikaner communities, throughout the twentieth century, and how women could subvert and 
escape these imposed identities. The position of women within ethnic and nationalist 
ideologies is demonstrated to be essential in the upkeep of these forms of group 
identifications. Issues such as constructions of motherhood and changing concepts of 
sexuality and sexual behaviour are explored as related issues. Chapter eight analyses the 
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development of, and relationship between, violence, ethnicity, and male socialisation within 
black communities in the period in question. Again, different disciplines are drawn upon, such 
as Sociology, Anthropology and Psychology, in order to enhance historical analysis, and the 
work of the Mayers is also demonstrated to provide important insights. 
The final chapter draws the theoretical strands of the previous chapters together, and provides 
an overview of the development of nationalist and ethnic identities within twentieth century 
South Africa. The relationship between these identifications receives particular analysis, and 
both Afrikaner and African communities are compared and contrasted, demonstrating the 
diverse routes that people trod towards modernity in this century. 
Throughout the thesis emphasis is placed on the importance of the migrant labour process in 
South Africa in the formation of ethnic and nationalist identities. Migrant labour also affected 
identity development throughout southern Africa, as it drew its labour force from many of the 
surrounding countries. Afrikaner and black African communities receive most critical analysis 
as they have developed the two main forms of nationalism-civic and ethnic-which have 
developed in South Africa, thus allowing a comparision between ethnic and nationalist 
identities. Both ethnic and nationalist identities are shown to be inextricably intertwined with 
other forms of identity, such as class and gender. The use of anthropological literature 
concerning South Africa from the 1930s and 1960s, when set within an historically contingent 
context, demonstrates that ethnic identities can exist on several levels, and need not be 
politicised. They can exist in a more 'passive', cultural context, although this is not to argue 
that they were primordial and static. The fluidity and adaptibility of ethnic identifications are 
emphasised throughout, although these could be rigidified and reified by various ethnic culture 
brokers. As the first two chapters illustrate, anthropological literature has received 
considerable criticism in South Africa for reifying identities in a primordial fashion. Whilst not 
denying that many forms of Anthropology did just this, and often reinforced segregationist and 
apartheid ideologies, there were some works which cannot be categorised in this fashion. 
These offer many insights into the development of ethnic identifications in a century of 
considerable, but uneven, industrialisation and modernisation, and the growth of 
institutionalised racism. 
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1. DEVELOPING THEORIES OF ETHNICITY, AN OVERVIEW. PART 1: FROM THE 
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY TO THE EARLY 1970S. 
Definitions, concepts and creations of 'tribe' and ethnicity manifested themselves in many 
different guises in the academic literature of this period. Theoretical approaches engaged with 
the phenomenon in markedly diverse ways, often influenced by the political climate of the 
time. Additionally, conceptualisations of ethnicity were developed differently depending upon 
the particular academic discipline that was being utilised in order to study it. This chapter will 
analyse the approaches of rural and urban anthropology from the early twentieth century to 
the 1970s, the sociology of pluralism that emerged in the 1960s, colonial conceptions of 'tribe', 
and the Marxist critique of many of these approaches that emerged in the early 1970s. 
Southern Africa provides the main area of reference, but interpretations of ethnic identity in 
other countries will be analysed where appropriate. Finally, it is important to note that colonial 
conceptions of 'tribe' will be analysed through the analytical prisms of the academic disciplines 
in question. This is due to the fact that colonial interpretations often provided the basis from 
which the academic disciplines in question formulated their own hypotheses, and in turn 
criticise one another. 
1.1 Early Reactions Against Colonial Concepts of Primordialism 
One of the first attempts to move beyond primordialist concepts of ethnicity (which were 
adhered to by many colonialist administrators) was that of the Cambridge anthropologist A. C. 
Haddon and the biologist Julian Huxley 3 They placed much emphasis on an explicit rejection 
of the biological meaning of 'race', and represented one of the earliest discussions about the 
'Primordialist' and 'Instrumentalist' views -a debate that provides the fundamental basis for 
virtually all academic theories regarding nationalism and ethnicity at least until 1990. Their 
work, conceived in the context of the rise of 1930s fascism with its particularly virulent brand 
of primordialist discourse, was influenced by the political climate of the time. Huxley and 
Haddon's arguments are significant in terms of the developing historiography concerning 
ethnicity in that, until the appearance of their work, primordialist concepts of colonised peoples 
were utilised in order to justify colonialism. Nineteenth century explorers, Colonial 
administrators and anthropologists often provided the ideological ammunition for colonial rule 
in terms of perceived 'biological traits', and this continued well into the twentieth century. 5 
3 J. C. Huxley and A. C. Haddon, We Europeans: A Survey of Racial' Problems, London, 1935. 4 See A. Smith, National Identity, London, 1991, J. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, London, 1991, and A. 
Smith and J. Hutchinson (eds), Ethnicity, Oxford, 1996 for examples of the many theoretical discussions concerned with this 
debate. 
5 For an interesting analysis of one particular example of colonial anthropology, and its concern with these issues, see T. 
Ranger, 'The Mobilisation of Labour and the Production of Knowledge: The Antiquarian Tradition in Rhodesia', JAH, Vol 20, 
No 4,1979. Also see S. Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-1936, London, 1989, 
and S. Dubow, Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa, Cambridge, 1995. 
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However, not all anthropological works drew such an essentialist, static, primordialist picture. 
For example, Wilson produced a very complex and detailed account of rural Mpondo society 
in South Africa in the 1930s. 6 Anthropologists such as Epstein and Mayer later provided 
similar works set within urban contexts ! All these works are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
suggestive of the fluidity of African identities, and their ability to adapt to changing situations - 
including that of capitalist and colonial penetration. It is worth examining these works in some 
detail for several reasons. Firstly, they have often been criticised by early 1970s Marxist 
historians such as Magubane for indirectly reinforcing colonialism and South African 
apartheid .8 This debate needs to be analysed in some depth. Secondly, the 'situational' 
model for African ethnic identities which these works suggest contrasts markedly with 
primordialist oriented models. Thus they further the 'Primordialist/Instrumentalist' debate to 
which reference was made earlier. Thirdly, there are differences between these theoretical 
approaches which require examination. Fourthly, these works are perhaps the first to 
demonstrate how categories such as race, class, gender and age intertwine and articulate 
with ethnic identities. Finally, these works suggest that ethnic identities can exist in cultural, 
as well as political, terms. The existence of multiple layers of ethnic identities, situated in the 
differing but overlapping spheres of culture, politics and economy, is a central tenet of this 
thesis .9 
1.2 Rural/Urban Anthropology In Southern Africa, and the 'Situational' Nature of Ethnic 
Identities. Circa 1930s-1970. 
One of the fascinations of studying past theoretical models, whether they originate from 
Anthropology, History or any other related discipline, resides in discovering that contemporary 
modes of theoretical analyses, despite their claims to sophistication, are not always as ground 
- breaking as they seem. This seems particularly so with regard to studies of ethnicity and 
nationalism. Furthermore, it becomes especially apparent when rural and anthropological 
works of the period in question are compared to more recent works such as that of Vail's The 
Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. 10 'Situational' concepts of ethnic identification are 
particularly useful in demonstrating this point. It is also important to recognise the salience of 
these works in contemporary historiography, in order to further the historical understanding of 
ethnic identity formation. 
6-- 
M. Wilson. Reaction to Conquest, London, 1964, (2nd. ed). The first edition was published in 1936. 
See for example P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, London, 1961, and A. Epstein, Politics in An Urban African Community. 
Manchester, 1958. 
8 B. Magubane. 'The 'Xhosa' in Town Revisited. Urban Anthropology: A Failure in Method and Theory'. American 
Anthropologist, Vol 75,1969. 
9 Anthropological studies of social change, in addition to the ones examined in this chapter, were particularly rich in the 1930s 
and 1960s in South Africa. They offer useful insights into the fluid processual nature of African cultural identities which fed 
into developing ethnicities, and will receive critical attention throughout later chapters. 10 L. Vail., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, London, 1989. 
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One of the earliest rural anthropological works which implicitly demonstrates facets of the 
'situational' nature of ethnic identification is that of Monica Wilson. Originally published in 
1936, her study of the Mpondo and their reaction to the penetration of colonialism and 
capitalism presages much of Epstein's later theoretical tenets of the late 1950s, as well as 
much of Vail's collected edition (itself hailed as a landmark in the study of Southern African 
ethnicity in the late 1980s). A particularly significant element of this research is its study of 
Mpondo interpretations of the changes wrought by colonial ideology and the gradual 
introduction of a capitalist economy. Wilson argues in the preface that her study owes an 
intellectual debt to Bronislaw Malinowski. Malinowski was the first to introduce the 
Functionalist approach to social anthropology, which was based on the premise that all 
customs had contemporary functions, 'even if these were only vaguely concerned with 
reinforcing the importance of traditional ways of behaving'. " This is reflected in the contents 
of Wilson's book, which provides an enormous amount of material concerning the 'functions' 
of various customs. Malinowski's approach failed, however, to take fully into account social 
change. This gave the impression that the societies he studied were situated in a type of 
timeless stasis. Wilson's work avoids this pitfall. In 1945, she co- developed a theoretical 
paradigm attempting to explain societal change. 12 The seeds of this approach are also evident 
in her earlier research, such as her study of the Mpondo analysed below. Her study of religion 
and social change, thirty years after the 1945 work, also remained rooted in its insights. 13 This 
later research also demonstrates the influence of Wilson's Christian beliefs on her work. Her 
concept of the articulation between Christianity, economy, consciousness, and increasing 
scale of society in promoting social change is particularly poignant, demonstrating both her 
liberal, individualist and Christian religious beliefs. Arguably, this could be said to adversely 
influence her study of non-Christian societies, in that she could be conceived to approach 
them from a Christian, subjective, viewpoint. However in an essay written in celebration of 
Wilson, Audrey Richards refers to this criticism as follows: 
This seems to me an unreasonable criticism. It is not only 
that she makes a point of announcing, with typical honesty, 
when she is speaking as a Christian rather than as an 
anthropologist, whereas many Marxists, who also have 
strong views on religion, do not. It seems to me possible 
that an anthropologist who has never had the experience of 
believing in a supernatural power nor of feeling the efficacy 
of ritual may find it difficult to understand the religion of another 
it . __ A. Cheater, Social Anthropology: An Alternative Introduction, London, 1989. 
12 G. Wilson, M. Wilson, The Analysis of Social Change, Cambridge, 1945. IA M. Wilson, Religion and the Transformation of Society, Cambridge, 1971. 
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people. 14 
Wilson's works demonstrate her ability to record the subjective consciousnesses of the people 
being studied. This is particularly important, not only in the study of religion, but also when 
analysing ethnic identities. For the subjective consciousnesses of the ordinary mass of the 
people shape the 'passive', cultural elements of ethnic identity. Furthermore, these 'passive' 
forms of cultural identification work on a subconscious level. Brownlie, in his study of South 
African peoples in the late nineteenth century, makes the following observation: 
Many men believe that most barbarous tribes have no religion 
at all, and that they do not recognise a Supreme Being, but this 
opinion, in most if not all cases, on due inquiry, will be found to 
be incorrect, and it is quite easy to account for this erroneous 
impression. Ask a barbarian about his religious belief, or what 
is generally termed superstition, and why he does this or that, 
and he will say that he does not know, or that is the custom. In 
many cases the answer is an honest one; the man really does 
not know why he does certain things. Exactly as in Christian 
churches, where forms and ceremonies are adopted, the great 
body of worshippers may be in utter ignorance of the import of 
the forms used either by themselves or the celebrant. 15 
Although Brownlie's comment refers primarily to religion, it applies equally to 'passive' ethnic 
identifications. Communities held to particular customs unquestionally, as they were 
embedded deep in the recipient's psyche. They thus represented a taken for granted recipe 
for life. However, these passive forms of identification formed the cultural bedrock from which 
more dynamic, mobilised forms of ethnic identities were constructed. This is not to suggest a 
primordialist essentialism inherent in ethnicity, but rather that earlier forms of identity could be 
mobilised in a more dynamic fashion. Passive ethnic identifications also continued to survive 
well into the twentieth century, although they were gradually eroded as rural patterns of life, 
based on the institution of the chieftaincy and the homestead, became increasingly difficult to 
sustain in the wake of colonialism and capitalist penetration. 
Through emphasising such elements as rationalism and political economy (although these are 
important areas of research), Marxists tend to sideline this subjective element, or try to explain 
14 A. Richards, 'Monica Wilson: An Appreciation', in M. Whisson and M. West (eds), Religion and Social Change in 
Southern Africa: Anthropological Essays in Honour of Monica Wilson, London, 1975. is C. Brownlie, Reminiscences of Kafir Life and History, Natal, 1977 (L_ _ 
an oL pc7sS 0 p. 241. 
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it primarily in rationalist terms. Even the more sophisticated Marxian analyses of the 1980s 
tended towards this approach. Additionally, as religious elements in pre-colonial societies 
tended to be inseparable from the secular, and contributed towards the shaping of 'passive' 
ethnic consciousnesses, it seems reasonable to argue that an analysis of ordinary peoples' 
subjective ethnic consciousnesses, understood in their own terms, is a fundamental 
prerequisite in gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of ethnic identities 
in general. Certainly religion played a major part in ethnic conflict in many southern African 
societies in the aftermath of colonial conquest. However, despite Wilson's ability to 
incorporate social change within her theoretical analysis, early 1970s Marxists still criticised 
anthropological approaches for being ahistorical in nature. With hindsight, this is certainly 
applicable to such as Malinowski, but less so Wilson. She was already demonstrating her 
capability to take social change on board in her 1930s work on Mpondo society. 16 
Wilson's concept of what she terms 'Selective Conservatism' is particularly interesting, in that 
it reflects much of the later theoretical models expounded by Mayer and Epstein. The concept 
itself is concerned with Mpondo resistance in the 1930s to certain elements of economic and 
social change which the Europeans wished to introduce. This was particularly the case with 
colonial attempts to limit the number of cattle that Africans owned on the reserves .17 
She also 
perceived that there were different degrees of acceptance of colonial introduced changes 
amongst different groups of Mpondo: 'the degree of external pressure and of internal 
resistance are forces determining the liability of different aspects of a culture to change, in the 
same way as they determine the liability of different communities to change'. 18 Wilson also 
refers to what she terms the 'Red/School' split in Mpondo society in the 1930s, which reflected 
the variation in acceptance of colonial rule and subsequent introduction of social and 
economic change. 19 It is this recognition of inter- and intra-community debates, regarding the 
extent to which colonial introduced change should be accepted, that is of crucial importance in 
understanding ethnic identity and its subsequent mobilisation. Wilson's conceptualisation of 
this moral debate is an early example of the ideas which were developed by Mayer in East 
London during the 1960s, which implicitly illustrates how ethnic identification can exist at 
several levels. Works such as that of Mayer and Epstein reflect the 'situationally selective' 
model of identity formation and mobilisation initially recognised by Wilson. Mayer and Epstein 
worked in a rapidly changing political climate, with African nationalism growing throughout the 
continent. Therefore it is worthwhile comparing their findings with that of Wilson, whilst setting 
their theoretical assumptions within their specific historical context. This is important, as the 
16 See M. Wilson, Reaction to Conquest. However, it is important to recognise that Wilson does not provide a systematic view 
of historical change, only a kind of 'before and after' approach. 17 M. Wilson, Reaction to Conquest, p. 540. 18 Ibid, p. 549. 
19 Ibid, p. p. 548-554. 
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political climate of the 1960s and 1970s dictated how these works would be received, and 
subsequently how they would be criticised. 
The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Lusaka was a birthplace of the 'situational' concept of 
ethnic identity formation. Urban anthropologists such as Godfrey Wilson, Max Gluckman, J. 
Clyde Mitchell and A. Epstein, prominent at this institute, became known as the Manchester 
School due to their later affiliation with the University of Manchester. Their work was 
specifically associated with the particular form of urbanisation occurring in Northern Rhodesia 
(now Zambia) from the 1930s onwards. The demand for labour in the copper mines had 
provoked a stream of migration from the rural areas to the mining towns, many workers 
settling in large barracks. This form of migratory labour had several significant effects upon 
the social situation of these workers, according to various members of the Manchester School. 
Firstly, workers were seen as having entered a predominantly monetary economy as wage 
labourers, whereas they had previously lived as subsistence farmers in a rural situation 
2° 
Secondly, their social organisation changed from being based on rural kinship to being 
virtually entirely dictated by the mining organisation, with their families left behind in the rural 
villages. Finally, the social system which they encountered at the mines was far larger and 
much more complex than that which existed in the rural areas. This entailed them coming into 
daily contact with a large number of other ethnic groups. Furthermore this type of social 
change was very similar to that occurring in South Africa at the same time. 
The Manchester School's main theoretical focus was concerned with social and cultural 
continuity and change within African communities, as a result of the changes mentioned 
above. There were differences of opinion between them. For example, Godfrey Wilson 
argued in the 1940s that the changes wrought had sparked a process of 'detribalisation' 
21 
However, J. Clyde Mitchell, and others, in their later studies carried out in the 1950s, argued 
that a process of 'retribalisation' was occurring in the mining towns. 2 Epstein's research in 
particular contained interesting similarities with that of Monica Wilson's earlier work 
mentioned above. He introduced the theoretical concept of 'situational selection', which aimed 
to demonstrate the flexibility of African mine workers in utilising this form if identification. 
Mayer summarises the concept lucidly: 'it has demonstrated that in certain interactions the 
urban workers still attach prime importance to their respective tribal identities, but that 
industrial work involves them in new sets of relations, in which they eventually became aware 
of the irrelevance of tribal categories'. 3 
20 One of the problems with many anthropological views of change is their tendency to collapse the wide variety of precolonial 
societies into the category `subsistences'. 21 
U. Wilson, Essays on the Economics ofDetribalization, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1941-2. 
22 See for example J. Clyde Mitchell, The Kalela Dance, Manchester, 1956. 21 
-- P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, p. xiii, preface. 
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Epstein further argues that at work Africans formed urban associations, particularly trade 
unions. Thus a mine worker in town can switch back and forth 'from "urban" to "tribal" patterns 
in his domestic life, yet deprecate a 'tribal' system of representation for dealing with the White 
management of mines' 24 The basis of Epstein's approach thus rests on the premise that 
Africans still interacted in terms of a 'tribal' (what is referred to today as 'ethnic') relationship. 
Furthermore, because the various sets of relations which make up the urban social system 
are interdependent, this form of ethnic identification tends to be carried over into, and to 
operate within, all the sets of relations in which urban Africans are involved. 'But as we move 
from the sphere of inter-personal relations into the sphere of political relations other factors 
come into play. Here... the tribal factor may be outweighed by the strength of the other 
interests involved' 25 . In this case, class affiliations are selected above 'tribal' ones. 
The concept of 'situational selection' is important in that it moves away from primordialist 
notions of African 'tribal' identities, towards a more instrumentalist approach. According to 
Epstein, African migrant workers employed on the Copperbelt consciously selected different 
identities in order to suit the particular situation they found themselves in at the time. To a 
certain extent this reflects more contemporary analyses of ethnic identification, such as that of 
John Lonsdale, who argues that this form of identification is a state of mind. 6 Lonsdale's 
analysis will be examined in later chapters, but it is worth noting that earlier anthropological 
studies considerably pre-dated some of his assumptions. Another important aspect of the 
research pursued by the Manchester School and Phillip Mayer was that it offered a partially 
alternative interpretation to that of the dominant 'Modernisation' theoretical paradigm of the 
1950s/1960s. As Vail states, most observers at the time believed that 'parochial ethnic 
loyalties were merely cultural ghosts lingering on into the present, weakened anomalies from a 
fast receding past'. 27 As such they were considered destined to disappear under the 
onslaught of the social, economic and political changes prevalent at the time. Works such as 
that of the Manchester School pointed to a reformulation of ethnic identification within a 
specifically urban context. 
This concept of new ethnic consciousnesses emerging primarily from the urban work place 
has now been convincingly criticised; ' As Vail argues in his own edited work concerning 
Southern African ethnic identities, stressing the essentially non-rural nature of the growth of 
ethnic stereotypes, `implicitly accepts the notion that rural Africa was preserved in some sort 
24 Ibid. 
25 .- A. Epstein. Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester, 1958. 76 
B. Berman and J. Lonsdale. Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa. Book 2: Violence and Ethnicity, London, 
1992. 
27 L. Vail. The Creation of Tribalism, p. l. 
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of "traditional pickle", antithetically opposed to "modern" industrial Africa and largely 
untouched by the forces of change associated with capitalist expansion and urbanisation'. 28 In 
contrast to the Manchester School he implies that the ability of the mining organisation to have 
such a pervasive effect on the migrants' social world is highly debatable, as is the concept of 
pre-colonial rural ethnic groups living in comparative isolation. More recent works, including 
that of Vail, demonstrate convincingly that rural areas were not confined in a 'traditional' 
backwater. However, the Manchester School did demonstrate that ethnic identities were not 
going to disappear quickly under the impact of industrialisation and colonial ideology. 
Furthermore Phillip Mayer, writing at approximately the same time as, although not part of, the 
Manchester School, did recognise the articulation between rural and urban ethnic constructs. 
, -. _. ' ---" His research is of importance as it pre-empted by nearly thirty years much of the findings of 
more contemporary scholars working in the field of ethnicity. His studies also provoked 
considerable Marxist criticism of anthropology in the early 1970s, due to the perceived 
relationship between anthropologists and the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
Mayer was specifically concerned with the effect of urbanisation upon the Xhosa communities 
living in and around East London in South Africa in the late 1950s. He placed particular 
emphasis on the conflict between what he termed 'Red' and 'School' social categories of the 
local Xhosa population. He argued that this social schism reflected a bitter conflict within the 
Xhosa community concerning the desirability or undesirability of adopting 'white peoples' 
ways, which had split the Xhosa for several generations 29 The recognition of this schism built 
upon the findings of the Manchester School, as it also demonstrated the increase in ethnic 
identification due to the effects of urbanisation. However, it additionally transposed this to a 
rural context and it is at this juncture that the originality of Mayer's theoretical approach 
becomes apparent. Mayer perceived the Xhosa communities in the vicinity of East London as 
split between 'assimilated' (i. e. fully urbanised) Xhosa townspeople who had forsaken Xhosa 
'traditional' culture; the 'Red' Xhosa ('red' referring to the smearing of their bodies and clothes 
with red ochre), 'who still stand by the indigenous way of life, including the pagan Xhosa 
religion'; and the 'School' Xhosa who are perceived as 'products of the mission and the 
School, holding up Christianity, literacy and other Western ways as ideal. 3° He primarily 
concentrated on the latter two categories, and how the effects of urbanisation divided them. 
There are several significant points which can be extracted from this anthropological study, 
and which reflect its uniqueness at the time it was written. The fact that it argues for an 
articulation between rural and urban concepts of ethnicity has already been stated. It also 
implicitly demonstrates that sub-cultural forms of ethnicity, stemming from an original pre- 
28 _.. - lbtd, p. 4. 
29 P. Mayer. Townsmen or Tribesmen, p. viii, preface. 30 Ibid. 
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industrial form of ethnic identification, proliferate rapidly as ethnic identities become 
increasingly debated within the context of social and economic change. Thirdly, Mayer also 
approaches gender issues, with many of his findings being reflected in more contemporary 
studies of gender and ethnicity 31 Finally, and most importantly, Mayer implicitly 
demonstrates that ethnicity exists at a subjective, emotionally felt, level and is not merely an 
example of constructed ideology. This stands in stark contrast to the early 1970s Marxian 
critiques of anthropological works concerning South Africa, which portrayed ethnic 
identification as a form of 'false consciousness' in the true Orthodox Marxist tradition. 
Additionally, in some respects it offers a greater insight into the multiple layers of ethnic 
consciousnesses than more contemporary historians such as Vail (see chapter three). 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that ethnic identity formation is not just a constructed 
phenomenon, formulated by an intellectual elite for their own self-interest. 
However Mayer did not initially dispute Epstein's analysis that 'trade unions transcend 
tribes'. 2 Thus his line of analysis contained the implicit assumption that ethnicities could 
easily be transformed into a national identity through the unions being coopted into a 
nationalist movement. This rather naive, teleological concept has been found lacking in the 
light of the increasing and widespread number of ethnic movements in Africa today. However, 
where anthropologists such as Mayer and Epstein differed from the dominant African 
Nationalist paradigm of the 1950s/1960s was in the fact that they recognised the ability of 
ethnic consciousnesses to adapt to a changing socio/economic situation, even if they were 
supposed to succumb eventually to the forces of 'modernisation'. 
Mayer in fact precludes the possibility of 'situational selection' occuring amongst the Xhosa, in 
the way that Epstein interprets the process. For in East London the salient sociological 
features were very different. The apartheid regime did not recognise trade unions, and 
reacted quickly to suppress their formation. Thus, in the case of East London in the late 
1950s/early 1960s, trade unions could not transcend 'tribes' anyway, as their activities were 
often suppressed by the state. Mayer also argues that there were no different 'tribes' to be 
transcended, for almost all the large urban labour force was drawn from 'the solidly Xhosa- 
speaking Native Reserves in the hinterland'. 33 (This assumption is open to dispute, for there 
was an inter-ethnic Xhosa-Mfengu cleavage which occured for largely the same reasons as 
the 'Red'/'School' split. Paradoxically, Mayer does recognise this second split, as mentioned 
below, and there will be a fuller analysis of this anomaly in chapter three). 'Thus 'Red' and 
'School' ethnic sub-categories became, according to Mayer, the main social cleavage in East 
London, representing an intra-ethnic - rather than an inter-ethnic - division. As this cleavage 
31 -. _ See later chapters for examples. 17 
-- P. Mayer. Townsmen or Tribesmen, p. viii, preface. 33 Ibid. 
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was situated in the rural areas, this also entailed a shift away from 'the relations and situations 
of work to those of leisure, where people (were) at liberty to act out their different 
convictions. i34 Mayer thus accepted that 'situational selection' did occur amongst the Xhosa 
community he was studying, but in a different format, and with different consequences for the 
historical actors concerned: 
The reference groups are distinct, but as the possibilities of 
transferring allegiance from one reference group to another 
are considerable, a man's choices have a particular 
significance: they show whether or not he intends to remain 
within his original social category. This question of choice as 
a determinant of mobility could not arise where the social 
categories (as in the Copperbelt) are ethnic, 
birth-determined ones. 35 
Nevertheless, there was some form of inter-ethnic conflict which mirrored the 'Red'/'School' 
schism, and Mayer illustrates this by situating his study within its specific historical context. 
He dates this cultural differentiation back to the late nineteenth century, and to the differing 
reactions of the Xhosa and Mfengu peoples to colonial conquest in the area. He refers to the 
fact that many Xhosa continuously resisted colonial imposed rule for a whole century, until the 
end of the ninth so-called 'Frontier War' in 1877. The Mfengu, in contrast, tended not to resist 
the imposition of colonial rule, due to their specific history immediately prior to the colonial 
wars. Until quite recently most historiographical interpretations of Mfengu origins have argued 
that they were in fact relative newcomers to the area, having fled the Mfecane wars in Natal 31' 
In order to gain sanctuary with the Xhosa peoples in the area, they had to accept subordinate 
societal status. Thus the Mfengu interpreted the arrival of the British as a way of improving 
their social status, and consequently tended not to resist colonialist impositions, although 
there were exceptions. 7 Peires, in a more contemporary study of the same area, specifically 
dates the 'Red'/'School' cleavage to 1835 when the Mfengu were persuaded by the 
missionary Ayliff to desert their Xhosa patrons and seek colonial protection. 38 This resulted in 
the Mfengu being granted vast tracts of Xhosa land by the British as reward for their non- 
opposition. Additionally, their acceptance of missionary-based European education enabled 
them to gain elite positions in the colonial economic and administrative structure. At the time 
34 Ibid. 
35 _.. . 1bid, p. ix, preface. 
36 Mfengu origins and identity have recently become the subject of a vigorous historiographical debate. This is explored in 
chapters 2,3, and 9. 37 P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, p. p. 31-32. 38 J. Peires. `Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnicity in the Ciskei', in L. Vail, The Creation ofTribalism, p. p. 395-413. 
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of Mayer's study, the Mfengu were 'School' people of long standing. He records that the 'Red' 
Xhosa bitterly resented this comparatively recent Mfengu economic and social dominance, 
perceiving the Mfengu as 'traitors', and that this represented an extreme example of the 
'Red'/'School' social divide 39 
Thus the specific history of the area had a profound impact upon the more contemporary 
social schism with which Mayer was concerned. Mayer recorded several significant ways in 
which this schism manifested itself in the late 1950s/early 1960s. He particularly stresses 
dress, education, religion and etiquette as four areas where 'Red' and . 'School' Xhosa 
symbolically represented their perceived sub-cultural/ethnic distinctiveness. 40 'Red' Xhosa 
generally retained traditional elements within these spheres, and stressed pre-colonial moral 
values, whilst 'School' Xhosa promoted western values and representations of it (such as 
individualism and Christianity). Furthermore, this distinction - as already mentioned - 
originated from the penetration of colonialism and capitalism and the varied reactions to this 
upheaval by these two particular groups. Nevertheless, Mayer illustrated that this social 
division was not simply one of a 'traditional/modern' dichotomy. His study demonstrated that it 
was a far more complex manifestation than that. This also distinguishes his theoretical 
hypotheses from those of Epstein. For, unlike Epstein, he argued that even what he 
perceived as the most 'conservative' elements of Xhosa culture in the area were not simply 
ossified relics from the past, incapable of change. Conversely, the 'School' Xhosa adherence 
to 'westernised' values and mores did not preclude them from utilising more traditional 
elements of Xhosa culture and custom when they felt it appropriate. This differs markedly 
from the conclusions of those commentators promoting the above mentioned African 
nationalist paradigm concerning ethnicity. 
Religion was just one example which Mayer utilised in order to demonstrate his hypothesis. 
For example, he found that although 'Red' Xhosa held the 'pagan' Xhosa religion and ancestor 
cults as central to their identity, and although 'School' Xhosa promoted 'western' Christianity, 
this did not represent the complete picture. In reality Mayer observed a far more complex 
scenario, whereby the actions of the two sub-cultures/ethnicities in question did not completely 
correspond with how they verbally differentiated themselves. In other words, actual inter- 
ethnic relations could diverge from stereotypes as presented in conversation. This may seem 
an obvious point to make, but it is nevertheless fundamental in furthering an understanding of 
the processes of ethnic identification. For example, Mayer states that many 'Red' people, 
although adamant in their opposition to western ideologies, did in fact often dabble in 
Christianity to a certain extent. He observed that 'Red' people who were concerned about a 
39 P. Mayer. Townsmen or Tribesmen, p. 32. Again, the differences between the 'Red'/'School' divide, and the Xhosa/Mfengu 
divide, which Mayer does not bring out fully, will receive further analysis in later chapters. 40 Ibid, chapter 2. 
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particular problem would often be pleased for Christian neighbours to pray for them at the 
same time as receiving treatment from diviners or herbalists. Christian prayers were also 
often invited as a contribution to pagan funerals4' Conversely, 'School' Christians, including 
full church members, were 'often also partly committed to the ancestor cult... A considerable 
proportion, even of full church members, actually conduct(ed) sacrifices at their own homes' 42 
Mayer demonstrates that this difference betweeen rhetoric and reality occurred in many other 
aspects of East London's Xhosa community in the 1950s/1960s, such as attitudes towards 
education. 43 Mayer's study here demonstrates the complex relationship between social and 
cultural change and continuity, reflecting the earlier concerns of J. Clyde Mitchell in his The 
Kalela Dance (1956). 
This complex interplay between continuity and change relates directly to another fundamental 
element involved in the formation of ethnic consciousness and mobilisation, whether this is 
within the political or cultural realm - that of defining ethnic identity as set against the 'Other'. 
Mayer argued that, for the 'Red' Xhosa, 'opposition to the White group tend(ed) to go with a 
heightened resistance to White ways and appreciation of 'tribal' ones' 44 He then drew specific 
comparisons with Gluckman's study of the Zulu, which came to similar conclusions. 45 This 
suggests that ethnic mobilisation sometimes occurs when a specific people encounter another 
community. In order to retain their identity, differences between their culture and that of the 
'Other' are thus accentuated. This dichotomy was further complicated in the context of East 
London's Xhosa community, due to its specific pre-colonial history, and the impact of 
colonialism (as has been illustrated). It can be convincingly argued that symbolic and 
ideological representations of ethnic identity are increasingly emphasised when that particular 
identity is threatened through the forces of change. Furthermore, differences between 
different ethnic groupings, or sub-groupings, are often emphasised to a greater degree if the 
two groupings concerned are in reality relatively similar. These two elements of ethnic 
identification and mobilisation were implicitly demonstrated in Mayer's work, and further 
demonstrate the importance of anthropological contributions to the understanding of ethnicity. 
Culturally and linguistically Mfengu and Xhosa 'proper' were at the time of Mayer's study very 
similar. It was the intrusion of colonialism that provoked the sub-cultural/ethnic schism with 
which Mayer is concerned. Thus in this particular instance, the 'Red' Xhosa's perceived 
distinctiveness vis-a-vis the 'School' Xhosa arose from colonialist appropriation of their 
territory, and the perceived threat of assimilation into western-oriented values and mores 
41 Ibid, p. 30. 
42 Ibid. 
43 mid, chapter 2. 
44 Ibid, p. 31. 
45 Ibid. Here Mayer is referring to M. Gluckman, Analysis of a Social Change in Modern Zululand, Manchester, 1958. 
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(something which was anathema to many 'Red' Xhosa, precisely because of this appropriation 
of land, and the subsequent rise in status of those Xhosa and Mfengu who 'cooperated' with 
the colonialists). Mayer also demonstrates that the situation was further complicated in that 
'School' Xhosa did not totally abandon traditional Xhosa rites, symbols and customs in their 
'turn' to a more European standard of morals and standards. This reinforces Mayer's above 
mentioned quote which implies that ethnic identification meant more than just economic and 
social advantage (as was initially gained by the 'School' Xhosa before apartheid entrenched 
itself), or 'conservative' reaction (which superficially could be interpreted as the reaction of the 
'Red' Xhosa). Gulliver echoes Mayer's conclusions in this respect. He argued that it would be 
a mistake to perceive of cultural factors as purely subsidiary - something which Marxists in the 
early 1970s would imply - and as only providing an ideology and a set of weapons in 
'intertribal' oppositions. 'Symbols of whatever kind though merely representational of more 
concrete interests, have an autonomy and force of their own'. 46 This is an important 
observation, for it is suggestive of a form of 'culture-bank' which can be drawn upon in a 
reformulated manner by ethnic groups seeking to emphasise thier distinctiveness for various 
reasons, economic or otherwise. 
Indeed, this is what distinguished works such as those of Mayer and Gulliver from that of 
Epstein's 'situationally selective' approach. Epstein, and others who promoted a similar 
approach, tended to perceive a divide between rural and urban concepts of identity, with (as 
stated previously) rural areas largely remaining within traditional societal structures. 
Meanwhile ethnic identities were perceived largely as a response to urbanisation and 
adjustment to wage labour and the workplace. A prime example of this approach in a West 
African context is that of Abner Cohen's study of Hausa migrant ethnic identity in Ibadan, 
western Nigeria in the 1960s. 7 Cohen argued that the success or failure of ethnic identities 
to endure was directly contingent upon their relative abilities to ensure economic well-being. 
He did recognise that ethnic organisation entailed aspects of both utility and meaning. 
`Political man is also symbolic man'. 48 However, he adheres to the notion that ethnic identity 
must have a practical function in order to be viable. His 1969 study demonstrated how Hausa 
migrants to Ibadan succeeded, in a relatively short period of time, in monopolising the cattle 
trade in the city. The cattle were bought from Hausa traders in Northern Nigeria, and Cohen 
argues that Hausa migrants monopolised this trade through drawing consciously on ethnic 
solidarity expressed in the idiom of shared culture. They also strenghened their group identity 
by joining the orthodox Muslim Tijaniyya order. "' 
46 --_.. Y. (iulliver, Tradition and Transition in East Africa, London, 1969, p. 32. 47 A. Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, London, 1969. AR 
A. Cohen, Two-Dimensional Man, preface, London, 1974. 49 A. Cohen, Custom and Politics, passim. 
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Cohen's study does provide interesting insights into the relationship between religion and 
ethnicity, and the gendered nature of ethnic identities. However, the important point to 
recognise in this context is that the survival of ethnic identities are perceived to be determined 
in the final analysis by economic factors. In this respect his approach is fundamentally the 
same as that of the 'Situational Selection' school of thought. This approach can be criticised 
in two ways. Firstly, it pays little attention to the symbolic aspect of ethnicity, treating this as 
either irrelevant or as largely contingent upon its utility in securing scarce resources. Gulliver, 
in the above mentioned quote, perceives symbolic and economic elements as often 
interacting, but remaining separate (and equally important) spheres. Mayer elaborates this 
point in his discovery that 'School' Xhosa still retained elements of 'Red' Xhosa custom, which 
had no bearing whatsoever in their attempts to pursue economic advantage through the 
appropriation of westernised colonial ideology (although they might have had functions in 
assuming economic security). Secondly, it fails to account for power differences in the society 
in question, and the effects of colonial hegemony. This criticism not only applies to Cohen 
and the Manchester School, but also to Mayer. 50 
This second criticism illustrates how even these anthropological approaches to ethnic 
identification, despite providing a cogent and powerful critique of the dominant African 
nationalist paradigm of the time, were still influenced by both it and 'Modernisation' theory. 
Perhaps the 'Winds of Change' blowing through Africa at the time, with many African states 
receiving independence, influenced anthropological approaches to ethnicity as well as those 
of newly independent government administrations. Combined with 'Modernisation' theory, and 
the prevalent hope in many African states that colonial hegemony was fading into the past, 
and a bright new future beckoned, it is not surprising that even academic works were 
influenced by the wave of optimism that accompanied it. Mayer's work presented an 
alternative interpretation (due in no small part to the existence of the apartheid regime in 
South Africa), which was suggestive of differing routes to modernity, but even his 1960s work 
argued for an eventual demise of ethnic affiliations when worker consciousness fully asserted 
itself. 51 
Later chapters will demonstrate that the 'homelands' policy was in no small measure influential 
in further reformulating 'ethnic' identities in South Africa, but it is important to recognise that 
Africans were not passively manipulated in constructing this identity. Sections of South 
African society (especially from the middle classes) were very much involved in its formation. 
This hypothesis also holds true for other areas of Southern Africa, and indeed on a global 
50 Although many of these anthropologists took power relations fully into account from the late 1970s onwards, providing a 
more complete analysis of ethnic identities. 51 Mayer, under the influence of more radical marxian perspectives regarding ethnic identities, later recognised that ideological 
forms of ethnic affiliation were not going to disappear so easily. See chapter 3 for an analysis of Mayer's later works. 
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scale. Differing levels of ethnic consciousnesses have existed historically in South Africa. 
Whereas ethnicity in the earlier part of the twentieth century in South Africa often involved 
defense of rural resources and an old way of life, it is now also mobilised in competition for 
new resources and control over new local states. Certainly the 'Red' Xhosa of East London fit 
into the former category of his analysis. It would seem therefore that the work of the 
Manchester School, Phillip Mayer, Abner Cohen and other anthropologists of the 1950s and 
1960s were working at a time when ethnic mobilisation existed as much in the cultural realm 
as in a political one, although a shift towards politicised ethnicity was occurring - not least 
because of the apartheid regime's 'Homelands' policy in the case of South Africa. Some 
ethnic consciousnesses, such as those of the Zulu, were being reformulated in an explicitly 
political sense as early as the 1920s. 2 However, this shift occurred in a more systematic 
manner from the 1960s onwards. The fact that the above mentioned urban anthropologists 
did not systematically examine this general trend amongst different communities at the time of 
their initial studies provoked strong critiques from early 1970s Marxist historians. 
Nevertheless, before examining the sociology of pluralism and these critiques, it is important 
to recognise that these anthropological works were extremely important in one fundamental 
sense. For they demonstrated that ethnic mobilisation did not necessarily evolve from elite 
politicised manipulation, but could also represent the mobilised defense of a particular group's 
culture and way of life when this was threatened. Ethnic mobilisation could evolve from 
'below' as much as from 'above'. They also illustrated that, far from ethnic identification 
consisting of an irrelevent anachronistic part of the rural African past, soon to die out in the 
tide of 'progress', ethnic mobilisation could exist and thrive in urban, industrialising contexts. 
This was due in no small part to its fluid, adaptable nature. 
1.3'Race' and Ethnicity Conflated: The Sociology of Pluralism in the 1960s 
The sociology of pluralism reflects many of the tenets of 1950s/1960s urban anthropology, 
and therefore their separation is partially artificial. Nevertheless, the "situational' approach 
does distinguish itself in that it promotes the concept of the 'instrumental' nature of ethnic 
mobilisation, whereas other proponents of the sociology of pluralism often argued that 
'primordialist' elements were fundamental in the formation of mobilised ethnic identities. 
Indeed, the concept of 'primordialism' was fundamental in provoking the later Marxist critique 
of 1950s/1960s studies of ethnic identities in South Africa. 
The sociology of pluralism also represented the first concentrated effort to introduce ethnicity 
as an appropriate analytical concept for the understanding of South African conditions. The 
concept of pluralism itself derived from J. S. Furnivall's 1948 work Colonial Policy and Practice. 
This study aimed at generating a conceptual framework for the understanding of tropical 
52 See chapter 5. 
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colonial societies. Furnival argued that these societies, although integrated artificially through 
a shared economic and political system, were divided by language, culture and religion and 
therefore their component social groups coexisted uneasily together. 53 Academics such as L. 
Kuper, M. G. Smith and P. Van den Berghe built upon Furnivall's theoretical approach in-a 
specifically African context. In his 1969 jointly edited work Smith argued that pluralism was a 
means of understanding conflict in 'a social structure characterised by fundamental 
discontinuities and cleavages, and a cultural complex based on systematic institutional 
diversity'. 54 The studies contained in this volume emanated from an interdisciplinary 
colloquium held at the University of California in 1966, and contributions to the subsequent 
published edition came from a wide range of academic disciplines, including Sociology, 
Political Science and History as well as Anthropology. All these contributions promoted the 
understanding of ethnicity within the theoretical paradigm of pluralism. However, there were 
significant differences between individual approaches. 
Davidson's contribution for example questions whether the concept of 'plural society' (as 
advocated by Furnivall and Smith) is equally applicable to different periods of Northern 
Rhodesia's/Zambia's history. He argues that in the early stages of colonialism 'Africans were 
no more members of Northern Rhodesian society, as recognised by duly enshrined authority, 
than the cattle and the game for whom reserves were also marked out'. 55 The advantage of 
Davidson's more historical analysis resides in its recognition that ethnic identities achieve 
varying degrees of importance in society at different points of time in a society's history. 
Nevertheless, pluralism at the time was dominated by the theoretical concepts of Smith, Kuper 
and Van den Berghe. All three theorists (although differing in some contexts) tended to 
conflate ethnic identification with 'race', something which earlier anthropologists and biologists 
such as Huxley and Haddon explicitly attempted to avoid. Smith in particular also seemed to 
implicitly suggest that ethnic groups were static, whilst reifying culture 56 This could arguably 
reinforce the notion of 'separate development' perpetrated by the apartheid state in the South 
African context, which promulgated the notion that Africans were 'naturally' divided along 
culturally ethnic lines, and needed to be separated from whites to develop at their own pace. 
Pluralism therefore provoked vehement ripostes from Marxist historians working in the early 
1970s, who perceived divisions in Southern African societies within class, rather than 'race', 
terms. 
53 J. Furnivall. Colonial Policy and Practice, Cambridge, 1948, passim. 54 _ -- L Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism in Africa, Los Angeles, 1969, p. 27. SS 
Quote by L. Kuper in L. Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism, p. 461. 56 See M. G. Smith, 'Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism', ibid, p. p. 27-30. Also see M. G. Smith, The Plural 
Society of the British West Indies, London, 1965. 
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1.4 Ethnicity as 'False Consciousness': The Marxist Riposte of the Early 1970s 
The strongest Marxist critiques of the 1950s/1960s anthropological interpretations of ethnic 
identification emerged from expatriate South Africans in the early 1970s. This stemmed 
specifically from the Nationalist party's 'Homelands' policy, which categorised Africans into 
'ethnic groupings' in order to justify exclusion of blacks from urban areas. Old chiefdoms that 
had partially survived the impact of colonialism and apartheid were reformulated during the 
1950s and after in order to supposedly 'legitimise' the existence of 'Homelands', the 'rights' of 
these 'chiefs' to rule them, and a policy of separate development for blacks. 7 The intention 
was to subvert the development of African nationalist consciousness and maintain the status 
quo of white domination. The policy was reinforced by a plethora of legislation, in addition to 
the Bantu Authorities Act, emanating from the apartheid regime in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Government anthropologists were co-opted into this project, aiming to establish dubious 
genealogies 'legitimising' the new Tribal Authorities. Funding was very often controlled by the 
state when anthropological works were carried out in the 'homelands'. This left 
anthropological studies open to the criticism that they were providing an ideological basis for 
the apartheid regime's policy of 'separate development', even if this was not in reality the 
case. 
In the early 1970s Magubane was levelling this critique specifically at Mayer's work, which 
was originally part of a three volume anthropological study. Magubane, in producing this 
critique, argued that the truly comprehensive understanding 'of social forces in a process of 
social change requires more than an analysis of the victims of oppression. It requires also the 
study of the system of domination itself. 58 This paucity of analysis of the dominating power 
led Magubane to argue that Mayer et al were providng ideological justification for the apartheid 
'Homelands' policy. Writing in the same period, Mafeje comments that if tribalism 'is thought 
of as peculiarly African, then the ideology itself is particularly European in origin' S9 In broad 
terms these historians argued that ethnicity was a result of colonial divide and rule tactics. 
Anthropologists were accused of ideologically reinforcing these policies through their 
'preoccupation' with the study of 'tribes', thus suggesting that Africans were divided naturally 
by 'tribe' 60 
In one sense, this particular Marxist critique reflected the concepts advocated by 1950s11960s 
African Nationalists and advocates of 'modernisation' theory. For all these interpretative 
57 This reflected earlier manipulations of remnant chieftaincies in order to bolster the segregationist policies of the 1920s (see 
later chapters). However, the 'Homelands' policy was much more systematic in its planning and implementation. 58 B. Magubane, 'The 'Xhosa' in Town Revisited', p. 1708. 
59 A. Mafeje., 'The Ideology of 'Tribalism", JMAS Vol 9 No 2,197 1. 
60 See especially B. Magubane, 'The 'Xhosa' in Town' and A. Mafeje, 'The Ideology of 'Tribalism' '. 
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approaches to ethnicity were teleological in nature. They argued that societies adhered to a 
process of natural evolutionary modernisation, and that ethnic identifications would eventually 
fall by the wayside in the inevitable tide of 'progress'. Of course there were differences. 
'Modernisation' theorists of the Right and Centre believed fervently that the 'beneficent' forces 
of economic growth would ensure that ethnic loyalties would disappear, with a new national 
consciousness taking their place. Marxists also stressed modernisation, although they 
perceived it in terms of the inevitable emergence of classes through capitalist penetration, with 
the eventual emergence of a politicised, industrial proletariat which would instigate the change 
to a socialist, democratic society. 
Magubane, Mafeje and others of their intellectual and activist persuasion made considerable 
use of Marx's concept of 'false consciousness' in explaining the persistence of ethnic 
identifications. Mafeje argues in his 1971 article that it is 'a mark of 'false consciousness' on 
the part of the supposed tribesmen, who subscribe to an ideology that is inconsistent with their 
material base and therefore unwittingly respond to the call for their own exploitation '. 61 They 
further argue that anthropologists such as Gulliver, Mayer and Mitchell (to mention just three) 
contributed to the creation of this ideological construct. For example, Mafeje criticises Gulliver 
for his use of the word 'tribe' in describing the ethnic groupings studied in his edited work 
(above). Gulliver justified the use of the word by arguing that Africans themselves had no 
inhibitions in describing themselves as 'tribal'. 62 Mafeje however argues that this reinforces 
European conceptions of superiority, due to the pejorative attachments adhering to the word 
'tribe', especially in terms of its perceived inferior 'evolutionary' stage of development when 
compared to that of European nation-states 83 Magubane criticises Mayer for emphasising the 
'unessential' rather than the 'essential' qualities of Xhosa society. 64 Magubane was here 
arguing that, by focussing on every-day cultural aspects of Xhosa life, and 'ignoring' the wider 
sphere of white domination within which this cultural milieu was situated, Mayer (as with 
Gulliver's use of the word 'tribe') reinforced European notions of evolutionary superiority, and 
thus provided ideological justification for apartheid policies of separate development in South 
Africa. 
Considering the consolidation of apartheid in South Africa during the 1960s and early 1970s, 
and the parallel growth of Marxist historiography, with its emphasis on class consciousness, it 
is perhaps not surprising that anthropological works received such vehement criticisms. 
Indeed, some of the criticisms are well-founded. For example, Mayer's study of the Xhosa 
can indeed be seen to contain a paucity of analysis concerning the nature of apartheid, and its 
61 
. -- -- A. Mateje, 'The Ideology of 'Tribalism", p. 259. F1) 
Y. Gulliver, Tradition and Transition, p. p. 5-8. 
A. Mafeje, 'The Ideology of 'Tribalism". nassirr. 
63 
64 13. Magubane, 'The 'Xhosa' in Town', p. 1708. 
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effect on Xhosa consciousness, although he corrected this in later works. Nevertheless, 
Marxian concentration in this period on the importance of class consciousness and class 
struggle, often in abstract theoretical terms, precluded an understanding of African agency in 
southern Africa (and elsewhere on the continent). For there were, and are, active African 
elements from the past that directly influenced the formation of ethnic identities in southern 
Africa which abstract teleological theories seemed unable to integrate (as they contradict the 
idea that ethnic identities were atavistic residues fading into the rural past). 
In many respects, the anthropological approaches of the 1950s/1960s, and the Marxist riposte 
of the early 1970s, reflect different aspects of the multi-layered nature of ethnic identifications. 
The anthropological approaches demonstrate that ethnic mobilisation can emanate from the 
pre-colonial customs of African societies, which subsequently became threatened under the 
onslaught of uneven capitalist development and colonial and apartheid ideology. Furthermore, 
it demonstrates that ethnic identification does not just consist of manipulation by a petty 
bourgeois elite. The Marxist critique implies that ethnic identifications can emanate from the 
political sphere, as well as the cultural one. It is also interesting to note that, despite the 
Marxist concern to repudiate the anthropological approach, there are underlying similarities in 
some of the conclusions drawn by both. For example, Mafeje makes the following comment in 
his critique of anthropological studies: 
A relatively undifferentiated society, practising a primitive 
subsistence economy and enjoying local autonomy, can 
legitimately be designated as a tribe. When such a 
society strives to maintain its basic structure and local 
autonomy, even under changed economic and political 
conditions, perhaps it can be said to exhibit Yribalism "65 
This can be compared to Gulliver's hypothesis of two years earlier: 
although ... active leaders have certainly encouraged 
tribal distinctiveness for their own purposes, they have 
done this for the concomitant purposes (however ill- 
defined) of the members of their tribal groups and with 
their willing support. Nor have the leaders created the 
'tribes': rather they have made use of them and, for 
the most part, developed what is for themselves the 
political and economic advantages of the tribe. 66 
65 A. Mafeje, 'The Ideology of 'Tribalism", p. 258. 
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Both Mafeje and Gulliver here acknowledge that ethnic identification does have a 'passive' 
cultural basis. Despite his general argument, Mafeje even recognises that this cultural base 
can be mobilised in order to defend identities in times of considerable economic and social 
change. Therefore, both are in their different ways recognising that ethnic identifications are 
multi-layered in nature, capable of being reformulated in order to accommodate the 
socio/economic context of the time. 
The difference between the two theoretical approaches lies in the respective emphases 
placed on the influence of capitalism and colonialism in determining ethnic mobilisation. 
Mafeje qualifies his above statement by arguing that it is fundamentally flawed to impose this 
concept of 'tribalism' upon societies effectively penetrated by colonialism, and unevenly 
entering a capitalist economy and world market. He perceives 'tribalism' in this context to be 
an invention of petty bourgeois elites manipulating 'tribal' ideology in order to achieve higher 
status within societies suffering from uneven capitalist 'development'. In South Africa, this is 
intensified by the 'Homelands' policies of the apartheid regime. That people follow this 
supposed 'top-down' manipulation is put down to 'false consciousness'. Thus there is no 
place in Mafeje's theoretical model for ethnic mobilisation from the 'bottom-up' in a newly 
forming capitalist economy. Gulliver, together with other anthropological approaches, disputes 
this assumption, as evidenced by his above argument. In effect he argues that elite 
manipulation of 'tribal' ideology is not such a 'one-way' affair. He argues that the ability for 
local elites to manipulate this 'tribal' ideology to their own advantage rests on the fact that the 
concept of 'tribe' rests on a solid, but malleable, foundation 67 Thus attempts to manipulate 
people along 'tribal' lines where no cultural basis is available for manipulation is likely to fail. 
This seems to be the advantage of the anthropological approaches of the 1950s/60s 
compared to the Marxist critique of the early 1970s. For they place much more emphasis on 
Africans as active agents in the formation of ethnic identities. Nevertheless, they did not apply 
rigorous class analysis to the context of the societies they were studying, and in some cases 
thier approaches were ahistorical. In pointing to this context, Marxian critiques had value. As 
the next chapter will demonstrate, class seems to have been one of a number of important 
missing, or under-analysed, elements in anthropological analyses of ethnic identities. The 
criticism that anthropologists such as Mayer consciously reinforced apartheid ideology is 
however a gross misrepresentation of their work, and is really more appropriate when applied 
to early twentieth century anthropological studies (and perhaps to the unfortunate clumsy 
conflation of concepts of 'race' and ethnicity by pluralist sociologists such as M. G. Smith). 
66 P Gulliver, Tradition and Transition, p. 17. 67 Ibid, p. 19-20. 
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Indeed, the early Marxist critique can in some respects be criticised for being far more 
patronising towards Africans, in that their abstract teleological view of societal development 
allowed little room for active Afrcan agency. This was to change in latter years, as Marxian 
approaches became far more sophisticated, producing much more sympathetic and 
comprehensive views of African identities, including ethnicity. (Later Marxists also argued that 
worker consciousness was an ideologically informed category). Nevertheless, the Marxist 
riposte of the early 1970s, which was very much a product of the political climate of its time, 
entailed that studies of ethnicity - especially in South Africa - became subordinated to 
concepts of nationalism and class consciousness. These studies had their own important 
contributions to make, but the lack of serious studies of ethnic identification, although 
understandable, was a serious academic omission. 
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2. DEVELOPING THEORIES OF ETHNICITY, AN OVERVIEW. PART 2: FROM THE 
EARLY 1970S TO CIRCA 1990. 
These two decades saw a fundamental shift in the perceived importance of ethnicity as an 
area of academic study. Chapter two illustrated how the early 1970s Marxist critique of 
anthropological and sociological theories of ethnicity centred around the paucity of class 
analysis contained within these conceptual approaches. This chapter will demonstrate how 
Marxist analyses developed from this critique, producing a diverse, rich array of theories and 
case studies which - unlike the Marxist analyses of Mafeje and Magubane mentioned in 
chapter two - placed considerable emphasis on African agency in constructing ethnic 
identities. Anthropological works of this period will also be examined, and emphasis will be 
placed upon how various anthropologists reacted to the 'Marxist riposte'. Mayer's studies will 
receive particular attention, although other anthropological works will be examined in depth. 
Social historians, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, attempted to bridge the theoretical divide that 
this riposte entailed in the early 1980s. Their analyses produced new concepts of ethnic 
identity, allowing ideological elements more prominence than was the case with earlier, more 
orthodox Marxist approaches. The mid-1980s also saw a proliferation of academic studies of 
nationalism which had a considerable influence upon studies of ethnicity including those 
concerned with southern Africa. These works will also be examined, and their various 
theoretical hypotheses explored. The chapter ends around the year 1990. This is because 
academic studies of ethnicity have proliferated considerably since the fall of the Soviet 
Communist bloc, and the subsequent rise in ethnic nationalisms, conflicts and tensions 
(although many existed beforehand). Additionally , the ending of the apartheid regime 
in 
South Africa has allowed studies of ethnicity to become more commonplace. It would 
therefore be impossible to survey adequately the burgeoning mass of literature from 1990 
onwards in chapter format, and instead post-1990 works will receive individual attention in 
later chapters where appropriate. As academic literature is often influenced by the political 
climate of the time, the year 1990 also provides a 'natural' historical fault line in terms of 
academic theories. 
2.1 Marxism and the Vexed Question of Ethnicity: Marxist Theoretical Approaches, c. 
1970-1979. 
As illustrated, both Anthropology and the Sociology of pluralism were subject to vehement 
critiques in the early 1970s from Marxist scholars. Legassick also criticised the work of 
Smith, Kuper and other 'pluralists' in a review of their previously mentioned book, arguing that 
their analysis explicitly ignored the role of class in the formation of ethnic identities 68 Many of 
these criticisms revolved around the 'Primordialist/Instrumentalist' debate concerning ethnic 
69 M. Legassick, 'The Concept of Pluralism: A Critique', in C. W. Gutkind and P. Waterman, African Social Studies: A 
Radical Reader, London, 1987, p. 47. 
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and national identities, but assumed a special significance in South Africa due to the apartheid 
regime's policies of ethnic engineering, especially the 'homelands' policy. This again 
demonstrates that theories concerning ethnic identification and mobilisation were often 
contingent in the 1970s (and beyond) upon the political climate existing in South Africa at the 
time. Ethnicity was being sidelined as a subject of academic study, as it could be perceived to 
reinforce the policies of the Nationalist party. Authors such as Smith, Kuper and Van den 
Berghe were seen to pursue an element of primordialism in their various works. Van den 
Berghe in fact turned to Socio-biology in the late 1970s in order to further pursue his 
'Primordialist' hypothesis, and in doing so specifically precluded the possibility of ethnic 
affiliations articulating with those of class 69 This separation of class and ethnic affiliations, 
and the conflation of 'race' and ethnicity which these three 'pluralists' promoted, opened their 
work up to appropriation by the proponents and apologists for apartheid. For 'primordialist', 
ascriptive concepts of ethnic identity fitted well with policies of 'separate development'. 70 
This was anathema to Marxist academics and activists in the early 1970s, who equated ethnic 
mobilisation with 'false consciousness' and 'petty bourgeois' manipulation. It is interesting to 
note, in passing, that radical academics such as Mafeje considerably altered their own 
approach to the study of African society in this period. Mafeje had previously conducted 
anthropological work with Monica Wilson which bore little resemblance to his later more 
radical Marxist approach. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that much academic work 
In the era of 'Grand Apartheid' was shaped by political factors, with academics across a range 
of disciplines criticising each others' work not so much for its academic content, but rather as 
regards its possible appropriation by the apartheid regime. This was particularly the case with 
the vexed question of ethnic affiliation. The conflation of 'race' and ethnicity by Pluralist 
theorists, and the (falsely) perceived taint of apartheid clinging to anthropological works such 
as that of Mayer, ensured that the study of ethnic identities received scant attention amongst 
radical South African scholars in the early 1970s, with the primary debate shifting to whether 
the fundamental division in South African society was one of 'race' or class. 
The area of debate fundamentally shifted, however, in the aftermath of the 1976 Soweto 
uprisings, the revival of Inkatha, and the continuing relevance of ethnic identifications 
throughout post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. Radical scholars began to dominate the 
intellectual arena after these series of events. They eventually provided a series of 
sophisticated analyses of ethnic identities within South Africa, which aimed to demonstrate 
how these identities articulated with class. However, it was first necessary to recognise that 
69 See for example P. Van den Berghe, 'Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective, % in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 
1, No 4,1978. p. p.. 402-411. Also P. Van Den Berghe, 'Does Race Matter? ', Nations and Nationalism, Vol 1, No 3,1995. 70 For further elaboration see for example the following: S. Dubow, 'Ethnic Euphemisms and Racial Echoes', JSAS, Vol 20, 
No 3,1994 and S. Bekker, Ethnicity in Focus, Natal, 1993. 71 M. Wilson and A. Mafeje, Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township, Oxford, 1963. 
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ethnicity represented more than just 'false consciousness', and thus Marxists went through a 
period of painful theoretical adjustment in order to fully accommodate the phenomenon of 
ethnic consciousness within their theoretical paradigms. 
John Saul was one of the first academics who recognised the need to adjust the more rigid 
elements of class analysis advocated by earlier Marxist works. vis-ä-vis ethnicity. He offered 
an alternative interpretation of its nature. Writing in 1979, he argued that Marxists need to 
engage with concepts of ethnicity in a more theoretically rigorous fashion, and not just dismiss 
it as a form of 'false consciousness'. He further comments that this is necessary in order to 
counter 'primordialist' forms of interpretations, which stress the perceived importance of ethnic 
affiliations in African societies and underplay class analyses. 2 The need for a more 
theoretically rigorous approach was especially apparent in South Africa, considering the policy 
of 'separate development' pursued by the apartheid regime which was based on the premise 
that Africans were fundamentally 'tribal' by nature (thus ideologically justifying forced 
'removals' and the creation of 'Homelands'). Utilising concepts originating from Structural and 
Post-Structural Marxists such as Althusser and Laclau, Saul dismisses Mafeje's concept of 
ethnicity as representing either 'false consciousness' or colonial ideology and nothing else. 
He develops Althusser's theory that ideology does not distort reality (as indicated by radical 
Marxists such as Mafeje) but produces it, or at least what people perceive as reality. He also 
bases his approach on Laclau's hypothesis regarding conflict in capitalist societies: 'Running 
through capitalist societies there is, in addition to the class contradiction, a second 
contradiction... that between 'power bloc' and 'people'. The first contradiction is the sphere of 
class struggle; the second, that of popular-democratic struggle'. 73 
He then develops this hypothesis with specific reference to ethnicity, arguing that the 
ideological terrain created by the uneven development of capitalism results in simultaneous 
class contradictions, and 'centre-periphery' contradictions. Both 'Third World' nationalism and 
bthnic identifications are perceived by Saul to emanate from this latter contradiction. This 
approach can be criticised in several respects, as will become apparent. It is important to 
acknowledge, however, that Saul was evolving a much more sophisticated theoretical model 
for analysing ethnic identifications than earlier marxian approaches, allowing for African 
agency in their formulations which did not entirely emanate from colonial interventions or 
Indigenous lower middle class manipulations. This is due to his stress upon what he terms 
'popular-democratic' struggle. He also recognises that the emotional power of ethnic 
mobilisation can be a more powerful uniting force than anti-colonial nationalism: 'For ethnicity 
72 J. Saul, The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa, London, 1979, p. p. 391-2. Saul specifically refers to the work of the 
ptolitical scientist, Henry Bienen, who refutes the salience of class analysis in African societies. 3 Ibid, p. p. 400-1. 
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can often draw upon much more proximate and recognisable ingredients - language, symbols, 
ties of kin, both real and imagined - in defining itself and recruiting 'subjects". 
4 
Saul demonstrates considerable eclecticism in developing his theory, borrowing from non- 
Marxist works as well as Althusser and Laclau. This does seem to allow him to overcome 
partially the somewhat mechanistic, dismissive approach of earlier Marxist studies. His use of 
Cynthia Enloe's conceptualisations concerning ethnic mobilisation is particularly interesting, as 
it allows him to further his hypothesis - initiated by his use of Laclau's theories - that ethnic 
mobilisation need not be an entirely negative phenomenon. Indeed, he argues that it can 
have very positive aspects. As Saul states, Enloe 'is not prepared to accept uncritically the 
negative judgement pronounced upon ethnicity by commentators from either the Marxist or 
modernisation schools of approach' 75 Enloe's argument that ethnic political mobilisation can 
be utilised to defend communal interests is itself used by Saul in a specific manner. He 
integrates her hypotheses with his more abstract usage of Laclau's theory (which was not 
specifically concerned with ethnicity). Saul shows particular interest in her argument that 
nation states are not the sole end realities in terms of political development, and that the 
exploitative nature of many postcolonial nation states make ethnic mobilisation an attractive 
alternative. 76 
Enloe draws her conclusions largely from the ethnic assertions of North American blacks and 
Native American peoples in the 1960s and 1970s. She comments that politicians, 
development planners and social scientists alike have inextricably intertwined modernity, 
development and nationalism within their theories of social and economic development. 
(O)bservers see ethnic groups to be significant mainly as they 
relate to the larger community. The nation-state becomes the 
point of reference. Therefore before long, the scientific observ 
-er joins the central policy maker in perceiving ethnic phenomena 
as problems - that is, as challenges to the integration of some 
larger system. " 
She views the process of assimilation to the requirements of the nation-state as repressive 
and coercive in terms of policies towards non-dominant ethnic groups within the boundaries of 
many nation-states. Ethnic politicisation and mobilisation to protect ethnic communal 
interests, as set against this coercive assimilation policy, are argued to be positive both in 
74 Ibid, p. 401. 
75 Ibid, p. 407. 
76 Ibid, P. P. 407-8. 
77 C. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development, London, 1986 (1 st ed 1973), p. p. 6-7. 
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terms of building individual and collective self-esteem, and defending communal interests. 
This political mobilisation of ethnicity also demonstrates that ethnic affiliations are not atavistic 
residues of prior primordial attachments requiring assimilation into the wider nationalist 
consciousness. Rather they can be remarkably resilient, flexible, fluid forms of identity which 
are progressive, democratic and do not run counter to development. 78 In this, she runs 
counter to many developmental theorists of the time, who viewed ethnic identities as counter- 
productive to development. 
Whilst criticising Enloe for a paucity of class analysis, Saul utilises her argument in order to 
further Marxist analysis of ethnic identities beyond the concept of ethnicity as 'false 
consciousness'. He integrates Enloe's argument with Laclau's hypothesis that capitalist 
countries contain a second contradiction, that of'power bloc' and 'people'. Ethnic mobilisation 
in his conceptualisation fits with the latter contradiction. This also allows him to argue for the 
ý 
appropriation of ethnic mobilised identities within the class struggle, assimilating elements of 
the former in order to strengthen the latter and make socialism more relevant to the people 
concerned. 
The idea that ethnic mobilisation can have positive aspects had precedents in academia, as 
illustrated in chapter two. Epstein's 'Situational Selection' approach, Cohen's study of migrant 
Hausa usage of ethnic identities, and Mayer's conceptualising of the Xhosa 'Red/School' 
cleavage all, in varying degrees, emphasised positive aspects through their anthropological 
studies. However, these works were more concerned with social change than political 
mobilisation. Nevertheless, it was Saul's acceptance of the positive potential of ethnic 
mobilisation that differentiated his work from earlier Marxist approaches. Communal 
resistance to colonial land expropriation in early twentieth century South Africa often 
translated itself in a reformulated ethnic sense, demonstrating that mobilised ethnic identities 
could be fluid, flexible and 'popular democratic' in form. 9 Saul further argues that this 
'popular-democratic' struggle should be integrated within the class struggle in order to avoid a 
degeneration into divisive 'tribal' politics. 80 
However, there were aspects to Saul's conceptual approach which were equally as 
teleological and reductionist as either the 'Modernisation' school or Marxists such as Mafeje. 
This was due to a large extent - as with many theories regarding ethnic identities - to the 
specific historical and political climate within which Saul was working, as well as his radical 
political persuasions. Saul also betrays a certain cultural bias in his work. For example, he 
78 Ibid. Introduction and Conclusion. 
79 --- See later chapters, and especially chapter 3 for a theoretical development of this theme. $o J. Saul, The State and Revolution, p. 409. This suggests that ethnicity can take several different forms, both divisive and 
liberatory. Again, the multiple levels of ethnic affiliations, and their contradictory elements, are explored further in chapter 3. 
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still treats ethnicity as a type of 'transitional' stage which is to be manipulated in order to 
promote a socialist revolution. Indeed, he refers to Frelimo's approach to ethnicity in this 
context. 81 As in the case of proponents of the nationalist paradigm, his theory promotes an 
exclusive claim to 'objective' truth, and the ultimate progression of society to a pure state of 
socialism. Therefore any aspects of ethnic identification that do not seem to be 'positive' or 
conducive to the socialist society which Saul perceives as the final stage in political 
development, are criticised as atavistic and irrelevant. For example he criticises elements of 
ethnic identification for promoting 'cramped and debilitating ritual and spiritual perspectives... 
(and)... excessive preoccupation with such 'side issues' as the sanctity of language... '. 2 Words 
such as 'cramped', 'debilitating', and 'excessive' are loaded with subjective, judgmental 
undertones which ignore the very real meanings these practices have for various peoples. 
Lonsdale's criticism of earlier Marxian concepts of 'false consciousness' vis-ä-vis ethnic 
affiliations is equally applicable to Saul's, admittedly more sophisticated, approach: The 
defect of this analysis was that its theoreticians assumed they knew so much better than the 
people who were most intimately involved, but who had the misfortune not to be academics 
possessed of a theory of history. 83 
Again, the historical and political context in which Saul was writing is of crucial importance in 
understanding this approach. The mid to late 1970s were a time of great expectations for 
socialist scholars and political activists. The Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola 
had achieved independence in 1975, due to the fall of Salazar's regime in a 1974 coup and 
the armed resistance of radical Marxist guerrilla movements. Zimbabwe was also to achieve 
independence in 1980, under what seemed then to be a socialist oriented government. All 
these governments had attempted to radicalise the peasantry during the course of their 
struggles against colonialism, and therefore had to address the issue of ethnic affiliations 84 
Therefore Saul was writing at a time when it seemed possible that some African countries 
were on the verge of achieving a truly socialist state. For example, he comments that Frelimo 
was successfully achieving 'a genuine 'fusion' of diverse aspects of the cultures and 'popular 
traditions' of Mozambique into a novel national and revolutionary form' 85 Thus Saul conceived 
of ethnic affiliations as potentially positive in that they supposedly centred around a type of 
'power bloc - people' contradiction, due to the exploitative nature of capitalism and colonialism, 
and that this positive aspect was available for co-optation into the socialist project. Any aspect 
81 Ibid, p. p. 416-9. 
82 _.. . -- lbtd, p. 414. 
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"" J. Lonsdale, 'Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism', in Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological 
Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, Occasional Paper No 11, International Development Studies, Roskilde, 
Denmark, 1994, p. 135. 84 There is a burgeoning literature on the issue of how far the peasantries of the various countries concerned were radicalised 
during the course of these struggles. See for example, D. Birmingham and P. Martin, History of Central Africa Vol. 2, London, 
1992; T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe, London, 1985; L. White, 'The Revolution Ten 
Years On', in JSAS Vol 11, No 2,1985. 
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of ethnic affiliation which did not integrate with this concept of co-optation was deemed 
atavistic and reactionary. Saul does not fully investigate what ethnic identifications meant to 
the people affiliated to them, and dismisses those which don't fit in with his concept of the 
ideal society. For this he is to be criticised. 
Saul also fails to address other aspects of ethnic identification. For example, he situates 
ethnic mobilisation within a theoretical paradigm which ultimately aims at democracy. He 
perceives ethnic affiliations to originate from 'centre-periphery' contradictions, due to the 
exploitative nature of colonialism and capitalism, and that these movements are 'inevitably' 
projecting themselves towards a democratic future, in direct opposition to this exploitation, 
unless they are appropriated by 'tribalist' oriented politicians pursuing their own political 
agenda. Therefore, these ethnic movements are readily available for socialist co-optation. 
This precludes the possibility (since proven) that ethnic affiliations may well not be part of a 
'popular-democratic' struggle (although they can be). Saul seems constantly to be looking for 
evidence of popular grassroots democracy, which precludes other root causes of ethnic 
mobilisation. This seems due in no small measure to his insistence upon teleological theories 
concerning societies. The spirit of optimism existing in parts of southern Africa in the mid to 
late 1970s reinforced this approach. In addition, his theoretical paradigm precludes the 
possibility of 'periphery-periphery' contradictions, concentrating solely as he does upon 
'centre-periphery' ones. This again does not allow for a full comprehensive analysis of the 
nature of ethnic identification, as will become apparent in later chapters. The ultimate fault of 
Saul's approach is that he does not take into account the various consciousnesses of the 
people mobilised by ethnic affiliations; he only perceives of these affiliations as prototypical 
democratic movements readily available for integrating into the struggle for a wider socialist 
democracy. Nevertheless, Saul's approach signified a sea-change in Marxist historiography 
with respect to ethnicity, and placed the study of the phenomena firmly on the radical agenda, 
even if it was to take the ending of apartheid in order for it to become a significant factor in 
radical South African historical studies. 
2.2 Anthropology in Crisis: Anthropological Approaches to Ethnicity During the 1970s, 
With Specific Reference to Southern Africa. 
Chapter two has demonstrated that anthropological. studies of ethnicity underwent 
considerable criticism in South Africa during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s for their supposed 
ideological underpinning of the apartheid regime (indeed, many government sponsored 
anthropological projects did have this objective). Anthropology was also receiving more 
general criticisms from various academic quarters from the 1960s onwards, especially with 
regard to its ahistorical approach and its failure to completely integrate political economy into 
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its societal analyses. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the case. Various 
anthropologists, such as the Comaroffs (see below), and Colin Murray had re-routed 
anthropology in a radically different direction, taking fully into account aspects of political 
economy and providing comprehensive critiques of the apartheid state within a historical 
context. 88 
The widespread scholarly antagonism towards some anthropological research in South Africa 
was partially due to Afrikaner nationalist anthropological studies. Afrikaans universities at the 
time approached ethnic identities in a specific way, referred to these studies as Volkekunde 
('the study of cultures'). This approach had its ideological roots in idealist, ultra-primordialist 
German anthropological theories pre-dating the Second World War. Sharp comments that 
this approach conceptualises ethnic groups as cultural isolates, sharing 'a common language, 
system of knowledge, social structure, political and military structure, legal system, economy, 
educational system, games and technical and art forms. '87 Ethnic groups were thus conceived 
of as a volk, or emerging nation, an hypothesis that fitted easily with policies of 'separate 
development'. Sharp summarises the fragmented situation of anthropology in South Africa at 
the end of the 1970s thus: 
South African anthropology does not present a uniform front... 
Those who claim to be 'volkekundiges' evince... a strong 
conservative tendency; contemporary social anthropologists 
within South Africa have a tradition of political liberalism... 
Those within South Africa who profess a radical anthropology 
can be counted on the ringers of one hand. 88 
The work of Phillip Mayer in the mid to late 1970s demonstrates how some anthropologists 
attempted to respond to this radical critique. His work is also worth analysing in some detail 
as it demonstrates that Sharp was incorrect when he argued that 'social anthropology is as 
compromised as volkekunde in respect of ideological subservience to the state' 89 In the 
1970s and early 1980s structural functionalism's dominance of the anthropological discipline 
was being challenged by neo-Marxist anthropological analysis. Previous to the development 
of this theoretical paradigm, anthropological Marxism had been somewhat hampered 'by the 
poverty of the material which Marx had used to construct his evolutionary sequencing in the 
86 See for example C. Murray, Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho, Cambridge, 1981; J. Comaroff, 
'Chiefship in a South African Homeland: A Case Study of the Tshidi Chiefdom of Bophuthatswana', JSAS, Vol 1, No 1,1974. 87 J. Sharp, 1980, p. 5, quoting Kies 1978. RR 
J. Sharp, 1980, p 3. R9 
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introduction to JSAS, Vol 8, No 1,1981. 
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mid-nineteenth century, in which 'modes of production' inexorably succeeded one another'. 0 
The inability of orthodox Marxists to integrate Marx's concepts satisfactorily within the context 
of the so-called 'Third World' earned them considerable disrepute by the 1970s. The problem 
was that many societies 'especially but not exclusively in Africa, were and sometimes still are 
organised not around economic relationships, but on the basis of kinship and marriage'. 91 The 
advantage of the neo-Marxist approach was that it moved away from mono-causal economic 
determinism, and towards concepts of interdependencies between institutions and 
relationships in society. These approaches 'were willing to accept, for example, that labour 
may be organised within kinship groups, without insisting that such labour co-operation must 
define kinship'. 92 
Of course, Anthropology had developed approaches that diverged considerably from the 
structural functionalist paradigm well before the arrival of neo-Marxism on the theoretical 
scene. The work of the 'Manchester School', discussed in chapter two, had already 
emphasised the 'situational' nature of some ethnic identifications. Anthropologists such as 
Gluckman and the Wilsons were questioning its ahistorical approach, and its paucity of 
analysis concerning conflict and change, as early as the 1940s and 1950s. 93 However, the 
work of the 'Manchester School' never penetrated South African anthropology to any 
significant degree, and the pioneering work of Gluckman and the Wilsons was never built 
upon. Mayer's studies were virtually the sole exception, in that they also promoted facets of 
the 'situational' approach, and even improved upon them by implicitly taking into account rural 
aspects of ethnicity. 
The theoretical shift in Mayer's approach between the publishing of his second edition of 
Townsmen or Tribesmen in 1971, and his edited publication Black Villagers in an Industrial 
Society published in 1980, reflects the shift towards neo-Marxist analysis. Mayer's 
contribution to his 1980 work is essentially a continuation of his study of the 'Red'/'School' 
Xhosa cleavage which he identified in 1961. The later study however, demonstrates 
considerable changes in the way Mayer has approached the subject. For example, he 
provides a much more in-depth historical perspective of the cleavage than previously, and 
locates much more of his analysis in the countryside. He also utilises the theoretical insights 
of Althusser. 84 Thus Mayer, at least on the surface, seemed to be shifting towards a more 
Marxist analysis of sub-cultural/ethnic identities than was previously the case. This was no 
90 A. Cheater, Social Anthropology: An Alternative Introduction, London, 1 989, p. 29. 91 Ibid, p. 30. For a detailed discussion of the switch from orthodox to neo-Marxism within Anthropology, also see A. Cheater, 
Social Anthropology, p. p. 28-34. 
ºb1a, p. p. 30-32. 07 
-- See M. Gluckman, Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand, Manchester, 1958 and G. and M. Wilson, The 
Analysis of Social Change: Based on Observations in Central Africa, Cambridge, 1968 (3rd ed, 1st ed 1945). 94 P. Mayer, Black Villagers in an Industrial Society, Cape Town, 1980, p. p. 3-4and p. 72. 
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doubt due at least largely to the Marxist 'riposte' mentioned in chapter two. In fact Mayer 
consulted radical scholars in the drafting of his study. For example Peires, a committed 
radical activist and scholar, had been consulted concerning the historical context of the 
cleavage 95 
It is interesting to note that Marxist analyses of ethnicity, as evidenced by the work of Saul, 
were utilising works such as Althusser at the same time as anthropologists such as Mayer. 
Both studies used these neo-marxist insights in attempting to explain the ability of ethnic 
affiliations to survive urbanisation and industrialisation Additionally, what both studies 
attempted was to integrate the subjective consciousnesses of the historical actors concerned 
regarding ethnic identities. However, the need to integrate people's own perceptions of ethnic 
identity was nothing new to Mayer. His 1961 work (see chapter two) demonstrated this to no 
small degree, and in 1975, whilst still working within the liberal scholarly paradigm, Mayer 
made the following comment: 'So far, at least in the South African context, topics like race, 
class, and ethnicity have been discussed without systematic attention being paid to the 
subjective angle, the people's own perceptions. It seems a major omission. '96 This concern to 
recognise subjective consciousnesses is still evident in his 1980 work, despite the turn to a 
more Marxian analysis. 
Indeed, the very persistence of ethnic identities within southern Africa entailed eclectic 
approaches from scholars of several different disciplines and political persuasions, especially 
with regard to people's own subjective understandings of ethnic identity. There was, however, 
still an underlying assumption that these forms of ethnic affiliations would eventually disappear 
as urbanisation, proletarianization and democratic nationalist movements grew. Saul, as has 
been illustrated, perceived ethnic identities as prototypical bases for the development of wider 
nationalist, democratic, socialist movements; Mayer argued that both 'Red' and School' sub- 
cultural/ethnic ideologies were in decline by 1978, due to the effects of industrialisation; 97 
others, such as the political activist/scholar Neville Alexander, pursued the hypothesis that 
ethnic mobilisations in South Africa were due to the policies of 'separate development' 
formulated by the Nationalist party, which would disappear if a radical working class socialist 
consciousness could be constructed (in itself, an advocation of ideology imposed from 
'above') 98 The difference between Alexander's analysis, and that of Saul, is that Alexander - 
due to his perception that ethnic affiliations were solely due to Nationalist party ideological 
manipulation - cannot accept the possibility pursued by Saul that ethnic affiliations are 
95 
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available for co-optation into the socialist project. Nevertheless, Alexander does accept 
(somewhat paradoxically) that ethnic affiliations are part of the subjective consciousnesses of 
black South Africans, and therefore should not be dismissed as merely some form of Mafeje- 
type 'false consciousness'. 99 
The idea that ethnic affiliations would inevitably 'die out' eventually - either through the 
processes of 'modernisation' as argued by Mayer, or through the evolution of socialist-based 
societies as posited by Marxian scholars - can be seen in hindsight to be a rather premature 
conclusion. 100 Nevertheless, the need to recognise and accept the subjective nature of ethnic 
consciousness was firmly on the agenda of most scholars by the 1980s. The advantage that 
Mayer's anthropological approach has over those more Marxist in orientation is that it does not 
perceive ethnic affiliations as either some form of precursor to class formation, or an 
ideological construction from above by elite groups of intellectuals. He is virtually unique in 
the 1970s in positing (in an indirect manner) the assumption that ethnic identities can exist on 
multiple levels, both in a 'passive' cultural form, and an 'active', dynamic political form. Mayer 
thus presaged the work of many later radical scholars. 
It is also questionable whether Mayer whole-heartedly reformulated his theoretical approach in 
the wake, of the Marxist critiques of the early 1970s. For example, he had always perceived 
'Red' ideology as a form of resistance to colonialism, apartheid and proletarianisation as 
evidenced in Townsmen or Tribesmen. Furthermore, the introduction of Althusserian neo- 
Marxist analysis does not seem to have significantly altered his conclusions from this earlier 
work. He had evolved a more comprehensive historical analysis, thus negating some of the 
criticisms of Magubane. However, he still situated his work very much in the context of 
people's subjective understandings of ethnic identities. Webster, in his review of Mayer's 
1980 edited work, criticises Mayer for conceptual confusion: 
In it, Mayer refers to `folk cultures, when he began writing 
about Iwo rural resistance ideologies. The confusion, or at 
least lack of conceptual clarity about the difference between 
culture and ideology is serious; it is unclear as to whether the 
two are seen as synonymous, or whether they are to be 
regarded as a form of false consciousness, or two 
manifestations of class consciousness as clear, articulate 
forms of resistance to capitalist penetration of the country- 
side. 101 
99 Ibid, P. M. 
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However, rather than this being an example of conceptual confusion, it is an early recognition 
of the multiple layers of meaning attached to ethnic identifications, which can operate 
simultaneously in any given situation. The 'folk cultures' can be taken to represent the cultural 
'passive' basis of the sub-ethnicities in question, and the ideological context (and indeed, the 
'Red'PSchool' cleavage itself) can be perceived as a form of ethnic 'moral debate' regarding 
the best way to engage with exploitation and urbanisation. Webster claims this 'confusion' is 
due to the eclectic approach of Mayer, acknowledging as he does the supposed influence of 
such as Althusser, Gellner, Mannheim and Shils. 102 However, Mayer was much less 
influenced by these academics than he claims. It would seem possible that - apart from the 
accepted need to provide a more comprehensive historical analysis, and more attention paid 
w to political economy - Mayer had continued largely with the approach initiated in his 1961 
work. 
Furthermore, this approach, far from detracting from a more comprehensive analysis of 
ethnicity, actually provides more lucid insights into African people's subjective 
consciousnesses than many Marxist interpretations of the time. In fact, Webster himself 
provides a similar conceptualisation of the multiple layered nature of ethnicity in a later 
work. 103 The neo -Marxist 'turn' towards a less economic determinist approach enabled Mayer 
to appropriate its tenets. This possibly provided his work with more academic credibility. 
Meanwhile, the contribution of Anthropology to southern African studies in general was 
undergoing a crisis. 
2.3 Ethnicity on the Agenda: Marxian Scholarship, Consociationalism and the 
Subjective Nature of Ethnicity. 
The crisis of Anthropology in southern African studies during the 1970s received due 
academic attention in September 1980, with a conference held at Manchester, England. 104 
One of the main items on the agenda was to examine the problems faced by Anthropology, 
and to look for ways forward from this impasse. The meeting itself was attended by 
anthropologists and historians, from both liberal and radical political backgrounds. The 
organisers originally planned that a joint discussion between scholars of both disciplines would 
entail history coming 'to the rescue of anthropology'. 105 However, as Ranger and Murray state, 
102 D. Webster, 1981, p. 140. 
ina . __ See D. Webster, 'Ethnicity and Gender in a KwaZulu Border Community', in A. Spiegel and P. McAllister (eds), Tradition 
and Transition in Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1991. 
104 For a discussion of the main points of this conference, and for papers which emanated from it, see JSAS Vol 8 1981. This is 
not to suggest that this conference was the first to recognise the problems faced by the Anthropological discipline, but it does 
re resent one of the most interesting discussions concerning the issue in the southern African context. 103 T. Ranger and C. Murray, 'Introduction', ibid, p. 2. 
37 
this expectation proved simplistic: 'So far from being a debate between two disciplines, or 
from being a magnanimous rescue of one discipline by the other, the conference developed 
into a joint exploration of common problems and their possible remedies'. 106 
A particularly interesting paper presented at the conference vis-ä-vis ethnicity was that 
produced by the South African historian William Beinart. This study attempted to integrate the 
insights of anthropologists such as Mayer, with the perspectives of radical historiography. 
Beinart argues in this work that the categories identified 'by anthropologists such as Mayer 
deserve serious consideration from historians, for the tradition within which he works is 
sensitive to the way that people talk about themselves'. 107 At the conference itself Beinart 
commented that the work of Monica Hunter, (later Wilson), 'almost begins to make the people 
subjects of their own history'. 108 Beinart's own particular training as an historian perhaps 
explains this integrative approach. His postgraduate career was pursued under the auspices 
of Shula Marks at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. Marks emphasised 
African initiatives in the making of South African society to a greater degree than the neo- 
Marxist analysts of capital and state such as Wolpe. This emphasis is clearly evidenced in her 
own work regarding Zulu ethnic consciousness as early as 1977.109 Beinart's own work 
reflects much of this emphasis, particularly concerning rural African consciousness. This 
approach perhaps made him inclined to view the work of Mayer, with whom he also had 
considerable contact, in a more positive light than scholars such as Mafeje, Magubane and 
Alexander. Beinart also produced a paper for Mayer's 1980 edited work, although he was not 
personally involved in the Chamber of Mines' sponsored study from which the work 
emanated. 110 
Beinart makes several important observations regarding ethnic identifications in this article, 
especially regarding the relationships between ethnic consciousness and violence, migrant 
labour, chieftaincy and political economy. Similarly to Mayer, he also demonstrates that ethnic 
consciousness could work at several levels, linking the violence in Qumbu district, Transkei at 
the beginning of the twentieth century (with which his article is concerned) directly to the 
political ethnic mobilisation of earlier rural consciousnesses: 
Political action, including strategic use of violence, and 
consciousness also remained embedded in pre-colonial 
106 Ibid. 
107 W. Beinart, 'Conflict in Qumbu: Rural Consciousness, Ethnicity and Violence in the Colonial Transkei', in W. Beinart and 
C. Bundy (eds), Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa, London, 1987 (but originally published in the edition of JSAS 
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forms; the political processes and popular ideology 
surrounding the chieftaincy were of particular importance 
in the colonial period. It was through the chief that people 
conceived of their rights to land and access to communal 
resources. "' 
This was not to suggest that Beinart presumed these identities to exist in some primordial 
stasis. Rather he aimed to discover the changing 'form and trajectory of rural popular 
movements in the district without losing sight of the cultural roots and symbols of the 
communities in which they were based'. 112 This is highly suggestive of former, more 'passive', 
cultural identities articulating with politicised, mobilised, dynamic identities arising in response 
to the changing political climate and form of colonial exploitation. The similarities to Mayer are 
considerable, although much more firmly based in an historical context. The emphasis on 
African agency in the mobilisation of ethnic identities was pursued further by Beinart in a 1982 
work. Beinart here utilised a 'life-history' approach which lucidly demonstrated how ethnic, 
class and nationalist consciousness could all articulate without any clear-cut distinction 
between them. 113 Beinart thus placed ethnic identifications within their own subjective milieu, 
avoiding the teleological assumptions of such as Saul. He also situated his work firmly within 
an analysis of political economy and historical context, thus avoiding the short-comings of 
Mayer. African agency was placed firmly on the agenda. 
Other participants at the conference also made stimulating contributions regarding the state of 
anthropology. Mafeje interestingly argued that, while he no longer considered himself an 
anthropologist, a sensitive anthropological dimension was still required in South African 
historical studies. Ranger and Murray also record that, at the end of his presentation, he 
'noted somewhat mysteriously ... that "a difference is discernible between those radicals who 
have a background in anthropology and those who lack it"'. 114 This suggests that Mafeje 
perhaps still saw mileage in the insights that the anthropological discipline offered. 
Additionally, it implies that Mafeje did not adhere so strictly to the radical Marxist assumptions 
vis-ä-vis ethnicity which he so vehemently advocated in the early 1970s. Beinart has noted 
that Mafeje was already positing some sensitive observations with regard to the relationship 
between class and ideology by 1975, which were'not as dismissive of forms of consciousness 
111 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, Hidden Struggles, p. p. 108-109. 112_... 
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which seem(ed) to fail in expressing directly class positions'. ' 15 Indeed Mafeje could well have 
been recognising the value of his earlier anthropological research, such as the joint venture he 
undertook with Monica Wilson in the early 1960s which was more in the liberal anthropological 
tradition, but making wide use of materialist class analysis within that paradigm. This study, ' 16 
as with Mayer's works, provides a diverse array of examples regarding how social categories 
such as gender, age and kinship interact with ethnic affiliations. It is also interesting to note 
that Mayer provided personal assistance in the initial stages of this research, something that 
1might well have been anathema to the Mafeje of 1971. ýý 
All this is highly suggestive of the fact that, by the early 1980s, both History and Anthropology 
were searching for new ways to interpret the continuing survival of ethnic affiliations. There is 
also an interesting parallel between the debates raging amongst different academics and the 
hostilities felt between some ethnic groups themselves. Hostilities between ethnic groups 
often appear at their most vehement, with each group insisting on its own 'uniqueness', at 
exactly the time when the groups in question are in reality very similar. So it seems with the 
debate with regard to Anthropology. For, as has been illustrated, both liberal anthropologists 
and radical historians (not to mention historians from the liberal corner) were working towards 
similar theoretical reformulations of ethnicity (although in different contexts) at the exact 
moment that they were most vehemently dismissing the academic credibilities of each other. 
Of course, the particular nature of the South African regime of the time played a very 
important role in this division. However, the division was not confined to South Africa, and one 
can't help thinking that academics were attempting to forge distinctive theoretical identities at 
the time when many of their assumptions were in fact quite similar. 
These debates also demonstrated the recognition by academics that ethnicity was not simply 
going to 'die out' (although the debate with regard to liberal anthropology's credibility had 
considerably wider concerns as well). The events of Soweto had initially caused radical 
historians to focus on class and race as major divisive factors in South African society, 
whereas liberal and conservative political scientists turned to the literature on ethnicity 
emanating from the United States. Liberal political scientists had come to the conclusion that, 
far from there being an evolutionary progression towards a common society, an assumption 
commonly held by liberal scholars of various academic disciplines until Soweto, South Africa 
was actually a deeply divided heterogenous country, in terms of ethnic and cultural cleavages. 
Furthermore, they argued that this 'pluralist' society was divided further by the centralised 
nature of white minority government. 118 Liberal and conservative political scientists thus 
115 
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advocated consociationalist forms of 'power-sharing', in order to move away from the 
Westminster-style parliamentary system in South Africa. Glazer and Moynihan, United States- 
based social scientists who had been working in the field of ethnic studies for several years, 
were - indirectly - very influential in reformulating the liberal/conservative approach in the 
aftermath of Soweto. They argued that there had been a pronounced and sudden increase in 
tendencies 'by people in many countries and in many circumstances to insist on the 
significance of their group distinctiveness and identity and on new rights that derive from this 
character'. 119 In terms of the influence on South African liberal and conservative academics, it 
was the former's argument that these reformulations often occurred within a milieu of unequal 
state allocation of resources, with one ethnic group dominating control of the state and the rest 
competing unequally for the said resources, that was to have the greatest impact. 120 For this 
provided the theoretical justification for federal, consociational forms of power-sharing, in 
direct contrast to the democratic nationalism of such as the African National Congress (ANC). 
Marxian scholars argued that the divisive character of South African society was in the final 
analysis based on class, rather than ethnic, divisions, and although ethnicity itself did not 
become a significant field of research within radical scholarship until the 1990s, there were 
some seminal studies produced which argued that ethnic affiliations were not 'primordial', and 
articulated with class and other identities. Beinart's work is one example. This was followed 
by a collection of studies specifically concerned with ethnicity in Southern Africa, emanating 
from a conference held in 1983 at the University of Virginia. 
This set of works121, edited by Leroy Vail, has been portrayed as a significant reformulation of 
radical historiography's approach to the vexed question of ethnicity. 122 It echoes Glazer and 
Moynihan's hypothesis in so far as it generally portrays more contemporary ethnic movements 
as politicised, and significantly different from earlier forms of ethnic consciousness. 123 
However Vail, who attempted to draw the various contributions contained in the collection 
within a coherent theoretical framework, still argues in the final analysis for the primacy of 
class, rather than ethnic, identification per se, in determining the form that twentieth century 
ethnic movements took in southern Africa. 124 It is important to draw out here the change in 
approach to ethnicity that this work broached. Firstly, it is situated firmly within the 
'Instrumentalist' camp, arguing that twentieth century ethnic identifications are not simply a 
reformulated continuation of pre-colonial identities. Vail posits the assumption, common to 
119 N. Glazer and D. Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, New York, 1975. 120 Ibid, p. p. l 1-14. 
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much marxian analysis, that the uneven introduction of a capitalist, colonial economy, and the 
social, economic and political upheavals that this entailed, provided the historical 'fault-line' 
from which politicised, contemporary ethnicities emerged. The discovery of gold on the 
Witwatersrand in 1886, and the developing migrant labour system, are argued to be significant 
factors in the forming of these identities. 125 This is also argued to be the fundamental factor 
linking southern Africa as a region. Secondly, Vail argues that lower middle class, intellectual 
'culture-brokers' were a fundamental driving force in constructing reformulated ethnic 
identities. This situated twentieth century ethnic movements in the area firmly within the 
political sphere, much as Glazer and Moynihan did but with the inclusion of class analysis. In 
fact Vail discerns three variables in the construction of ethnic identities after the penetration of 
colonial capitalism: 
First... it was essential to have a group of intellectuals involved 
in formulating it... a group of culture brokers. Second, there was 
widespread use of African intermediaries to administer the 
subordinate peoples... this served to define the boundaries and 
texture of the new ideologies. Third, ordinary people had a real 
need for so-called `traditional values' at a time of rapid social 
change, thus opening the way for the wide acceptance of new 
ideologies. 126 
This theoretical model illustrates a third element of change in marxian historiographical 
accounts of ethnicity. For it takes into consideration the contribution of the mass of the 
southern African people in terms of ethnic construction. This allows it to avoid the pitfalls of 
approaches such as that of Mafeje, which tend to depict 'ordinary people as being credulous, 
blindly accepting the ethnic party line from their devious betters'. 127 
Vail's edited collection also illustrates the growing theoretical eclecticism which has also been 
demonstrated in other works regarding ethnicity in this period. There are probably a number 
of reasons for this. Firstly, the inability of earlier, less eclectic, approaches to construct an 
adequate explanatory paradigm vis-ä-vis the continuing flourishing of ethnic movements (both 
in South Africa and in a more global context). As such, his introduction to this collection 
represents a continuation of the move towards theoretical eclecticism so apparent in the 
studies mentioned above. Secondly, there appeared during the 1980s a number of influential 
works - primarily concerned with nationalism - but which also had a profound impact on 
scholars' approaches to the study of ethnicity. Vail's own acceptance of the possibility that 
125 Ibid, p. p. 7-10. 
126 Ibid, p. 11. 
127 Ibid, p. 5. 
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ordinary Africans could play a part in creating ethnic identities could well have been influenced 
by his reading of Horowitz and Giddens. In fact, Vail specifically acknowledges the influence 
of these two scholars on his theoretical approach. 128 
Both these authors arguably approached ethnicity from a somewhat 'primordialist' perspective 
during the 1980s, utilising psychological perspectives in their analyses. 129 Interestingly 
enough, Horowitz also displays similarities of approach to 'Pluralist' theory, including 
advocating a consociational solution to 'ethnic conflict' in South Africa. 130 The fact that a 
broadly Marxian work (although Vail himself is not a Marxist) can take on board some of the 
tenets of a 'Pluralist' approach suggests in itself the increased flexibility of radical scholarship. 
There are many problems with the approach of Horowitz which will be examined a little later. 
However, he does posit the assumption that ethnic mobilisation can emanate from 'below' as 
much as from 'above', thus implying that ordinary Africans are actively involved, and that 
intellectual 'culture-brokers' are not the only element participating in its construction. The 
difference between this conceptualisation, and that posited by Vail, is that, although Vail 
accepts active participation by ordinary Africans in the creation of ethnic identities (and it is 
probable that the theories of Horowitz influenced this assumption), he does not, as illustrated 
by his theoretical model quoted above, believe this is the primary factor. Instead, he places 
great emphasis on the importance of middle-class intellectual 'culture-brokers' in creating 
ethnic ideologies. This also contrasts with the earlier studies of Mayer, who placed far more 
emphasis on the active agency of 'ordinary' people in shaping their own consciousnesses and 
identities in the wake of colonial and capitalist penetration. 
The stress placed by Marxist social historians in the late 1980s on the importance of this 
social and economic group has much to do with the specific nature of southern African ethnic 
identities, and their specific historical context. Works such as Hobsbawm and Ranger's 
'Invention of Tradition'131 stressed the recently 'invented' nature of supposedly ancient 
customs and traditions, and Ranger's chapter within this edited collection argued for the 
influence of colonial Europeans iri 'inventing' customs within their African colonies in order to 
perpetuate their rule. Furthermore, African intellectual culture-brokers often upheld these 
'inventions' in order to pursue their own private, self-interested agendas. The invention of 
'tribes' was very much part of this contested ideological arena as far as Ranger was 
concerned. Ranger's contribution to the work also emphasised the politicisation of identities 
through the impact of colonialism. As he later remarks, the work posited the assumption that 
128 _.. __ lbid, p. 18. 179 
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African identities 'of 'tribe', gender and generation were all bounded by the rigidities of 
invented tradition'. 132 This codified ossification of identities, including invented 'tribal' ones, 
was especially relevant to South Africa, whose indigenous population not only had to face the 
imposition of colonial divide-and-rule policies, which involved the 'invention' of 'tribal' 
categories, but also the later 'Homelands' policy of the apartheid regime, which additionally 
attempted to impose invented 'ethnic' identities from 'above'. There can be little doubt that 
Ranger's study thus had a considerable influence on Vail. 
The articles contained within Vail's edited collection also demonstrate a greater diversity of 
approach towards the study of ethnic identities than his introduction allows. Bekker criticises 
Vail for utilising the word 'Tribalism' in the title of the work in question, in spite of arguing within 
his introduction that ethnic identities should not be condemned wholesale as a reactionary, 
divisive force: 133 
That the term tribalism is pejorative in contemporary South 
African society is without doubt. By using it, these scholars 
signal moral judgement, perhaps even condemnation of these 
ethnic communities and their particularistic values. In choosing 
this title, Vail disregarded his own admonishment that condemn 
-ation would 'accomplish very little . 
134 
Bekker's term 'these scholars' refers to the studies of ethnic identities within South Africa 
carried out by Shula Marks, Hugh MacMillan and Jeff Peires, as well as Leroy Vail himself. 
Bekker continues to criticise them for their 'disparaging' accounts of the ethnic identities with 
which they are concerned, in contrast to what they perceive as a broader, more democratic 
and all-embracing South African nationalism. 735 There is some substance to this criticism. For 
these scholars do not deconstruct the democratic nationalist paradigm with which they 
counterpoise the ethnic identities that form the basis of their studies. They still seem to portray 
politicised ethnic identities primarily as obstacles to the progression of democratic nationalism. 
However, it is questionable that there is a monopoly on the interpretation of what constitutes 
democratic nationalism. This is a highly contentious field in South Africa, as any criticism of 
the ANC's democratic approach could be deemed to be an advocation of consociationalism. 
Indeed, Horowitz does support this viewpoint and for this should be criticised (see below). 
132 T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited', p. 6. 133 L. Vail, The Creation of Tribalism, p. 2, p. 17, p. 18. 134 S. Bekker, Ethnicity in Focus, p. 88. This criticism seems partially unjustified. Vail was accepting the reality of politicised 
ethnicity, not attempting to avoid the issue. However it is interesting that the original version of the collection was entitled 
'The Political Economy of Ethnicity'. 135 Ibid, p"p. 87-8. 
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Bekker also portrays implicit tendencies towards this approach in his critique of Marxian works 
on ethnicity. Nevertheless, it does seem valid to criticise these studies for portraying ethnicity 
in a somewhat one-dimensional sense. They constantly posit the assumption that ethnic 
mobilisation from colonialism onwards is in the final analysis a created, intellectual construct 
from 'above', which is adhered to by the mass of the people due to the traumas of colonialism, 
capitalist penetration, and the social, political, and economic upheavals that these entailed. 
Vail himself can be criticised in another sense. His introduction gives the impression that the 
individual contributions within his edited collection represent similar points of view. This is 
especially the case with his contention that ethnic identities from the impact of colonialism 
onwards are political constructs from 'above', which are fundamentally divisive. However, 
there are marked variations of approach between these various works, and different 
emphases are placed on different aspects of ethnic identification by the various scholars 
concerned. Gendered aspects of ethnicity are one important example, and this will be 
discussed in the next section. Ranger's article on the creation of 'Manyika' ethnic identity 
also demonstrates that not all the scholars who contributed to the said volume viewed ethnic 
identities as solely an ideology constructed through political self-interest. 136 Ranger's piece 
owes an intellectual debt to Benedict Anderson. Anderson argues that the principal material 
precondition for nationalism is commercial printing on a widespread scale - 'print-capitalism'. 
This spreads the idea of the nation and the ideology of nationalism, through the 
standardisation of languages and the dissemination of nationalist ideology. In this way, 
nations could be 'imagined'. This influenced many scholars involved in the study of 
nationalism, and also penetrated many studies of ethnicity. 137 The stress placed by Ranger 
on missionary standardisation of language in his work clearly reflects the ideas of Anderson. 
Anderson had put ideology into the forefront of radical scholarship, moving away from a solely 
materialist-based analysis, and illustrating the importance of language codification in terms of 
establishing broader forms of 'imagined' identities. 
Ranger also posits the argument that ethnic identities need not degenerate into politicised 
ideologies, but can represent constructive responses to socio-economic change. 138 He 
comments that ethnic identifications work at several levels, and that they can be reformulated 
from 'below' as well as from 'above'. 139 This is perhaps something which is not taken fully into 
account in Vail's introduction. Vail states the following with regard to the study of ethnicity: 
136 T. Ranger, 'Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika: The Invention of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe', in L. Vail, The Creation of 
Tribalism, p. p. 118-151. Ranger's changing approaches to ethnic identities are explored in more detail in chapter 4. 137 For an example situated in the South African context see I. Hofineyer, 'Building a Nation From Words: Afrikaans 
Language, Literature and Ethnic Identity, 1902-1924', in S. Marks and S. Trapido, The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism 138 -- 1. Ranger, 'Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika', p. 146. 1,9 
'-- See especially his comments on 'Manyika' migrant labourers, ibid, p. p. 137-41. 
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It is thus only common sense to accept that no one explanation 
suffices to `explain' it wholly and in every instance. But it is plainly 
inadequate merely to accept that all interpretations have some 
elements of truth within them and then try to cobble them together 
into an intellectual construct comprising elements of each. 140 
One can't help thinking that, to a certain extent, Vail is guilty of the same process of 'cobbling 
together' of which he is so critical. 
There were other new approaches to the study of ethnicity in southern Africa in the 1980s 
which partially deviated from the conceptual route mapped by Vail. Heribert Adam, a 
sociologist based in the United States, and Hermann Giliomee, a liberal Afrikaner historian, 
produced a comprehensive analysis of Afrikaner ethnicity in 1979.141 Like Saul, this heralded a 
break from the then dominant materialist analyses of ethnicity, but this time from a sociologist 
working from a broadly Weberian perspective, and a liberal historian (who nevertheless, 
stressed the importance of class analysis). This particular study was one of the first to stress 
the importance of psychological factors with regard to Afrikaner ethnicity, set within a 
materialist perspective. Giliomee in fact later contributed a paper to Vail's collection. 142 The 
1979 work represents a seminal break from the liberal mainstream with regard to the study 
South African ethnicity at the time. Another important set of studies, although not solely with 
regard to ethnicity, were those produced by the Comaroffs, especially in the 1980s. 143 The 
focus on consciousness in these analyses reinforces the concept of ethnicity consisting of a 
144 state of mind. 
2.4 Psychology, Anthropology, Gender and Ethnicity. 
The insights of psychology attracted the attention of many scholars concerned with the study 
of ethnicity in this period. Horowitz's use of psychology has already been referred to briefly. 
There is much similarity in some of Horowitz's insights to those made by Gulliver in the 
1960s. 145 However, Horowitz takes Gulliver's recognition of the importance of symbolism 
further, in the context of criticising solely materialist analyses of ethnic identities. He argues 
140_ 
_. .. - L. Vail, The Creation of Tribalism, p. 7. 141 
H. Adam and H. Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilised: Can South Africa Change? New Haven, 1979. 
142 H. Giliomee, `The Beginnings of Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness, 1850-1915'in L. Vail, The Creation of Tribalism, p. p. 21- 
55. 
143 See especially the following: J. Comaroff, Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South 
African People. Chicago, 1985; J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and 
Consciousness in South Africa. Chicago, 1991. 
144 Aspects of some of these studies will be explored in later chapters, especially in the context of the importance of subjective 
consciousness in the formation of ethnic identity. 145 See chapter 1. 
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that just because educated elites make use of ethnic antipathy for their own economic 
purposes 'does not mean that ethnic conflict is primarily about jobs and requisites. The elites 
could not use the antipathy for their own ends unless ethnic feeling were already strong'. 146 
If Horowitz is right, this suggests that ethnic mobilisation is controlled as much from 'below' as 
it is from 'above'. It also suggests that there is more than one level of ethnic identification, with 
symbolism providing an equal motivating force to that of materialism. This contrasts with the 
work of Abner Cohen who recognised the importance of symbolic factors, but argued that they 
were contingent on materialist ones. 147 It also suggests that elite manipulation of ethnic 
identities can only gain mass support when their materialist aims articulate with the symbolic 
aims of the mass of the people. 
The psychology of symbolism influenced several anthropological works in the 1970s, thus 
presaging that of Horowitz. Epstein's 1978 study provides a particularly interesting 
example. 148 He criticises both earlier anthropological works for overemphasising perceived 
'cultural' aspects of ethnicity, and later social scientific approaches (such as that of Glazer and 
Moynihan) who he argues place too much stress on the political dimension. 149 He states that it 
is necessary to take into account what he terms the cognitive and affective dimensions of 
ethnic identification, arguing that ethnic affiliations are not based solely in rationality. 150 This is 
in stark contrast to the studies contained in Vail's collected edition, and especially Vail's own 
introduction which views ethnic mobilisation as rooted virtually entirely in rational objectives. 
Epstein comments that ethnic affiliations need to be understood in both their individual and 
communal manifestations. 151 Other established anthropologists also turned to the insights 
offered by psychology in the 1970s, including Phillip Mayer. 152 The importance of symbolism in 
ethnic mobilisation is also a central tenet of the work of Anthony Smith. Smith provides just 
one example of the rash of scholars involved with the study of nationalism who also influenced 
works concerned with that of ethnicity in the 1980s/early 1990s. 153 Smith takes a markedly 
different approach to such as Anderson with regard to the origins of nationalism. He argues 
146 
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that nations are not modern phenomena, but have their roots in earlier ethnic origins. 154 
Furthermore, symbolism is integral to their survival. 
There is more than a hint of primordialism in Smith's approach, and psychological approaches 
in general could arguably be said to reinforce apartheid ideology in the context of South Africa. 
The problem with a psychological approach is that it could suggest that ethnic groups differ 
fundamentally between themselves somehow, and that a pluralist, consociational society is 
the only way that they will live together without conflict. Horowitz takes this angle. 155 This 
begs the question, however, of exactly whose interests are being represented by politicised 
'ethnic' movements. For example, it is questionable that Inkatha and Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
represent the interests of many Zulus. 158 Horowitz fails to distinguish fully the various levels of 
ethnic identification in his consociational model, merely stressing the ossified, ideological level. 
Ranger, in contrast, does see positive aspects to ethnic mobilisation (as illustrated above). 
The problem with his approach, like that of Saul earlier, is that it tends to stress a 
'modernisation' model of sorts: 
Manyika identity arose... not... as the fruit of megalomaniac 
tribalism but as a very human and often constructive 
response to socio-economic change, a response however 
that now needs to be replaced by the development of other 
kinds of consciousness. 157 
Fields, in a different context, has argued for a more relativist approach to African 
consciousness. She states that historical researchers 'must reconstruct the horizon within 
which historical subjects thought and acted. r158 The attempt to recognise ethnic consciousness 
within its own specific context, and to perceive it as a state of mind, would perhaps avoid 
'modernisation' approaches which dismiss ethnic identities as atavistic to various degrees or, 
worse, consociational models which advocate apartheid by the back-door in some respects. 
Another issue which began to emerge in the late 1980s was the gendered nature of ethnic 
identities. As mentioned earlier, anthropological approaches in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
had already implicitly demonstrated this. However radical historians, due to the political 
controversies surrounding ethnicity, had not developed these insights. t59 Marks, Butler and 
154 A. Smith, The Ethnic origins of Nations. . 11 ISS 
V. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? I 56 
'-- See chapter 5. 
157 -- T. Ranger, 'Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika', in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, p. 146. iSR 
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Harries - in their respective contributions to Vail's work - begin to address this aspect of 
ethnicity, again demonstrating the differing approaches amongst the various contributions to 
this work, which Vail failed to recognise. There are also important differences between these 
approaches to gender. Marks demonstrates how women are discriminated against in her 
historical analysis of Zulu ethnicity. 160 However, by focusing solely on the politicised aspects of 
ethnic identification, she portrays women as reactive rather than proactive agents in the 
construction of ethnic ideologies. In contrast Butler, in his analysis of Afrikaner ethnicity in the 
first half of the twentieth century, demonstrates how Afrikaner women could carve out a 
circumscribed, positive identity for themselves, which straddled both the cultural sphere to 
which women were relegated, and the political sphere, which remained the domain of men. 161 
The work of Anthias and Yuval-Davis considerably developed concepts of womens' roles in 
ethnic movements, constructing a theoretical framework with which to analyse gendered 
aspects of its nature . 
162 They implicitly develop Butler's line of analysis, demonstrating that 
women were often involved in the contested construction of ethnic identity formation. 
However, the gendered nature of ethnicity was only beginning to receive serious attention by 
the late 1980s, especially in South Africa. 163 It seems reasonable to state that a return to the 
insights offered by earlier anthropological works would further the analysis of this aspect of 
ethnicity. 
160 S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness', p. p. 215-41, in L. Vail, 
The Creation of Tribalism, p. p. 215-241. 161 J. Butler, 'Afrikaner Women and the Creation of Ethnicity in a Small South African Town, 1902-1950', p. p. 55-82, in L. 
Vail, The Creation of Tribalism, p. p. 55-82. 162- ... V. Anthias and N. Yuval-Davis, Women-Nation-State, London, 1989. 16 
-" See also chapters 7 and 8. 
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3. FROM MORAL ETHNICITY TO POLITICAL TRIBALISM: ' PERIODISING TWENTIETH 
CENTURY SOUTH AFRICAN ETHNICITY, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE 
EASTERN CAPE. I 
As the title suggests, this chapter periodises twentieth century South African ethnic identities 
utilising the Eastern Cape as a primary example. It attempts to provide a theoretical paradigm 
with which to analyse the development of South African ethnicity, and to periodise these 
identities within the structure of this framework. There is an element of artificiality about the 
periodisation, as the ethnic constructions mentioned could - and did - overlap. However, there 
seems to be a broad pattern of development which this form of periodisation captures. 
Emphasis is deliberately placed on the Eastern Cape for two reasons. Firstly it allows a 
further examination of the work of Iona and Phillip Mayer who lived and worked in the region 
for a number of years? Although not primarily concerned with studying ethnicity, they were 
very much involved in analysing aspects of the day to day consciousness of the eastern Cape 
population, especially in terms of gender, generational differences and identities forged 
through the process of migrant labour. As different forms of identity are inextricably 
intertwined with the formation of ethnic consciousness their work is particularly useful, 
especially as the Mayers allow Africans 'to speak for themselves', thus avoiding schematic, 
structural analyses. Secondly the 'Red'/'School' divide amongst the Xhosa-speaking 
population, with which much of the Mayers' work is concerned, provides particular insights into 
the nature of moral ethnicity. The chapter seeks to outline a theoretical model rather than 
analysing changing identities in detail. Specific aspects of each period will be analysed in 
greater depth in the following chapters. 
By drawing primarily upon the Eastern Cape material, but with reference to other areas in 
South Africa, it is argued that three main periods of ethnic identity mobilisation can be 
discerned through the twentieth century: late nineteenth and early twentieth century ethnic 
mobilisation over land and rural resources; ethnicised identities formed in the context of the 
mid-twentieth century mining industry; the manipulation of ethnicity by the apartheid state 
through its policy of 'separate development', especially from 1960 onwards. A fourth period, 
involving the intertwining of shack city and hostel worker militarisation and ethnic identities in 
the 1980s/early 1990s, is discussed in later chapters. Migrant labour and apartheid social 
engineering are shown to be central factors in the changing nature of these ethnicised 
The terms 'moral ethnicity' and 'political tribalism' have been taken from J. Lonsdale's and B. Berman's book Unhappy 
Valley; Conflict in Kenya and Africa. Book 2, Violence and Ethnicity. London, 1992. Also see J. Lonsdale, 'Moral Ethnicity 
and Political Tribalism', in P. Kaarsholm and J. Hultin (eds) Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism. International Development Studies Occasional Paper No 11, Roskilde 
University, Denmark, 1994. 
2 See chapters 1 and 2. 
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identities. Pre-colonial identity formation is also argued to have affected the particular ways 
that twentieth century ethnic identities have been constructed, providing the cultural building 
blocks upon whcih these later identities were founded. Of fundamental importance is an 
attempt to illustrate the shift from fluid, 'popular-democratic' identities, mobilised around moral 
ethnicity, to the ossified, elite political tribalism which emerged from the discourses inherent in 
moral ethnicity. The moral ethnicity-political tribalism paradigm is thus outlined in the initial 
section. 
3.1 Claiming Back the Land: The Ethnic Component of Rural Mobilisation in Early 
Twentieth Century South Africa. 
In his analysis of Kikuyu identity during the Mau Mau rebellion in 1950s colonial Kenya, 
Lonsdale argues that ethnic identity was the reverse of what it is often said to be-unthinking 
conformity. Rather, 'common ethnicity was the arena for the sharpest social and political 
division'. Lonsdale perceives this form of moral ethnic debate as originating from the 
penetration of colonial capitalism. He argues that pre-colonial African society was bonded 
together in a type of 'moral economy', which ensured that any individual accumulation of 
wealth simultaneously incurred social obligations: 'rich and poor had duties to each other; 
patronage had to earn its service'. 5 However with the impact of colonialism and capitalism, this 
form of social cohesion became subverted or distorted, causing people to question its validity. 
Big men might become official chiefs and thus careless of 
their clients; but weaker members of society, poor men and 
women generally, might also aquire unprecedented bargain- 
ing power by engaging in wage-work elsewhere or by going 
to school. These new social competitions fostered new 
arguments about what forms of achievement made one a 
good member of the local community. Competition in comm- 
unity service harked back to the social morality of an imagin- 
atively more virtuous, and thus communalistic, past. 6 
The divisions and cleavages wrought by colonialism and capitalism were thus inter-and intra- 
ethnic in nature. 
3 Lonsdale's theoretical paradigm does in fact allow for a theoretical periodisation of ethnic identities. There are problems 
with their analysis, but their framework does provide a basis for the theoretical approach developed in this chapter and 
throughout the rest of the thesis. 4 J. Lonsdale, `Moral Ethnicity', p. p. 138-139. 5 Ibid, p. 139. 
6 Ibid. 
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Just as moral ethnicity was socially constructed in debate 
about honour - between, say, unlettered polygynous elders 
in round huts and monogamous teachers in square houses, 
between 'red' and 'school' people as they say in South Africa 
- so, too, there has been dispute as to who can best 'speak 
for the tribe' in the political arena where large constituencies 
count. ' 
Lonsdale refers to this latter manifestation of ethnic identity as political tribalism, and argues 
that it is this form of ethnic consciousness, emanating from the colonial invention of 'tribes', 
that translated the principled political argument of moral ethnicity 'into unprincipled faction' .8 
Despite some short-comings, Lonsdale's theoretical paradigm reinforces the periodisation of 
ethnic identities below and integrates with much of the anthropological work of the Mayers in 
the eastern Cape context. 
The divisions which arose between Mfengu and Xhosa peoples from the late nineteenth 
century onwards can be viewed through the prism of the moral ethnicity/political tribalism 
model, when suitably adjusted to take account of local conditions and events. Until 
comparatively recently the historiography concerned with nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Mfengu and Xhosa identities, and nineteenth century Eastern Cape history in general, 
has been based on the assumption that the Mfengu were originally several distinct clans who 
fled Zululand at the time of the Mfecane and settled in the Eastern Cape under Xhosa 
patronage. The Xhosa peoples, who themselves consisted of several distinct chieftaincies, 
had lived in the area for much longer, being descended from the first Bantu-speaking people 
who inhabited the area. 9 According to these versions of Eastern Cape history, the Mfengu 
deserted their Xhosa patrons and sought colonial protection in 1835, during one of several 
wars between the British colonial power and Xhosa peoples. This led to the preferential 
treatment of the Mfengu by the colonial administration in terms of land allocation and access 
to education. 10 The Mfengu also tended to accept Christian doctrine to a far greater extent 
than Xhosa peoples at this time, thus endearing them further in the eyes of the colonial power, 
who viewed them as erstwhile allies against the Xhosa. 
7 Ibid, p. 140. 
9 Ibid, p. p. 140-141. 
9 See for example the following: L. Switzer, Power and Resistance in an African Society: The Ciskei Xhosa and the Making 
of South Africa, London, 1993; P. Mayer, "The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', in P. Mayer (ed), 
Black Villagers in an Industrial Society: Anthropological Perspectives on Labour Migration in South Africa, Cape Town, 
1980; C. Manona, 'Ethnic Relations in the Ciskei', in N. Charton (ed), Ciskei: A South African Homeland, London, 1980; R. 
Moyer, 'Some Current Manifestations of Early Mfengu History', Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar 
Papers, Vol 3,1971; J. Peires, 'Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnicity in the Ciskei', in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in 
Southern Africa, London, 1989. 
10 But see J. Thompson, 'Mission among the Kaffirs and Fingoes of Southern Africa', PR 1615,1854, Rhodes University, 
South Africa. This pamphlet contains a letter from a Reverend James Laing, dated 8th December 1853, which suggests, in the 
area around Lovedale at least, Xhosa peoples sometimes upheld the value of mission education more than Mfengu. 
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This version of Mfengu/Xhosa history has recently been vehemently attacked by historians 
influenced by the work of Julian Cobbing. 11 In short, they have argued that the supposed Natal 
origins of the Mfengu is a myth. In reality the Mfengu were mostly opportunistic Xhosa military 
collaborators, and the colonial power perpetuated the myth of freeing Mfengu from Xhosa 
'bondage' in order to complete their subjugation of Xhosa peoples and to disguise their 
aggression as philanthropy. 12 It is important to take account of both these versions of Eastern 
Cape history as, if the latter interpretation is accepted, ethnic identities are virtually solely the 
preserve of twentieth century ethnic culture brokers, allowing little in terms of moral ethnic 
debate emanating from 'below'. 
Nevertheless whichever version is accepted, there is little doubt that Xhosa and Mfengu 
identities were mobilised in terms of access to land and rural resources from the mid- 
nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. For rural communities throughout the Eastern Cape 
region, ethnic identification 'could be an integral part of the way in which they defined 
themselves both from each other and from the pressures imposed in colonisation'. 13 
Additionally these identities waxed and waned in tandem with changing political, social and 
economic circumstances over time. The expropriation of land by the British colonial power led 
to a divide amongst many African peoples which can roughly be perceived in terms of 
'modernisers' and 'traditionalists', and which often translated itself in an ethnicised manner. If 
conventional historiography is accepted, the second wave of immigrants into the Cape, 
including the Mfengu, could gain from allying themselves with the British. The Mfengu had 
attached themselves to more wealthy Xhosa men as clients soon after their arrival, which 
eventually might have led to assimilation into the host group. However, in 'the short time 
between the Mfengus' arrival and their British-sponsored exodus to the Ciskei, they could not 
have achieved a position which they felt deeply committed to defend; they were ready to listen 
to British overtures promising them land of their own and to missionaries offering them help'. 14 
Nevertheless, significant inter-marriage did occur between Mfengu and Xhosa peoples, if 
evidence from British settlers and colonial administrators is accepted. For example Colonel 
11 Cobbing has argued that African migration and state formation in the 1810s and 1820s was caused by the illegal activities of 
colonial slave raiders who covered up their operations by claiming that the Zulu kingdom under Shaka had caused these 
disruptions. He thus claims that the Mfecane was a myth perpetuated to justify white supremacy by portraying blacks as 
inherently violent. See J. Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on the Battles of Dithakong and Mbolompo', JAH, Vol 
29,1988, and 'A Tainted Well: The Objectives, Historical Fantasies and Working Methods of James Stuart, wth Counter- 
Argument, Journal of Natal and Zulu History, Vol 11,1988. 12 See for example, A. Webster, 'Land Expropriation and Labour Extraction Under Cape Colonial Rule: The War of 1835 and 
the 'Emancipation' of the Fingo', MA Thesis, Rhodes University, South Africa, 1991; T. Stapleton, 'Oral Evidence in a 
Pseudo-Ethnicity: the Fingo Debate', unpublished personal copy; T. Stapleton, 'Gathering Under the Milkwood Tree: The 
Development of Mfengu Tribalism in the Eastern Cape (1878-1978), unpublished personal copy. Stapleton's articles are due to 
be published at the time of writing. 13 W. Beinart, 'Conflict in Qumbu: Rural Consciousness, Ethnicity and Violence in the Colonial Transkei', in W. Beinart and 
C. Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa, London, 1987, p. 108. 14 P. Mayer, 'The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', p. p. 9-10. This interpretation broadly corresponds 
with the interpretations of the historians mentioned in footnote 9. 
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Bisset, who had served as a quarter-master general for many years in the Eastern Cape 
region, argued during a Select Committee enquiry into cattle thefts in 1863 that it was virtually 
impossible to distinquish culturally between Mfengu and Xhosa peoples: 
(T)here used to be a slight difference. You could tell a Fingo 
formerly by a large hole in his ear... (B)ut... (t)he great distinction 
there used to be has worn out... They are perfectly one nation. 
Their language is the same, with but a few expressions differing. 15 
Other informants to this committee commented in a similar fashion, suggesting that Mfengu 
and Xhosa identities were at the time fluid and processual. 16 
It could be argued that this reinforces recent revisions of nineteenth century Eastern Cape 
history, in that this evidence suggests Xhosa and Mfengu identities could be 'situationally 
selected'17 at times when it was socially, economically and politically advantageous to do so. 
However, the considerable confusion of the informants to this Select Committee suggests 
otherwise. The Committee concerned directed much of its attention to the perceived 'threat' 
from Africans both in terms of cattle theft and possible military resistance. Therefore some of 
the recorded evidence centred implicitly and explicitly around whether it was appropriate to 
promote 'tribal' identities or encourage 'detribalisation'. Bisset implicitly took the view that 
detribalisation should be promoted. When asked whether he considered colonial land 
expropriation could be a major factor in inciting further military conflicts with African peoples in 
the area, He replied firmly in the negative, placing far more emphasis on African socialisation 
processes and concepts of manhood: 
(1)t would arise more from that feeling of restlessness a Kafir 
always has; and, besides, without a war no young man can 
become an 'amadoda' - that is, a warrior. He must distinguish 
himself in war, otherwise he is only a boy ('quanqua) till he has 
had a fght 18 
He further argues that Mfengu peoples had similar 'war-like compulsions'. 19 He concludes by 
arguing vehemently for the complete destruction of African customs, or removal of the African 
15 Evidence of Colonel Bisset to the Select Committee on Cattle Thefts, July 1863, 'Cape of Good Hope. The Report and 
Proceedings of the Committee of the Legislative Council on Cattle Thefts'. Cape Parliamentary Papers, C4,1863. 16 Ibid. Evidence of W. Stanton, Military Contract Supplier, p. 38, p. 40-41, p. 49; G. Wood, Colonial Administrator and 
Farmer, p. 61-62, p. 63; S. Cawood, Military Contract Supplier and Farmer, p. 53, p. 59. 17 This phrase is borrowed from A. P. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester, 1958. See chapter 1 for 
an outline of this concept. 19 Evidence of Colonel Bisset, Select Committee on Cattle-Thefts, p. 16. 19 Ibid. 
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population beyond the border of the colony? ° Other respondents took the view that 'tribal' 
identities should be promoted? ' 
The confusion and lack of clarity and consensus amongst the respondents, all of whom had 
lived for a considerable time in the colony, does not suggest some grand colonial conspiracy 
to artificially create a Mfengu identity in order to perpetuate colonial rule and expropriate 
African communal land. The fact that all the respondents refer constantly to the categories 
'Fingo' and 'Kafir', 2 whilst additionally mentioning that it was difficult to distinguish between 
the two, also contradicts this recent historical revisionism. This is not to suggest that the 
colonial power really did facilitate the release of Mfengu peoples from Xhosa servitude. This 
colonial and missionary based propaganda has for a long time been dismissed by historians. 23 
There was also rivalry between the two peoples due to Mfengu cooperation with the colonial 
forces, as is evidenced below. However, as Switzer argues, it is difficult to believe that 
thousands of Xhosa, however desparate, would have converted to a new Mfengu identity 
virtually overnight in 1835, and the amount of African oral evidence for the existence of a 
Mfengu identity also suggests that it could not just be a figment of the colonial imagination 24 
Nevertheless the fact that there was inter-mingling of the two peoples does imply that a 
reformulation of identities was occuring. Intra-ethnic, as well as inter-ethnic, debates had 
been initiated in terms of what values best represented 'Xhosa-ness' or 'Mfengu-ness', the 
essence of moral ethnicity. Uneven colonial and capitalist penetration, and subsequent land 
expropriation had led to people mobilising around particularist rural, ethnicised identities in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As such, these identities were often centred around 
the institution of the chieftaincy. Furthermore by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning 
of the twentieth centuries, the advantages gained by communities such as the Mfengu through 
allying with the colonial power had begun to dissipate, as most African resistance had been 
effectively crushed, and therefore there was less need for these alliances. This led to a 
certain demoralisation amongst these latter communities at the same time as a renaissance of 
identity, often centred around the institution of the chieftaincy, occured amongst communities 
who had inhabited areas of the Eastern Cape before the upheavals of the Mfecane. 25 
20 mid, p. 19. 71 
-' One respondent argued for the deliberate promotion of 'tribal' rivalries in order to subvert the perceived threat of combined 
Mfengu/Xhosa military resistance to the colonial power.: Evidence of W. Stanton, p. 49, ibid. For further implied suggestions 
that encouraging 'tribalism' would be an advantageous move for the colony see p. 40, p. 53, p. 59. 
These were the colonial terms for Mfengu and Xhosa respectively. 23 All the historians mentioned in footnotes 9,11 and 12 dismiss this form of colonial historical misrepresentation and provide 
comprehensive empirical evidence to justify this, by now, moribund debate. 24 
L. Switzer, Power and Resistance, p. 60. 7S 
"" For examples in early twentieth century Transkei and surrounding areas see W. Beinart 'Conflict in Qumbu' and 
'Amafelandawonye (The Diehards): Popular Protest and Women's Movements in Herschel District in the 1920s', in Hidden 
Struggles. For examples in Natal see S. Marks, 'Natal, the Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation', JSAS, Vol 4, 
Nol, 1977, and S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth 
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This can be related to the moral ethnicity/political tribalism model. In the context of the 
Eastern Cape it is useful to return to the historiographical debate above regarding Mfengu 
origins. The proponents of the revisionist view, due to the fact that they perceive the Mfengu 
to be virtually the sole creation of the British colonial power and Xhosa opportunists, portray 
early twentieth century Mfengu ethnicity very much in the politically tribalist mode. Arguments 
for a synthesis between cultural categories and ethnicised identities, emanating from the 
people themselves, have little room in their analysis. Stapleton's work is a case in point. He 
has recently examined the development of Mfengu identity between the years 1878 and 
1978.26 His periodisation of Mfengu ethnic identity development mirrors that outlined above. 
He refers to the mineral discoveries and rapid conquest of all the remaining independent 
African states in the late nineteenth century as a significant moment in Mfengu identity, with 
African allies now an obsolete item in the colonial agenda. Following in the footsteps of Vail, 
to whom he specifically refers, Stapleton argues that Mfengu ethnic culture brokers 
'responded to this fall from grace by reinventing and reinforcing the Mfengu identity from within 
the community itself? ' Emphasis is placed upon the role of early African Nationalists such as 
J. T. Jabavu and D. D. T. Jabavu in fostering Mfengu 'tribalism'. 
D. D. T. Jabavu's contributions to Mfengu identity are examined in more detail in chapter nine, 
where I take issue with Stapleton's caricature of him. Far from being an ardent proponent of 
Mfengu political tribalism, D. D. T. Jabavu seems to promote a particular version of early 
African nationalism, rooted in selective African traditionalism. This did not mean that he in any 
way promoted tribalist tendencies-for political self-interest or otherwise. However, his 
particular version of African nationalism, rooted as it was in the Christian doctrine to which 
many Mfengu adhered, could be misunderstood to represent Mfengu 'tribalist' tendencies. In 
this contest, as chapter nine illustrates, Jabavu was a man of his time. In the first decades of 
the twentieth century there was not such a big difference between elite African nationalists 
and ordinary Africans. Value systems and identities were far more blurred and ambiguous 
than is often portrayed by some historians. 
Stapleton's study is centred very much around the activities of elite culture brokers of the time, 
and their political machinations. He focuses on several issues such as the creation of 'Fingo 
Emancipation Day' in 1907, the re-writing of Mfengu history by ethnic culture brokers in order 
to promote Mfengu identity and supposedly emphasise Mfengu superiority over Xhosa 
peoples, and the artificial construction of Mfengu chieftaincies in order to retain access to land 
Century Natal, London, 1986. Also see D. James, 'A Question of Ethnicity: Ndzundza Ndebele in a Lebowa Village', 
JSAS, Vol 16, No 1,1990. 
26 T. Stapleton, 'Gathering Under the Milkwood Tree', passim. 27 Ibid, p. 5. The reference to Vail is on p. 3. See chapter 2 for a critique of Vail's assumptions, which can also be applied to 
Stapleton in some respects, although Stapleton pursues a much more fundamentalist African nationalist line. 
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and a relatively privileged position vis-a-vis Xhosa peoples 28 Whilst there is an element of 
truth in his argument, Stapleton places far too much emphasis on elite political machinations. 
Ethnicity is viewed solely as a constructed ideology, with little reference to the meaning of 
'Mfengu' and 'Xhosa' to the bulk of the people concerned at the subjective, emotional level. 
Social and economic changes were significant factors in reformulating Xhosa and Mfengu 
identities in this period, but these changes were often translated by the bulk of the people 
concerned in cultural terms. Qumbu District in the Transkei provides a lucid example. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Qumbu district experienced divisions 
which partially mirrored those experienced earlier in the Eastern Cape. Rivalry between 
immigrant Mfengu and Hlubi communities on the one hand, and Mpondomise groups on the 
other centred very much around the question of access to land and this rivalry often 
translated itself in ethnicised conflict. Land had been taken from the Mpondomise in the late 
nineteenth century and given to the Mfengu and Hlubi. This was due to the fact that Mhlonhlo, 
chief of the Mpondomise, had rebelled against colonial authority in 1880, whilst the immigrants 
had remained loyal to the government 29 The nineteenth century 'frontier' wars in the Eastern 
Cape also centred around concepts of resistance to, and cooperation with, the colonial 
authorities. As in Qumbu, the Mfengu communities cooperated with the colonialists in quelling 
Xhosa resistance, despite considerable inter-marriage between Xhosa and Mfengu peoples, 
and land was redistributed in favour of the Mfengu for their cooperation. Similar divides 
occured in late nineteenth century Natal, and elsewhere 30 However, as with the Mfengu in the 
Eastern Cape, the old alliance between Mfengu 'collaborators' and the colonial power became 
increasingly superfluous as the need for African military alliances receded with the 
entrenchment of colonial rule. 
`Progressive' Mfengu communities also suffered economically, as the British colonial 
administration began to increase pressure on Africans to provide cheap migrant labour. 
Rinderpest and East Coast fever also decimated livestock in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, at a time when access to markets was becoming increasingly restricted 
for Africans. Four social categories seem to have emerged in the Transkei during this period. 
These included an educated elite, who remained largely within leading positions in the mission 
schools, minor government posts and to some extent in commerce, therefore maintaining their 
economic position throughout the economic uncertainties of those years; the old loyal 
communities, such as the Mfengu, who were increasingly marginalised economically and 
politically in rural areas without possessing the education to gain salaried jobs in urban areas, 
28 T. Stapleton, 'Gathering Under the Milkwood Tree', p. p. 8-20. Stapleton's arguments will be re-examined in more detail a 
little later. 
29 W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'Introduction', Hidden Struggles, p. 15. 30 See Footnote 25. 
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apart from unskilled migrant work - this group 'sought to bridge the gap with traditionalists 
through populist politics and the use of a common language of protest'; 
31 the traditionalist 
leaders, such as hereditary chiefs and headmen, who were increasingly merging with the new 
elite themselves through such experiences as mission education, and who sought to augment 
their own power and position, and also to represent their 'traditionalist' followers; and finally 
the 'traditionalist' mass of the people themselves, who were difficult to mobilise except on a 
local basis. The shift from a mid-Victorian policy of 'civilisation' and 'assimilation', towards a 
policy of 'cultural relativism' and segregation contributed considerably towards this 
reformulation of social groupings and identities. Colonial fears centred around black 
urbanisation and proletarianisation, with the possibility of an organised working class opposing 
colonial dominance, as well as the need for a cheap labour workforce, contributed towards this 
fundamental shift in policy 32 This eventually facilitated the buttressing of the institution of the 
chieftaincy, with chiefs and headmen brought under the auspices of the colonial administration 
so that segregated reserves could be run through indirect rule. However, the institution of the 
chieftaincy would always remain ambiguous in this respect, for it remained the major focus of 
allegiance for many 'traditionalist' people. It also provided the leadership for them to resist 
colonial land expropriation through redefining their ethnic identity and uniting behind the 
chieftainship if a particular chief opposed colonial policy 33 It is at this juncture that 
anthropological works such as those of the Mayers can provide further insights into the 
changing nature of African identities, including ethnicised ones, and also illustrate how these 
identities articulate with the moral ethnicity/political tribalism model 34 -' 
In many ways analyses such as that of Stapleton ignore these cultural factors in the 
construction of identities which embrace ethnicity. Even when he does analyse cultural 
divisions, at least in the twentieth century context, Stapleton tends to misinterpret them as 
examples of state induced politically tribalist tendencies facilitated by educated elite culture 
brokers and traditional authorities brought under the influence of the state. He also ignores 
the fact that elite politicians such as the Jabavus were in fact not so divorced from the mass of 
ordinary Africans as is sometimes portrayed. 35 
31 This categorisation draws directly from W. Beinart and C. Bundy, 'Introduction', Hidden Struggles. p. p. 11.12. In reality 
these categories often overlapped, and their boundaries were blurred. 
32 See S. Dubow, 'The Elaboration of Segregationist Ideology', in Racial Segregation and the Origins ofApartheid in South 
Africa, c. 1919-1936, London, 1989. 
3 This is very much the thrust of Beinart and Bundy's argument in Hidden Struggles. Mhlonhlo was just one example in their 
work of a chief who became the focus of, in this case Mpondomise, redefined rural ethnic identity in defense of land and rural 
resources. Further examples of this form of ethnic mobilisation will receive analysis throughout the rest of the thesis. See 
chapter 5 for a detailed examination of similar occurences in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Natal. In this chapter 
the emphasis will remain on the Eastern Cape. 34 The relationship between the 'Red'/'School' divide and Mfengu/Xhosa ethnicised conflict has been examined thoroughly in 
chapters land 2, and therefore will not be reiterated here. 35 These issues are explored in some detail in chapter 9 in the wider context of South Africa in general. 
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Moral ethnicity did seem to emanate from the symbolic meanings inherent in institutions such 
as the chieftaincy in the early decades of the twentieth century. In this context, it seems to 
have represented a transitional shape, where multiple, processual, contested identities were 
interpreted by rural people in terms of the cultural values of the past, and the 'modernising' 
narratives of the present (for example, missionary influence and migrant labour). People 
could do this as their moral values were not tied to a systematic form of knowledge and moral 
outlook, allowing a certain flexibility in terms of consciousness and identity. Furthermore, 
people did not feel the need to attach themselves to culturally brokered state versions of 
ethnic or nationalist identities, as these made little symbolic sense in the moral universe which 
they inhabited. Radical and nationalist organisations, such as the ANC and the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union only made headway in this period when they consciously merged 
their wider versions of working class or nationalist identities with the needs and value systems 
of rural Africans 36 Small-scale communities did not need consciously brokered forms of 
social coherence. Therefore state-sponsored politically tribalist versions of identity, or 
versions of African nationalism as promoted by the ANC, which might make sense to a small 
professional African elite, were not considered necessary in the moral universes that the mass 
of rural Africans inhabited. The contested moral ethnic identities of this period were very 
much a phenomenon of the time. Ethnicised identities were often formed within a contested 
moral ethnic arena, where - as Lonsdale argues - people debated what values 
best 
represented a 'good' member of the community. These might have indirectly lead to the 
buttressing of politically tribalist versions of ethnicised identities37, but this was not necessarily 
how people in rural areas percieved them. However, ethnic mobilisation over rural resources 
and land were not the only constructed versions of ethnic identification in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Very work specific forms were also developing in the gold and diamond 
mines which had initiated South Africa's mineral and industrial revolutions. 
3.2 Migrancy, Mining and Moral Ethnicity: The Reformulation of Ethnic Identities 
Through the Process of Migrant Labour 
There is a substantial overlap between rural ethnic mobilisation over land and the beginning of 
the migrant -labour system. 
Migrant labour became increasingly widespread after the 
discovery of diamonds and gold in the late nineteenth century, but it existed before the mineral 
revolution. For example, southern Mozambican migrant workers were employed on the Natal 
sugar plantations from the mid-nineteenth century. 38 it is also important to recognise that mass 
migrancy originated as much in the dynamics of African societies as in the demands of the 
mining industry. Migrant labourers remained very much part of the rural economy, which 
36 See chapters 5 and 9. 
37 A good example of this occured in Natal in the first few decades of the twentieth century. See chapter S. iA 
-- See P. Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, London, 1994, chapter 2. 
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suited the cheap labour requirements of the plantations, and later the mining compounds, as 
well as the patriarchal structure of rural African communities. 39 However, ethnic identity 
reformulation in the mining compounds was particularly apparent in the mid-twentieth century, 
and therefore marks a new period in ethnic identity construction. 
Harries distinguishes compound ethnic identification from earlier rural forms of identity in 
terms of a shift from the chieftaincy to culture as a focus of loyalty: 
(l)n the cosmopolitan society of the diamond fields... the fictive 
element in kinship was extended to include a wider community 
in which the chief was replaced by culture as the focus of loyalty. 
At the same time, a society which accepted fictive kinship could 
easily extend this belief into a putative ethnicity built on the use 
of familial terms... Ethnicity, like kinship, was based on myths of 
origin, ascriptive and putative belonging, as well as relations of 
reciprocity. "' 
The ideology of kinship has also been argued to have been an important homogenising force 
within pre-colonial societies - the basis of moral economies 
41 Harries also comments on the 
difference between ethnic categorisation from external sources, and ethnic self-ascription. 42 
The shift from chief to culture as the focus of loyalty perhaps represents one of the most 
important reformulations of ethnic identities in the context of the shift from rural to compound 
life43 Rural ethnic mobilisation often centred around chiefs in the early twentieth century. 
These rural identities themselves probably originated from earlier clan identities, and it is even 
possible that some of the peoples classified as Mfengu in Qumbu district were originally part 
of the Mpondomise chiefdoms prior to the Mfecane. 44 Therefore this section of the Mfengu 
could represent a people who originally were part of the kinship system of the Mpondomise, 
and subsequently acquired a separate ethnic identity, due to their particular response to 
colonial capitalist penetration. It is also possible that some Xhosa peoples attempted to 
assume a `Mfengu' identity during the protracted wars waged against British colonial forces in 
39 The patriarchal nature of rural African communities were a fundamental influence in ethnic mobilisation, especially in the 
first half of the twentieth century. This receives greater analysis in chapter 7. 40 P. Harries, Work Culture and Identity, p. 64. 41 Ibid, p. p. 63-66. Also see C. Hamilton and J. Wright, 'The Making of the'Amalala': Ethnicity, Ideology and Relations of 
Subordintion in a Precolonial Context', SAHJ, Vol 22,1990. 
42 Ibid, p. p. 63-66. Wright and Hamilton comment in a similar fashion. 
43 This is not to suggest an inevitable erosion of the influence of chiefs. As will become apparent in the following chapters, the 
changing institution of the chieftaincy remained a potent factor in the shaping of values, identities and consciousnesses of rural 
people right up to the present day. However, reformulated ethnicised identities on the mine compounds do seem to have 
encapsulated a wider form of consciousness, with workers translating their rural cultural values - in tandem with ethnic 
stereotyping by white management - in a specific work context. 44 See W. Beinart, 'Conflict in Qumbu', p. 1 11. Also, C. Hamilton and J. Wright, 'The Making of the 'Amalala', passim. 
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the nienteenth century. This is not to reinforce the hypothesis that Mfengu in the Eastern 
Cape were really Xhosa opportunists. But it is possible that some Xhosa sought to gain this 
identity in order to survive the upheavals occuring at the time. Additionally, as illustrated 
above, Mfengu and Xhosa peoples had merged significantly by the mid-nineteenth century. In 
the Qumbu case, the Mfengu were therefore also a group which had been categorised from 
external sources. Categorisation was the result of the manipulations of colonial 
administrators, but it also came from the Mpondomise, who defined themselves against the 
Mfengu in order to assert their own identity within a changing social and economic situation, 
as well as the Mfengu themselves. This exactly reflects the moral debate around which moral 
ethnicity is centred. 
Compound life entailed a move from putative kinship affiliations, or particularist rural ethnic 
identities, to a more specifically work-based reformulation of ethnicised identities. Wage 
labour offered a circumscribed independence to workers on the mines, and this partially 
challenged the leverage chiefs could exert on these men. Chiefs often initially supported the 
concept of migrant labour, as it gave them access to money with which to purchase guns and 
defend political independence. But by the end of the nineteenth century they had begun to 
lose control of the labour supply. Nevertheless men were still tied to the rural economy. 
Tactics such as bridewealth inflation ensured village elders and fathers controlled access to 
their sons' wages, and discouraged them from breaking with their rural links. Rural 
hierarchies also kept women entrenched in the countryside, another reason for men to return 
home. 5 Ideologies such as'selective traditionalism', forged in a rural environment, additionally 
meant that men often wished to promote their rural connections. Wages in the mines were 
also relatively high in the nineteenth century, although this was to alter with the onset of more 
systematic segregation, and later apartheid. 
In a series of works emanating from the early 1960s until the late 1970s, Phillip and Iona 
Mayer sought to demonstrate how migrant labour had affected the identities of Africans living 
in the Eastern Cape region. 46 Phillip Mayer also began to explore what he termed 'alternative 
routes to modernity' in the development of African moralities in the Eastern Cape and 
elsewhere, which he argued emanated from pre-colonial moralities, the differential 
incorporation of different African polities into the late nineteenth century colonial economy, 
missionary influence, and the uneven entrenchment of the migrant labour system 47 He 
45 --- Nee B. Bozzoli, 'Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies', JSAS, Vol 9, No 2,1983. dF 
.-P. Mayer, 'Migrancy and the Study of Africans in Towns', American Anthropologist, Vol 64, No 3, Part 1,1962; P. Mayer, 
Townsmen or Tribesmen, Oxford, 1971 (2nd ed. 1st ed 1963); P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation Amongst Xhosa Youth, Vols 
1 and 2', Unpublished Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University; P. and I. Mayer, 'Socialisation by Peers', in P. Mayer (ed), 
Socialisation: The Approach from Social Anthropology, London, 1972; P. Mayer, 'Subculture, Moralities and Migrant 
Labour', Migrant Labour Mimeograph, Cory Lbrary, Rhodes University, 1978 (P. Mayer also edited the entire mimeograph); P. Mayer, 'The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', in P. Mayer (ed), Black Villagers. 47 See especially P. Mayer, 'Subculture, Moralities and Migrant Labour', passim. He specifically uses the phrase on p. 33. 
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quotes a song composed by a Bhaca teacher in the 1950s which reflects these 'alternative 
routes' and identity formations: 
We Bhaca are divided into three groups according to our 
manner of life. 
We get Christians, the middle ones who are clothed, and the 
pagans proper. 
The Christians are people of the Church, the middle ones are 
wanderers, the pagans have their own ways. 
Of these we prefer the last. 
The Christians cheat, some say they are converted, but it is not so; 
These middle ones are not wanted at all, 
The pagans are people of beer and beer alone. 
The middle ones do all these things. 
The Christians go after evil, yet are the great and important people. 48 
This 'middle group' was argued by Mayer to represent an 'alternative route to modernity'. 
These groupings, or more accurately male associations, developed in areas of the Eastern 
Transkei and Zululand which had not been as greatly affected by the protracted colonial wars 
waged in the Eastern Cape throughout the nineteenth century. The areas concerned did not 
come under colonial rule until the end of that century. Thus men were drawn into migrant 
labour later than the Xhosa speakers to the west, and in the 1930s these areas still had fewer 
mission stations, schools and stores than the Ciskei or Western Transkei. The people living 
there, such as the Mpondo, Xesibe and Zulu, did not experience the deepening of the 
'Red'/'School' division into a rift between 'national resisters and collaborators'. 49 All these 
factors combined to allow the formation of a new form of cultural male association which was 
equally unacceptable to christian converts and 'conservatives'. Such male associations 
tended to consist of young men, and sometimes older men in their thirties, who rejected rural 
'School' christian morality, and the 'selective traditionalism' of 'Red' ideology. Referred to as 
amagxagxa in Zululand, and indlavini in the Eastern Transkei, their membership also largely 
consisted of migrant labourers who had experienced urban secular life-styles without 
interpreting them through the moral ideologies inherent in christian or traditionalist groupings. 
This was due to the historically contingent reasons outlined above. Associations such as 
these constructed their own moral universe, which debated the values of Traditionalist and 
48 Ibid, p. 36. 
49 Ibid, p. p. 33-34. 
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Christian groupings, and can be perceived as a reformulation of ethnic identities, intertwined 
with changing conceptions of manhood and possibly a nascent class consciousness. As such 
they represented part of an increasingly proliferating debate of what it meant to be a 'Zulu', 
'Mpondo', Xhosa' or other ethnicised group. Again the concept of moral ethnicity provides a 
useful theoretical explanatory framework with which to view these identity reformulations 50 
Concepts of gender and ethnic identities, themselves inextricably intertwined, 51 were being 
increasingly debated in a fast-changing socio-economic climate. However, it is important to 
recognise that these rural, migrant forms of ethnicised identities could break down into 
identities which reflected a non-ethnic consciousness when transposed onto a more urban 
context. Tsotsi gangs, urban criminal gangs which formed in many urban areas by the 1940s, 
held loyalties to specific urban territories, having broken from rural ties 52 
This is not to suggest that 'Red' (or 'School') ideologies were not themselves re-workings of 
rural identities. 'Red' Xhosa selective traditionalism was still a coherent ideological force in the 
1970s, and even beyond in some isolated pockets of the Eastern Cape countryside. 53 'Red' 
Xhosa adapted to migrant labour, either to the mines or elsewhere, through what Phillip Mayer 
has termed a process of 'incapsulation'. 54 The entrenchment of migrant labour meant that it 
became recognised as both necessary and a threat to 'Red' Xhosa culture, through the 
possibility of competing urban moral universes. Rituals and symbols were adapted to ensure 
that migrancy was interpreted through the ideological prism of 'Red' values. Male initiation 
ceremonies were adapted to warn initiates of the 'temptations' of urban life, and the need to be 
responsible and use their wages to build a homestead 55 Beer drinks were also occasions 
which reinforced these ideological tenets. Young 'Red' Xhosa men were in effect perceived 
as entering a liminal phase when joining the migrant workforce. 56 It seems reasonable to 
argue that this was a re-working of one form of Xhosa ethnic identity, emanating from 'below', 
which sought to resist full incorporation into the capitalist economy. It demonstrates that 
50 This is a very brief summary of this form of identity reformulation, which relates very much to generational divides and the 
formation of youth gangs in rural, urban and mine compound situations in the first half of the twentieth century. Chapter 8 
explores these issues at much greater length, whilst additionally illustrating their link to cultural issues such as the importance 
of circumcision initiation ceremonies, and male ethnicised violence. More recently Beinart has re-examined these types of 
rural identity reformulations. He has made use of the insights provided by the Mayers, whilst developing some of their 
conclusions. See for example the following: W. Beinart, 'The Origins of the Indlavini: Male Associations and Migrant 
Labour in the Transkei', in A. Spiegel and P. McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in southern Africa, Johannesburg, 
1991; W. Beinart, 'Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism and Nationalism: The Experiences of a South African 
Migrant, 1930-1960'. in S. Marks and S. Trapido, The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism, London, 1993. His insights 
will also be analysed in chapter 8. Beinart places more emphasis on varying levels of education in determining membership of 
such groups. 
51 See chapters 7 and 8. 
52 Again, see chapter 8 for a full analysis and periodisation of these associations, and their relationship to changing forms of 
male violence and identity. 53 See P. McAllister, 'Using Ritual to Resist Domination in the Transkei', in A. Spiegel and P. McAllister (eds), Tradition and 
Transition. McAllister found elements of 'Red' ideology still surviving in 1989 in some areas. [A 
See chapters land 2. 
See the work of the Mayers quoted in footnote 46. Also chapter 8. 
55 
56 See chapter 7 for the significance of liminality in shaping ethnic and gendered identities. 
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'traditional' cultures were just as capable of adapting to modernity, and indeed often emanated 
from it. 
Identities on the mine compounds also reflected re-workings of male identities within a specific 
work-place context. Ethnic boundaries could be alternately fluid and hardened on the mines. 
Workers were often separated in ethnically segregated housing, according to mine 
management's perceptions of what entailed specific ethnic identities, although work teams 
remained ethnically mixed. For example Bhaca workers, who speak a dialect of Xhosa, could 
sometimes be housed separately or - as there were relatively few on the mines - could be 
classified as Mpondo or Xhosa due to linguistic similarities. 57 However, these imposed forms 
of identification were often accepted by the African workers themselves. Migrant miners often 
identified with home-friends on the mine, or in the absence of these, with people who spoke 
the same or similar languages, or perhaps with the most powerful group on the mine. 58 This 
reflects the somewhat situationally selected forms of ethnic identities prevalent in black 
communities in South Africa throughout the early colonial period. 
Ethnic identities were also based upon putative physical and mental characteristics which 
made a specific ethnicised group more amenable to a particular type of job. For example, 
Bhaca workers developed a monopoly on night-soil removal and latrine cleaning. Mpondo 
often gained employment as drillers, 'Shangaans' often became 'boss-boys' and Sotho people 
often gained employment as lashers and shaft sinkers 59 Ethnic stereotyping benefitted white 
management by facilitating control of the workforce. Dividing workers into discrete groups 
according to management's concepts of 'tribes' divided 'authority and privilege amongst 
members of different groups thereby diverting hostility towards management from other 
workers' 60 However mine workers encouraged similar ethnic perceptions of themselves, but 
for very different reasons: 'in a situation of tremendous labour oppression... the propagation of 
ethnic ideas, and mobilisation of workers around them, was a means of protection, a qualified 
form of work satisfaction, and above all, a means of securing a greater income'. 61 These 
identities could lead to ethnic conflict between workers. 
Nevertheless it is important to recognise that ethnic identification and violence on the mines 
cannot be reduced to a purely materialist analysis. As inferred above, rural ideologies and 
57 D. Moodie, 'Ethnic Violence on South African Gold Mines', JSAS, Vol 18, No 3,1992, p. p. 586-587. For other examples 
see the following: J. Guy and M. Thabane, 'Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the 
South African Gold Mines', JSAS, Vol 14, No 2,1988; D. Moodie and V. Ndatshe, Going For Gold: Men, Mines and 
Migration, London, 1994; P. Harries, Work, Culture and Identity, 58 D. Moodie, 'Ethnic Violence', p. 586. 59 lbid, p. p. 586-588. Also see J. Guy and M. Thabane, 'Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology'. These ethnicised stereotypes, 
and their relationship with constructs of masculinity and ethnic violence, are explored in detail in chapter 8. 60 J. Guy and M. Thabane, 'Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology', p. 258. 61 Ibid, p. 266. Guy and Thabane are referring specifically to Sotho workers, but their argument also applies to most other 
ethnicised groupings on the mines. See D. Moodie, 'Ethnic Violence'. 
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socialisation processes - themselves being reformulated by the changes wrought through the 
migrant labour process - could play a significant role in the form of these conflicts 
62 It also 
appears that ethnic conflicts on the mines occurred at times of changes in the demographic 
make-up of the mine worker population, thus threatening job securities themselves often 
based upon ethnicised identities fi3 Additionally, ethnicised conflict seems to have become 
more widespread from the early 1970s onwards with the gradual emergence of worker 
consciousness: 
The consequences of ritual collective violence have been 
less heinous in the past because management or South 
African Police could usually be trusted to intervene in the 
interests of order and traditional workers respected their 
intervention. In the particular juncture of the 1980s, with 
worker organisation finally coming to the mines, certain 
levels of management and police seemed to be willing to 
risk disorder in order to smash the Union's threatened new 
order. ` 
Moodie also tellingly argues that if this was so, 'their purposes are well served by twisting 
traditional ethnic solidarities, which preserved personal integrity in the old mine culture, to new 
ends' 65 This seems to represent another example of moral ethnicity hardening into a form of 
political tribalism, this time through the manipulations of mine management who politicised and 
rigidified previously fluid identities66 In addition employment of fully proletarianised workers 
from South Africa and Rhodesia in the 1970s, due to cuts in migrant labour from Malawi and 
Mozambique as a result of political decisions, caused conflict between this group - whose 
consciousness was shaped in an urban milieu and the liberation struggle - and migrant 
workers who were more insulated from these influences and were more accepting of mine 
authority. 67 
62 Again, these issues are explored fully in chapter 8. Differing emphases on materialist explanations also differentiated the 
above works of Moodie and Guy and Thabane (see previous footnote). Guy and Thabane tend towards a very reductionist 
analysis which partially ignores, or rejects, other forms of influence in the shaping of ethnicised conflict. However Moodie, 
although still arguing for the ultimate primacy of a materialist interpretation, also emphasises the importance of rural ideologies 
and ethnic particularisms in shaping conflict on the mines. The latter interpretation comes closer to the line of analysis taken in 
this thesis. 
63- -- - --- - --- 1). Moodie, `Ethnic Violence', passim. Also see D. Moodie and V. Ndatshe, Going for Gold. 64 D. Moodie, 'Ethnic Violence', p. 613. 65 Ibid, p. 613. 
66 As is evident, I am utilising Lonsdale's concept of political tribalism in a wider sense in this context. He situates this form 
of ethnic identity firmly within the elite ethnic constructions of politicians and the state in general. But it seems to me that 
rigidified ethnicised identities could also occur due to the combination of mine management ethnic manipulation, the re- 
working of these identities by the workers themselves, and the exigencies of the changing socio-economic and political 
climate. 
67 For a detailed analysis of 'Red' ideology amongst 1950s Eastern Cape Xhosa, and how this articulated with migrant labour 
requirements on the mines, see P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen. Also chapters 1 and 2. 
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Thus forms of moral ethnicity and political tribalism interacted, and became more or less 
apparent, at different times within the mining compounds. Furthermore this was linked to 
economic and social change within the wider South African context. Nevertheless it is 
important to stress that ethnic affiliations were not shaped solely by these factors. Gender 
divisions, the relationship between changing forms of masculine identity and violence, 
reformulated pre-colonial socialisation processes, generational divides, sexuality and 
patriarchy all played their part in the construction of ethnicity during the twentieth century. 
However, ethnic identities were forged very much within the changing socio-economic context 
of South Africa. This is especially evident in terms of the apartheid regime's 'Homelands' 
policy, forced removals, and shack city ethnicised identities. 
3.3 Identities Imposed? The 'Homelands' Policy, Ethnicity and Political Tribalism 
The histories of the creation of the 'Homelands' and those of the independent countries most 
closely linked with South Africa politically and economically - i. e. Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Botswana - are closely intertwined from the late 1950s onwards. The 'winds of change' 
sweeping through Africa, with many black states on the verge of independence, and South 
Africa's long-cherished aim of absorbing the three British High Commission Territories (later 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana) obviously not achievable, entailed a radical rethink of 
apartheid policy with reference to the bantustans. 'Separate development' and self- 
government became the name of the game, as the Nationalist party sought to divert black 
political aspirations away from the key issue of control of the South African economic 
heartland. The apartheid regime also attempted to curry favour with an increasingly outraged 
international community (which nevertheless did not stop some from continuing investment in 
South Africa) by arguing that a policy of separate development would mean that the 
bantustans would essentially be no different from the High Commission Territories soon to 
gain independence. These so-called 'Homelands' were to be developed along 'ethnic' lines, 
with people re-located to a specific 'Homeland', which the government deigned corresponded 
with their ethnic identity and 'historic origin'. The 'Homelands' themselves were a 
development of earlier reserves, and therefore the re-located inhabitants built upon the 
substantial rural populations already living there. The importance of chieftaincies and 'tribal 
tradition' was therefore emphasised by Nationalist politicians. Ideas of 'tribe' and chieftaincy 
also had some attraction for African politicians uncertain about the possibility of real gains 
under apartheid. And there were significant legacies in popular consciousness which gave 
bantustan politicians some purchase. 'Separate development' policies entailed a further 
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overlay on the multiple layers of ethnic consciousness already discussed. It ensured a further 
rigidifying of ethnic identities, but this time - unlike on the mining compounds - it was directed 
from 'above' in terms of its political context, both by white ideologues and black politicians. It 
is this process of social engineering that illustrates most graphically the swing from moral 
ethnicity to political tribalism, and demonstrates the 'uniqueness' of contemporary South 
African history. 68 
This was certainly the case in the Eastern Cape. State manipulation of the chieftaincy, 
together with the intrigues of 'Homeland' politicians, did reinforce state aims of subverting 
African nationalism by transferring the locus of conflict from urban centres to the largely rural 
'homelands'. 69 Inter-and intra-ethnic antagonisms resulted from the manipulation of the 
chieftaincy. In the Ciskei, Mfengu/Xhosa rivalry was deliberately manipulated by black ethnic 
culture brokers seeking to entrench their rule in the impoverished area. Mayer argues that 
this form of what he terms 'neo-tribalism' emerged as an unintended result of 'Red' ideology: 
The Red ideology has also an 'illegitimate' offspring: the neo- 
traditionalism or neo-tribalism which uses traditional Xhosa 
symbols and the dancing skills of Red girls to legitimise the 
powers of the homeland chiefs, with support from sections of 
the new homeland middle classes... This use of'Africanism' 
is an attempt to 'mask'the realities of conflict within the home- 
lands as well as the homelands' external dependence. 70 
'Red' and 'School' ideologies were gradually eroding by the late 1970s, due to the effect of 
industrialisation and urbanisation. " The correspondence between the 'Red'/'School' divide 
and the Xhosa/Mfengu divide had also eroded through the second half of the twentieth 
century. No doubt this was due in part to inter-marriage and the erosion of boundaries. 
However, oral research conducted by Moyer in the 1970s suggested that Mfengu identity, 
when it was emphasised, was understood in a very fluid, prcessual sense anyway: 
When questioning the people I encountered, it seemed as 
though an Mfengu might be any person who chose to iden- 
68 The evolving, contested nature of Afrikaner ethnic identities, which are inextricably intertwined with the 'Homelands' 
policy, are examined in chapter 9. 69 This objective was reinforced by allowing the development of decentralised industry along the borders of'Homelands', 
serviced by a black labour force. The small black elite which governed these 'Homelands' also benefitted through the growth 
of bureacracy, another reason to support the aims of the Nationalist government. 70 P. Mayer, 'Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', p. p. 71-72. 71 See chapters 1 and 2. 
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tify himself as such, or any person so recognised. This 
elusive definition allows an Mfengu to identify with the people 
amongst whom he lives when it is to his advantage, but it 
also allows their hosts to dissociate themselves from this 
72 individual when it is to their advantage. 
This reflects the fluid, processual nature of the same identifications in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Mayer argues that many rural Africans vehemently rejected the hardened, politically 
tribalist versions of ethnic identification promulgated by 'Homeland' leaders and the apartheid 
state as representative of racist ideology rather than true cultural ethnicity. 73 Nevertheless 
rural values, often invested in the chieftaincy, still retained a pull on rural consciousness. The 
importance of remnant layers of popular consciousness in shaping any justification and 
support for the 'Homelands' policy and its attendent social engineering cannot be completely 
dismissed. 
The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 laid 
the basis for Mfengu-Xhosa politically tribalist rivalry. Both aimed at restoring a version of pre- 
colonial authority invested in the chieftainship, which would tow the line of the apartheid 
regime. Mfengu-Xhosa rivalry became particularly prominent in what was to become the 
Ciskei 'Homeland', due to the fact that there was a prominent Mfengu population there. The 
Transkei 'Homeland' only contained a small Mfengu population, and therefore political 
tribalism between Mfengu and Xhosa was not such a problem. In what was to become the 
Ciskei, the Mfengu felt particularly threatened by the restoration of the Rharhabe Xhosa 
paramountcy. It seemed to threaten their dominance in the bureaucracy and other 
professional salaried posts, a legacy of colonialism. Government appointed anthropologists, 
employed to trace genealogical lines in order to establish the 'proper' heirs to the chieftaincy, 
failed to recognise a paramount chief for the Mfengu. 74 This caused Mfengu elites to mobilise, 
resulting in for example the 1968 'Fingo Manifesto' which demanded the recognition of the 
Mfengu as a distinct ethnic group with representation in the Ciskei executive. 
Ultimately, this conflict resulted in the formation of two political parties which divided along 
ethnic lines. The Ciskei National Party led by Justice Mabandla was Mfengu dominated, 
whilst the Ciskei National Independence Party, led by Lennox Sebe, sought to manipulate the 
72 R. Moyer, 'Some Current Manifestations of Early Mfengu History', Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Collected Seminar 
Papers on the Societies of Southern Africa, Vol 3,1971-2, p. 144. Also see his thesis 'A History of the Mfengu of the South 
Eastern Cape, 1855-65', Ph. D Thesis, London University, 1976. 
73 It is important to bear in mind that, according to Mayer, both 'Red' and 'School' identities evolved into ideologies of 
resistance to white rule in the mid-twentieth century as well as representing what he termed 'folk cultures' - see chapters land 2 
for further discussion. 
74 See T. Stapleton, 'Gathering Under the Milkwood Tree', p. p. 21-22, and C. Crais, 'Representation and the Politics of 
Identity', p. p. 104-109. 
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Rharharbe Xhosa vote. This politically tribalist rivalry also resulted in a plethora of historical 
reconstructions, which sought to place either Mfengu or Xhosa in a more favourable historical 
light, and further fanned the flames of ethnic tension. Middle class culture brokers sought to 
forge alliances with rural chiefs, who could often be the same people anyway, in order to 
promote ethnic messages. Although these forms of politicised ethnicity did not reflect the 
more rural, cultural, moral ethnic identities which existed particularly in the 1920s, they did 
gain some purchase among people competing for scarce resources in an oppressive political 
climate. It is also important to recognise that these forms of identity often resonated with 
peoples' moral universes anyway. Lennox Sebe made full use of identifications with chiefly 
lineages, real and imagined, in order to gain power in the Ciskei 'Homeland' in 1978. Although 
this involved much chiefly intrigue and political manipulation, there was popular support for 
various chiefs due to this pull on popular consciousness. 75 However, when Sebe tried to 
create a bogus Ciskeian nationalism once in power, thus rejecting ethnicised particularisms 
and chiefly loyalties, he failed miserably. 76 Imagined communities cannot be created out of thin 
air. 77 Sebe's bogus nationalism also had to contend with the widespread African Nationalist 
consciousness existing in the Eastern Cape, which had a legacy stretching back to the 
nineteenth century. 78 Nevertheless, these forms of politicised ethnicity resulted in an increase 
in politicised violence both in the Eastern Cape and elsewhere in South Africa. People 
mobilised under the ethnic banner in order to gain some material advantage as the apartheid 
system gradually collapsed during the 1980s. 
3.4 Does the Model Fit? A Retrospective Overview of Moral Ethnicity and Political 
Tribalism, Within the Context of Twentieth Century South Africa 
In a recent article Mosse has sought to define the relationship between nationalism and 
racism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 79 He argues that, although racism and 
nationalism seem to belong together today, this has not always been the case. Defining 
racism as a sharply focused faith which tolerates no ambiguities, and nationalism as more 
loosely constructed, making alliances with most nineteenth century ideologies (such as 
conservatism, liberalism and socialism), he states that racism was never an indispensible 
element of nationalism, but came to dominate it once the two had allied. Furthermore, this 
alliance occured due to the very fact that nationalism was/is an ambiguous, loosely 
75 
See K. Moyer, some Current Manifestations', passim. Also J. Peires, 'Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnicity'. 76 The reasons for Sebe's attempt at creating a Ciskeian nationalism are outlined In J. Peires, 'Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnicity'. 
In short, although it may partly have been an attempt to avoid ethnicised conflict, itself a result of the previous machinations of 
the chieftaincy by Sebe, it mostly involved an attempt by Sebe to further his own personal political power. 77 For analyses of other forms of political tribalism in South Africa during the apartheid years, and their eventual demise with 
the collapse of apartheid, see the special issue of JSAS, Vol 20, No 3,1994, especially the following: M. de Haas and P. Zulu, 
'Ethnicity and Federalism: The Case of KwaZulu/Natal'; M. Lawrence and A. Manson, 'The "Dog of the Boers": The Rise 
and Fall of Mangope in Bophuthatswana'. 
79 G. Mosse, `Racism and Nationalism, Nations and Nationalism, Vol 1, No 2,1995. 
See L. Switzer, Power and Resistance, Chapters 6,8, and 9 for a useful synthesis. 
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constructed ideology, always looking for the defining difference between the nation from which 
it emanates and the 'Other': 
Modern nationalism, even if it was tolerant and respected the 
culture of other nations, always contained elements which might 
lead to a greater exclusiveness. If racism constructed the ideal 
type, nationalism was sooner or later in search of the proper 
`national character. 80 
This offers instructive parallels with the concepts of moral ethnicity and political tribalism. For, 
as has been illustrated, moral ethnicity - like the early forms of nineteenth century nationalism 
- is by its very nature ambiguous. It is an arena of constant debate with regard to what best 
represents the identity of a body of people, and therefore is also in search of the ideal type. 
Political tribalism, like racism, is unambiguous, certain, and allows for no debate over identity. 
It tries to be fixed and rigid. The alternating fluidity and rigidity of identities in the early 
twentieth century applies equally to other specific periods in South Africa's history. 
Furthermore, the critical nexus always occured when there was a particularly rapid period of 
social and economic transformation. This provoked the multilogue of voices inherent in moral 
ethnicity, a form of debate which engendered creative and transformative responses to 
change in itself - but never reached what seemed its ultimate goal of completely defining the 
'ethnic character' of a specific people. In eras of rapid change, political tribalism offered a firm 
identity of almost religious intensity. It is also important to acknowledge that political tribalism 
was not just the invention of ethnic entrepreneurs, seeking to justify their privileged positions 
in a fast-changing society. Political tribalism grew as much from the moral ethnic debate 
taking place amongst the mass of the people, a debate which had the power to transform but 
also - due to its very ambiguity - contained the seeds from which political tribalism could grow. 
To argue that political tribalism did not grow from a populist base is to take away ordinary 
peoples' abilities to shape their own identities. This is not to deny the importance of ethnic 
entrepreneurs, rather it is meant to emphasise the point that the ideologies that these people 
espouse have to be rooted in popular consciousness. .. -1 
The moral ethnicity/political tribalism model does seem a useful analytical tool with which to 
periodise ethnic identity formation in twentieth century South Africa. But it needs to be set 
firmly within an historical context, and without teleological assumptions. It would be wrong to 
assume, like many scholars have done, that ethnic identities will die out as a more global 
economy, and society develop, and the ANC seek to promote their inclusive concept of African 
90 Ibid, P, 167. 
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nationalism. For example, less than a year after the ANC were elected to power, there was a 
small outbreak of Mfengu politicised ethnicity in Peddle District, Eastern Cape. A small group 
of Mfengu people gathered under the same Milkwood tree where the Mfengu population of 
1835 were said to have made their vows of promoting 'christianity, education and loyalty' 
under the influence of the missionary Joseph Ayliffe. The event went ahead despite the 
opposition of many chiefs who argued it would promote divisions amongst the local populace. 
The event itself was picketed by ANC Women's League protestors and the National Education 
and Health Allied Workers' Union. The celebration was attacked as divisive by the local ANC 
representative. 
The secretary-general of the Peddle sub-region, MrXolisa 
Dimbaza, said claims that the celebrations were a cultural 
event were incorrect and went against the ANC's primary 
objective of uniting the African people. He supported the 
actions of ANC and ANC Women's League members who 
picketed the event... He said to revive the pledge to 'educate 
our children and uphold the principles of christianity and 
loyalty to the government of the day' was a counter-revolu- 
tionary practice. 'lt is not one's culture to be exploited and 
oppressed. We therefore wish to warn those who want to 
climb to popularity and boost their unguided aspirations at 
the expense of our people. 
Our past grief, hardship and oppression must not be turned 
into fallacy, Mr Dimbaza said. 81 
The Mfengu/Xhosa divide could therefore be resurrected despite the gaining of power by a 
democratically elected, African nationalist government. It is also interesting to note that the 
argument for going ahead with the celebration centred around the concept that the celebration 
was cultural, and not political, in content. However, if the event itself provokes politically 
motivated opposition, it must in itself become politicised. Dimbaza's terminology, especially 
his phrase 'unguided and counter-revolutionary', itself graphically illustrates that the ANC is 
not a homogenous nationalist force, for it sits uneasily with the moderate, 'pro-western' stance 
taken by Nelson Mandela. 
81 'ANC in Peddie Slams Mfengu Event', article in Daily Despatch, Friday May 19th 1995. For a succinct summary of the 
main events and protests which arose around this renewal of the 1835 vow see T. Stapleton, 'Gathering under the Milkwood 
Tree'. It is also interesting to note that many of the participants in the celebration apparently wore academic gowns 
symbolising their academic achievements (p. 2, ibid). This demonstrates the symbolic importance of clothing in representing 
reformulated forms of ethnic identification, and the merging of European and African symbolism. 
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The Comaroffs, although referring to a different context, reinforce this point. 
Ideology may, of course, take many guises, narrative and 
nonnarrative, realistic or whimsical; it may be heavily 
symbolic, deeply coded; but at its root its message must 
be communicable. Hegemony... represents itself everywhere 
in its saturating silences or its ritual repetitions. It is on the 
middle ground between such silences and repetitions that 
human beings often seek new ways to test out and give voice 
to their evolving perceptions of, and dispositions toward, the 
world. 82 
In terms of ethnicity, their interpretation of hegemony corresponds with political tribalism, and 
ideology with moral ethnicity. Peoples' moral universes seem to slide constantly between the 
two, and this is why ethnic identities are alternately fluid, rigid and ever-adaptable. 
It does seem that the essence of twentieth century African ethnicity in South Africa centred 
around two opposing, but interlinked, poles - one originating from Africans themselves, and 
taking the form of moral debate (moral ethnicity); the other emanating from colonial invention 
of 'tribes' and mine management and missionary stereotypes (although actively participated in 
by black people), thus creating an external arena of inter-ethnic competition which encouraged 
rigidified identities and allowed for no debate regarding the content of ethnic identification 
(political tribalism). Periodising the moral ethnicity/political tribalism model demonstrates that 
politicisation of these identities occurs at times of rapid social and economic change. 
I 
82 J. and J. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa, London, 
1991, p. 30. 
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4. 'INVENTION', 'IMAGINATION' AND 'REALITY': TERENCE RANGER AS A CASE 
STUDY OF CHANGING ACADEMIC APPROACHES TO ETHNICITY. 
Chapters two and three have demonstrated the diverse approaches proffered with regard to 
the study of ethnicity. Differing concepts, definitions and paradigms have waxed and waned as 
academics from various disciplines have challenged previously held cherished assumptions, 
only to find their own theories debated and opposed. However academics (or at least some of 
them) do not leave their work in a theoretical brine of tradition. Theories and assumptions, like 
ethnicity itself, are reformulated constantly in the light of new research, and possibly reflect the 
social and political concerns of the time. In southern Africa, the rise of Inkatha in the late 
1970s and the post-1980 civil conflict in Zimbabwe, has led to a plethora of new work on 
ethnic and nationalist identities, as well as re-workings and developments of older theories 
and studies of these forms of identification. 
This chapter seeks to examine the theoretical developments in the work of Terence Ranger 
vis-a-vis ethnicity. The reasons for this case study are three-fold: firstly, Ranger's conceptual 
shift from 'invention' to 'imaginationr2 provides a vivid example of the way studies of ethnic 
identities have reformulated in southern Africa. Secondly, Ranger has always argued that 
ethnic identities, at least in the African context, are a distinctly modern phenomenon, 
emanating primarily from the impact of colonialism onwards. Nevertheless he has recently 
examined identities existing before this impact in order to compare and contrast them to ethnic 
identities emanating in the colonial period. Thirdly, Ranger's depth and breadth of reading and 
research, his ability to 'soak up' and reformulate newly developed theories and ideas in novel 
and intellectually penetrating ways, and his willingness to change his theoretical approach in 
the wake of new research justifies a case study. His work regarding ethnicity provides further 
insights into changing academic approaches towards the subject, as well as a greater 
understanding of the phenomenon in itself. The context within which his studies of ethnic 
identities in Zimbabwe are set is also important. As with many other Africanist historians, he is 
always at pains to demonstrate that the Zanu/Zapu split emanating from the 1970s was not 
the result of some form of primordial tribalist conflict - an argument which gained popular 
currency amongst journalists and political commentators at the time, and which still fed 
popular misconceptions concerning the divisions and conflicts in Zimbabwe throughout the 
1980s. The chapter is divided into three sections: a brief analysis of Ranger's work 
concerning ethnicity up to his chapter in The Invention of Tradition; a fuller analysis of the 
t The term is taken from E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, 1983. 2 This term is taken from two sources: O. Vaughan and T. Ranger's co-edited work Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth 
Century South Africa, London, 1993, and Ranger's article 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited' in Inventions and 
Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism. Occasional Paper 11, 
Roskilde, Denmark, 1994. As both works provide the same auto-critique, I will draw upon the one in Inventions and 
Boundaries unless otherwise stated. 
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development of his ideas since then, and the sources he has drawn upon, and finally a 
critique of the theoretical assumptions he has developed in his conceptual shift from 
'invention' to 'imagination'. 
4.1 Ethnicities Invented: A Review of Terence Ranger's Early Work on Ethnicity. 
Ranger's work has been concerned with ethnicity as a problematic area for academic 
investigation for approximately fifteen years 3 The title of his article in Ross' 1980 edited 
collection-Race and Tribe in Southern Africa: European Ideas and African Acceptance-lucidly 
illustrates the particular theoretical stage Ranger's studies had reached at this juncture. 
Ethnic identities are very much portrayed as ideologically imposed from 'above', primarily by 
white colonialist administrators, urban employers and missionaries, and accepted by 
oppressed African populations. Ranger sets the scene for his approach to ethnic identities 
early in the article: 
(S)cholarly literature has been oddly lopsided. Those writing 
about tribalism in the towns have focussed upon the utility 
of the concept of tribe to African migrant workers. They 
have seen urban tribalism as very much something constructed 
by Africans. On the other hand, those writing about the 
'invention' of rural tribalism have stressed the crucial role of 
colonial indirect rule and divide-and-rule policies...! wish to 
explore urban tribalism in terms of manipulation by white 
employers. On the other hand, I wish to explore rural tribalism 
in terms of manipulation by particular African interests. When 
these two perspectives have been added to the two already 
established, we shall be able to see the diffusion of the ideas 
of tribe and race as a constant process both in town and country 
of interaction between Africans and Europeans - though always 
within a context defined by European power. 4 
This presages Vail's approach to ethnic identity construction, much heralded as a major 
breakthrough in the study of Southern African ethnicities, by several years, 5 although John 
3 Two conferences were instrumental in initiating Ranger's work with regard to ethnicity (personal interview, Dec 1995): the 
conference held at the Leiden Centre for the History of European Expansion, Netherlands, in 1980-this gave rise to the book 
edited by R. Ross, Racism and Colonialism: Essays on Ideology and Social Structure, Dordrecht, 1982-and secondly, the 
conference which gave rise to Hobsbawm and Ranger's co-edited work The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, 1983. 
R. Ross, Racism and Colonialism, p. 124. 
See the introduction to L. Vail, The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, London, 1989. 
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Saul had already developed a similar approach a few years beforehand. 6 Ranger's article in 
The Invention of Tradition is set within a similar theoretical format. Africans are portrayed as 
accepting the boundaries of colonial classifications, this time not just within the realm of 
'ethnicity', but also in terms of such criteria as reified customary law. However, there are 
differences. As Ranger states, the idea of African 'acceptance' of imposed colonial ethnic 
categorisations in the Ross article ' was perhaps an odd one for someone as closely 
associated as I had been with arguments for "African initiative", especially since a sense of 
ethnic identity (Ranger's emphasis) could hardly be simply imposed from outside or from 
above. There plainly had to be more than merely African "acceptance" 7 
Ranger's chapter in The Invention of Tradition attempts to approach this lacuna in his work. 
Here he takes up the theme of African 'collaboration' in the 'invention' of ethnicity, as well as 
other criteria such as customary law. 8 Ranger illustrates African agency in the invention of 
ethnicity, and there are marked similarities between these agents and Vail's concept of 'ethnic 
entrepreneurs' or 'culture brokers'. The emphasis is very much on African collaboration with 
what is portrayed as an all-embracing colonial hegemony. In his later auto-critique, Ranger 
has come to view this work as too polarised between flexible, indigenous African custom and 
rigidified, ossified, European imposed 'tradition': 
I associated all the positive forces in African societies with custom 
and all the reactionary forces with tradition. The African agents of 
ethnicity were all those elements in southern African society of 
which I disapproved - chiefs against commoners, fathers against 
sons, patriarchs against wives and daughters. They had their own 
interests, of course, but these interests were compatible with 
colonial hegemony. Such collaborators were building up African 
patriarchy within the structures of European paternalism. 9 
It is important to place Ranger's studies in Racism and Colonialism and The Invention of 
Tradition in their proper historical context, as well as recognising the constraints upon Ranger 
at the time of writing them. Ranger wrote both before he was able to resume his more 
6 See Chapter 2. 
7 T. Ranger, `The Invention of Tradition Revisited', p. 26. 8 Apart from demonstrating his conceptual shift from 'Invention' to 'Imagination', Ranger's above chapter in Inventions and 
Boundaries and his chapter in Legitimacy and The State provide an auto-critique of his works on ethnicity which is far more 
comprehensive than the short analysis provided in this chapter. 9 T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited', p. 26. Ranger is correct in criticising this polarisation. However, 
intertwining concepts of rigidity and flexibility are argued in chapter 3 of this thesis to be fundamental in the creation and 
'imagination' of twentieth century Southern African ethnicities. 
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'microcosmic fieldwork' (his phrase) in Zimbabwe, after independence. 10 Subsequently, his 
ideas altered as will become apparent. Secondly, both works refer primarily to particular 
periods of colonialism - the 1930s and especially the period of early colonialism in the late 
nineteenth century. They do not focus on the Second World War and after. His piece in 
Racism and Colonialism focuses very much on urban and occupational ethnicities (despite 
claiming early in the article that he would focus equally on rural ethnic identities), and through 
the use of specific colonial sources demonstrates colonial pre-occupations with determining 
occupational status through 'ethnicised' ranking: 
The Fingoes , wrote Dr Hans Sauer, "are very intelligent and 
amongst the most industrious of our native races, with a Scots- 
man's capacity for making money" The Sotho were "the best 
class among the native tribes as agriculturalists and stock - 
breeders". The Zulus, on the other hand, were a "military race", 
displaying in the view of the Director of British Military Intelligence 
"a high qualification for a soldier's duty. Especially noteworthy is 
their inborn love of military exercises, their high courage and 
great power of endurance, and their loyalty to their leaders". 11 
Ranger also demonstrates that colonial ethnicised stereotypes were often negative in 
content, 12 and illustrates how 'positive' ethnic stereotypes were often altered by colonial 
administrators, missionaries, employers etc. according to the social and economic dictates of 
the time, and African responses to them13 He additionally concentrates on the articulation 
between colonially instigated ethnic categorisation in the urban field of employment, African 
acceptance and how this affected nascent worker consciousness (focussing particularly on 
the late 1920s/early 1930s). Ranger argues that Africans adopted these categories in order to 
obtain some measure of security in an extremely oppressive environment, thus hindering the 
possibility of a wider worker unity and often provoking 'ethnic faction fights'. 14 This 
conceptualisation of occupational ethnicities, with Africans internalising ethnic categories, 
presages much later work concerned with ethnicity and worker consciousness. 15 Thus Ranger 
argues that'European ideas came to be adopted and made use of by very many Africans'. 16 
10 Personal Interview, Dec 1995. 
11 R. Ross, Racism and Colonialism, p. p. 121-2. 12 mid, p. 122. 
13 Ibid, p. 128, for administrative reworkings of stereotyped Mfengu identities, in the light of Mfengu reluctance to work on 
Rhodesian mines at the turn of the twentieth century. 14 mid, p. p. 129-134. 
15 For example, see J. Guy and M. Thabane, `Technology, Ethnicity, and Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the 
South African Gold Mines', JSAS, Vol 14, No 2,1988. Also, Chapter 8. 16 R. Ross, Racism and Colonialism, p. 122. 
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The Invention of Tradition concentrates very much on late nineteenth century European 
colonialism, a time which Ranger argues involved a great deal of 'invented tradition'. 
Harmonising with the other essays in the collected work, Ranger's chapter focuses particularly 
on the last three decades of the nineteenth century -a period when Europe itself was 
producing a plethora of its own 'invented traditions' at a time of rapid social and economic 
change. ' This transposed itself onto Africa, as the colonial powers attempted to assert their 
authority through a hegemonic appeal to what they perceived as 'timeless' African 'traditions'. 
Ranger here develops the themes of his article in Racism and Colonialism to include African 
'collaborators'. His concept of European imposition and African 'acceptance' is still apparent: 
'The invented traditions of African societies - whether invented by the Europeans or by 
Africans themselves in response - distorted the past but became in themselves realities 
through which a good deal of the colonial encounter was expressed'. 18 However, there is 
much more emphasis on African collaboration in this work. The mechanistic assumptions 
contained in his article in Racism and Colonialism, where Ranger treats African 'acceptance' 
of ethnic categorisation as somewhat unproblematic, are challenged by this concept of 
'collaboration'. These themes will be examined later, in the context of Ranger's later works. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the problem with this approach (as Ranger points out in his 
auto-critique) is that it polarises his argument between what he identifies as ' "admirable" 
flexible custom and.. "deplorable" invented tradition'. 19 His views were to alter when he was 
able to resume his fieldwork in Zimbabwe. The following section analyses this change, as well 
as providing a critique of Ranger's most recent views regarding African ethnicity. 
4.2 Imagined Ethnicities - The African Response: A Critical Analysis of Terence 
Ranger's Later Works On African Ethnic Identities. 
Ranger was to resume fieldwork in Zimbabwe soon after he completed the above two studies. 
This led to the publication in 1985 of his work Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in 
Zimbabwe. 20 Although this study was not directly concerned with exploring ethnic identities as 
a problematic area for investigation, the data that Ranger gained from his fieldwork in Makoni 
17 Times of rapid, but incomplete, social and economic change often result in the production of 'invented traditions' and 
espousals of fixed ethnic categorisations, as people seek to reformulate their identities in order to achieve some form of 
Psychological security. See chapter five for a fuller analysis. 
T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, 
212. 
20 
T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited', in p. 26. 20 T. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe, London, 1985. 
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District was invaluable in shaping his ideas on the development of ethnic identities in 
Zimbabwe? ' In fact, the data collected on Manyika identity was subsequently published in 
Vail's 1989 work. 22 Fieldwork data in Matabeleland also led to Ranger's 1985 article The 
Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe. 23 The resumption of fieldwork activity allowed a more 
sophisticated and subtle treatment of the intricacies of ethnic identity construction by Ranger 
than his earlier theoretical approaches, as he readily acknowledges. 24 
Ranger's switch to fieldwork within Matabeleland was largely due to the civil war raging at the 
time in Zimbabwe. Political commentators and journalists tended towards portraying the war 
as some form of ancient primordialist conflict between 'Ndebele' guerillas headed by Joshua 
Nkomo, and 'Shona' guerillas led by Robert Mugabe. This implicitly suggested that Africans 
were naturally 'tribal', which in turn fed into wider European racist assumptions and 
misconceptions. Ranger states at the beginning of his article The Invention of Tribalism in 
Zimbabwe, that he is writing explicitly in a double capacity - as a historian of Zimbabwe and as 
chairperson of the Britain-Zimbabwe Society in the United Kingdom 25 The latter organisation 
aimed explicitly at countering distorted and misleading accounts of Zimbabwe, especially 
concerning the so-called 'tribal' divisions with which the British press became so pre-occupied 
when covering developments in the country. 26 The fact that he was now able to carry out 
fieldwork meant that he could counter these distortions through detailed historical research. 
The 1987-1988 Unity agreement between the Zimbabwean African National Union (Zanu) and 
theZimbabwean African People's Union (Zapu) was significant here, as it allowed more 
access to archives and documentation concerning Matabeleland and people were more willing 
to speak out in interviews. 27 The freeing up of Matabeleland archival material certainly 
benefited Ranger's work, allowing a more subtle treatment of Ndebele ethnic identities, and of 
other aspects of Matabeleland history. 28 
The Invention of Tribalism and his study of changing Manyika identities also sought to 
challenge African misconceptions regarding the causes of conflict. Many black Zimbabweans, 
including prominent politicians and political commentators, also advanced the argument that 
21- 
-- --- Personal Interview, December 1995. 
22 T. Ranger, `Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika: The Invention of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe', in L. Vail (ed), the 
Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, London, 1989. 
23 T. Ranger, The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe, Gweru, 1985. 
24 Personal Interview, Dec. 1995. 
25 T. Ranger, The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe, p. 3. 26 For two extreme examples cited by Ranger see The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe, ibid. 27 P. Kaarsholm, 'The Past as Battlefield in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe: The Struggle of Competing Nationalisms Over History 
From Colonization to Independence', Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, Vol 2,1989. 
28 Personal Interview, Dec 1995. Ranger wrote a particularly interesting article which arose from his later work in 
Matabeleland. It investigates such diverse (but in this case integrated) themes as colonial conservation ideologies, 
environmental issues, ethnic identity construction, and the connection between land and myth: T. Ranger, 'Whose Heritage? 
the Case of the Matobo National Park', JSAS, Vol 15, No 2,1989. 
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'tribalism' was endemic to the civil conflict. African political commentators additionally 
asserted that other conflicts were due to rivalries between Shona sub-ethnicities, such as 
Manyika and Karanga. In the introduction to his work on Manyika identities, Ranger refers to 
the Zambian government appointed international commission of inquiry, which reported on the 
murder of the Zanu chairperson Herbert Chitepo in 1976. The report claimed that Chitepo's 
death was the climax of a struggle for power between the Manyika and the Karanga. 'The 
victorious Karanga, now supreme in the party's command, had eliminated the Manyika 
Chitepo'. 29 He also cites further examples of Zimbabwean Nationalist politicians, the British 
press and even minority rights groups arguing that conflicts were fundamentally 'tribal' in 
nature. This fed directly into the Southern Rhodesian government's propaganda that black 
Zimbabweans were divided 'naturally' by 'tribe', and that this precluded the possibility of a 
workable African Nationalist government. 30 The Invention of Tribalism and the Manyika study 
sought directly to counter these misconceptions, and demonstrate both the historian and 
political activist inherent in Ranger. Both works additionally attempted to explain why so many 
black Zimbabweans had come to accept these politically manipulated forms of ethnic identity. 
I 
The resumption of fieldwork allowed Ranger to broaden and deepen his historical research 
methods. As he has recently stated, he prefers to initiate projects from fieldwork material, 
integrating comparative theory later(if at all) 31 This is reflected in his work on ethnicity. 
Ranger's article in Racism and Colonialism certainly seems a shift away from his previous 
'African Initiative' approach to African history, promoting an image of colonial imposition of 
ethnic identities from 'above' and allowing little space for African participation. The article did 
allow for African appropriation of these identities, but always within the boundaries set by 
colonial classificatory systems. 'African Acceptance', rather than 'African Initiative' is the main 
theme of the article. The chapter in The Invention of Tradition attempted to rectify this lacuna, 
but with difficulty. Here the theme was one of 'African collaboration' with European imposed 
classifications. This is perhaps best exemplified by Ranger's description of the 'collaboration' 
between the Lozi chief Yeta, educated Lozi migrant workers, and the Northern Rhodesian 
colonial administration in inventing a Lozi monarchy in the 1920s and 1930s. The diverse 
interests of all three of these groups were served by this 'invention of tradition', and it 
contributed considerably towards crystallising a Lozi identity centred around the resurrected 
monarchy. 32 
29 T. Ranger, 'Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika', p. 118. This comment is drawn directly from the Republic of 
Zambia's 'Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo' (Lusaka, 1976). 30 Ibid, pp 118-119. il 
32 T. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', p. p. 240-243. 
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Personal Interview, Dec 1995. 
However, even here, African initiative was constrained by European classifications. Various 
African interest groups benefited from this 'invention', but themselves were involved in 
indirectly oppressing the mass of ordinary Africans, whilst still operating within the constraints 
of colonial ideology. Ranger sought to move away from this conceptualisation when he 
resumed fieldwork and became aware that ethnic identities were not solely imposed from 
'above'. This is reflected particularly in his study of Manyika identity, which drew explicitly on 
the Makoni material. It is in this article that the conceptual shift from 'invention' to 'imagination' 
first becomes apparent. The article is also an excellent example of Ranger utilising fieldwork 
material to reformulate his theoretical understanding of ethnicity, and later reinforcing his 
findings through integrating comparative theory. In this work Ranger outlines the sub- 
ethnicities within the Shona community: 'Korekore', 'Zezuru', 'Karanga', 'Kalanga', and 
'Manyika' 33 He then concentrates on how a specific 'Manyika' ethnic identity was formed, in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, through the moral debate produced by 
migrant workers and various missionary schools. Ethnic identities are perceived as far more 
flexible than earlier studies, and missionary language construction is shown to play a major 
role in defining them. 
I 
Ranger demonstrates that the development of Manyika ethnic identity was a response to 
socio-economic change during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Manyika 
are shown to be indistinguishable from other 'Shona' groups before 1890, sharing common 
language and cultural traits, but without a common Shona ethnic consciousness. However the 
linguistic codifications of mission stations led to a written Manyika dialect being established 
which, together with colonial manipulation of territory, forged a Manyika ethnic identity centred 
around this language standardisation. Other ethnicised identities, such as Karanga and 
Zezuru, were created in similar fashion. So far this does not differ from his earlier concept of 
'invention' (apart from the stress on the importance of language in identity construction, which 
will be commented upon later). However, he then focuses on how the concept of 
'Manyikaness' became contested by various African interest groups themselves - and not just 
in terms of reifying 'invented' traditions. 
The earliest African converts to the christian message of these mission stations were essential 
in disseminating a common sense of Manyika identity where previously people identified with 
much smaller chiefdoms. They formed an early elite which articulated culturally brokered 
forms of ethnic identity in the wake of the language work of various missions. Thus a Manyika 
identity had been invented. However, the migrant labour process ensured that this identity 
remained fluid and processual, reflecting the socio-economic context of the times. Many 
migrant workers, after gaining an education through these missions and assuming a Manyika 
33 T. Ranger, 'Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika', p. 118. The following paragraphs summarise this work. 
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identity, went to work in South Africa. Migrant networks were slowly formed in the first few 
decades of the twentieth century, whereby established migrant workers sought to gain 
employment for newly arrived migrants. People who assumed a Manyika identity were able to 
forge a niche for themselves in the labour market as domestic servants and in hotels, due to 
their acquired literacy skills. European employers and administrators stereotyped people who 
assumed this identity as especially suited to this form of work, and therefore many sought to 
assume the identity even if previously they had not thought of themselves as 'Manyika'. Even 
people who had not converted to 
h 
stianity sought to assume this identity as it provided a 
distinct advantage in gaining employment. 'Manyika-ness' was being re-imagined to reflect 
the conditions of the urban workplace. 
Ranger also demonstrates how these migrants came into contact with organisations such as 
the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union and the Young Ethiopians through the course of 
their labour contracts. The radical ideas of these organisations merged with a sense of 
Manyika identity, and were disseminated back into rural areas, especially during the 
depression years dating from 1929, when many migrant workers returned home. 34 Rural 
c 
ristian educated culture brokers also sought to upkeep the Manyika identity in rural areas. 
Thus various African interest groups aimed at forging a 'Manyika' consciousness for their own 
religious, economic and political reasons. The invented identities emanating from mission 
codification of languages in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been re- 
imagined by various African interest groups to reflect their own life experiences as they 
entered the labourlnarket and a money economy. It was only during the 1930s that colonial 
officials and variouu I istian missions sought to codify a standardised 'Shona' language, and 
thus forge a Shona identity. This was in order to provide avenues of common communication 
for government beyond the limits of dialect provinces, and to provide missions with the chance 
to extend theirir chrristian message in a more effective fashion. By the 1950s a specific Shona 
identity had emerged, with which many Zimbabwean African Nationalists identified. 
However, facets of earlier identities, such as Manyika, died hard, and many missions and 
educated Africans fiercely resisted the merging of 'Manyika-ness' within a wider Shona 
identity. Ranger makes the point that these smaller ethnicised identities could still provide a 
rallying point in the Zimbabwean Nationalist struggle throughout the 1970s. Many exiled 
Nationalists grouped together under these identities. It was these remnant identities which 
were manipulated by ethnic culture brokers during these years, and which contributed to the 
death of Chitepo. Ranger thus demonstrates that Manyika identity never existed in an 
essentialist, reified form. It was a fluid and processual identity which was appropriated by 
34 For an analysis of how the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union sought to link working class interests with rural 
concenrs and ethnic identities see chapter 5. 
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various African interest groups throughout the twentieth century, reflecting the life experiences 
and meeting the needs of different people. It was only during the second half of the twentieth 
century that this form of fluid identity was manipulated by various culture brokers, and divided 
the Nationalist movement, precisely because these 'tribalist' politicians could play on the 
meanings these remnant identities still held for many people. A previously fluid form of 
Manyika identity had been expropriated to meet the requirements of ambitious politicians bent 
on pursuing their own political projects. 
Through this work Ranger had moved away from a narrow concept of 'invented ethnicity' 
solely from 'above', and demonstrated - through the resumption of fieldwork - that the 
construction of identity is far more subtle and contested than he formerly portrayed it to be. In 
short, ethnicity could be 'imagined' and 're-imagined' in a contested socio-economic context. 
By doing so he also provides a riposte to those political commentators who argued that the 
Nationalist movement was riddled by primordial tribalist divisions which had existed in 
unchanged form for centuries. These findings also presage many of the theoretical 
paradigms - post-modern and otherwise - that emerged after Ranger had completed the 
fieldwork from which this article emanated. It is worthwhile examining these works and 
conferences, or at least the ones that influenced him, as it demonstrates how he is able to 
assimilate their theoretical tenets within his own developing theoretical approach vis-a-vis 
ethnicity - an approach which, since 1980, has been firmly grounded in fieldwork. 
It seems reasonable to assert that one major conference and several published works 
influenced Ranger as he assimilated his fieldwork data for the Manyika article, and 
subsequently provided an auto-critique of The Invention of Tradition. The conference in 
question was the one held at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA in 1983,35 and the 
published works are those of Benedict Anderson38 Steven Feierman 37 John Wright and 
Carol ý; -$ Hamilton'38 the various works of Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, 39 and John and 
Jean Comaroff. 40 The ideas which emanated from the Virginia conference have already been 
analysed through the examination of Vail's work in chapter three, and will therefore not be 
reiterated here, apart from stressing Vail's emphasis on ethnicity as a modern phenomenon, 
35 Personal Interview, Dec. 1995. Leroy Vail's 1989 work, cited above, was the direct product of this gathering. 36 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, London, 1983. 
37 S. Feieruran, Peasant Intellectuals, Madison, 1990. 
AR 
-- There are several articles by these academics which influenced Ranger. See his auto-critique The Invention of Tradition 
Revisited', p. p. 30-32, for a complete reference list. 39 Again, see the above auto-critique for a complete reference list, p. p. 33-38. 40 John and Jean Comaroff, 'Of Totemism and Ethnicity: Consciousness, Practice and the Signs of Inequality'; first published 
in Ethnos, Vol 52.1987, and subsequently as a chapter in the authors' joint work Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, 
Oxford, 1992. (specifically cited by Ranger in the above-mentioned personal interview, Dec. 1995). It is important readers 
recognise that many other works influenced Ranger in his conceptual move from'invention' to 'imagination'. However, a 
comprehensive treatment of these would require far more than one thesis chapter. I have focused on the ones which most 
directly relate to Ranger's reconceptualisation of ethnicity within this context. 
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only emerging in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an hypothesis with which 
Ranger fully concurred. Benedict Anderson's work on the importance of language and what 
he termed print-capitalism was also very influential in the formulation of Ranger's theoretical 
approach as he assimilated his Manyika fieldwork data. Interestingly, Ranger turns Anderson 
'on his head' in this article. Whilst gaining intellectual inspiration from Anderson's discussion 
of the interactions of language development and national feeling, he found that Anderson's 
concept of 'print-capitalism's' ability to create large unified languages from an oral multiplicity 
to be the reverse of the Manyika case. 1 
(Here) printing had actually broken up a common language into 
distinct and competitive dialects... Initially, the various churches 
were more concerned to Christianize intensively in their own 
particular zones than to create a territory-wide market for missionary 
literature. It was the use of literacy by labour migrants which linked 
this process with the industrial political economy. 42 
Only from the 1930s onwards, as the state and various capitalist enterprises began to wish to 
reach wider markets with vernacular publications did a drive towards 'Standard Shona' 
begin. 43 Feierman's work was instrumental in refining Ranger's concepts of African peasant 
intellectual roles in defining ethnic identities. It certainly integrates with Ranger's concept of 
'African initiative' in shaping their own history. The role of intellectuals in defining ethnic 
identities - and indeed, how one defines the term 'intellectuals' in this context - is important. 
Intellectual 'culture brokers' are perceived as an essential factor in shaping modern ethnic 
identities by many academics and Ranger is no exception to this perception. 
The studies of Wright and Hamilton also contributed to Ranger's concepts of intellectual 
'culture brokers', in terms of a pre-colonial ethnic identity construction. Additionally, the work 
of Lonsdale and Berman exercised considerable influence over Ranger, especially Lonsdale's 
concepts of moral ethnicity and political tribalism. It is easy to conceive why these terms 
integrated with Ranger's own approach to African history, and how it helped refine his 
conceptual shift from 'invention' to 'imagination': 'Lonsdale calls the colonial (and post- 
colonial) invention of ethnic groups and their exploitations as units of patronage political 
tribalism; the imagination by Africans of ethnic citizenship he calls 'moral ethnicity' '. 44 The 
41 T. Ranger, 'Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika', p. 142. For Anderson's concept of'print-capitalism' see his seminal 
work Imagined Communities. 
42 T. Ranger, 'Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika', p. 142. 
Ibid. The importance of language in identity construction will receive a denser treatment in chapter 9. dd 
T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited', p. 38. 
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concept of moral ethnicity restores African initiative to the forefront in shaping ethnic identities, 
without fully intertwining it with colonial classifications. 45 Finally, the work of the Comaroffs 
regarding ethnicity also influenced Ranger during the time they were all based at the 
University of Manchester - although this does not apply to their more recent research. Their 
article 'Of Totemism and Ethnicity' was especially important in giving Ranger's work an 
'anthropological edge . 46 
4.3 'Imagined' Ethnicities and Ethnicity from 'Below'.: Does Ranger's Theory Address 
the Totality of the African 'Ethnic Experience'? 
The main issues requiring analysis with respect to Ranger's work are his assumptions that 
ethnic identities require intellectuals, of whatever hue, to formulate them, and that ethnic 
identities are a distinctly modern phenomenon. These two assumptions are now made by 
most academics concerned with the history of ethnic identity construction, 47 although Ranger's 
approach is particularly subtle and sophisticated. The shift from rural to urban environments, 
change in societal scale and differing gendered concepts of ethnicity are all demonstrated to 
be relevant in determining ethnic identities. 
Writing about the formation of nationalist movements, the geographer Jan Penrose has 
posited the following theory regarding the relationship between culture and nationalism, and 
what elements are'essential': 
(T)he only constant seems to be the 'process' of category 
formation and the associated 'processes' of individual 
identity and group formation which generate a sense of 
belonging. It is these processes, and not any of their 
particular end products that human beings cannot do 
without... the power associated with culture as a particular 
way of life comes from appropriating the essentialness 
of the processes which give rise to it. This conception of 
culture is empowered by the inappropriate transfer of 
essentialism from 'processes'to 'select products' of 
these processes. 48 
45 These theoretical concepts are central to the theoretical thrust of the rest of this thesis. 
40 Personal correspondence and personal interview, Dec 1995. 
47 See the introduction to L. Vail's The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa and G. Marc's Ethnicity and Politics in South 
Africa. London, 1993, for just two of many examples. 4 J. Penrose, 'Essential Constructions? The 'Cultural Bases' of Nationalist Movements', in Nations and Nationalism, Vol 1, 
Part 3,1995. 
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Although her study is not concerned with African ethnic identities, Penrose's separation of the 
essentialness of the process of group formation, as contrasted to the constructed nature of the 
end product (a construction led by nationalist intellectual culture brokers) is useful in 
attempting to analyse whether 'passive' cultural ethnic affiliations did or do exist in Africa. 
Gerhard Mare's recent work certainly holds to the concept of the process of group formation 
as essential, or at least fundamental, to human existence. 49 This needs to be related to the 
'primordialism/instrumentalism' debate, with specific regard to the African context. In his 
recent co-edited study with Olemi Vaughan, Ranger has grappled with this debate, and 
y)Smith. Smith provides more than a hint of specifically with the theoretical tenets of ýt: o-n- 
primordialism in his assumptions. Ranger comments that Smith, who views ethnic affiliations 
as the 'primordial' base from which nationalism grows, must have found The Invention of 
Tradition particularly jarring, as it argued that ethnicity itself was an invented constructoo 
However (and this provides yet another example of Ranger taking on board, and 
reformulating, the criticisms of other scholars) Ranger does argue that there is a point to 
Smith's criticisms51 of The Invention of Tradition: 
Smith's challenge to Hobsbawm - what was there before 
nationalism in Europe? out of what did it grow? - can be 
turned into a challenge to Ranger. If ethnicity is recent in 
Africa out of what cultural material did it grow? What 
alternative forms of self- conscious identity preceded 
ethnicity and how were they constructed? If African states 
did not draw on ethnic solidarity for their legitimation, on 
what solidarities did they draw? 52 
Ranger certainly doesn't fully analyse pre-colonial identities in his auto-critique of his chapter 
in The Invention of Tradition, an omission which he readily admitted at the time 53 However, he 
has recently systematically dealt with this lacuna in his work, 54 again demonstrating his ability 
49 G. Mare, Ethnicity and Politics, p. p. 7-8. 
50 
T. Ranger and O. Vaughan, Legitimacy and the State, p. 9. As mentioned in chapter 2, there occured a plethora of theories 
regarding nationalism from the mid-1980s onwards, and scholars concerned with the study of African ethnicity increasingly 
integrated these works - which had previously often run parallel to studies of ethnicity - into their own theoretical frameworks. 
Some of the most influential studies of nationalism are as follows: the work of Benedict Anderson (mentioned above); E. 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, London, 1983; E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Cambridge, 1990; A. 
Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, 1986. Basil Davidson utilises some of these theories in the context of African 
nationalism in his The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, London, 1992. sl Ranger here is referring to Smith's critique contained in his article `The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed', in 
Millenium. Vol 26, No 3,1991. 
52 T. Ranger and O. Vaughan, Legitimation and the State, p. 9. 11 J., _.. - -- 1uta, p. p. 9-10. 
54 T. Ranger, `The Nature of Ethnicity: Lessons From Africa', personal copy of lecture given at Warwick University. 1995. 
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to 'soak up' ideas and criticisms which might emanate from theoretical paradigms markedly 
different from his own. However, it is important to recognise here that the debate with Smith 
reflects Ranger's 'turn' towards a more post-modern analysis of ethnic identities. 55 This 'turn' 
can already be discerned in his earlier works, such as The Invention of Tradition, and indeed 
his most recent study is partly a response to a 'primordialist' interpretation of ethnic identities. 
It also reflects Ranger's attempts to move beyond the intellectual processes which underlay 
the production of ethnic units, the major focus of his recent works, and redirect attention to the 
great disruptions which colonialism wreaked on pre-colonial identities. 56 It is worth exploring 
Ranger's appropriation of facets of post-modern analysis, and comparing it to Penrose's 
concept of the 'essential' need for group formation. This comparative analysis allows a 
greater understanding of the complexities of ethnic identities, and facilitates a critique of 
Ranger's most recent hypotheses regarding the subject. 
Smith has summarised the position of post-modern analyses of nationalism as follows: 
Though nations are modern and the product of modern 
cultural conditions, nationalists who want to disseminate 
the concept of the nation will make liberal use of elements 
from the ethnic past, where they appear to answer to 
present needs and preoccupations. The present creates 
the past in its own image. So modern nationalist intellectuals 
will freely select, invent and mix traditions in their quest for 
the imagined political community. 57 
With some modification, this interpretation can be applied to Ranger's analysis of southern 
African ethnicities. Certainly the concept of ethnic identity as a relatively recent phenomenon, 
and the requirement of intellectual mobilisation, are readily apparent in Ranger's work. This is 
evidenced by the above quoted examples of Lozi and Manyika identities. However, Ranger's 
approach differs in terms of his theoretical shift from 'invention' to 'imagination'. For this 
involved different types of intellectual 'ethnic entrepreneurs'. This theoretical shift does not 
involve- a complete break from the concept of 'invention'. Rather, as Ranger has recently 
55 This 'post-modern' turn is not to suggest that Ranger has forsaken historical narrative. He vigorously defends the latter in a 
paper presented at Edinburgh University: 'Africa in the Age of Extremes: The Irrelevance of African History', Centre of 
African Studies, University of Edinburgh, May 1996. 56 Ranger refers to this lacuna in his work in the following: T. Ranger, 'Colonial and Postcolonial Identities', in T. Ranger 
and R. Werbner (eds), Postcolonial Identities in Africa, London, 1996, p. 274. The attempt to address this issue may well have 
been partially provoked by J. Ajayi's following criticism of Ranger's concepts of 'invention' and 'imagination': 'as we focus 
more and more on the 'discourse' of invention and imagination, we move further and further away from the reality of the 
problem of what nourishes, and what undermines, the legitimacy of the state in Africa'. (J. F. Ade Ajayi, Book Review of T. 
Ranger and O. Vaughan (eds), Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa, in JAN, Vol 34, No 1,1993. If so, this 
reflects another example of Ranger's ability to take on board the criticisms of other scholars. 57 A. Smith, 'Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations', in Nations and 
Nationalism, Vol 1, Part One, 1995. 
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argued, the term 'invention' applies to a particular period (the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries) when European colonialists were imposing 'invented' traditions in order to 
gain an hegemonic hold over African societies. Ranger still maintains this argument vis-a-vis 
the genesis of African ethnic identities, but views his concept of the 'imagination' of ethnicities 
as a development of this theme. 'An invention may take some time to develop but, once made 
by the individual or team who have been working on it, all that is left is to apply for a patent. It 
is a term which makes little allowance for process, for the constant reworking of identities and 
the steady transformation of institutions'. 58 
Apart from the Manyika example this processual development is demonstrated in Ranger's 
recent reworking of ethnic construction in Matebeleland. As Ranger states, his 1985 pamphlet 
The Invention of Tribalism in Zimbabwe concentrated on how there emerged an alliance 
between European administrators and Ndebele indunas (supplemented by the ideological 
work of mission educated Ndebele intellectuals) in terms of ideologically forging a particular 
Ndebele identity in the first half of the twentieth century. In simplified terms, this identity 
construction aimed at propping up European hegemony. Many Indunas participated in this 
ideological construction, partly to avoid a restoration of the Ndebele monarchy, which would 
directly threaten their social status. Here, the theme of 'collaboration', so prominent in The 
Invention of Tradition, is readily apparent. Ranger's later work, however, has demonstrated 
how this form of identity was reworked (re-imagined) by a different set of intellectuals, such as 
Joshua Nkomo, who simultaneously aimed to revive Kalanga cultural nationalism whilst 
assuming leadership of the Matabele Home Society, 'which was defining a broader, more 
inclusive Ndebele identity'. By this time, two particular studies by Fields and Ekeh had 
considerably influenced Ranger's theoretical approach 59 Both these works stressed the 
partial nature of colonial hegemony, allowing Africans some form of autonomy within the 
colonial ideological framework imposed on them. In this later work, Ranger also argues that 
conservation and betterment policies - involving massive destocking and movement of people 
- alienated Ndebele chiefs 'and drove them and their people into an alliance with the urban 
political spokesmen of the wider Ndebele identity' 60 The central role of intellectual 'culture 
brokers' remains a central theme throughout Ranger's developing theoretical approaches 
however, and his most recent study to date concerning ethnic identities still stresses their 
relatively recent origins6' 
58 T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited', p. 23. 59 K. Fields, Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa, Princeton, 1985, and P. Ekeh, 'Social Anthropology and Two 
Contrasting Uses of Tribalism in Africa', Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol 32, No 4,1990. Field's work has 
been particularly influential on Ranger's later theoretical developments, and not just within the realm of ethnicity. For 
example, her work has been a major factor in respect of his reconceptualising the relationships between anti-colonial resistance, 
African religious movements and African nationalism; see T. Ranger, 'Religious Movements and Politics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa', African Studies Review, Vol 29, No 2,1986. This article also indirectly stresses the localising and ethnicising effect of 
partial colonial hegemony. 
60 T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition Revisited', p. 42. Al 
"' T. Ranger, 'The Nature of Ethnicity', passim. 
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Ranger sets out to address systematically pre-colonial identities in African societies, and to 
demonstrate that most were not ethnic constructs, but consisted of other forms of 
identification. He situates his argument in the context of a debate with a 'moderate' form of 
primodialist theory, embedded in the 'givens' of 'congruities of blood, speech and 
culture... common blood, kinship and belief. 62 In response to these assumptions, Ranger sets 
himself the task of answering the following questions: 'If these amounted to ethnicity, how 
could I claim that it was recently invented? And if they were not the ingredients of ethnicity, 
what identities did they underlay? ' 63 The next nine pages of the article are then devoted to 
dismissing these 'givens' as necessarily associated with ethnicity, whilst constructing an 
argument concerning what forms of identity did exist in Africa before colonialist penetration. 
Thus Ranger responds in this paper to the earlier mentioned critique of Smith. 
Utilising, amongst others, the recent work of Robert Shell on eighteenth century Cape families, 
Ranger argues that kinship was not necessarily connected to ethnicity, and led to other 
identities. Family was/is a social construction and metaphor, which has often been used in 
Africa 'to bind together in defined relations of inequality people of many different origins' sa 
Ranger eventually concludes this first section of his article on pre-colonial African identities as 
follows: 
African identities were given by and expressed in place, 
household, connection, occupation, polity, cult, status - 
much like European identities in the medieval and early 
modern period ... Early modern Europeans who visited 
Africa were able to take these familiar identities seriously; 
later modern Europeans needed to find ethnicity. 65 
He then analyses the effect such criteria as the uneven penetration of the capitalist economy, 
missionary codification of language, competition for scarce resources, and not least colonial 
paranoia as major contributing factors in the construction of African ethnic identities, together 
with identity construction by African intellectuals and ordinary Africans' appropriation of these 
identities. 66 In other words, 'invented' ethnic identities became 'imagined' ethnic identities. 
62 Ibid, p. 1. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, p. 3. 
65 Ibid, p. 9. 
66 Ibid, p. P. 9-14. 
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The article therefore gives a picture of alternating fluidity and rigidity with regard to African 
identities. Pre-colonial identities are portrayed as fluid, processual, constantly changing87, and 
this only altered with the onset of colonialism and capitalist penetration which for various 
reasons rigidified identities in an ethnicised sense. However, this hegemonic rigidity was not 
all-encompassing, and Africans were able to 're-imagine' their ethnicised identities - albeit 
within the confines of colonial imposed boundaries. This of course is not to suggest Ranger 
was arguing that Africans thought of themselves constantly In an ethnicised sense from 
colonialism onwards. Rather that many fluid aspects of their identities had now been codified 
and rigidified in a rigid, 'ethnic' format. Ranger again utilises Lonsdale's twin concepts of 
political tribalism and moral ethnicity in order to facilitate conceptualisation of these changes, 
thus demonstrating that state imposed, rigidified manipulation of ethnicity'from above' was not 
the only form of ethnicity. Moral ethnicity, with its fluid, processual nature (echoing Penrose), 
illustrated African's own autonomous contributions to what exactly ethnic identity entailed 
albeit within colonially defined ethnic boundaries. He also reiterates his argument that ethnic 
identities did not necessarily arise from colonialism, referring - as in his earlier auto-critique - 
to the case of 'the Zulu'. 
It would seem therefore that, with this article, Ranger has developed a theoretical 
conceptualisation of African ethnic identities which fully addresses the criticisms of his earlier 
approaches to the subject. It suggests a considerable change in Africans' consciousness, 
from fluid, processual forms of identity to codified, rigidified formats. His argument is certainly 
very convincing. There is no doubt that a plethora of different identities arose (if slowly and 
unevenly) in the wake of colonialism and capitalism, including class, gender and generational 
identities as well as ethnicised ones. Additionally, as ethnic identities cannot be separated 
from other forms of identity (see following chapters) it is easy to conceive of the huge array of 
identities and moral discourses which arose in the wake of these changes. The influence of 
the Comaroffs is readily apparent in this article, especially their work 'Of Totemism and 
Ethnicity', originally published in 1982 and very influential upon Ranger at that time as well as 
in his latest article. The Comaroff piece allowed Ranger to explore in more depth the 
relationship between culture and ethnicity, both in terms of colonially induced change or, In the 
case of the Zulu, from African societies themselves. Arguing that it is possible for ethnicity to 
emerge 'wherever there are relations of inequality and exchange accompanied by intellectual 
assumptions of cultural and somatic classification', 68 Ranger comments thus: 
67 Ranger draws on an impressive array of academic works in order to reinforce his argument. For example he utilises the 
following in order to demonstrate the socially constructed nature of'family' in order to refute the argument of'blood' or genes 
as a 'given' of ethnic identity: R. Shell, Children of Bondage, Johannesburg, 1994, K. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger 
Delta, 1830-1885, Oxford, 1956, J. Miller, Wa}Sof Death, Wisconsin, 1988. For the fluidity of pre-colonial language he draws 
on the work of A. von Oppen in J. Heidrich, Changing Identities. The Transformation of Asian and African Societies Under 
colonialism. (Center for Modern Oriental Studies, 1994). He also argues for the fluidity of precolonial religions, drawing on 
the many of his own works concerned with this field. One can't help feeling, however, that this concept of fluidity has been 
oversimplified, as will become apparent later in the chapter. 68 Ranger, 'The Nature of Ethnicity', p. 10. 
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"In systems where 'ascribed' cultural differences rationalize 
structures of inequality", write John and Jean Comaroff, 
"ethnicity takes on a cogent existential reality. it is this 
process of reification that gives it the appearance of being 
an autonomous factor in the ordering of the social world. 
As a result, ethnic identities regularly assume, for those 
who share them, a pervasive functionality in everyday 
social, economic and political life". 69 
The Comaroffs have further explored what they aptly term 'the colonisation of (African) 
consciousness' in their collected work Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, which 
seems to reinforce Ranger's conceptualisations. Examining the impact of missionaries upon 
Tswana consciousness in the nineteenth century, they comment: 
for the Tswana, the encounter with a people preoccupied 
with techniques of self-representation and rationalisation 
brought forth a sense of opposition between 'sekgoa' 
(European ways) and 'setswana' (Tswana ways). The 
latter was perceived, for the first time, as a coherent body 
of knowledge and practice in relation to the former, which 
they had learnt to see as a system of 'belief... In this 
moment of self-objectivication, we suggest, lie the cultural 
origins of modern Tswana ethnicity. For, until this time, 
the Bechuana' - who had no names for themselves, other 
than 'batho ; human beings - were divided into political 
communities distinguished by their totemic affiliations, a 
quite different form of collective consciousness. 70 
Thus, over a period of time, the Tswana became aware of the 'colonisation of their 
consciousness' and reformulated their identity accordingly - and in an ethnicised_ sense. The 
Comaroffs also seek to explain most pre-colonial African identities by what they term 'totemic 
consciousness'. " Again, the break with the pre-colonial past is stressed, something which 
seems at the centre of Ranger's conceptualisation of ethnic identities. 
69 Ibid. 
70 J and J Comaroff, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, Oxford, 1992. 71 Ibid, P. M. 
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The long standing historical conundrum of what matters more - 'continuity' or 'change' - is 
never more apparent than in the study of ethnic identities. Ranger certainly perceives a 
fundamental 'break' with the pre-colonial past, a conceptualisation common with most recent 
radical historical analyses. 2 Intellectual 'ethnic entrepreneurs', or 'culture brokers' are also still 
seen as an indispensible ingredient in ethnic identity construction. However, it is important to 
question whether constructionist theories of ethnic identities provide a complete, 
comprehensive explanation of ethnicity's genesis and, just as important, how these identities 
were, and are, perceived by the historic actors involved. Anthropology has grappled with this 
conceptual conundrum for sometime, referring to historical and social actors' concepts of 
themselves as emic categories of ascription, whilst the analyst's concepts, descriptions and 
analyses are referred to as etic. This distinction is of vital importance. For it is precisely in 
terms of how people perceive themselves that the roots of ethnicity lie. " If people believe in a 
particular self-identity, it is real in its consequences. Although not dealing specifically with 
ethnic identities, Karen Fields has stressed the importance of recognising this distinction in her 
study of colonial central Africa. 73 In his recent debate with the primodialist approach, Ranger 
refers to the argument that 'what is real in the mind is real in its consequences'. 74 Ranger 
accepts this, but then proceeds to argue that the acceptance of ethnic consciousness by the 
mass of the people, and its consequent 'reality', is initially constructed by 'culture brokers' 
(both African and European) within the confines of capitalism and colonialism. 
This brings us back to the argument of Penrose. It is necessary here to emphasise my 
assumption of a fundamental 'need to belong' amongst human beings, and that this identity 
has to be defined vis-a-vis the 'Other'. This identity is vocalised through cultural bases, which 
are not 'essential' in themselves (and are in fact socially and historically contingent, as 
constructionist historians argue). However, and this is also of crucial importance, the 
construction of these bases are 'essential'. People need to classify in order to make an 
ordered sense of the world. It is peoples' understanding of their ethnic identity within these 
constructions that need to be understood, in order to gain a greater understanding of ethnicity. 
This is where the work of such as the Mayers is so useful, for they allow people to vocalise 
exactly what their identity means to them. Constructionist approaches, whether those of 
Anthropology, History or any other discipline, even the most empathetic (such as those of 
72 
See L. Vail, The Creation of Tribalism. to which. as has been mentioned. Ranger contributed. See also chapter 2. 73 K. Fields, Revival and Rebellion in colonial Central Africa, Princeton, 1985. Fields' work influenced Ranger's developing 
analyses of ethnicity, religion and identity. This is acknowledged in both his auto-critique mentioned above, and his 1985 
article 'Religious Movements and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa', in African Studies Review, Vol 29, No 2. Both these works 
should be consulted in order to understand the influence of Fields upon Ranger's work. It is interesting, however, to note that, 
although Ranger places great stress upon the importance of this work (amongst others) in shaping his own conceptualisations, 
they do not seem to have altered the fundamental tenets of his own constructionist analysis. Ethnic identities are still generated 
from the impact of colonialism, and constructed by intellectual 'ethnic entrepreneurs'. This begs the question of whether 
Ranger - rather than directly debating with works that have in some way questioned his approaches - has reformulated them 
within the confines of his own conceptual approach. 74 T. Ranger. 'The Nature of Ethnicity', P. 12. 
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Ranger), cannot fully realise, or accept the 'reality' of peoples' own identities as the very 
nature of constructionism means that that this 'reality' has to be dismantled. Take for example 
the stress placed on intellectual 'culture-brokers'. This immediately begs the question 'what is 
an intellectual? ', and furthermore 'who is defining this grouping? '. Ranger sees intellectual 
'culture-brokers' as essential in the construction of ethnic identities. But is this social grouping 
perceived in the same terms by the ethnicised group in general? And if not, whose definition 
is to be taken as correct? 
There is a recognition of the need for elite and 'mass' group needs to articulate, and for a 
grounding of ethnic identities within the social realities experienced by the group in question. 
The problem is that, by the very nature of constructionism, the group's social reality as 
experienced by that group is not fully taken into account, due to the very fact that many 
constructionists disassemble realities in order to reveal their constructed nature. Thus there 
has to be an 'elite group of culture-brokers' as separate from the 'mass' of the people 
(although I accept that this 'mass' is not perceived as homogenous by constructionists - 
divisions in terms of class and gender are taken into account). What is not taken completely 
into account is how this elite group is perceived by the rest of the people in question. Certainly 
Shula Marks found that the group of culture brokers who forged the first Inkatha movement 
were not that divorced from the remnants of the pre-colonial consciousnesses exisitng among 
the 'mass' of the rural Zulu people. 5 Ranger is fully aware of the need to define 'intellectual 
culture-brokers' within the parameters of constructionist analysis, recognising the contribution 
of both mission-educated literates and rurally-based 'culture-brokers' such as diviners and 
local high-priests. 76 He views the fusion of the two as important in constructing ethnic 
identities, although with the majority of the ideological input emanating from the former 
category. But it is necessary to question how much Africans perceived these groupings as in 
some way separated categorically from other sections of the population. 
It is also important to recognise that culture does not equate with ethnic group. Culture 
transcends ethnic boundaries. As the Kriges state with regard to Lovedu society 'culture 
elements, culture patterns, and the major cultural configurations do not stop short upon the 
borders of districts, nor of tribes, nor even of culture areas'. " Furthermore, ethnicity is 
produced through group contact. A cultural group cannot be defined as ethnic in isolation. It 
needs to be able to define itself against another. Ethnic identities are formed when two groups 
have a minimum of regular interaction, and perceive themselves to be culturally distinctive. 
Furthermore, as the rest of this thesis will demonstrate, politicised ethnic identities form in the 
context of competition for scarce resources, where perceived cultural differences might be 
7s See chapter 5. 
76 _ Personal Interview, Dec 1995. See also his auto-critique The Invention of Tradition Revisited. 77 
E. and J. Krige, The Realm of a Rain-Queen: A Study of the Pattern of Lovedu Society, Oxford, 1965. 
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emphasised for political and economic advantage. In one sense ethnicity can be perceived as 
the politicisation of culture. Ranger certainly acknowledges much of this. For example, he 
argues that there were wide networks of trade and religious interaction amongst pre-colonial 
societies, which were feared by the colonial powers as potential settings for anti-colonial 
rebellion. Thus they reified and rigidified 'tribal' boundaries and appropriated chieftaincies to 
reinforce colonial rule. 78 It is easy to conceive of these wide-ranging pre-colonial networks 
facilitating the transcendence of cultural traits over the boundaries of 'tribe'. However, Ranger 
still does not explore what the significance of cultural traits were to the people involved. 
Therefore, he does not analyse their significance in determining African identities when the 
colonial powers rigidified 'tribal' boundaries. The significance of these traits also need to be 
recognised in the shaping of ethnic identities in the era of post-colonialism, and the 
subsequent rise of nationalist consciousness. 
The relationship between culture and ethnicity requires further analysis. As Eriksen states, 
whereas there is a mass of studies available 'which deal with power inequalities, the social 
reproduction of group boundaries, group competition and political identities, the "cultural stuff' 
that the boundaries contain... has not been granted proportionate attention'. 79 He points, for 
example, to the stereotyping of ethnic Gypsies by Europeans as unclean and dishonourable. 
This cannot be understood in terms of competition or domination, but rather in terms of 
encounters between cultures. These issues are certainly not addressed by constructionist 
historians such as Ranger, due in no small measure to the risk of reifying cultural difference 
and indigenous stereotypes. Ranger provides a comprehensive historical analysis of the 
social, political and economic factors involved in the shaping of ethnic identities but, due to his 
understandable wish to avoid reinforcing, and desire to challenge, 'primordialist' 
interpretations, he seems to avoid emphasising the cultural factor. This is even more 
understandable in the case of South Africa, where the former apartheid regime reified 
supposed cultural difference to such an extent. However, the time is ripe for a reappraisal of 
the influence of culture in shaping ethnic identities. This is not to suggest a primordialist 
interpretation. Rather, an analysis of the cultural input into Southern African ethnicities would 
seem to suggest a way forward in understanding what ethnic identities mean to the people 
who adhere to them, and whether they exist at another conceptual level which is not situated 
in the political sphere. Anthropological studies of African identities would seem to offer a rich 
field of material in promoting this endeavour, and the rest of the thesis will utilise their insights, 
whilst situating them in their social and historical contexts. 
78 -- T. Ranger. `The Nature of Ethnicity', P. 12. 79 
T. H. Eriksen. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, London, 1993, p. 136. 
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5. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE `WARRIOR NATION': THE WORK OF SHULA MARKS 
AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY ZULU ETHNIC IDENTITY. 
This chapter has a dual purpose. Firstly, it aims to critically analyse the historical 
development of Zulu ethnic nationalism in the twentieth century. Zulu ethnicised identity has 
acquired a special significance in the unfolding of twentieth century South African history, 
especially in the last two decades. The emergence of the second Inkatha Zulu cultural 
movement in the 1970s, its subsequent politicisation and espousal of ethnic Zulu nationalism, 
and its contrast with the broader conception of a pan-African nationalism promoted by the 
ANC, has played a major part in the increasing violence which marked the early transition 
from apartheid. The historical growth of Zulu political tribalism requires critical analysis in 
order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of politicised ethnicity in contemporary 
South Africa. Secondly, threaded throughout the chapter is an analysis of the works of Shula 
Marks, an historian who has provided many significant studies of the development of Zulu 
politicised identity in the twentieth century. Although receiving her initial training as an 
historian in South Africa, Marks later emigrated to Britain where she established an important 
centre for the study of southern African studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London. Her stress on the importance of African agency in the construction of 
southern African history has meant that her work illustrates Africans' own initiatives in the 
construction of ethnicised identities. She therefore avoids the pitfalls of earlier marxian works 
which placed primary stress on colonial 'divide and rule' policies and the later machinations of 
the apartheid state in socially constructing ethnicity. Hence her work has similarities with the 
moral ethnicity/political tribalism model although there are differences. She also provides 
further insight into how academics have changed their conceptualisations regarding ethnicity 
over time. 
5.1 Shula Marks and Zulu Identity in Pre-Apartheid Twentieth Century South Africa 
The nineteenth century Zulu kingdom founded by Shaka was fundamentally destroyed by the 
civil war which raged in the region between 1879 and 1884, itself a consequence of British 
colonial interference and the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879.80 The ill-fated Bambatha Rebellion of 
1906 emphasised the futility of armed resistance to colonial rule. 81 Radical marxian analyses 
of Zulu ethnic identities argue strongly that the uneven incursion of a capitalist economy, and 
the migrant labour process, which increased considerably as the pre-colonial Zulu kingdom 
disintegrated, mark a fundamental fault-line in the development of twentieth century Zulu 
ethnicity. The work of Shula Marks is firmly situated within this school. Nevertheless, her 
stress on the importance of African agency in the shaping of South African history allows for 
80 See J. Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand. 1879-1884, London, 1979. 91 
-' See S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal, Oxford, 1970. 
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Africans to shape their own identities in a rapidly changing socio-economic climate, although 
she still seems to place primary emphasis on the political machinations of an elite group of 
culture-brokers in terms of the creation of twentieth century Zulu ethnicity 82 This does not 
allow for a complete examination of what identification with Zulu politicised ethnicity meant for 
the mass of the ordinary people who adhered to this particular identity. 
Marks began to emphasise the importance of African agency early in her academic career. 
This is particularly apparent in a book review written in 1970 83 The article covers two major 
historical works which had recently been published: M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds), The 
Oxford History of South Africa to 1870, Oxford, 1969, and C. F. J. Muller (ed), 500 Years: A 
History of South Africa, Pretoria and Cape Town, 1969. By comparing the two, Marks 
illustrated the failure of studies such as that of Muller which fail to consider black Africans as 
part of the history of South Africa. Some of the themes which later dominate Marks' research 
on ethnicity and nationalism are apparent in this article. For example, she argues that Muller's 
edited work is a prime example of Afrikaner historiography in that it ignored the fact that South 
African history was shaped by the interaction of the diverse peoples living there, whilst The 
Oxford History argues that interaction is the main linking theme in South African history. The 
interaction between the various peoples sets the boundaries for ethnic and nationalist 
identities. Linked with this theme, Marks also argues that there are many similarities between 
the historical development of Afrikaner and African communities. She develops this 
hypothesis considerably in her later studies when her attention shifts more systematically to 
the study of ethnic and national identities. The importance of African resistance to early 
colonial and Afrikaner incursions in shaping African identities and communities is also 
discussed, and this is also a major element in the development of more explicit national and 
ethnic identities amongst African peoples in twentieth century South Africa. She also 
demonstrates the power of rumour and myth in constructing the African 'Other' amongst 
colonial societies. This is particularly apparent in her study of the 1906 Bambatha Rebellion84 
However, there is much more to the formation of ethnic and nationalist identities than 
representations and constructions of the 'Other', be that through the construction of 
knowledge by colonial intellectuals and politicians, or through the fears and hostilities of early 
settler societies themselves. This becomes increasingly evident in Marks' work. From the 
1970s onwards, she was concerned with far more than representations of identity. She also 
82 This is despite the fact that Marks stresses that awareness of an ethnic identity does not necessarily need to originate from 
elitist culture-brokers, but can originate from 'below' (personal interview, May 1996). Also see S. Marks, 'The Origins of 




-- - S. Marks, 'African and Afrikaner History', Journal of African History, Vol 11, No 3,1970. Rd 
-' See S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, especially chapter 6. The construction of the 'Other' is a major theme in the 
historiography of identity formation, and the works concerned with this theme are two numerous to reproduce here. See E. 
Said, Orientalism, London, 1978 for a theretically powerful overview of this theme. Also see J. Shuttleworth, 'Sons of Shaka 
or Sons of Umslopogaas? ', in N. Etherington (ed), Peace, Politics and Violence for an application of this concept to present- day Zulu societies. 
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placed much emphasis on African agency in determining the formation of more explicit Zulu 
ethnic identifications in the twentieth century context. 
The importance of the role of the Zulu monarchy in shaping Zulu ethnic consciousness is also 
evident in most of Marks' studies. She stresses that the Bambatha Rebellion was very much 
a restorationist, rather than revolutionary, rebellion, representing the last attempt by the pre- 
capitalist Zulu order to resist full incorporation into the capitalist economy. The origins of the 
rebellion lay in the accelerated impoverishment of both Natal proper and Zululand. Late 
nineteenth century disasters like the 1897 Rinderpest epidemic and the 1903 drought led to 
poverty and insecurity. This combined with colonially imposed hut tax - aimed at enforcing 
migrant wage labour - and the appropriation of Zulu land by white settlers, to provoke the 
Rebellion. Hence Zulu resistance was 'reluctant', as the title of Marks' volume claims, and 
was not an example of the resurgence of a supposedly innate 'war-like' urge amongst the Zulu 
people, an idea all too prominent amongst the white settler society in Natal 85 There was also 
much confusion amongst Zulu people as they attempted to come to terms with the vagaries of 
capitalism, and the plethora of petty laws imposed on those who sought work within the 
colonialist capitalist economy. James Stuart, a colonial official at the time of the rebellion and 
an exceptional Zulu linguist, collected much evidence concerning these issues from Zulu 
informants just prior to the Rebellion. One informant complained thus: 
Natives should not be given money because they do not know 
its use. After we have worked, the money we earn is taken from 
us in every way. Our needs are increased. We then go out to 
work and wages are reduced. 86 
The seeming pettiness of the law regarding black Africans in Natal also rankled. Ndhlovu ka 
Timuni, who had originally participated in the colonial economy, but who joined the 1906 rural 
rebellion, had his thoughts recorded and interpreted by Stuart three years earlier: 
Ndhlovu says, We cannot find your gate; the gateway in our 
own times consisted in going and tendering our allegiance. ' The 
chief laid stress on this. His meaning is that the native people, so 
far from being taken into our fold and becoming one with us, are 
standing outside and drifting further away as time goes on. 87 
85 _ __ - S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, 1970, chapter 6. 86 C. Webb and J. Wright (eds), 'The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and 
Neighbouring Peoples', Vol 3, P. 29. (Henceforth JSA). Webb and Wright have edited four volumes of Stuart's collection of interviews, published by the University of Natal Press, 1979-1987. This provides a major primary source for historians, and the 
work of Stuart provided the background for Marks' own work on the 1906 rebellion (see P. xvii, Reluctant Rebellion). 87 JSA, Vol 4, P. 212. 
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Marks demonstrates how Dinuzulu, then heir to the Zulu kingship previously held by 
Cetshwayo, became the symbol for resistance during the rebellion. 8 Dinuzulu had himself 
been exiled to St. Helena in the late nineteenth century when he was accused by the colonial 
authorities of fomenting unrest among the Zulu population, and encouraging rifts between the 
Usuthu, who supported the royal house, and other factions which opposed it. 89 When he 
returned after nine years of exile, the position of Zululand had altered considerably. It had 
been incorporated into Natal province, and Dinizulu himself became a government sponsored 
induna, responsible for just one region. But, as Marks points out, however well-meaning 
Dinuzulu might have been on his return, it was inevitable that he would become the focal point 
around which discontent congregated 90 His name was invoked frequently in the Bambatha 
Rebellion, and subsequently led to his final exile on a farm in the Transvaal despite the fact 
that he played no active role in the uprising itself. 
In an important article published in 1977, Marks furthers her analysis of the role of the Zulu 
monarchy in early twentieth century South Africa, its integral role in shaping a reformulated 
Zulu ethnic consciousness and examines the rise of the first Inkatha movements' It is from 
this point that her work seems to become more explicitly involved with investigating the 
historical development of politicised Zulu ethnic identification. 92 However, before analysing 
these works it is worth referring to a recent criticism of the revisionist school of historiography 
to which Marks belongs vis-ä-vis the study of ethnicity in South Africa, as this raises some 
major issues with respect to the way ethnicity is represented in South African historiography. 
Simon Bekker, a political scientist based in South Africa, has recently surveyed the major 
contributions to the study of ethnicity in South Africa from the disciplines of sociology, history 
and political science 93 In this overview Bekker provides a critique of Vail's 1989 edited volume 
which explores the historical development of southern African ethnic identities94 Whilst 
acknowledging that the collection marks a considerable break from earlip 
6,1m 
rxian studies of 
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S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, parts 2 and 4. 20 
These rifts in Zulu society were a direct result of the break-up of the nineteenth century Zulu kingdom after the Anglo-Zulu 
war and the consequent Zulu civil war. See J. Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, p. p. 238-9. 90- 
S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, P. 100. 
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S. Marks, 'Natal, The Zulu Royal Family and the Ideology of Segregation', JSAS, Vol 4, No 1,1977. 92 Marks has commented that her awareness of ethnic identities as a problematic area for academic investigation did not 
develop until the early 1980s. (Personal interview, May 1996). However, this article seems to lay the groundwork for many of 
her later articles, as will be demonstrated below. Following this article, Marks wrote several significant studies of Zulu ethnic 
identity, and ethnicity and nationalism in general. The main articles, and the ones which receive most examination in this 
chapter, are as follows: 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness', in L. Vail, 
The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, London, 1989; the introduction, co-written with Stanley Trapido, to The Politics 
of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, London, 1987; 'The Origins of Ethnic Violence in South 
Africa'; 'Black and White Nationalisms in South Africa: A Comparative Perspective', in P. Kaarsholm and J. Hultin (eds), 
Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, Roskilde, 
Denmark, 1994. These works borrow upon, and mutually reinforce, each other. Marks also, like Terence Ranger, makes much 
use of the recent explosion in studies concerned with ethnic and nationalist identities, and therefore can also be perceived as 
both reflecting and leading in the study of these identity formations. This observation will be expanded upon below. 93- 
- -- -- S. iiekker, Ethnicity in Focus, Natal, 1993. 
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See chapter 2 for the significance of Vail's work in contributing to the academic study of ethnicity in southern Africa. 
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ethnicity, Bekker argues that it still portrays southern African political identities as 
fundamentally the result of political manipulation. He also criticises several of the 
contributions concerning South Africa, including that of Shula Marks, as addressing ethnicity 
at the level of the 'nation-state', with ethnic identifications portrayed as 'fracturing' the 
development of a broader nationalist consciousness 95 Additionally, he argues that social 
history emerging in the 1980s, which analysed the historical development of ethnicity in South 
Africa, still placed too much emphasis on the role of capitalist development and ideological 
(political tribalist) forms of state manipulated ethnic identities. What these forms of identity 
meant to the people who adhered to them, in terms of every-day consciousness, went 
relatively unexplored. 96 
Marks' published studies regarding Zulu ethnic identities certainly seem to be primarily 
concerned with the political manipulation of ethnic consciousness. Her previously mentioned 
article analysing the development of the first Inkatha movement was also important at the time 
for stressing that twentieth century ideologies of segregation had their origins in nineteenth 
century Natal rather than the Boer republics, and that these nineteenth century ideologies 
were fundamentally reformulated in the twentieth century by English-speaking white 
segregationists 97 However, although not explicitly or solely concerned with Zulu ethnic 
identification, the role of the Zulu monarchy and the first Inkatha movement in shaping 
politicised Zulu ethnic consciousness is comprehensively analysed. Marks argues that, by the 
1920s, the colonial authorities were becoming increasingly concerned with the effects of 
'detribalization' in Natal and Zululand. This was due to the fact that Zululand had begun to 
'show really major strains as a result of the expansion of white capitalist farming, class 
formation within the African population, and overstocking and overgrazing - the latter 
ecological concomitants of the first two factors taken together with the consequences of the 
95 S. Bekker, Ethnicity in Focus, p. p. 86-87. 
96 Ibid, P. 84. 
97 The differences between the Boer republics' attitudes to chieftaincies and 'traditional' African societies, and that of the 
British administration in Natal, in the late nineteenth century was considerable. This was vividly portrayed in an article 
published in the Jan 29,1892 edition of the Natal Mercury. The article is in effect a response by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the 
Secretary of State for Native Affairs in Natal between 1845 and 1875, to an earler article by President Reitz of the Orange Free 
State published in the November issue of the Cape Magazine. In this article Reitz had advocated the abolition of the institution 
of chieftainship and the 'tribal' system in order to fully incorporate the black African population as a subservient workforce 
serving white rule: 'The Kaffir, as an individual, maybe a 'man'and (under due reservations) 'a brother', but as a member of a 
tribe, and the subject of a fat, arrogant chieftain, he can never be such. He is divided by an impassable barrier from the laws 
and customs of civilised humanity, and there is no room for him in his tribal condition in our European system of political 
economy'. Shepstone replied vigorously to this argument in the Natal Mercury article, strongly defending the upkeep of 
customary law, reserved lands for 'tribal' occupation, administration through acceptable traditional authorities, and measures to 
avoid the full proletarianisation of the African population which were the keystones of his reforms south of the Tugela river 
during his tenure as Secretary for Native Affairs, after the power of the Zulu monarchy had been broken (see D. Welsh, The 
Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Natal, 1845-1910, London, 1971, for comprehensive analysis of the reforms 
implemented by Shepstone, which became a forerunner of 'indirect rule' policies elsewhere in British colonial Africa). The 
contrast between Reitz's advocation of full proletarianisation, and the policy of 'separate development' pursued by the later 
apartheid regime after 1948, are obvious. The above quote from Reitz is taken from T. Shepstone, 'The Native Question: 
Answer to President Reitz', Pamphlet DT 763 CAP, Bristol University (no date), which reproduces the original Natal Mercury 
edition, and the original article by Reitz. 
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eradication of East Coast Fever by about 1920'. 98 These factors facilitated the expansion of 
the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union into rural areas, causing considerable alarm 
amongst colonial officials and white farmers. 99 Thus segregationists such as George Heaton 
Nicholls, M. P. for Zululand and President of both the South African Planter's Union and its 
affiliate the Zululand Planter's Union, began to advocate the restoration of the Zulu monarchy 
as a bulwark against rural unrest and discontent, and the preservation of 'traditional' African 
lifestyles in order to avert the perceived threat of communism. 100 
The culturally brokered, politically tribalist version of Zulu ethnic mobilisation in this period is 
strongly evident in this article. Through her analysis of the seemingly unlikely alliance 
between the small educated, professional, African elite in Natal and the Zulu royal family and 
its followers, Marks is able to demonstrate the convergence of widely different interest groups 
in terms of promoting the restoration of the Zulu royal line. The kholwa (African Christian) elite 
were products of mission school education dating from nineteenth century Natal. They initially 
rejected 'tribal' society and indigenous custom in order to embrace a 'European' lifestyle and 
eventual assimilation into colonial society. The divisions between kholwa and 'traditionalists' 
in many ways mirrored the 'red'/'school' split in the Eastern Cape. 101 The division was also 
largely geographical, with the kholwa mainly emerging from the nineteenth century Natal 
colony, whilst the Zulu kingdom north of the Tugela river remained largely impervious to 
missionary endeavours until the destruction of the Zulu kingdom in the late nineteenth century 
Zulu civil war. 
John Dube, the first president of the South African Native National Congress (later to be 
renamed the African National Congress), embodied the spirit of this educated elite. In an 
early published tract, Dube graphically demonstrates the rejection of pre-colonial forms of 
culture and custom: 
My people are thirsting for knowledge, are hungering after 
enlightenment, are ashamed of their nakedness and their 
empty minds. Our ignorance crushes us down. We cannot 
rise, even to be helpful to those that rule us, so long as this 
impotence lies heavily upon us. Relieve us of it. Help us to 
rise to those better things which we hoped for on your coming. 
98 S. Marks, 'The Ideology of Segregation', P. 183. 99 For an insightful study of the penetration of the ICUinto rural areas, see H. Bradford, 'Lynch Law and Labourers: The ICU 
in Umvoti, 1927-1928', in W. Beinart, P. Delius, and S. Trapido (eds), Putting a Plough to the Ground, Braamfontein, South 
Africa. 1986. Bradford also comments on the utilisation of Zulu ethnicity by the ICU in order to pursue their own agenda. 100- -- --- 
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That is what we pray; that is England's duty. 102 
His inaugural address as first president of the South African Native National Congress makes 
similar references to the need for 'civilisation'. 103 However, by 1938, Charles Mpanza, 
secretary of the Zulu Cultural Society, (dominated by Kholwa), was pushing hard for the 
restoration of the Zulu paramountcy and a return to custom and tradition. 104 
Marks argues that this considerable change in attitude towards the Zulu paramountcy was due 
largely to kholwa 'petty bourgeois' class interest. The growth in support for the ICU, and the 
consequent radicalisation of agricultural labourers, many of whom were employed by this early 
African elite, challenged their class status. This was already under threat from such legislation 
as the 1913 Lands Act, which in many ways was a response to the prosperity gained by many 
kholwa and other black African agricultural entrepreneurs in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Hence the restoration of the paramountcy served various diverse 
interests, which nevertheless could buttress white domination. Ideologues such as Heaton 
Nicholls perceived the need to encourage this restoration in order to avoid the formation of a 
radicalised African proletariat; Dube, and others like him, did likewise in order to upkeep their 
own privileged status, which was under dual threat from the activities of the ICU and 
government legislation. 105 
As Marks comments, this unlikely alliance led to the formation of the first Inkatha movement in 
1922-23. Founded by a group of Solomon's advisers, and members of the kholwa elite, 
including Dube, the movement aimed at raising money to purchase land for Zulu people and 
for paying off debts incurred by Solomon (which were considerable), as well as promoting Zulu 
'tradition' and custom and the restoration of the Zulu paramountcy. 106 However, Marks does 
not just concentrate on political machinations, class self-interest and colonial manipulation of 
identity in her article. She also refers to two elements which are very important in the 
formation of an evolving early twentieth century Zulu ethnic consciousness. These include the 
appeal of the Zulu monarchy to the mass consciousness of rural Zulu people, and the close 
102 J. Dube, 'The Zulu's Appeal for Light and England's Duty', London, 1908. P. S. Dube's pamphlet is littered throughout 
with these forms of subservient appeals, and these should be seen partly as a shrewd way of raising funds for his Ohlange 
industrial school, set up in the early part of the century. The pamphlet was specifically aimed at philanthropic bodies such as 
the Aborigines' Protection Society. However, it still seves to demonstrate kholwa thinking in terms of breaking from the 
perceived constraints of pre-colonial custom and culture, and of the wish to integrate with the 'European' way of life. 103 Quoted in N. Cope, 'The Zulu Petty Bourgeoisie and Zulu Nationalism in the 1920s: Origins of Inkatha', in JSAS, Vol 16, 
No 3,1990. P. 435. 
104 Quoted in S. Marks, 'The Ideology of Segregation', P. 194. inc -- Before the various social, economic, political and ecological changes outlined above led to the growth of the ICU, the Zulu 
monarchy was perceived as a threat by the colonial power, posing the possibility of unifying the Zulu against white rule (S. 
Marks, 'The Ideology of Segregation', P. 178). Furthermore, Dube and others like him, had earlier in the century been 
perceived by the Natal government as dangerous radicals (see S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. p. 72-76). Marks' article is 
particularly useful in outlining the politically expedient reasons for the change in attitude towards the Zulu paramountcy in the 
1920s. 
106 S. Marks, 'The Ideology of Segregation', P. 189. 
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connections which many of the kholwa elite had with the old elite of chiefs. People are 
socialised into pre-existing identities and ethnic mobilisation has to be rooted in the real 
experiences of ordinary people. Although the uneven incursion of a capitalist economy and 
colonial domination had fractured Zulu society, many facets of pre-colonial Zulu morality and 
values remained. 
Marks specifically refers to the importance of the role of the king in unifying pre-colonial Zulu 
society, protecting the people on both their natural and supernatural planes. 107 She also 
emphasises the close linkages between the new kholwa elite and the old elite of chiefs: 
'nothing is more incorrect than to imagine that there was an inevitable and invariable rift 
between the new elite of teachers, preachers, clerks, lawyers and prosperous farmers and the 
old elite of chiefs.. on many occasions the new elite were indeed the old in new guise'. 108 The 
reference to mass consciousness is also significant. For, as Marks comments, it was perhaps 
inevitable that people should turn to the royal family as well as the ICU, at a time of social and 
economic crisis. The Zulu royal family had been a central factor in defining pre-colonial Zulu 
ethnic identity, and the fact that full proletarianisation was being delayed through the migrant 
labour process meant that these loyalties remained the prime focus for many people. 
Nevertheless, Marks still seems to stress the culturally brokered version of Zulu ethnic identity 
to the detriment of further analysing ethnic identities at a more grass-roots level in this work. 
Political machinations figure far more prominently than issues of social, moral and ideological 
change. Gender identities, which are inextricably intertwined with ethnic and national 
identities, are also largely ignored. Some of these issues were directly addressed in Marks' 
later works. 
In 1983, Marks attended the conference at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, which 
resulted in Leroy Vail's 1989 edited work The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. Marks' 
contribution to this publication involved a further study of the construction of pre-1948 Zulu 
ethnicity, expanding her previous work by extending her study into the 1930s. 109 The influence 
of Tom Nairn's study of British nationalism is very apparent in this work. Marks herself states 
that his work has been one of the most influential in the development of her own thinking with 
107 Ibid, P. 186. The fact that Marks recognises the contribution of ordinary people in constructing Zulu politicised ethnicity 
during this period contrasts with the concept of 'invention of tradition' originating from Terence Ranger a few years later. 
Marks places African agency nearer to the centre of identity construction (although Ranger was referring to a specific period in 
his analysis, when 'traditions' were being 'invented' at a particularly rapid rate. Ranger's work has also suffered from 
misinterpretation, many academics utilising his conceptualisations out of chronological context - see chapter 4). 108 Ibid, P. 191. Early twentieth century African nationalist culture brokers often tended to display varying levels of 
consciousness with regard to nationalist and more parochial ethnicised identities. Many situated their conceptualisation of African nationalism in this period firmly within the idiom of the cultures and customs of the communities in which they were 
socialised. See chapter 9 for a more in-depth analysis of this issue. Marks specifically refers to the origins of several Zulu 
culture-brokers in this period, some of whom were early African nationalists, who often originated from chiefly lineages and 
were closely involved in the affairs of the Zulu and Swazi royal families. The South African Native National Congress was 
also heavily reliant on funding from the major royal families (see S. Marks, 'The Ideology of Segregation', p. p. 189-90). 109 S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness', in L. Vail (ed), The 
Creation of Tribalism. 
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regard to ethnicity and nationalism. 110 His depiction of nationalism as the 'Modern Janus' is 
particularly evident in this example of Marks' work, as is his argument that 'Third World' 
nationalist elites had to make use of the cultural building blocks already existing: 
In the Third World, as 'newly awakened elites' have 'discovered that 
tranquil incorporation into the cosmopolitan technocracy was possible 
for only a few of them at a time', they were thrown on their own 
resources and sought to mobilize their societies for advance... and 
the point of the dilemma was that there was nothing - none of the 
economic and political institutions of modernity now so needed. All 
that there was was the people and peculiarities of the region: its 
inherited ethnos, speech, folklore, skin-colour and so on... The new 
middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into 
history; and the invitation card had to be written in a language they 
understood. '" 
The article itself concentrates on the 'selective traditionalism' of the Zulu Cultural society, 
which pursued many of the objectives originating from the first Inkatha movement before its 
demise in the early 1930s. 112 Social change and ideological issues are also given far more 
prominence than previously. By now, Marks had been influenced by the work of Benedict 
Anderson as well as Tom Nairn, and this seems to have sharpened her approach in analysing 
the construction of 'imagined communities'. ' 13 She was also focussing on gender issues. 
Bekker's criticism that Marks addresses Zulu ethnic identity at the level of the nation-state in 
this article does contain some elements of truth. At the end of the article, Marks comments as 
follows: 
In Natal, to a very considerable extent - although there were, 
of course, exceptions and a certain radicalization there too - 
the construction of an ethnic `answer' to the problems of 
urbanization and modernity - whether by the Zulu Society or 
Inkatha - hampered the growth of the kind of radical vision 
which could have combatted the chauvinism encouraged by 
1 10 Personal Interview, May 1996. The work to which Marks refers is T. Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain, London, 1977. Ill 
"" S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 221. 112 This demise was due largely to Inkatha's close identification with Solomon, who was becoming increasingly politically 
unreliable by the start of the 1930s, and financial mismanagement. See N. Cope, To Bind the Nation: Solomon kaDinuzulu 
and Zulu Nationalism, 1913-1933, Pietermaritzburg, 1993, chapter 10. 113 Personal interview, May 1996. Marks' article on the rise of the first Inkatha movement (see above) in some ways presages 
these works, in that it does analyse the constructed and contested nature of culturally brokered Zulu ethnicity. However, Naim 
and Anderson seem to have been influential in allowing Marks to frame a more complex analysis of this construction, with 
social issues receiving far more prominence than before. 
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the state and the anti-Indian polemic of Natal whites in 1949 
- or, indeed, contemporary 'tribal' violence. 
14 
However, he then accuses Marks, together with various other contributors to Vail's work, of 
glossing over the fact that ethnicity can coexist easily within modernity, and instead arguing 
that these 'parochial' loyalties to 'clan', 'chief and 'tribe' will wither away as a wider 
consciousness develops. ' 15 This is a mis-reading of Marks' work, and can be illustrated 
through quoting another section of Nairn's theory regarding nationalism: 
(l)t has to function through highly rhetorical forms, through 
a sentimental culture sufficiently accessible to the lower strata 
now being called into battle. This is why a romantic culture 
quite remote from Enlightenment rationalism always went 
hand in hand with the spread of nationalism. 116 
This differentiation refers to the two main forms of nationalism which have rooted themselves 
in nineteenth and twentieth century global history; ethnic and civic nationalism. Nationalism 
itself is an extremely malleable form of identity (as is ethnicity), and can be allied with 
numerous different ideologies according to the historical circumstances of the time. '" Civic 
nationalism, rooted - as Nairn mentions - in Enlightenment rationality, 'envisages the nation as 
a community of equal, rights - bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of 
political practices and values... Ethnic nationalism claims-that an individual's deepest 
attachments are inherited, not chosen. It is the national community which defines the 
individual, not the individuals who define the national community'. 78 Marks' contribution to 
Vail's book implicitly develops this theoretical approach, moving beyond rigid classifications of 
identity and demonstrating how they can overlap and intertwine - for both ethnic and civic 
nationalism grow from the same roots. 19 
Marks outlines several concerns of the kholwa intelligentsia who dominated the Zulu Cultural 
Society at the time. These included the practice of lobola, land reform, the `proper' conduct of 
women and the practice of hlonipha and changing modes of dance which often interlinked with 
violence. All these issues were set within the context of concern over the effects of 
urbanization and proletarianization, and the tensions arising between the need to select what 
was considered valuable in African culture, and the need for this elite intelligentsia to maintain 
114- 
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Quoted in S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 221. 117 This malleability of nationalism is discussed in more depth in chapters 3 and 9. 112 
- M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys Into the New Nationalism, London, 1993. P. P. 3-5. 
119 Again, see chapters 3 and 9 for further analysis. 
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a self-definition of 'respectability'. 120 Of course, these concerns were not, exclusive to Zulu 
society at this time. Many other African communities contained small groups of elite culture 
brokers who were equally concerned with the effects of urbanisation and proletarianization. 121 
What is important to recognise here is that Marks was not, as Bekker implies, suggesting that 
ethnic identities would eventually wither away under the impact of modernity. Instead, she is 
stressing the multiplicity of paths towards modernity that existed within the South African, and 
specifically Zulu, context at this historical juncture. It is within this context that the moral 
ethnicity/political tribalism model can be usefully applied. 122 
In the context of Zulu ethnicity, it seems that the meaning of 'Zulu-ness' was being constantly 
debated within the small elite intelligentsia of the time. Marks provides several examples of 
this 'selective traditionalism'. She refers for example to Dube's denouncing of the lobola 
system as detrimental to the 'progress' of the people. 123 However, although this could be 
perceived as an attempt to allow more women independence, the Zulu Royal Charter itself 
defended the declining practice of hlonipha, which certainly entailed women maintaining a 
subservient role to men. 124 Marks demonstrates that all these debates were rooted in a 
concern with the effects of urbanization, modernity, and gradual proletarianization upon the 
Zulu people. The effects of the migrant labour process deprived villages of young men for 
considerable lengths of time and consequently put young women under increasing pressure to 
participate in sexual intercourse. This combined with the decline of external forms of 
intercourse - frowned upon by the church - to increase the number of unwanted adolescent 
pregnancies. 125 
Another contested area concerned dance. Marks refers to a heated debate between 
members of the Zulu Cultural Society, and other Zulu members of the kholwa dominated 
intelligentsia, concerning the Natal Education Department's introduction of 'Bantu Dancing' 
into the teacher training syllabus in 1948. Some members argued that this should be 
encouraged as a symbol of a vibrant Zulu culture, others objected on the grounds that it would 
portray Zulu people as 'primitive', encouraging white racist stereotypes. However, the Zulu 
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122 My interpretation of moral ethnicity and political tribalism is outlined in chapter 3. Ili 
'-- S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 222. The lobola, or 'bridewealth', system was central to the moral 
economies of many pre-colonial southern African societies. See A. Kuper, Wives for Cattle: Bridewealth and Marriage in 
Southern Africa, London, 1982, and J. Guy, 'Analysing Pre-Capitalist Societies in Southern Africa', JSAS, Vol 14, No 1,1987. 
Dube was a key member of the Zulu Cultural Society in the 1930s. 
124 S. Marks, ibid, p. p. 229-230. The whole issue of hionipha etiquette is, however, one of ambiguity, for women could 
maintain a circumscribed independence within its prescribed parameters. See chapter 7. Also A. Liebenberg, 'Authority, 
Avoidances and Marriage: An Analysis of the Position of Gcaleka Women in Qwaninga, Willowvale District, Transkei', M. A. 
Thesis, Rhodes University, South Africa, 1994. 
125 S. Marks, ibid, p. 228. The consequent male fear of loss of control over women demonstrates how women often marked the 
boundaries of ethnicised identities. As Marks points out, many men feared that 'their' women would fall prey to men of other 
'races' in an urban situation. 
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Cultural Society charter also inveighed against another form of dancing which had started to 
permeate Zulu culture through urbanisation and contact with westernised forms of culture: 
With regard to the abandonment of original Zulu dancing, it 
is to be observed that our youth do not now shrink from 
engaging in types of dancing that they copy from other races. 
It is said that these our people take whole nights capering 
man and woman glued together in pairs, cheek to cheek, 
jumping and jiggling in a manner that is most foreign and 
objectionable to us Zulus. 126 
Marks also refers to how pre-colonial dance forms could contribute to the ways in which a 
'pre-colonial past provided military metaphors for mobilisation'. 127 This issue will be examined 
later. What is made apparent through these examples is the fact that, although many of the 
Zulu Cultural Society were also ardent African Nationalists, they could only articulate this 
nascent nationalism to the majority of the people through the cultural building blocks which 
already existed. These building blocks provided the raw material for the growth of either 
ethnic or civic nationalism. Marks also points out that many of these early culture brokers 
were themselves not that far removed from the societies to whom they projected their 
message. 128 This is an important observation in itself. For although this new cultural elite 
represented in many respects a newly forming middle class, it still had its foundations firmly 
rooted in its own particular culture. Marks thus demonstrates that ethnic nationalism can 
evolve alongside civic nationalism, and this contradicts the criticism of Bekker. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates that the paths to modernity for Zulu people, and Africans in general for that 
matter, were diverse and varied. However, Marks can be criticised for concentrating too much 
on culturally brokered forms of ethnic identification in this article, and it is perhaps here that 
Bekker's criticism does have some credibility. For Marks does seem to neglect partially an 
analysis of what these culturally brokered forms of identity actually meant to the people they 
were projected at, and how they could reformulate them in order to form their own identities in 
an era of rapid socio-economic change. 
5.2 Shula Marks and the Multiple Levels of Ethnic Identity: Some Theoretical 
Reflections 
Ethnic identification works at various levels, intertwined with. other identities such as class and 
gender, and also in terms of moral ethnicity and political tribalism. There does seem to be a 
126 Quoted in S. Marks, ibid, p. 229. 127 Ibid, p. 233. 
128 Ibid, p. 224, and footnote no47, p. 237. 
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pattern within southern African societies whereby people have gained an ethnicised 
consciousness, largely - although not necessarily - through contact with colonising powers, 
which has provoked an internal debate with regard to what lived criteria best represents the 
ethnicised group. In other words, moral ethnicity. These identities have subsequently been 
appropriated by both the state and elite ethnic culture brokers within the group itself in order to 
pursue particular political agendas - in other words, political tribalism. 
129 Marks certainly 
recognises that various levels of ethnic identification exist, including what I have referred to in 
this thesis as 'passive', day-to-day, non-politicised identities, which people utilise in order to 
make sense of their lives. 130 However, she has argued that it is difficult to conceive of an 
ethnic identity without it first being categorised as such, either from outside the group itself, or 
by certain individuals from within. 131 Marks also questions Lonsdale's concept of moral 
ethnicity and political tribalism as potentially divisive and dangerous, arguing that moral 
ethnicity promotes the concept of an innate 'tribal' morality: 
It seems to me that there is an enormous danger in accepting 
ethnicity as a given... Once you maintain that it is the ethnic 
group which is the bearer of moral purpose, you entrench those 
boundaries in much too narrow a way... I think what we have to 
do is persuade people of the openness of boundaries, and the 
possibility of people moving to and fro. 132 
Hence there is a clear political objective in Marks' works. She seems to be arguing for an 
historiography which demonstrates that tight, constructed ethnic boundaries can be broken 
down. At a conference held at Roskilde University in Denmark in 1993, which was specifically 
concerned with theoretical approaches in studying ethnicity and nationalism, and which was 
attended by both Lonsdale and Marks, she argued that Lonsdale's concept was not applicable 
in the South African context. '33 
This dismissal of the concept of moral ethnicity seems to emanate from Marks' own 
advocation of demonstrating the fluidity of ethnic boundaries. Her earlier works, especially the 
129 See chapter 3. 
130 S. Marks, personal interview, May 1996. 
131 Ibid. In this interview Marks argues that everyone lives their culture, handed down from generation to generation. 
However, peoples perceive this as a 'natural' way of life, and that others who do not adhere to their culture, customs and 
lifestyles are 'strange'. She then argues that this does not mean that people perceive of themselves as an ethnic group without 
this identity being articulated in some form. 
132 S. Marks, personal interview, May 1996. Marks' response was to a question regarding her opinion of Lonsdale's concept of 
moral ethnicity. 
133 T. Ranger, personal interview, Dec 1995. The conference, entitled 'Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and 
Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism', was hosted by the university's department of 
International Development Studies. Ranger, who also attended the conference, recalls Marks commenting that the concept of 
moral ethnicity was not acceptable in the South African context, as it (according to her) implied that ethnicity was an 
acceptable, moral identity in itself. (Personal interview, December 1995). 
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two examples outlined above, stress the ways that politicised ethnicity (political tribalism) 
fractures class consciousness. She argues in Vail's edited collection: 'that the responses to 
poverty and privilege tend to take a 'racial' or 'tribal' form has as much to do with the 
deliberate manipulation of ethnic rather than other forms of identity by the state and the 
particular road that the African intelligentsia and political leadership have travelled in Natal'. 134 
Her later works place primary emphasis on the divisive effects of this form of ethnicity in terms 
of subverting a broader nationalist consciousness. 135 Therefore, although she argues strongly 
for the importance of African agency in the shaping of South African history, most of her works 
regarding the study of ethnicity are more concerned with the ideas and actions of elite leaders 
than on their relationships with their followers. She also fails to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of what these identities meant to the ordinary Africans involved. It is in this context 
that Bekker's critique carries some weight. IM Marks does refer to 'mass' consciousness in her 
1977 article, especially with reference to the importance of the Zulu paramountcy as an early 
focus for opposition to colonial rule. 137 However, this is not developed, and she concentrates 
primarily on the machinations of ethnic culture brokers. This seems to be a political choice. 
For by placing emphasis on the culturally brokered, politically tribalist form of Zulu identity, 
twentieth century Zulu ethnicity is portrayed as primarily a political, constructed, creation (and 
by implication, can therefore be deconstructed in order to forge a broader, pan-African 
consciousness). 138 It seems that Marks' work is pulled in two different directions over this 
issue. She always stresses the importance of African agency in her work, and yet places 
primary emphasis on the role of the state and ethnic culture brokers in terms of the 
construction of ethnicised identities, perhaps in order to avoid implying a dubious essentialism 
to Zulu ethnicity. However, the concept of moral ethnicity was never meant to suggest that 
ethnicity is moral in itself. Rather, it suggests that morality can sometimes be debated within 
an ethnicised context. I 
5.3 Age-Regiments, Migrant Labour, and the Erosion of Rural Identities 
The widespread formation of age-regiments in the time of Shaka resulted in a fundamental 
reformulation of pre-colonial Zulu society. Anthropologists studying Zulu communities 
between the 1930s and 1960s stressed their importance in producing the perceived character 
of the Zulu peoples. For example, Krige argues that the whole nineteenth century Zulu 'nation' 
134 _ -. - -- -- S. Marks, `Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 233. lii 
-- See especially her work 'Black and White Nationalisms in South Africa: A Comparative Perspective', in Inventions and 
Boundaries, her co-written introduction to The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism, and the Ambiguities of Dependence. 136 This should not be read as a ringing endorsement of all Bekker's criticisms. His dismissal of capitalism and colonialism as 
fundamental shaping forces in the creation of twentieth century ethnic identifications implies allowing the latter a dubious 
essentialism, which is patently not the case. 137 'The Ideology of Segregation', p. p. 187-8. 138 Ranger certainly takes the view that Marks perceives ethnicity primarily in politicised terms - personal interview, Dec 1995. 
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was organised into what could be perceived as one great military camp, which helped mould 
the 'character' of the Zulu people. 139 Reader, in his study of a particular Zulu society in the 
1950s, comments that 'religio-magical sanctions and the strengthening of the regiments 
reinforce political solidarity and fortify the people's belief in their capacity for potential 
independence'. 140 
Age-regiments, and their disintegration in the aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu war, and the 
subsequent Civil war, are important in gaining a more comprehensive understanding of why 
Zulu ethnic identities developed as they did in the twentieth century. As mentioned above, the 
promotion of the age-regiment system under Shaka contributed to the construction of the 
nineteenth century Zulu state, and therefore the growth of a specifically Zulu ethnic identity. 
The whole issue of regiments has provoked considerable controversy amongst academics 
concerning the psychological and sociological effects they had upon the consciousness of the 
peoples involved. When young men were buthwa'd (enrolled) into amabutho (age-sets or 
regiments), they had to reside at the military kraal of the king, providing service to him, and 
were not allowed to don the head-ring and thus be eligible for marriage until the king gave his 
consent. Women were also enrolled into age-sets, but were allowed to remain at their 
homesteads until marriage. Some histories concerning the Zulu peoples have argued that this 
restriction on marriage led to an accumulation of repressed sexual energy which was 
somehow transmuted into military vigour. A recent example of this approach is Stephen 
Taylor's 'popular' history of the Zulu people. 141 
Revisionist historians such as Jeff Guy have dismissed this somewhat 'primordialist' 
interpretation, instead arguing that the age-regiment system represented a mechanism of 
control over the production and reproduction of labour power in pre-capitalist society, allowing 
the king control over exploitation of the environment. 142 However, this revisionist approach 
does not completely explain the impact which the age-regiment system had upon the 
consciousness of the people involved. As a process of socialisation into particular identities it 
seems to have been very important, affecting Zulu societies well into the twentieth century, 
despite - or perhaps because of - the disintegration of the late nineteenth century Zulu state. 
Furthermore, these processes cannot be solely reduced to concepts of ideological 
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Socialisation processes are very significant in the shaping of ethnic identities. As mentioned 
above, Marks herself examined several changing aspects of Zulu socialisation processes and 
customs in her contribution to Vail's edited volume. She refers in particular to the connection 
between certain dance forms and recurrent outbreaks of 'faction fights', which caused concern 
among the elite intelligentsia of the time. Drawing on Clegg, Marks argues that the deliberate 
manipulation of ethnic boundaries and chiefly authority by Natal administrators since the mid- 
nineteenth century had meant that from the end of that century onwards, tensions over land 
shortage in particular had manifested themselves in 'faction fights' between different 'tribes' 
and within them between supporters of rival chiefly contenders. 143 The absence of the 
institution of the monarch and national age-regiments as stabilising factors contributed to 
these conflicts. 144 Concerns over the proposed revival of 'traditional' forms of Zulu dance, as 
advocated by the Natal Department of Education for introduction into the teaching syllabus in 
1948, centred around these themes. 145 To dance, or giya, was an essential part of the rituals 
utilised in preparing for war in the nineteenth century Zulu state. Warriors would have their 
praises sung, and then be called upon to dance: 
Praises would cause a person to become roused. He would 
remember his praises when the battle was on, feeling he would 
be worthless if he did not tight fiercely. For it was one's praises 
that displayed one's popularity... When a man was not praised, 
when he did not 'giya, when he did not work himself into a frenzy, 
as one who was no longer a fierce fighter, his meat would be 
soaked in water. 148 
Krige, in her classic study of the Zulu peoples during the 1930s, made several observations 
regarding the reformulation of age-regiments which arose due to the process of migrant labour 
and the consequent loss of chiefly authority. Young men participating in migrant labour were 
not always present at times of regiment formation, and this led to a loss of hierarchical respect 
for elders. 147 She argues that the buthwa is essential in perpetuating any corporate 'tribal' life, 
as without it men cannot become full members of the 'tribe' as they cannot take their 'proper' 
place in the hierarchy of age which, in Zulu rural life at that time (and even now), was so 
important. However, she also observed that, although the absence of so many young men in 
143 S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 232. The work upon which Marks draws in this instance is J. Clegg, 
'Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - "Bringing Back the Body": An Examination Into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and 
Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944', in P. Bonner (ed), Working Papers in Southern African Studies, Vol 2, Braamfontein, 
1981. 
144 J. Clegg, 'Ukubuyisa Isidumbu', p. 165. 1Sc 
S. Marks, `Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 232. 146 Evidence of Mtshapi ka Noradu, JSA, Vol 4, p. p. 73-7. 147 E. Krige, Social System, p. 38. 
109 
the service of the European, affects the holding of these ceremonies,... this is not as great a 
drawback as may at first appear, for those absent nowadays automatically belong to the group 
of their age-mates . 
'148 Krige also found that young men who still attended the buthwa in the 
1930s were becoming more difficult to control, with increased rivalries breaking out between 
different groups, often ending in violence. 149 
Whilst there are problems with the methodology of Krige's work, 150 her observations do hint at 
changes resulting from the migrant labour process, and how young men were perhaps forging 
a new ethnicity within a more urban milieu. The breakdown in hierarchy previously so 
important in Zulu social life (and for South African peoples in general) does seem to be 
primarily related to urban influences and partial proletarianisation. Furthermore, the 
generational divisions to which Krige refers may well have manifested themselves in the 
growth of amalaita gangs in the first four decades of the twentieth century. 
Amalaita gangs were primarily an urban phenomenon, with only an uneven and varied 
transposition of their form of identity back into the countryside. 151 It seems they represented a 
reformulation of rural Zulu identity within a specific urban milieu. Located on the boundaries of 
youthful rebellion and professional criminal activity, these migrant youth groups drew upon 
symbolic elements of Zulu militarism and self-discipline, reminiscent of the values promoted in 
previous rural age-regiment systems. As Krige noted, many young migrant labourers 
migrated to town with members of their own age-set, and this facilitated the creation of a 
reformulated identity. La Hausse's periodisation of the growth and demise of amalaita gangs 
bears much similarity with the more general preliminary periodisation of youth gangs 
contained in Beinart's study of political violence in South Africa. 152 These gangs appear 
sometimes to have constructed their own discipline and code of conduct, in place of the 
system of discipline inherent in amabutho age-regiments. It also seems that these gangs 
sometimes arose within the context of an ethnicised division of labour. 153 
148 Ibid, p. 107. 
149 mid, p. 110. 
150 Like many anthropological works between the 1930s and 1960s (although there are notable exceptions, such as the work of 
the Mayers - see chapters two and three), Krige writes in the ethnographic present. She draws on a wide range of historical 
sources spanning a considerable length of time, and tends towards portraying a picture of Zulu life as it might have been like if 
undisturbed by conquest and colonial rule. This means that she tends not to analyse processes of change at any depth, instead 
roducing a type of 'then and now' approach. ýst 
P. La Hausse, "'The Cows of Nongoloza": Youth, Crime and Amalaita Gangs in Durban, 1900-1936', JSAS, Vol 16, No 1. 
1990. 
152 W. Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography', JSAS, Vol 18, No 3,1992. This 
periodisation is outlined and systematically analysed in chapter 8, which also contains a more comprehensie analysis of the 
relationship between male socialisation, violence, migrant labour and reformulated ethnic identity. 153 P. La Hausse, 'The Cows of Nongoloza', p. p. 86-87. La Hausse comments that amalaita gangs in the early twentieth 
century were composed largely of young domestic servants. These young people had originally migrated with their own age- 
set members due to the disintegration of rural society for the reasons mentioned above. La Hausse argues that rural Zulu youth 
tended towards this form of employment both because white employers could pay lower wages to younger males, and also 
because older, rurally based African males considered domestic work the province of women and young men. 
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Marks herself refers to this correspondence between specific forms of employment and ethnic 
identity. 154 However, she does not expand on this form of ethnicity, which I would argue is part 
of the moral ethnic debate. Instead, much of her work concentrates on the construction of 
Zulu political tribalism. This would seem an important omission. Migrant youth associations 
often based their sense of identity around a reformulated form of ethnicity. In the context of the 
amalaita, stick-fighting, which was often a major component of the socialisation of youth in 
rural areas, was transferred to the urban context, as well as ngoma dancing, utilisation of rural 
Zulu regimental names and reformulated forms of rural Zulu dress. 155 Hence, they can be 
perceived as representing a re-interpretation of 'Zuluness' within an urban context. Young 
men, having gained an increased amount of independence due to the incursions of the 
capitalist economy and migrant labour system, were openly debating what it meant to be 
'Zulu', as well as challenging the authority of rural chiefs. The migrant labour system had 
allowed a crucial space for the re-working of older forms of identification, which may not have 
existed if the process of proletarianisation had been more complete. 
156 As this ethnicised 
identity became more explicit, amalaita gangs in Durban could be mobilised for more radical, 
political purposes. For example, many amalaita were incorporated into ICU organisation 
during the 1929-30 beerhall riots. 157 Although the form of identity which the amalaita 
represented was not easily mobilised, the fact that many did support the union illustrates that 
they were available for mobilisation into wider forms of consciousness, as well as illustrating 
the flexibility of the ICU. However, the symbols of a rural Zulu identity which these gangs 
drew upon could also be utilised in terms of gaining support for various forms of ethnic 
nationalism, as will be demonstrated later. Amalaita gangs themselves eventually died away 
15e by the 1940s, giving way to the fully urbanised tsotsi gangs. 
The issue of circumcision also seems to play an as yet ill-explored factor in the process of 
ethnicised Zulu identities. Unlike many traditional youth organisations, young men enrolled 
into the amabutho age-regiments during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not 
circumcised. Additionally, amabutho initiates underwent 'no learning of secret formulae, nor 
the strict seclusion and mystery that characterise the circumcision lodge'. 159 When the age- 
regiment system was largely broken up at the end of the nineteenth century, this meant that 
154 S. Marks, 'The Origins of Ethnic Violence', p. 128. r 15i P. La Hausse, 'The Cows of Nongoloza', p. 87,88,95,100,101. 
156 However, amalaita gangs were not exclusive to Zulu youths. In Johannesburg and Pretoria, Pedi youths formed similar 
associations. See W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, Oxford, 1994, p. 105. 
157 P. La Hausse, 'The Cows of Nongoloza', p. p. 105-107. 15R 
159 E. Krige, Social System, p. 117. Circumcision was a central element in socialising young men into responsible `manhood' - 
see chapter five. The admonition ceremonies similarly stressed the need to be responsible as the young men involved passed 
out of the circumcision lodge. For descriptions of these lodges in different societies, see for example P. Mayer, Townsmen or 
Tribesmen, Oxford, 1971, and W. D. Hammond-Tooke, Boundaries and Belief. The Structure of a Sotho World View, 
Witwatersrand, 1981. 
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there was little left in terms of socialisation into full 'manhood', iso unlike other South African 
communities. Although only speculation, this may have facilitated Buthelezi's mobilisation of 
young males in support of his Inkatha movement, for the lack of these socialisation processes 
in the rural areas could have ensured that young men tended to perceive of their identities 
through other forms of surviving, or reformulated, customs if these were promoted in a 
culturally brokered fashion. But, as demonstrated, the myth of the Zulu 'warrior tradition' could 
be manipulated at times of soclo-economic and political crisis. 
5.4 Culture Brokers and 'Passive' Ethnicity: Shula Marks' Analysis of Zulu Ethnic 
Identity 1948-Present 
The ascendancy of the Nationalist party in 1948 also seemed initially to mark the decline of 
Zulu ethnic identifications. Support for the Zulu monarchy dwindled when, as Marks 
comments, the apartheid state 'handed the king a poisoned chalice by recognising him'. 181 
The Zulu Cultural Society faded away due to the fact that it backed the wrong incumbent to 
the chieftaincy. African nationalism was also becoming a more attractive alternate form of 
identity. However, this was to become more complicated with the full implementation of 
apartheid legislation, especially the establishment of Kwazulu as a 'Bantu Homeland' in 1972. 
This allowed the crucial space for political culture brokers such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi to 
manipulate what Marks has termed the 'the inchoate but still pulsating Zulu cultural 
nationalism'. 162 The Inkatha Zulu National Cultural Movement was resurrected in 1975, 
paradoxically with the covert support of the ANC., and through it Buthelezi was initially able to 
portray himself as the inheritor of the now banned ANC's resistance to apartheid. However, in 
order to survive as a Bantustan leader, he had to oppose the armed struggle and the 
sanctions campaign. This eventually led to clashes between supporters of Inkatha, and ANC 
oriented organisations such as the United Democratic Front and the Trade Union movement. 
Violence thus escalated throughout the 1980s, and into the run-up to the first democratic 
national elections in South Africa during the early 1990s. 163 
160 Although the regimental system did continue in some areas for the first few decades of the twentieth century this was 
largely a ceremonial event, although some chiefs were accused of deliberately strengthening their armies - See E. Krige, Social System, passim. 
161 S. Marks, 'The Origins of Ethnic Violence', p. 138. 162 lbid, p. 138. 
163 This is a very basic summary of these important issues. For a useful introductory overview, see W. Beinart, Twentieth . Century South Africa, especially chapters 8,9 and 10. 
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Marks' later works comprehensively analyse this reification of Zulu ethnic identity. In her 1992 
study of the origins of ethnic violence in South Africa she stresses several elements which 
have contributed to the success of Buthelezi, Inkatha and Zulu ethnic nationalism. For 
example she mentions that Buthelezi had everything to play for if he could get Zulu people to 
identify primarily as Zulu in a decentralised federal state. She states that rapid 
impoverishment and urbanisation provided the grounds for him to play on ethnic 
exclusivism. 164 She then argues that this political project was facilitated by the construction of 
a 'proud military history' of the Zulu, centred around opposition to colonial rule. Finally, the 
existence of a nineteenth century centralised kingdom, and the institution of the Zulu 
monarchy provided the cultural and social building blocks by which Buthelezi was able to build 
his own tribalist version of Zulu ethnic nationalism. He was thus able to do this with far more 
support from the people at whom his ethnicised message was aimed than political culture 
brokers in other 'homelands', who often had to build their constructed, 'ethnicised' edifices 
without the solid foundations which existed amongst the Zulu speaking people. 165 
This particular approach is very much a development of the works analysed above. The 
insights first gleaned from the earlier articles are synthesised and expanded in order to take 
into account the development of Zulu ethnicised identities through the era of apartheid and its 
final dismantling. 166 The importance of the monarchy is still central to Marks' analysis with 
regard to mobilising Zulu people, as is the articulation between patriarchy and the various 
forms of Zulu ethnicised identity discussed. Generational divisions, centred around the 
breakdown of rural concepts of respect, are also re-emphasised. Marks utilises these insights 
in order to demonstrate why the increase in urbanization, together with a process of 
deindustrialisation and consequent mass unemployment, which accelerated towards the end 
of the apartheid era, manifested themselves in an ethnicised manner in Natal and the Rand . 
167 
She also attempts to analyse the consciousness of Zulu people other than ethnic culture 
brokers in a more systematic fashion, albeit in terms of why people are available for ethnicised 
violence: 
the very terms ANC/UDFrcomrades%amagabane on the one hand, 
and Inkatha and amatheleweni on the other, encapsulate `maps of 
meaning', clusters of attributes in the minds both of those who identify 
164 S. Marks, 'The Origins of Ethnic Violence', p. 131-2. 
103 _... --- --- lbltl, p. p. 132-136. 
166 Marks has written two other recent major articles which are substantially concerned with ethnicised identities in post-1948 
South Africa: the co-edited introduction to The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism, and 'Black and White Nationalisms in 
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themselves in this way and in those of their opponents. The labels go 
far beyond what we usually consider political allegiance, to encompass 
urban and rural values, styles of language and dress. Membership 
means being a part of the 'culture' or sub-culture of the groups involved, 
rather than merely signifying adherence to a political programme. 168 
In other words, membership of these groupings signifies a cultural identity, not simply a 
political statement. Marks argues that this explains why many members are willing to kill and 
die for both movements without being able to specify the national policies and leaders whom 
they allegedly support. 
Marks here seems to be demonstrating the difference between structure and agency, which 
is, as has already been mentioned, a central tenet of her approach to South African history in 
general. However, she still seems to portray ethnic identities as culturally brokered 
constructions, with non-politicised identifications argued to be cultural building blocks, around 
which people might form identities, but which in themselves are not ethnic. In order for an 
identity to become ethnicised, it has usually to be culturally brokered, and in a politically 
tribalist fashion. The only other form of ethnic identification which she accepts is in terms of 
competition for jobs in a specifically urban context, and even though Marks accepts this form 
of ethnic identity, she does not analyse it in any great depth. However, recent sociological 
studies of Zulu ethnic identities have suggested that a more 'passive', non-politicised form of 
Zulu ethnicity exists, and anthropological works carried out in the 1960s posited the 
assumption that ethnicised identities could exist without being culturally brokered. Kuper's 
study of Zulu society in 1960s Durban is a case in point. 169 
A recent sociological survey, concerned with the intertwining of ethnic, gender and class 
identities in a specifically urban milieu, has posited that a form of 'passive' (my term) Zulu 
ethnic identity does exist, although vague and ill-defined. The authors of the study also found 
that, although this 'passive' form of ethnic identification could be manipulated by ethnic 
entrepreneurs such as Buthelezi, it was not in itself politicised. Nor was it manipulated by the 
historical actors themselves in order to obtain scarce resources, such as jobs, in a fast- 
changing, poverty stricken, socio-economic climate . 
170 Finally, 'in contrast to Buthelezi's 
168 Ibid. 
169 L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, especially chapter eight. Kuper specifically analyses 'tribal' stereotyping amongst 
students, particularly between Sotho and Zulu. These stereotypes seem to have little to do with culturally brokered 
manipulations of identity. See chapter 8 of this thesis for a more comprehensive coverage of Kuper's work. 170 See C. Campbell, G. Mare, C. Walker, with D. Mbona and N. Marawa, 'Part Three. Just About Being: Social Identities 
and Working People', in A. Sitas (Project Coordinator), Managing Change in Kwazulu-Natal's Industries: A Research Report 
to the CSD/HSRC, Centre for Industrial and Labour Studies, University of Natal, Durban, 1995. The authors conceptualise 
ethnicity in terms of two distinct manifestations of ethnicity, which can intertwine but are distinct. These are defined as 
follows: 'I) the lived experience of ordinary people as perceived members of an ethnic group (which we are describing here as 
ethnic identity), and 2) the fashioning and mobilisation of this experience by political brokers for political ends', (P. 288). Also 
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ethno-nationalism, which focuses on the political in regional and national terms, our informants 
located their identification of themselves as 'Zulu' primarily in the domestic and the local: in 
terms of family, home, clan and community'. "' Elements which suggested the existence of a 
'passive', day-to-day, lived form of ethnic identity included the importance of the Zulu 
language to people in shaping their Zulu identity, and concepts of custom and respect, 
especially inter-generational respectfulness, originating from a constructed rural past. 
However, although the past was important in terms of constructing a sense of 'Zuluness' 
amongst the people interviewed, it was not the heroic past upon which Buthelezi's 
construction of Zulu history places great stress. 172 Rather, it was the concept of a constructed, 
remembered, rural past, in which patriarchal relationships existed in a supposedly non- 
conflictual, harmonious fashion and community values of reciprocity were strong, that figured 
strongly in the consciousness of the people of Umlazi township. 
The concept of reciprocal respect, especially in inter-generational and gender terms, was a 
central feature of the report. Many informants believed that the 'breakdown of respect' served 
as an important obstacle in the way of community harmony. Concepts of reciprocity and 
respect seem to have been very important in Zulu, and indeed other southern African, 
societies throughout the twentieth century. Early ethnographers such as Kidd were 
commentating on the submergence of the individual within the collectivity of the clan at the 
beginning of the century. 173 Krige, writing in the 1930s, similarly stresses the importance of 
hierarchy, collective consciousness, respect and reciprocity. She mentions for example that in 
Zulu society, 'the father... is respected and feared and his commands obeyed. A man does not 
talk when his father is present unless he is addressed, nor may he be free in his speech in his 
father's presence'. 174 The respectful attitude of young men towards their fathers is captured 
particularly well in a photograph taken by A. M. Duggan-Cronin in the late 1930s. The younger 
man is making a report to his father, a headman, and the photograph demonstrates the 
respectful attitude of the former towards the latter, and the intensity with which the younger 
man listens to what his father has to say. 175 Krige additionally states the following: '(A) native 
regards the kraal of every man having the same isibongo as himself as his own home, the 
see C. Campbell, 0. Mare and C. Walker, 'Evidence for an Ethnic Identity in the Life Histories of Zulu-Speaking Durban 
Township Residents', JSAS, Vol 21, No 2,1995. 
Ill-. 
------ -- .. C;. Campbell, G. Mare, and C. Walker, 'Just About Being', p. 291. 172 For a recent overview of Buthelezi's constructions of Zulu history, see P. Forsyth, 'The Past in the Service of the Present: 
The Political use of History by Chief AN. M. G. Buthelezi', 1951-1991', South African Historical Journal, Vol 2,1992. 173 
ll. Kidd, Kaffir Socialism, New York, 1969 (originally published 1908), p. 17. 174 
E. Krige, Social System, p. p. 23-24. It is important to bear in mind the limitations to Krige's methodological approaches-see 
footnote 79. The linkage between hierarchy and reciprocity is demonstrated by Lonsdale's concept of 'moral economy' 
outlined in chapter five. 
175 See Plate XCVII, 'Father and Son, in The Bantu Tribes of South Africa: Reproductions of Photographic Studies by A. M. 
Duggan-Cronin. Vol 3, Section 3: The Zulu, Cambridge, 1938. 
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owner being to him a father or a brother. He has only to walk in and make known his sib 
name, and he will be treated as one of the family'. 176 
Krige also comments on hionipha customs and the importance of hierarchy in terms of age in 
shaping the consciousness of the historical actors involved. Her description portrays Zulu 
people as having their behaviour towards, and conceptions of, each other fundamentally 
moulded by these forms of custom, taboo, reciprocity and hierarchy. 177 She found that 
behaviour towards the father's relatives was generally more respectful than towards those of 
the mother, and that certain relationships were more patriarchal in nature than in other 'tribes'. 
The age-regiment system further enhanced the submergence of the individual amongst the 
collective. 178 Berglund, who carried out field research amongst particular rural Zulu 
communities between 1959 and 1970, makes similar observations. 179 His focus on anger and 
fertility as important expressions of power within clan systems, portrayed as innate qualities of 
the clan and only specific to men, is particularly illuminating with regard to the connections 
between hierarchy, violence and reciprocity. 180 
Furthermore, due largely to the longevity of the migrant labour process, these forms of control 
could be reformulated in order to forge a new ethnicity within a more urbanised context - as 
demonstrated by the emergence of amalaita gangs. This seems to be the essence of moral 
ethnicity. Young men in this context were reformulating the values of rural society in order to 
make sense of the more urbanised milieu within which they found themselves. Values such 
as respect for older men were being debated, but other aspects of rural identities were upheld 
in a reformulated fashion. 'Zuluness' was being openly debated. This is something that is 
missing in the work of Shula Marks. She is correct in arguing that (often Christian) elites were 
increasingly debating the meaning of 'Zuluness' throughout the twentieth century, and that this 
could lead to political tribalism (not her term) when their interests coincided with those of the 
state, allowing for the construction of a more ossified, static form of identity. However, she 
does not take fully into account the possibility of ordinary people reformulating their identities 
in an ethnicised sense, in order to express generational, gender and other interests. 181 These 
issues are subsumed by the concentration on the machinations of political elites. 
This is not to say that there is no necessary connection between these differing levels of 
ethnicity. Moral ethnicity, which emerged in the context of colonialism, capitalist penetration 
176 E. Krige, Social System, p. 34. 
177 ]bid, chapter 2. 
178 Ibid, p. p. 36-38. 
179 A. Berglund, Zulu Thought Patterns and Symbolism, London, 1976. 180 
See Chapter 8 for an analysis of Beralund's concentualisine of aneer and fertility. 181 For a very interesting example of how ethnicised identities could be manipulated to serve gender interests in a 
contemporary context, see D. Webster, 'Ethnicity and Gender in a KwaZulu Border Community', in A. Spiegel and P. 
McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1991. 
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and the growth of individualism, can be, and was, captured by culture brokers and the 
apartheid regime in order to further their own political agendas. Campbell, Mare and Walker, 
who co-authored the study concerned with Umlazi district mentioned above, posit the 
argument that'passive', lived forms of ethnic identity (which represent moral ethnicity in a non- 
politicised form) can articulate with the culturally brokered versions of Zulu political tribalism in 
times of rapid socio-economic change. They argue that politicised ethnicity did not appear to 
be an important factor in the identities of the Umlazi population as Umlazi is a relatively 
homogenous Zulu community. This contrasted with studies which analysed Zulu-speaking 
hostel dwellers in the Transvaal townships, where there was a more heterogeneous 
population and Zulu identity was consequently more under 'threat'. ' 82 They also found that 
many of the customs which have been historically perceived as 'Zulu' are becoming 
increasingly redundant in a poverty-stricken, unsettled urban milieu, despite the fact that many 
respondents showed considerable flexibility in reformulating them in order to adapt to 
township life. They accordingly found that Buthelezi has been more successful in mobilising 
rural people than urban people. 183 
Despite the many links between rural and urban people this differentiation still seems 
important. 184 It is possible that some of the more rurally attached Zulu people could be more 
prone to Buthelezi's machinations as his rhetoric more closely reflects their own 
consciousness, in terms of ritual and symbolic respect and reciprocity. The appeal of the past 
could resonate strongly with Zulu migrant workers, under threat from militant ANC 'comrades' 
who were intent on rendering the country ungovernable during apartheid's death throes. The 
setting up of military camps for youth by Buthelezi could also have instilled a strong desire to 
'recapture' the past among some Zulu young men, especially as these camps included lengthy 
ideological inculcations of a re-constructed, 'glorious' Zulu warrior past. 185 The example of the 
amalaita demonstrates how elements of the amabutho age-regiment system could be 
reformulated in order to promote ethnic, criminal and wider, more radical consciousnesses 
based on Zulu historical experiences. Buthelezi's politically tribalist version does not allow for 
this flexible moral ethnic debate, and demonstrates how political tribalism has become the 
dominant version of Zulu ethnicity in contemporary times. For perhaps his hijacking of the 
past has instilled some young Zulu men with concepts of revived elements of this earlier form 
of military male socialisation. Buthelezi simultaneously, until recently, has argued that Inkatha 
also represents the true inheritance of the struggle against apartheid, therefore presenting a 
182 C. Campbell, G. Mare, and C. Walker, 'Just About Being', p. 304. The authors specifically compare their study with that of 
Segal, which found that Zulu politicised ethnicity did come to the fore when directly threatened by the wider community. See 
L. Segal, 'The Human Face of Violence: Hostel Dwellers Speak', in SAS, Vol 18, Nol, 1991. These issues are more 
comprehensively discussed in chapter 183 
C. Campbell, G. Mare, C. Walker, 'Just About Being', p. 305. IR4 
--' Interestingly, Marks does not perceive any differentiation between rural and urban forms of Zulu ethnicity in contemporary 
times - personal interview, May 1996. 185 See Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief With a Double Agenda, London, 1988, p. 16. 
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'Janus-faced' representation of 'Zuluness' which also provides appeal to young men and 
women. 186 
Marks' work does capture fully the manipulatory elements of political tribalism, but her 
concentration on the agendas of political elites does not fully encapsulate the myriad of ways 
that ethnic identity can be reformulated over time. Ordinary Zulu people themselves re- 
worked definitions of 'Zuluness' throughout the twentieth century, which could merge with a 
variety of other mobilised identities. Segregation did entail politically tribalist versions of Zulu 
identity to emerge also, but this only became the dominant version of Zulu ethnicity with the 
policy of so-called 'separate development' under the apartheid regime. It seems important to 
recognise that ethnic identifications are not necessarily retrograde and harmful in themselves, 
it depends on how - and by whom - they are reformulated. As they often resonate with the 
very real historical life experiences of Zulu (and other) people, it is important not to dismiss 
them as a hindrance to wider forms of consciousness. Wider forms of nationalist 
consciousness could feasibly articulate with ethnicised forms of Zulu identity, as long as these 
nationalist culture brokers recognise that these identities are very meaningful to the people 
who adhere to them, thus avoiding their hi-jacking by political culture brokers bent upon their 
own political projects. 
186 For Inkatha's policies aimed at gaining the support of Zulu women, which also place emphasis on a reformulated Zulu past, 
see S. Hassim, 'Family, Motherhood and Zulu Nationalism: The Politics of the Inkatha Women's Brigade', Feminist Review, 
No 43, Spring, 1993. The appeal of the politically tribalist message to women is examined in more depth in chapter 7. 
However, it is also important to recognise the fact that support of Inkatha was also due to pragmatic, economic reasons. 
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Hassim refers to the various economic niches created for women by Inkatha and Mzala also points towards the economic 
advantages that can be gained from supporting the party, albeit in a coercive economic climate. 
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6. NATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND IDENTITY FORMATION: TWENTIETH CENTURY 
SOTHO IDENTITIES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF LESOTHO 
The historical development of the Lesotho nation-state provides an interesting comparison 
with identity formation in South Africa. Despite various attempts to incorporate Lesotho within 
the national boundaries of South Africa throughout the twentieth century, it has always 
managed to retain its political independence, often in the face of considerable military and 
political opposition. This retention of independent status has resulted in various forms of 
Sotho ethnic and national identities, both within and outside of the country's borders. ' 
Ironically, the collapse"of apartheid has brought into question the viability of Lesotho remaining 
an independent nation-state. It has become increasingly economically dependent on South 
Africa since the late nineteenth century. Migrant labour income from South Africa has 
provided a vital buttress for its impoverished economy, in terms of both financial stability and 
employment provision. In fact, labour has been one of Lesotho's main exports. Unfortunately, 
this dependency is becoming an increasing liability as South Africa attempts to deal with its 
own economic problems in the wake of apartheid. Reliance on South Africa has also 
influenced the various constructions of Sotho identities in the twentieth century. 
This chapter sets out to explore the contested nature of Sotho identities. Migrant labour, the 
changing institution of the chieftainship, and contest gender roles are shown to be significant 
shaping factors. British colonial interference, the policies of the South African government in 
the apartheid era, and the influence of missionary activity are also demonstrated to be 
important elements. This examination also provides insights into ethnic identity formation both 
within and outside nation-state borders, whilst demonstrating that ethnicity results from 
internal as well as external dynamics, and is not solely reliant on the machinations of elite 
culture brokers. 
I For a recent useful summary of the development of ethnic and national identities within Lesotho throughout the twentieth 
century see D. Coplan and T. Quinlan, 'A Chief by the People: Nation Versus State in Lesotho', Africa, Vol 67, No 1,1997. 2 In 1993 22.7% of the labour force was employed outside the country. Internally, unemployment is very high. One report 
measured the 1995 unemployment rate, in terms of adults having no income whatever, even in the informal sector, at around 
35%. See R. Love, 'Lesotho: Inner to Outer Periphery', ROAPE, No 67,1996. Although this report is very probably an 
exaggeration as many people probably gain some income from agriculture, unemployment is very serious. 
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6.1 The Beginnings of Sotho Identity: A Brief Overview of Nineteenth Century Lesotho 
State Formation3 
The formation of the Lesotho nation-state is rooted in the early nineteenth century disruptions, 
upheavals and violence in southern Africa termed the Mfecane (or lifagane in Sotho). The first 
Sotho ruler Moshoeshoe, established a mountain fortress at Thaba Bosiu in the 1820s, which 
provided security from these violent upheavals. He was thus able to receive large numbers of 
other refugees under his protection, adding to the population which had already arrived with 
him. It was at this point that the Sotho nation evolved. By the time of the arrival of the Paris 
Evangelical Missionary Society in 1833, Moshoeshoe and his Koena clan had gained 
predominance in Basutoland, as it came to be called in colonial times (although not all minor 
chiefs recognised his rule). Wars waged against Boer encroachment in the 1850s and mid- 
1860s, and the Gun War of 1880-1881 were further contributory factors in shaping Sotho 
identity. The wars against the Boers had resulted in considerable land loss to the Orange 
Free State, but Moshoeshoe avoided complete defeat by successfully appealing for British 
protection. This resulted In Basutoland becoming a British Protectorate in 1868, therefore 
firmly fixing national borders, avoiding further Boer encroachment and consequently 
heightening Sothos' sense of national identity within prescribed territorial boundaries. The 
British handed Basutoland over to direct Cape Colony rule in 1871. Cape rule proved very 
unpopular, due to imposed high levels of taxation aimed at pushing Sotho people into migrant 
labour, and the attempted banning of Sotho ownership of guns and spears. This resulted in 
the Gun War, which eventually provoked the British to resume direct rule in 1884.5 This 
remained the case until Lesotho gained its independence in 1966, although it was never 
entirely certain whether or not Britain would allow South Africa to assimilate Lesotho within its 
own national boundaries throughout this period. This further heightened a sense of Sotho 
identity. Indeed, possibly the strongest element 'linking past and present has been vigorous 
resistance to any efforts aimed at incorporating Lesotho within South Africa or its colonial 
predecessors' .6 
3 This section is not intended to provide a critical analysis of the various elements which contributed to twentieth century 
Sotho identity formation. This is left to later sections, which demonstrate how earlier forms of Sotho culture and belief systems 
were reformulated in order to perpetuate the interests of particular interest groups, and also reformulated Sotho ethnic 
identities. What is outlined here are various elements of pre-colonial Sotho culture and value-systems which will later be 
demonstrated to feed into twentieth century forms of Sotho identities. 4 There are several historical works which deal comprehensively with the nineteenth century history of Lesotho. See for 
example the following: L. Thompson, Survival in Two Worlds: Moshoeshoe of Lesotho. 1786-1870, London, 1975; P. 
Sanders, Moshoeshoe, Chief of the Sotho, London, 1975; E. Eldredge, A South African Kingdom: The Pursuit of Security in 
Nineteenth-century Lesotho. The two former mentioned works have to be read with caution, as they tend towards the `Great 
Man' theory of history, reifying the importance of the founding king Moshoeshoe without taking fully into account wider 
socio-economic factors in the formation of Lesotho. 5 See references in footnote 3. Also S. Burman, Chiefdom Politics and Alien Law, London, 1981. eR Weisfelder, 'The Basotho Nation-State: What Legacy for the Future? ', JMAS, Vol 19, No 2,1981. 
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The mobilisation of the chieftaincy, and particularly the consolidation of the position of the 
Paramount Chief, were central factors in the early formation of Sotho identity. The initial 
mobilisation of ethnicised identities in southern Africa often centred around the institution of 
the chieftaincy and the defence of land against expropriation, and this was particularly the 
case in Basutoland. ' Casalis, a missionary from the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society 
established in Basutoland in 1861, made the following comment in his recordings of Sotho life 
and customs of the time: 
(Me observe, among these people, an almost superstitious 
respect for their sovereigns. There is something in this which 
resembles the ancient theory of the Divine right. The natives 
cannot conceive of a community, however limited it may be, 
that can order its own affairs, and do without a superior; or, to 
speak in their language a `head .8 
He later refers to the importance of social order in maintaining morality: 
Morality among the people depends so entirely upon social 
order, that all political disorganisation is immediately followed 
by a state of degeneracy, which the re-establishment of order 
alone can rectify... The sudden and premature introduction of 
new laws and customs, and the imposition of a strange authority 
are for the same reason, equally fatal to their moral character. 
They rob the native of the only motive he can have for moderat- 
ing his passions, which is the desire to maintain entire the order 
of things, in which are summed up all his ideas of prosperity and 
decency. ' 
This latter comment, despite the essentialist undertones, was in hindsight a prescient warning. 
For colonial interference in the institution of the chieftaincy did indeed undermine social 
structures, although also contributing to the moral ethnic debate of what exactly it meant to be 
'Sotho'. Additionally the centrality of the chieftaincy in peoples' consciousness, especially the 
symbolic significance of the kingship embodied in Moshoeshoe's rule, is hardly surprising 
7 See chapter 3 for a comprehensive periodisation of ethnic identities in South Africa. Also, W. Beinart, 'Chieftaincy and the 
Concept of Articulation: South Africa circa 1900-1950', Canadian Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol 19,1985. Sotho 
ethnic identity tends to follow this broad pattern, but with its own unique aspects as illustrated below. a E. Casalis, The Basutos or Twenty Three Years in South Africa. Facsimile Reprint, Cape Town 1965 (originally published 
1861). 
9 Ibid, pp. 302-3. 
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considering the insecurity of the times. 70 Moshoeshoe had led the exodus to Thaba Bosiu 
and, through diplomatic manoeuvres, avoided defeat by the Boers and further incursions by 
other African armies. Perceptions of, and changes to, the institution of the chieftaincy, 
together with the symbolic significance of the monarchy and the capturing of this symbolic 
significance by various interest groups, played a major part in the development of Sotho 
ethnicised identities, and are still significant today. 
6.2 Alien Law, Migrant Labour and the Contested Nature of the Chieftaincy: Sotho 
Ethnic Identities Prior to Independence 
In referring to the contested nature of the chieftaincy in present day Lesotho, Quinlan 
comments: 
From the perspective of the government and international 
organisations, social order is best based upon a notion of 
nationality that can be integrated into the international pol- 
itical and economic framework of nation-states. From the 
perspective of the rural populace, this order must include 
institutions which stem from local concerns, and which can 
then promote local needs in the national and international 
arenas. It is in this contest of approach that the chieftain- 
ship becomes an important symbol of political identity and 
organisation. " 
Thus 'the chieftainship is a faultline in the contest between rural residents, chiefs, the 
government and other external agencies about what the appropriate political order should 
be'. 12 In many respects this is a useful distinction in analysing Sotho ethnicised identities. It 
takes into account ethnic nationalist/political tribalist state imposed identities from 'above', and 
the more fluid, contested, moral ethnic identities emanating from 'below'. There are problems 
10 However, it is important to carefully analyse the reasons why people sought security through the chieftaincy at this time. 
The argument that Sotho people identified with the nation-state in pursuit of security is correct but banal. The pursuit of 
security is perhaps not the most helpful factor in determining the particular identifications which arose at this time. Eldredge's 
work (see footnote 3) has been criticised in this context by several radical scholars. See for example the following: T. Maloka, 
"'All Chiefs are Sheperds": Populism and Labour Migration in Colonial Lesotho, 1886-1940', Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies Seminar Paper, October 1994; C. Murray's book review of Eldredge's work in African Affairs, Vol 94, No 374,1995; 
M. Thabane, 'A Mutual Benefit Utopia where Expoitation was Unknown? Elizabeth Eldredge's Liberal Interpretation of 
Social Relations in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho', South African Historical Journal, No 34,1996. However whilst I agree with 
the general thrust of these radical scholars' critiques, I do not in turn agree with their emphasis on forming class divisions as 
the primary motor behind identity formation. This is especially apparent in the work of Maloka and Thabane. Forming class 
divisions were important factors in the formation of ethnic and nationalist identities, but it is also important to take into account 
the self-perceptions of Sotho peoples when attempting to explain the formation of their identities, and these did not necessarily 
correspond with a forming class consciousness. IIT. Quinlan, ' "Marena A Lesotho": Chiefs, Politics and culture in Lesotho'. PhD Thesis, University of Cape Town, June 
1994, p. 10. 
12 Ibid, p. 181. 
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with this conceptualisation however. Despite acknowledging popular rural concepts of the 
chieftaincy, Quinlan's analysis does ultimately focus on a macro/national level. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that his thesis is concerned primarily with Lesotho, and not Sotho 
communities outside of Lesotho's national boundaries. Therefore he does not take fully into 
account the variety of forms which Sotho ethnicised identities could take in the twentieth 
century. It is important to recognise the centrality of the chieftaincy in formulating ethnic 
identifications in twentieth century Lesotho, but it is equally important to recognise other 
factors. Migrant labour, and urbanisation and residence in South Africa could lead to 
reformulations of Sotho identity which arose from previous cultural values, but without 
necessarily being centred around the chieftainship. The following therefore attempts to build 
upon Quinlan's concept of the chieftaincy as a 'faultline' between different concepts of Sotho 
identities, whilst additionally analysing other forms of Sotho identity formation. 
After British rule was established in 1884, the small colonial administration - in time-honoured 
British colonial fashion - set about installing the structures of 'indirect rule'. In order to do this, 
the administration sought to reformulate pre-colonial forms of Sotho government structures. 
Prior to the entrenchment of British rule, Sotho people living in Basutoland had established a 
popular forum for airing grievances to the chiefs, called the pitso. The community therefore 
had some opportunity to criticise the chiefs openly regarding their rule. The chiefs resorted to 
several methods in order to ensure they gained a positive response. 
(Woe to any who have been imprudent enough to take undue 
advantage of the liberty of speech! If the potentate they have 
attacked happens to be a witty and sensible man, he will make 
them pay dearly for the impunity on which they reckoned. This 
is the fatal hour which gives birth to nicknames, which cling with 
the tenacity of a shadow to those on whom they are bestowed. 13 
Bestowing derogatory names on people who were perceived to be acting against the social 
norms of the community seems to have been a common occurrence in pre-colonial and 
colonial Basutoland, and throughout southern Africa in general. Lestrade, an ethnologist 
working in the Native Affairs Department in the 1930s, refers to the 'fondness of the Basotho 
for giving people significant names, and their aptness in finding appropriate ones'. 14 This 
seems to correspond with a larger social context, whereby chiefdoms and other communities 
sought to reproduce their own moral universe and social order by deriding behaviour outside 
13 E. Casalis, The Basutos, p. p. 235-236. The importance attached to oratory skills by many rural African communities in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may be linked to this 'naming' process. See below for further comments. 14 A. M. Duggan-Cronin, The Bantu Tribes of Southern Africa: Reproductions of Photographic Studies, Vol Two, Section 
Three. The Suto-Chuana Tribes. Sub-Group Three, The Southern Basotho, plate LXXVIII. The photographic plate in question 
refers to a Sotho girl named Lipuo, which according to Lestrade roughly translates as 'Chatterbox'. 
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of expected norms. Schapera, for example, refers to the use of 'mockery' songs by 1930s 
rural Kgatla communities in order to deride young women who become pregnant outside of 
marriage. 15 Hamilton and Wright's study of 'Lala' identity demonstrates how forms of 
derogatory naming could lead to ethnicised stereotyping in a pre-colonial context, and 
therefore without the implementation of colonial constructions of ethnicity. Furthermore, this 
ethnicised derogatory form of naming could be re-appropriated in a more positive fashion if 
socio-economic circumstances changed. 16 
This need to re-impose order, referred to by both Quinlan, and much earlier by Casalis, 
resonates with Douglas' argument that '(i)deas about separating, purifying, demarcating and 
punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy 
experience'. 17 Communal needs to re-impose order after transgressions of moral universes, 
seem to have been reflected in the increasingly contested nature of the chieftaincy after the 
imposition of British colonial rule. For people sought to re-establish their sense of identity 
through this changing Institution in order to make sense of the considerable socio-economic 
changes being wrought by colonial and capitalist penetration, religious influence and the 
hegemony of the South African state through the implementation of the migrant labour 
process. 18 
The British sought to reconstruct the institution of the chieftaincy by synthesising elements of 
its social structure with British introduced concepts of government. In 1903 the pitso system 
was replaced by the Basutoland National Council. This Council was given statutory status in 
1910 and was transformed into a Legislative Council in 1960. The king was now re-titled 
'Paramount Chief and was demarcated equal powers with the British Residential 
Commissioner. British Assistant Commissioners worked with principal chiefs in their 
respective districts. The Cape Town based High Commissioner held the reins of legislative 
power. The first meeting of the Basutoland National Council adopted the so-called 'Laws of 
Lerotholi', supported by the then Paramount Chief Lerotholi in order to strengthen his position, 
and also by the Resident Commissioner Godfrey Lagden and the High Commissioner Alfred 
Milner. These 'Laws' were the start of the systematic entrenchment of the structure of the 
chieftaincy, 'and did not address the system of checks on the powers of the chiefs'. 19 The 
15 See I. Schapera, 'Pre-Marital Pregnancy and Native Opinion. A Note on Social Change', Africa, Vol 6, No 1,1933, pp. 55- 
56. Also chapter 7. 
16 C. Hamilton and J. Wright, 'the Making of the 'AmaLala': Ethnicity, Ideology and Relations of Subordination in a Pre- 
Colonial Context', SAHJ, Vol 22,1990. 
17 M. Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, London, 1969p. 162. See chapter 7 for a 
more comprehensive analysis of Douglas' concepts. 18 See below for how this fits with the diverse routes to modernity followed by Sotho peoples in the twentieth century, and the 
proliferation of contested identities which were created as a result. 19 T. Maloka, ' "All Chiefs are Shepherds": Populism and Labour Migration in Colonial Lesotho, 1886-1940', Institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar Paper, October 1994. P. S. 
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advent of Imperial Rule meant that the chiefs no longer had to depend on popular support to 
20 retain their dominance. Therefore exploitation tended to proliferate from 1884 onwards. 
These changes to the institution of the chieftaincy resulted in a variety of political responses, 
all of which played upon different conceptions of what it was to be 'Sotho', whilst additionally 
reflecting forming class affiliations. These early attempts at opposing colonial rule did not 
argue for a wholesale abandonment of the chieftaincy, however. As such they seem to 
demonstrate diverse attempts to re-establish a social order which was disintegrating through 
the removal of popular checks on chiefs' powers. In the first half of the twentieth century 
peoples' organisation against the abuse of powers by chiefs centred around the Basutoland 
Progressive Association, formed in 1908, and Lekhotla la Bafo, formed in 1919. The 
difference between the two groups' objectives was most pronounced with respect to the 
chieftaincy. The Progressive Association supported reforms which would circumscribe chiefs' 
powers, whilst Lekhotla la Bafo aimed at restoring the pre-colonial structure of the chieftaincy. 
Many of Lekhotla la Bafo's appeals and public addresses defended the institution of the 
chieftaincy, whilst decrying the exploitative attitudes of individual chiefs. Furthermore, this 
exploitation was argued to be the result of colonial reform, missionary interference and the 
detrimental effects of migrant labour siphoned off to the South African gold and diamond 
mines. The party also endeavoured to set up self-help schemes which would preserve Sotho 
political, economic and cultural institutions from being eroded by the colonial system? ' 
The approach of the Progressive Association differed in that it attempted to reduce the 
influence of the chieftaincy through working within the existing system, for example by 
attempting to gain more seats on the National Council. The difference between the two 
parties was partially the result of the dissimilar social groups which supported them. The 
Progressive Party tended to draw its support from the tiny educated Sotho elite and reflected 
their interests. Lekhotla la Bafo, although including leaders who were also educated through 
the auspices of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, largely drew its support from small 
farmers and the peasantry, and largely reflected their interests. zz This is representative of the 
increasing moral ethnic debate regarding what it meant to be Sotho. However, both parties 
sought to reform the worst excesses of the chieftaincy, which had arisen in the wake of the 
introduction of the National Council and the removal of popular checks on the said institution's 
power. One of the most important grievances centred around the abuse of the practice of 
20 For in-depth analyses of early forms of this exploitation see E. Eldredge, A South African Kingdom, chapter 12, and S. 
Burman, Chiefdom Politics, chapter 12 and epilogue. 21 See R. Edgar, Prophets With Honour: A Documentary History of Lekhotla la Bafo, Braamfontein, 1987; Introduction and 
Documents 12-19 (p. p. 79-136). 221bid, 
p. 26. 
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letsema, or tribute labour. 23 In pre-colonial times this involved chiefs requesting people to form 
work parties to cultivate certain of their (the chiefs') lands. This was undertaken willingly in 
pre-colonial times as it involved reciprocal rights. In pre-colonial times chiefs relied heavily on 
the co-operation of their people in order to maintain their social status, greater wealth and the 
military security of their chiefdom. Therefore it was in their interest to provide for their people 
in return for their labour. However, with the introduction of colonial rule, and the introduction of 
the National Council, chiefs no longer had to rely on the goodwill of their people, and abuses 
of the system were commonplace. 24 Together with the abuses of the 'placing' system, the 
misuse of letsema led to much unrest directed at the abuse of power by chiefs. 5 
The increasingly contested role of the chieftaincy was not the only element of debated Sotho 
identity in this period however. The changing nature of gender roles, itself closely related to 
the upheavals resulting from the entrenchment of the migrant labour system, also contributed 
to the diversity of the moral ethnic debate of the time. In fact, male migrant labourers were 
migrating to work on the farms and railways of the Cape as early as 1820. Therefore, 'the 
system of labour migrancy... (was)... coeval with the historical existence of the Basotho state'. 26 
Nevertheless, at this stage Basutoland was not reliant on migrant labour remittances in order 
to prop up its economy. During the late nineteenth century Basutoland was a 'grain basket' of 
South Africa, exporting wool, hides, grain and livestock to the Orange Free State and the new 
diamond city of Kimberley. This was despite the earlier loss of much land to the Orange Free 
State as a result of the agreements culminating in the protection of British colonial rule. 
However, the introduction of the Cape railway at the turn of the century, which resulted in the 
cheap imports of Australian and American grain, government reforms which were actively 
biased in favour of white farmers, a devastating rinderpest epidemic in 1896-7, ecological 
degradation due to lack of land, serious droughts in 1905,1912-13, and 1932-33, and the 
1929 depression, ensured Basutoland became an impoverished labour reserve with its 
primary income deriving from migrant labour. 27 
23 See T. Maloka, ' "All Chiefs are Shepherds" ', p. p. 8-9. Also S. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief by the People, London, 1975, 
p. p. 173-180. 
2a This is not to suggest that these abuses rose solely in the era of British rule from 1884 onwards. Burman refers to abuses of 
the system before the final entrenchment of British rule - S. Burman, Chiefdom Politics, p. p. 76-77. However, these earlier 
forms of abuse may well have been dealt with by popular forms of justice. Jingoes refers to people literally thrashing their 
chiefs if they attempted to abuse the system - S. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief, p. 178. However, this form of popular justice, itself 
an attempt to restore the social and moral order prevalent at the time, would not have been acceptable in the era of British rule, 
which relied on the appropriation of the chieftaincy in order to implement 'indirect rule'. 25 The abuses of the 'placing' system, itself partially a result of the impoverishment of Lesotho's economy, provoked the 
colonial administration to implement further reforms on the institution. This inadvertently ensured more abuses of chiefly 
power. 
5. 
U. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals: The Word Music of South Africa's Basotho Migrants, London, 1994, p. 4. 
Most good general histories deal with this change from South Africa's 'grain basket' to impoverished labour reserve. See 
27 
for example, J. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, London, 1994, (2nd ed), p. p. 252-262. The extent of this 
impoverishment is best brought out in C. Murray's two works: Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho, 
London, 1981 and Black Mountain: Land, Class and Power in the Eastern Orange Free State, 1880s to 1980s, London, 1992. 
The latter work concentrates primarily on the areas surrounding Lesotho, but nevertheless provides many penetrating insights. 
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The gradual impoverishment of Basutoland, and the entrenchment of the migrant labour 
process, wrought considerable changes in gender roles during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Reformulated constructions of Sotho identity were directly related to these changes. 
Prior to the full entrenchment of migrant labour Basutoland had a very patriarchal culture. In 
pre-colonial times, the sex of a newly born child resulted in deeply symbolic acts which 
stressed the gendered nature of rural Sotho socialisation processes 28 Sotho communities 
reflected many of the facets common to rural societies in southern Africa at the time with 
regard to the role of women . 
29 Bridewealth, hlonipha avoidances, and male domination of 
property and land, were all apparent in 'traditional' rural Sotho communities. Migrant labour 
began to break down this social structure, leading to a proliferation of discourses regarding 
what was 'appropriate' behaviour for a Sotho woman. This in turn fed into reformulated 
ethnicised identities. Reproduction was central to the role of rural Sotho women in the 
nineteenth century. Casalis comments that even people who became ardent Christian 
converts regarded sterility as disastrous in a marriage, and was the only cause of divorce not 
subject to litigation 30 The advent of migrant labour began to affect this patriarchal 
conceptualisation of women, and discourses evolved centring around either the supposed 
'conservative' nature of Sotho women, or paradoxically their 'wanton' behaviour, especially 
those who migrated to South Africa. Writing in the 1960s, Ashton comments on rural 
conceptions of sterility, which seem to have been influenced by the process of migrant labour: 
Failure to conceive may be due to a number of causes. One 
is... namely that the semen does not reach the womb... another 
is promiscuity. If a woman has intercourse with different men 
before her womb has 'closed', their semen struggle for sole 
possession of the womb until all are ejected so that no fusion 
with the woman's blood takes place: hence the notorious 
barrenness of prostitutes and female sexual maniacs; hence, 
too, the seriousness of a wife's adultery which may thwart her 
husband's procreation and lead to her sterility, quite apart from 
the danger of her introducing her lover's 'strange' blood into the 
family. 31 
28 H. Ashton, The Basuto, p. 29. It is interesting to note that the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) adopted the Knobkerry as its 
party symbol in the 1960s (p. xvii, ibid). This is suggestive of concepts of masculinity involving fighting ability being 
transposed onto a militant African Nationalist context. As will be demonstrated below, the BCP was very patriarchal itself. 29 For a general overview, which should nevertheless be read with caution due to its tendency to materialist reductionism, see 
J. Guy, 'Analysing Pre-Capitalist Societies in Southern Africa', JSAS, vol 14, No 1,1987. For a more specific, compact 
summary of rural Sotho constructions of women's roles at the time see S. Burman, 'Fighting a Two-Pronged Attack: the 
Changing Legal Status of Women in Cape-Ruled Basutoland, 1872-1884', in C. Walker, Women and Gender in Southern 
Africa to 1945, London, 1990. Although Burman's article specifically refers to the short period of Cape rule, her summary 
does reflect practices which were continued into the twentieth century. 30 E. Casalis, The Basutos, p. p. 184-185. 11 
-' H. Ashton, The Basuto, p. 26. 
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Themes of female fertility and sterility were prominent in pre-colonial rural southern African 
societies, and remained so throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 32 Ashton's 
reference to the 'notorious barrenness' of prostitutes and so-called 'female sexual maniacs' is 
interesting, as this resonates with older male representations of the 'dangers' inherent in 
women and the changes wrought in gender roles by the migrant labour system. There was a 
tendency in rural communities of the period to regard women and female sexuality as 
potentially dangerous to men and cattle. 33 Oppositions were often constructed between 
healing and fertilising agents and dangerous and sterilising forces. For example, women's' 
menstrual blood was considered dangerous to men, whilst male semen was considered 
healing and fertilising. 34 As one of the main roles of women was to reproduce the male line of 
succession, sterility was a serious problem and often resulted in considerable loss of status. 
Furthermore, sterility was usually considered to be a female condition, and it was rarely 
3 attributed to men s 
These binary oppositions resonate with Douglas' above-mentioned reference to the 
construction of binary opposites in order to impose an order upon untidy reality. The 
construction of 'conservative' and 'wanton' representations of Sotho women seem to reflect a 
male reformulation of this need to re-impose order in a time of considerable social and 
economic flux. From the 1930s onwards, many Sotho women began migrating in 
considerable numbers to the Rand (although this exodus started in the 1920s), often initially in 
search of errant husbands who had not returned home from the mines and were not providing 
financial support. Many of these women failed to find their husbands, or when they did, failed 
to get them to return home. 6 Subsequently many women forged a tenuous independence by 
participating in illicit beer-brewing and prostitution. 37 Sotho traditionalists inveighed heavily 
against the resulting male loss of control of these women and, together with colonial and mine 
administrations of the time, constructed a picture of 'wanton' urban Sotho women, who were 
destroying the social fabric of 'traditional' Sotho culture. This ignored the reality of the 
situation, whereby women sought to carve out a more independent life for themselves which 
avoided patriarchal domination. Interestingly, women who remained in rural Basutoland 
gradually gained a reputation for 'conservatism' which again was not a true portrayal of reality. 
32 For a useful overview see A. Kuper, Wives for Cattle: Bridewealth and Marriage in Southern Africa, London, 1982, 
especially chapter 2. Kuper should be read with caution, however, due to a somewhat ahistorical approach. 33 
_.. -- -- lbid, p. 18. Also see chapter 7 which refers to similar findings by other anthropologists. U 
lbid, p. 19. 
7i 
H. Ashton, The Basutos, p. 27. 
36 P. Bonner, ' "Desirable or Undesirable Basotho Women? " Liquor, Prostitution and the Migration of Basotho Women to the 
Rand, 1920-1945', in C. Walker (ed), Women and Gender. 37 This issue has received a comprehensive analysis in chapter 7, and therefore will only be summarised here. 
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This representation of 'conservative' Sotho women reflects a common theme inherent in the 
3s discourses of many ethnic and nationalist culture brokers 
Basutoland was no exception. Even academics inadvertently contributed to this 'conservative' 
identity construction. Sotho women were considered a fundamental element in ensuring the 
gaining of power of the 'conservative' Basutoland National Party in 1965. Conversely Sotho 
men, due to their experience in political discussion and traditional courts, and their wider 
experience of the conditions under apartheid, supposedly 'were more able... to understand and 
support the ... strategy for the liberation of South Africa and the demi-socialist rhetoric of 
the 
'radical' parties'. 9 Women were popularly supposed to have won the day for the Basutoland 
National Party due to the absence of many men working in South Africa under the migrant 
labour system ao 
The rigidification of women's supposed personality traits had little to do with older, rural forms 
of Sotho culture. Indeed, formulations among the Sotho were less explicitly tied to anatomy 
and sexuality than they were among the British administration. For 'traditional' Sotho, 
'expectations of proper behaviour for men and women were contingent upon social context, a 
dangerous if not revolutionary concept in the eyes of the colonial masters' 41 The binary 
oppositions regarding women's fertility and sexuality classified 'mainly states and conditions or 
phases rather than unchanging essences'. 42 Men equally could be prone to behaviour which 
threatened the sanctity and reproduction of the homestead. 43 The proponents of politically 
tribalist and ethnic nationalist ideologies tend to ignore this factor when reifying constructions 
of 'tradition' tailor-made to suit their own political agendas. Patriarchal discourses inherent in 
political tribalism essentialises the gender roles of men and women, not taking fully into 
account the more fluid nature of pre-colonial and early colonial rural communities' gendered 
ideologies. 
Many women portrayed as essentially 'conservative' by academics and politicians alike were 
often quite radical for their time, especially between the 1920s and the gaining of 
independence. They thus transcended the simple dichotomy whereby men were perceived to 
be dominant in the public, political sphere, and women entrenched in the domestic, private 
sphere. Their achievements were all the more remarkable considering the inequalities 
prevalent in Sotho communities in this period, inequalities moreover which were exacerbated 
38 For various examples of this form of gendered identity construction see F. Anthias and N. Yuval-Davis, Woman-Nation- 
State, London, 1989, and G. Mare, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, London, 1993. Also see chapter 7. 39 M. Epprecht, 'Women's "Conservatism" and the Politics of Gender in Late Colonial Lesotho', JAli, Vol 36,1995, p. 29. an - Ibid. 
41 _.. lbid, p. 40. 
42 A. Kuper, Wives for Cattle, p. 19. aa '" Ibid. 
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by the British administration's attempts to impose its own conceptualisations of morality upon 
Sotho rural communities. Writing with reference to the 1950s Jingoes, who himself embodied 
a diverse mix of 'radical' and 'conservative' ideologies, implied that the sons of chiefs were 
losing 'traditional' 'masculine' traits of leadership due partly to the fact that they were being 
raised by women and not in the chiefs court, as many men were absent through migrant 
labour. 44 It was possible for women themselves to become chiefs or chiefs' regents in Sotho 
communities, although this was not often to the liking of male traditionalists 45 
The respect accorded women chiefs did not diminish due to their sex however. Their status 
stemmed from the office of the chieftaincy as an institution rather than the individual herself. 
In essence, woman chiefs were 'honourary men'. This is evidenced by the following quote 
from chief Mantsebo, when her authority was challenged by the senior Koena widow, Mahali: 
I call myself a man because I am a Paramount Chief.. You are my wife 
because I was married to you by my father. I say you are married to me 
because I have taken the name of my husband your father and therefore 
all the upkeeping should be in my hands. 46 
In fact many women chiefs actively sought to gain the vote for women, and even to abolish the 
patriarchal inheritance customs inherent in rural culture. Even in instances where the colonial 
authorities accused woman chiefs of being 'anti-progressive', the reality was somewhat 
different. For example, the opposition of some women chiefs to so-called colonial 
'improvement schemes' in the 1930s and 1940s was not some form of anti-modernisation 
movement, but rather a defence of peasants' ways of life in the face of what would have been 
disastrous land reforms resulting in considerable erosion. 7 Nevertheless, some Sotho 
women often seem to have regarded the chieftaincy as a main bulwark of their identity. The 
impact of rural Sotho women on the outcome of the 1965 election, and the reasons for their 
voting pattern will be analysed later. However there were other forms of reformulated Sotho 
identity arising in this period, especially in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The formation of Ma-Rashea ('Russian') gangs in urban South Africa are a particularly 
poignant case in point. Originating in the late 1940s, these gangs developed a particular form 
of heavily masculine Sotho identity suited to the poverty stricken, urban milieu within which 
they lived. The name Ma-Rashea itself demonstrates the widening consciousness of Africans 
44 S. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief, p. 152. For insights into Jingoes' own life, which illuuminates much in terms of ethnic and 
nationalist identity development, see chapter 9. 45 H. Ashton, The Basuto, p. 198. 
46 Cited in M. Epprecht, 'Women's "Conservatism"", p. 39. 47 See for example K. Showers and G. Malahleha, 'Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact Assessment: Soil 
Conservation in the 1930s and 1940s', JSAS, Vol 18,1992. 
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working in an urban context, and the integration of broader global issues within their own life- 
worlds. Inspired by white fears of the supposed post-war threat posed by Stalin, the name 
'provided a suitable antonym for one of their most feared enemies, the tsotsi'Americans' gang 
of Johannesburg' 48 Originating from migrant Sotho males who grouped together in order to 
defend themselves against tsotsi and other criminal assaults, the Ma-Rashea utilised much 
Sotho symbolism in a reformulated manner, in order to give themselves a particular identity 
within an urban milieu. 49 Clothing and weaponry were badges of an urban ethnicised identity, 
and previous chiefly divisions in Lesotho were re-ignited in this urban context. The historic 
rivalries which had arisen between Moshoeshoe's heir, Letsie I, who was based at Matsieng, 
and his second and third sons Molapo and Masupha, based further to the North, were 
reproduced by the Ma-Rashea, who divided into 'Matsieng' and 'Ha Molapo' factions. These 
factions fought amongst themselves, but also united against urban tsotsi, and other criminal, 
gangs. Thus the Ma-rashea sought to reproduce more regionalised Sotho identities than that 
represented by the Basutoland nation-state. The Ma-Rashea form of Sotho identity was thus 
both larger and smaller than that of the Sotho nation-state. Larger, in that it transcended state 
boundaries, and smaller, in that it reworked previous sub-national rural Sotho identities in a 
specific urban milieu. Jingoes additionally refers to his own experience of intra-Sotho rivalries, 
including Ma-Rashea, amongst Sotho mine-workers, arguing that this was far more prominent 
than inter-ethnic conflict. He also refers to previous chiefly rivalries as the prime motivator for 
violence. 5o 
Blanket styles, which had become symbolic of Sotho (and other African) identities in the 
nineteenth century51, were re-worked by these Ma-Rashea factions in order to promote their 
own specific, ethnicised identities 52 Ma-Rashea dance songs also often represented rural 
regional, rather than national, forms of unity and identification. 53 Other forms of previously 
48- 
---- V. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, p. 189. IQ 
"- Together with reformulated Sotho ethnic identities on the gold mines, these identities broadly correspond with the second 
chronological period of ethic identity construction outlined in chapter 3. 50 S. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief, p. 66. 51 
-" Thabane has argued that blanket wearing was, and is, not a symbolic representation of Sotho culture and identity, due to the 
fact that it was introduced in mass-produced fashion by Europeans in the nineteenth century, thus allowing indigenous 
industries little chance of competing - see M. Thabane, 'Some Economic and Technological Factors Behind the Adoption of 
the Blanket as Basotho Dress', Review of Southern African Studies, Vol 1, No 1,1995. However, just because blankets 
originated from outside of Basutoland (as it was called at the time), this did not mean that they were forced on Sotho people in 
the roles of 'passive' victims of market forces. Sotho people invested these items with their own symbolic meanings, and 
paradoxically Thabane implicitly recognises this when he refers to blanket wearing as a symbol of nationalist social elites 
emerging in Lesotho in the 1960s (p. p. 43-44, ibid). Ashton also argues that rural Sotho people in the 1950s and 1960s 
regarded the blanket as Sotho traditional or national dress (H. Ashton, The Basuto, p. 33). Sotho people did adapt the blanket 
for their own specific and pragmatic usages, and they were fundamental in representing a plethora of re-worked Sotho identity 
forms from the nineteenth century onwards. They also presented a form of clothing which did not involve the lengthy process 
of production involved in making clothing out of skins. See also E. Eldredge, A South African Kingdom, p. 7, and K. 
Tranberg-Hansen, 'Transnational Biographies and Local Meanings: Used Clothes Practices in Lusaka', JSAS, Vol 2, No 1, 
1995. 
52 D. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, p. p. 187-188. Blankets were also used for weapon concealment. See J. Guy and M. 
Thabane, 'The Ma-Rashea: A Participant's Perspective', in B. Bozzoli (ed), Class, Community and Conflict: South African 
Perspectves, Johannesburg, 1987. 
53 D. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, p. 189. 
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rural Sotho culture which seem to have been adapted in an urban context by the Ma-Rashea 
include participation in violence and sport (the boundaries between these activities often being 
quite fluid), and an appreciation of oral skills, especially in a legal context. One Ma-Rashea 
member specifically linked the tactics of violent fighting to the tactics of football, a sport 
becoming popular amongst migrant workers. 54 There seems to be a correspondence here 
with previous rural forms of violence ('sport'? ) in which herdboys participated. 5 Jingoes 
provides a vivid portrayal of herdboy activities in his youth in the early part of the twentieth 
century, which often involved stick-fighting according to specific rules and customs, but which 
sometimes broke down into more uncontrolled fighting between rival groups of herdboys 
disputing grazing territory. His description implies that herdboys willingly participated in this 
form of behaviour, and often found it exciting, exhilarating and enjoyable 58 Concepts of male 
self-worth, tied into fighting prowess and courage in battle, are readily apparent both in rural 
herdboy, and urban Ma-Rashea, morality. 
Ma-Rashea members also seem to have appreciated the oral skills and legal manipulations of 
lawyers. 57 Jingoes has similar respect for legal process and tactics. 58 He infers that this was 
due to the informal socialisation process of young boys, which involved participation in local 
rural legal disputes at the village lekhot! a (court). 59 Appreciation of legal process seems to 
have been a fundamental part of young male socialisation. Initiation schools, which were 
central to the transition from 'boyhood' to 'manhood', even had their own courts which 
doubtless added to the respect for law and custom. 60 Male respect and appreciation of legal 
process seems to have been widespread in rural pre-colonial southern African societies, and 
lasted into the first half of the twentieth century. 'Red' Xhosa male socialisation processes 
involved similar facets, and often involved a move from 'boyhood' 'violent' behaviour to an 
appreciation of solving disputes by eloquence, argument and knowledge of legal procedure 81 
By the 1940s, however, boys' initiation schools were well in decline, due partially to the 
opposition and increasing influence of missionaries 62 Indeed, this decline was noticeable as 
early as the 1920s. Josiel Lefela, president of Lekhotla la Bafo, was inveighing against the 
54 J. Guy and M. Thabane, 'The Ma-Rashea', p. 441. 55 -- However, this is a theoretically problematic area of investigation. Metaphors of warfare were, and are, often used in sport in 
western societies. See for example J. Naubrught and T. Chandler (eds), Making Men: Rugby and Masculine Identity, London, 
1996. Themes of masculinity, nationalism and other forms of identity are often intertwined with sporting achievement, and 
these relationships require much more detailed research. 56 S. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief, chapter 2. 
57 J. Guy and M. Thabane, 'The Ma-Rashea', p. 441. SR 
--See S. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief, chapter 8, which is aptly entitled 'Without Law, People are Animals'. 59 _.. ___ Mid, p. 216. 
Fn 
H. Ashton, The Basuto, p. p. 225-226. Al 
P. and I. Mayer, 'Socialisation by Peers: The Youth Organisation of the Red Xhosa', in P. Mayer (ed), Socialisation: the 
Approach From Social Anthropology, London, 1972. Also see chapter 8. 6 H. Ashton, The Basuto, p. p. 55-56. 
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decline of initiation schools due to what he perceived as missionary influence, as early as 
83 
1928. He linked this decline as a direct attack on Sotho nation-hood. 
It is likely that many of the Ma-Rashea were un-initiated, or at least sought to avoid initiation 
64 
The appreciation of legal process by Ma-Rashea members seems to have centred around 
lawyers' abilities to facilitate their release from a potential prison sentence, whereas Jingoes 
sought to promote rural concepts of legality, and linked it directly to the institution of the 
chieftainship and a form of Sotho nationalism. Nevertheless, the similarities between rural 
male Sotho socialisation processes, and Ma-Rashea moral codes are striking, especially in 
the context of violence, sport and legal systems. Guy and Thabane argue the following 
regarding the values inherent in an ex-member of a Ma-Rashea gang whom they interviewed: 
His philosophy is not an abstract one, but emerges from concrete 
situations. He sees life as a struggle, a right, in which one must 
-always be consolidating one's forces, undermining the opposition, 
and developing a strategy which avoids the obvious, frontal attack 
and strikes where it is not expected. to succeed in life one has to 
be continually wary, calculating, and prepared to attack when 
necessary. 
This suggests that Ma-Rashea gangs represented a newly forged, fluid form of Sotho 
ethnicised identity, drawing on previous cultural building blocks in order to construct an identity 
more suited to the brutal, violent, poverty-stricken urban context, which nevertheless offered 
opportunities for circumscribed independence and wealth if Sotho banded together and 
'thought on their feet'. 65 The Ma-Rashea existed at a time when rural values were coming 
under question, but consequently open for reformulation, the essence of the moral ethnic 
debate. As with the indlavini, and other forms of rural and urban male gang formations in the 
first half of the twentieth century, the Ma-Rashea formed their own moral code of sorts, 
suggesting again that their values represented an attempt 'to restore order to an essentially 
untidy experience'. 66 The liminal status of Ma-Rashea moral codes is perhaps best illustrated 
by the fact that fighting with knobkerries was abandoned by the late 1950s, replaced by 
pistols, as these gangs reached the height of their popularity, and conflicts between 
63 J. Lefela, 'Presidential Address, Matsieng, 1928, quoted in R. Edgar, Prophets With Honour, p. 80. Interestingly, this 
decline reversed itself in the 1950s, when Sotho culture brokers sought to preserve all things 'Sotho'. This revival accelerated 
from independence onwards, due to the decline of the Catholic church's influence and a growing distrust of foreign influences 
D. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, p. 104). 4 J. Guy and M. Thabane, `The Ma-Rashea', p. 436. 
65ý. . 1-his is graphically illustrated by the quote of Guy and Thabane's informant, ibid, p. 441. 66 Chapter 8 provides a more in-depth analysis of ethnic male gangs in the first half of the twentieth century. 
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themselves and other ethnic and criminal gangs became more numerous. This hints at a 
gradual absorption into tsotsi-type culture. By the 1960s, with the full implementation of 
apartheid and influx control, Ma-Rashea gangs declined in numbers and significance. But 
their legend has persisted. 'Today the term 'russian' is used to label everything from petty 
thugs to armed robbers, strike-breakers, police goons, and hired assassins, perpetuating and 
inflaming the antagonism between rural and urban Africans'. 7 This is despite the fact that the 
original gangs attempted to mould together rural and urban values, in direct contrast to the 
'Red'/'School' divide in the Eastern Cape. 
During the twentieth century, the migrant labour process threatened the status of Sotho chiefs, 
especially after the increased migratory exodus from Basutoland as a result of the devastating 
drought in the early 1930s. New forms of Sotho identity were being forged, reflecting 
conditions on the mines and in urban areas, and these did not always accord with chiefly 
power. The above mentioned abuses of power by chiefs, and the inadequacies of the 
placement system68, led to the British administration drastically reducing the numbers of chiefs 
through various reforms from the late 1930s until the 1950s. These reforms resulted in the 
notorious so-called 'medicine murders' of the 1940s, as chiefs sought to retain their status. 
Meanwhile, on the mines, Sotho migrant workers were forging a Sotho identity centred around 
specific technical skills, especially the arduous task of shaft-sinking or lashing. 69 This form of 
ethnic identification lasted from the 1930s until well into the 1960s, when technological 
developments increasingly removed the need for manual shaft-sinking. 
It is interesting to compare these mine identities with earlier, rural forms of male socialisation. 
Both exhibit similar forms of masculine identity construction, centred on the building of 
communal bonding, strength and endurance. In their study of ethnic identity formations on the 
gold mines in this period, Guy and Thabane comment that most of the ex-mineworkers they 
interviewed had positive memories of their time on the mines: 
Lashing was associated with youth, strength and endurance. 
One gains the impression that work in the shafts, the need for 
co-operation and teamwork, the noise, the energy expended, 
the praise and the privileges, did something to overcome the 
isolation, loneliness, harshness and alienation of compound 
life and conventional mining. 70 
67 D. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, p. p. 189-190. 
- 
69 
For a succinct summary of the placement system and its inadequacies see A. Kuper, Wives for Cattle, p. p. 53-55. AG 
-- See J. Guy and M. Thabane, `Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the South African 
Gold Mines', JSAS, Vol 14, No 2,1988. 
70 Ibid, p. 269. 
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Guy and Thabane's point that this form of masculine bonding represented an attempt to 
overcome the extreme difficulties of mine work is probably right. It is also interesting that 
different work roles could serve the same purpose of accentuating youth, strength and 
endurance. As different segments of the workforce were divided into assumed ethnic 
categories, each associated with different jobs, different masculine, ethnicised hierarchies 
developed around which men identified themselves. 71 However, the values mentioned in the 
above comment suggest that the values attached to male socialisation processes in rural 
areas were transposed to the mining context as migrant labour developed. Nineteenth 
century commentators on Sotho customs and culture, such as Casalis and Ellenberger, make 
several references to the importance of male initiation in shaping the personality and moral 
outlook of young men, values moreover which mirror those of the later period with which Guy 
and Thabane are concerned. 72 
The initiation process itself involved weapons training, exposure to extremes of heat and cold, 
and the submergence of the individual within the collective. During initiation, young men 
would also frequently travel long distances, a practice which still occurs today in some areas. 
'(L)ike herdboys and migrants, initiates are taught travelling as a discipline and are "forced to 
march long distances at a time throughout their country, to familiarize them with its 
topography" '. 73 This forced travelling forms part of a socialisation process whereby young 
Sotho men forge an appreciation of, and identify with, Sotho culture. 4 It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that many of the heavily masculine values of these socialisation processes 
seem to have been transposed onto the migrant labour mining context, albeit in a reformulated 
manner. 75 This is not to suggest that initiation processes, and Sotho culture itself, were 
unchanging essences. Initiation procedures changed considerably throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, as did their popularity 76 Ma-Rashea members often avoided initiation 
altogether. However many of the masculine values inherent in rural Sotho communities seem 
to have survived, if in a somewhat reformulated manner. This reinforces the theory that Sotho 
- as with other - ethnic identities were explicitly gendered. Male ethnic constructs have 
71 See for example, D. Moodie, Going for Gold: Men, Mines and Migration, London, 1994, and P. Harries, Work, Culture and 
Identity, London, 1994. 
72 See E. Casalis, The Basutos, p. p. 261-267, and D. Ellenberger, History of the Basuto Ancient and Modern, London, 1912, 
pt. p. 280-287. 
D. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, p. 107, quoting L Machobane, Governernment and Change in Lesotho, 1800-1966, 
Maseru, 1990. 
74 Ibid. The importance of wide-ranging travelling in male socialisation processes, especially in forging a wider cultural 
identity, was also argued to be a significant factor in 1960s rural Xhosa communities. See for example P. and I. Mayer, 
`Socialisation by Peers' in P. Mayer (ed), Socialisation: The Approach from Social Anthropology, Tavistock, 1972, esp. 
pt. p. 178-181. 
This is also suggested by Coplan, who backs up the theory with considerable empirical evidence. Seep. 116 and chapter 5, 
ibid. 
76 See above and H. Ashton, The Basuto, p. p. 55-56 for a periodisation. 
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remained situated within the political sphere throughout all the reformulations of identity 
mentioned above. 
Indeed Sotho socialisation processes, which contribute heavily to Sotho ethnicised identities, 
have reinforced patriarchal discourses throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Ellenberger argues that early nineteenth century initiation instructors could often be extremely 
misogynistic: '(A)mong the instructors of these lads there were bad ones who taught them to 
despise all women, even their own mothers'" Although this observation might be partially due 
to missionary prejudice, and their above mentioned opposition to initiation practices in general, 
there seems little doubt that many rural Sotho men remained rooted in patriarchal values 
throughout the twentieth century, and these values may well have contributed to domestic 
violence. The continuation of reformulated patriarchal discourses within political parties 
pursuing Basutoland's independence contributed heavily to the particular direction women's' 
political views, values and voting patterns took in the lead up to independence in 1966. The 
rigidification of women within categories of either 'conservatism' or 'wantonness', itself partially 
a result of British colonial interference, entrenched itself within the various political parties 
which evolved in the first half of the twentieth century. Josiel Lefela, president of Lekhotla la 
Bafo, made several references to 'wanton' Sotho women and their supposed threat to 
'traditional' forms of Sotho culture and custom. For example, in an article written in 1920, he 
refers to supposed missionary influence in facilitating prostitution among black women, and 
the subsequent threat to his concept of what it was to be 'Sotho'. 78 
Lefela situated this argument within a conspiracy theory aimed at reducing the black 
population, through prostitution and the encouragement of so-called 'half-castes': 'The 
Government would give these half-castes the same rights as Europeans and these rights 
would make the half-castes despise the blacks though they themselves were born of our own 
daughters'. 79 Indeed, both the Basutoland Progressive Association and Lekhotla la Bafo 
reacted against colonial prejudice and interference with what Epprecht has described as 
'aggressive machismo', leaving little room for Involvement with women's concerns 80 
The radical critique of colonial rule presented by Lekhotla la Bafo was taken up by the newly 
formed Basutoland African Congress (later to become the Basutoland Congress Party or 
BCP) in the late 1950s. The BCP Women's League actively participated in many of the BCP's 
protests against colonial rule during the 1960s, making unique contributions with their singing, 
77 D. Ellenberger, History of the Basuto, p. 283. 78 J. Lefela, `How Shall we do Away with the Black Race? ', Naledi, 3 September 1920, cited in R Edgar, Prophets with 
Honour, p. p. 68-69. 79 Ibid, p. 69. It is interesting to note throughout this article that Lefela seems to see women's primary role as reproducers of 
the 'black race'. In other words he is perpetuating a 'Mothers of the Nation' ideology. 80 M. Epprecht, 'Women's "Conservatism", p. 44. 
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speeches and praise poems. They were also not averse to adopting violent and provocative 
behaviour, such as brandishing a knobkerry, a traditional male weapon and the symbol of the 
party. 81 However the BCP leadership, despite its radical image, refused to promote women's 
right to vote, and took little interest in specific women's concerns. This was in direct contrast 
to the, in many ways, more conservative Basutoland National Party (BNP) and Marema-Tlou 
Freedom Party who explicitly supported women's suffrage (either as a genuine conviction, or 
out of political astuteness). Furthermore the BNP's leader, Chief Leaboa Jonathan, 
specifically praised the development work of catholic nuns and lay women, referring to the 
latter as 'bulldozers with breasts'82 Catholic nuns had done much in terms of gaining a 
circumscribed independence for Sotho women from the patriarchal marriage customs of rural 
Sotho society (despite promoting Christian values of domesticity), and their small scale 
development work also contributed to this. Migrant workers, and the BCP, feared this 
development work threatened patriarchal dominance, particularly at a time when migrant 
labour wages were extremely low. This led to many women voting for the BNP, and 
contributed to the myth that they were inherently conservative. In fact, some women did still 
vote for the BCP, who might have won the 1965 election if they had paid more attention to 
women's concerns. As it was, the BNP led Lesotho into independence in 1966, against most 
commentators' expectations. 
6.3 Sotho Identities Outside of Lesotho's Borders: Apartheid Social Engineering, the 
Qwagwa'Homeland' and Rural Slums 
The so-called South Sotho 'Homeland' of Qwaqwa was created in 1969 by the Nationalist 
party, and developed out of the small 'native reserve' of Witsieshoek. The self -government of 
Qwaqwa was drawn from previously conflicting Bakwena and Batlokwa chiefs, whose people 
lived in the Witsiehoek area, and who accepted joint governing status due to political pressure 
from the state. In accordance with the Nationalist party's aims of 'separate development', 
plans were evolved in order to draw the so-called surplus 'South Sotho' people from the 'white' 
towns and cities in the Orange Free State and re-locate them in Qwaqwa or in what was to 
become the huge rural slum of Onverwacht/Botshabelo, adjacent to the Thaba Nchu district of 
Bophuthatswana. Qwaqwa and Onverwacht/Botshabelo's development was closely 
interlinked through the Nationalist party's policy of 'separate development' and later what 
sl Ibid. This is an interesting inversion of masculine symbolism which may have been in order to demonstrate a circumscribed 
female independence within the nrmally male domain of violent political protest. As examined in chapter 7. these re- 
appropriations and inversions of symbols by women seem to occur at times of particular political, economic and social 
upheaval, and manifest themselves particularly with respect to violence and sexual behaviour, two areas in which men have 
historically attempted to maintain dominance. 
82 Ibid, p. 52. This comment was taken as a compliment. 
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Murray has termed 'displaced urbanisation' 83 This latter term refers to the policy of diverting 
African urbanisation through the development of massive rural slums, which nevertheless 
remained within commuting distance of 'white' urban areas providing the economy with a 
cheap labour supply. The formation of Qwaqwa and Onverwacht/Botshabelo resulted in mass 
'forced removals', resulting in extreme poverty, squalor and misery. This was fertile ground 
for ethnic entrepreneurs, who could play upon people's uncertainties and misery in order to 
bolster their own personal power base through politicising ethnicity. It was vastly exacerbated 
by the fact that many black rural farm workers were also relocated to either Qwaqwa or Thaba 
Nchu, due to the process of 'forced removals' or wider structural changes in the agricultural 
economy, such as the increased mechanisation of 'white' capitalist agriculture, which made 
many black labourers redundant. 
In the late 1960s Qwaqwa was intended to become the 'Homeland' of South Sotho speakers, 
whilst Thaba Nchu services were to remain under the control of the Bophuthatswana 
government, and become a place of residence for people categorised as Tswana. However, 
Thaba Nchu also housed a considerable Sotho population, as well as some Xhosa people. 
Ethnic conflict sharpened, as the leader of the Bophuthatswana government, Lucas Mangope, 
sought to favour the Tswana population in an area of desperately scarce resources. The 
Bophuthatswana government pursued a policy of intense repression against Sotho people, 
especially through the use of their police force. Many abuses were perpetrated, including the 
rape of Sotho women by members of the said police. 4 T. K. Mopeli, who became leader of the 
Qwaqwa government in 1975, was able to make much political capital out of taking up the 
cause of the Sotho population in Thaba Nchu. Eventually the Bophuthatswana government 
set aside some land for the growing Sotho population, which was to become the desperately 
impoverished rural slum of Onverwacht/Botshabelo in 1980. It was intended by both the 
Nationalist party and the government of Qwaqwa that this rural slum was to become part of 
Qwagwa, but it never did due to the crumbling of apartheid. 
Qwaqwa itself exhibited similar problems to Onverwacht/Botshabelo, due to the same 
problems of overcrowding, poverty and lack of industrial development. This also provoked 
ethnicised conflict. Banks comments that the extreme poverty and consequent growth in 
crime contributed directly to the re-appropriation of clan identities as ethnic markers within 
83 See C. Murray, Black Mountain, chapter 6, and C. Murray, 'Displaced Urbanisation: South Africa's Rural Slums', African 
Affairs, Vol 86,1987. For a compact analysis of 'displaced urbanisation' in other areas of South Africa, see W. Beinart, 
Twentieth Century South Africa, London, 1994, p. p. 197-203. 84 C. Murray, Black Mountain, p. p. 221-222. Rape in this context can reflect the close intertwining of masculine and politically 
tribalist identities, for women often represent the boundaries of ethnicised identities. For an in-depth examination of this form 
of ethnicised abuse, and how it is deliberately used in order to portray the dominance of one ethnic group over another, see the 
following: A. Ahmed, ' "Ethnic Cleansing": A Metaphor for Our Time? ', Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 18, No 1,1995, and 
S. Sofos, 'Inter-Ethnic Violence and Gendered Constructions of Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia', Social Identities, Vol 2, No 
1,1996. Also see chapters 7 and 8 for related issues. This form of ethnicised conflict corresponds with the fourth periodisation 
of ethnic identities outlined in chapter 3. 
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many villages. 85 Social cleavages mainly centred around matswantle (outsiders) and 
matswalla (insiders): 
In villages overrun or encircled by newcomers these labels 
became highly politicised in the daily struggle for water, wood, 
food and jobs. The endless influx of farm people angered the 
original inhabitants, who suddenly found their fields transform- 
ed into closer settlement villages. To compound matters, they 
found that with mass relocation virtually all their livestock was 
stolen. 86 
Ethnicised stereotypes abounded. Matswalla often referred to matswantle as 'backward' and 
'unsophisticated'. Matswantle argued that matswalla had preferential access to resources as 
they belonged to the Bakwena clan, unlike the matswantle who originated largely from 
Makgolokwe or Batlokwa clans 87 This sub-ethnic discourse of clan also utilised custom and 
tradition in order to demonstrate who were the 'true Sotho', thus ethnicising conflict. For 
example, matswantle argued that matswalla were not'true Sotho' as the Bakwena clan chiefs 
had largely given up circumcision rituals in the early part of the century, due largely to 
missionary influence, whilst the Batlokwa continued to practice the rite. Thus matswalla chiefs 
had no right to rule as they were uncircumcised. Matswantle also referred derogatively to 
matswalla chiefs and headmen as induna, thus placing them in the same category as the 
notorious 'boss-boys' on the mines. 88 These ethnicised rivalries had their origins in earlier 
hostilities to farm people in the 1950s, which also equated with rivalries between clans and 
89 chiefdoms. 
T. K. Mopeli attempted to overcome these divisions by deliberately fostering ethnic 
nationalism 90 The attempt to curry the favour of the Sotho population in Thaba Nchu 
represented part of this project. This ultimately failed due to the strength of the above- 
mentioned local ethnicised divides, and the inability of Mopeli to construct a convincing 
discourse of Sotho nationalism for Qwaqwa, due to the fact that many of the symbols 
85 L. Banks, 'The Failure of Ethnic Nationalism: Land, Power and the Politics of Clanship on the South African Highveld, 
1860-1990', Africa, Vol 65, No 4,1995, p. 578. 
86 Ibid. 
87 This reflects the earlier regional divisions between urban Ma-Rashea gangs. 
88 Ibid, p. p. 578-579. Although not exclusively an urban/rural ethnicised divide, these ethnic stereotypes are remarkably 
similar to those in other areas during the 1960s and 1970s, outlined in chapters 3 and 8. 89 The full history of Witsiehoek, its subsequent metamorphosis into Qwaqwa, and the rivalries between chiefdoms, clans and 
others which accompanied these developments, are too complex to reproduce here. For a useful summary see L. Banks, 'The 
Failure of Ethnic Nationalism'. Also see the magisterial study by C. Murray, Black Mountain, which explores these issues in a 
broader context, as well as vividly illustrating the full extent of the misery of apartheid, 'Separate Development' and 'displaced 
urbanisation'. 
90 This corresponds with the third periodisation of ethnic identity construction outlined in chapter 3. 
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representative of Sotho identity had already been appropriated by the elites ruling in Lesotho 
itself. Ultimately, Mopeli had to return to a narrow politically tribalist base for support, and 
eventually, in 1992, the Batlokwa and Bakwena chiefs resigned from the Qwaqwa cabinet to 
join the ANC aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders. 
The failure of Mopeli's attempts at fostering ethnic nationalism from 'above' illustrate the need 
for these forms of ethnicised discourses to resonate with people's concrete experiences in 
order for them to gain an ideological grip on popular consciousness. Ethnicised discourses 
arising from 'below', based on clan identities, were able to take a firm hold on people's 
imaginations as they resonated with their past experiences and could provide a form of 
circumscribed security and identity in a time of extreme poverty, neglect and violence. The 
importance of the institution of the chieftaincy is also readily apparent. There is also one 
important contrast between Qwaqwa and Lesotho. Some of Lesotho's rural populace, despite 
the appalling poverty there, still had access to some land, whereas this was patently not the 
case for most in Qwaqwa. Therefore state appeals to Sotho ethnic nationalism in the latter 
case were far less likely to work, as people tended to identify on a local, ethnicised level with 
the chieftaincy, and the importance of the chieftaincy was in turn tied to ensuring access to 
land. This was far less likely to be the case in Qwaqwa than in Lesotho. 
6.4 Independence, the End of Apartheid and an Uncertain Future: Post-1966 Lesotho 
and the Changing Nature of Sotho Identities. 
The transition from colonial rule to full democratic independence has followed an extremely 
uneven path in Lesotho. Chief Leaboa Jonathan became the first prime minister of newly 
independent Lesotho in 1966, due to the winning of the 1965 elections by the Basutoland 
National Party (henceforth BNP). Tension soon arose between him and King Moshoeshoe II. 
The king had the support of the Marema Tlou Freedom Party, and felt that the newly forged 
constitution deprived him of his rightful powers. The 1970 elections were won by the 
Basutoland Congress Party (henceforth BCP), but were prevented from gaining power by 
Jonathan, who staged a coup. Moshoeshoe II was exiled to Holland. Several attempts were 
made to remove Jonathan from power, all of which failed. Jonathan gravitated to a pro-ANC 
stance and stepped up his criticism of apartheid, for example refusing to recognise Transkeian 
'independence' in 1976. However, he continued a policy of ruthless repression of resistance 
to his rule at home. The apartheid regime responded to his pro-ANC stance by supporting the 
Lesotho Liberation Army, made up of some of Jonathan's exiled opponents, and in 1986 
struck a decisive blow to his rule by closing South Africa's borders with Lesotho, thus cutting 
the country off from many essential supplies. This triggered a military coup, and Lesotho 
remained under military control for seven years until the elections of 1993 which brought the 
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BCP to power in an uneasy co-habitation with the police, military and monarchy. Moshoeshoe 
II was re-instated soon after. Economically, Lesotho remained heavily dependent on South 
Africa, migrant labour remaining an essential financial source. The end of apartheid has not 
ended the severe economic problems faced by Lesotho, especially as the ANC is 
concentrating on dealing with the massive unemployment problems within South Africa itself, 
thus reducing the likelihood of financial help foe the ailing Lesotho economy. 01 
Post-independence Lesotho governments invariably attempted to appropriate Sotho identity in 
order to fashion a rigidified national identity from 'above', which did not resonate with the fluid, 
processual identities of many of the rural populace. The weakening of the monarchy and the 
chieftainship by British imposed reforms during the period of colonial rule had, as outlined 
above, led to the formation of 'new political movements as alternative means of reasserting 
national objectives'. 92 The historical avoidance of assimilation within South Africa and the later 
gaining of independence led to a huge growth in the civil service, and other relatively elite 
groups, from the 1960s onwards. The fact that Lesotho was surrounded by South Africa, and 
virtually reliant on migrant labour remittances economically during the apartheid era, ensured 
this growth, especially as international condemnation of apartheid gathered pace. Leaboa 
Jonathan's condemnation of apartheid, which became stronger after Mozambique and Angola 
gained independence in 1974, and the events of Soweto in 1976 heralded change in South 
Africa, also ran in tandem with continued - seemingly paradoxical - attempts at encouraging 
investment in Lesotho by South African business. The result of these factors led to a growth 
of a civil service elite which had vested interests in pursuing a particular form of Sotho 
nationalism. 93 
Other elite groupings, such as the military and police leadership, politicians, chiefs and various 
entrepreneurs also had vested interests in promoting an elite form of culturally brokered 
nationalism for similar reasons. Therefore national symbols were deliberately created and 
promoted in various ways, such as Moshoeshoe Day (originally created by Sotho chiefs in 
1919), and more banal examples such as commemorations of famous battles on postage 
stamps, the national flag and anthem, and independence holiday. During the later 1970s, the 
formation of links with such countries as Mozambique and Cuba also demonstrated politically 
independent nation-state status from South Africa. The pursuit of a national purpose by these 
elite groups also encompassed such criteria as improved communications links and the 
91 This is necessarily a brief summary of the political and economic history of Lesotho since independence. For more detailed 
accounts see for example the following: J. Bardill and J. Cobbe, Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa, 
London, 1985; J. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, p. p. 260-263; R. Weisfelder, 'The Basotho Nation-State'; It 
Weisfelder, 'Lesotho and the Inner Periphery in the New South Africa', JMAS. Vol 30. No 4.1992; R. Love, 'Lesotho: Inner to 
Outer Periphery? '; It Southall, Democratising Dependence? The Lesotho General Elections of 1993, Pretoria, 1993; T. 
Quinlan, 'Marena A Lesotho'. 
92 1- Weisfelder, 'The Basuto Nation-State', p. 224. 93 Ibid, p. 226. 
142 
formation of a national army. Images of modernity assumed great importance in this politically 
elite project. As Weisfelder comments, construction cranes and other images of modern 
technology and commercial activity 'assume unusual significance in a country totally devoid of 
an integrated economy at the time of independence' 94 In the Janus-like fashion of nationalist 
ideologues Leaboa Jonathan pursued this route to modernity whilst stressing the importance 
of traditions, custom and culture rooted in the chieftainship, family and church. 95 
In some respects this form of elite, culturally brokered nationalism parallels forms of ethnic 
nationalism such as that espoused by Mangosuthu Buthelezi. However, it also embraces 
facets of civic nationalism and thus eludes these forms of rigid theoretical categorisations 96 
This is at least part due to the fact that Lesotho has been largely ethnically homogenous since 
its formation as a nation-state in the nineteenth century91 It has a tradition of resistance to 
assimilation within South Africa's borders, promoting nationalist identifications, whilst its 
virtually ethnically homogenous population entails little in terms of ethnic conflict within state 
borders (although this does not preclude sub-ethnic conflicts between chiefdoms, which could 
be ethnicised outside of the state, as illustrated above). This elite form of nationalism does 
not articulate well with the majority of the population however. Many ordinary rural Sotho 
people still experienced their identities primarily through the institution of the chieftaincy. As 
already demonstrated, this did not preclude criticisms of individual chiefs. Indeed, there was 
an historical tradition of criticism dating back to the early nineteenth century. However, the 
institution itself remained important. This is not to suggest that the chieftainship was the only 
element of rural Sotho identity in the era of independence. Religious, gender and class 
affiliations did exist. However it still remains an important, if gradually eroding, element of 
popular Sotho consciousness. Additionally, political independence itself could do little to 
change a population 'whose existence, and national identity was based on the bonds between 
chief and subject, and on links between rural home and urban South Africa, rather than on any 
substantive affinity with the state'. 98 
The importance of migrant labour in determining many rural Sothos' continuing identifications 
with Lesotho also cannot be underestimated. Urbanised Sotho living in South Africa still 
identified with facets of Sotho identity in the 1960s. For example in Cape Town many still 
94 _... --- lbia, p. zz5. 
Oi 
lbla, p. zZ7. 
06 
See chapters 3and 9 for descriptions of what these forms of nationalism entail. 97 
"' This does not mean that Sotho people were not influenced by the small pockets of 'Nguni' and other peoples who sought 
protection under Moshoeshoe in the early nineteenth century. See A. M. Duggan-Cronin, The Bantu Tribes of Southern Africa. 
Vo12 Section 3, which illustrates several 'Nguni' influences upon Sotho culture. Especially see plate LXII, which 
demonstrates 'Nguni' influnce on Sotho hut construction. This photographic plate also illustrates that pre-colonial forms of 
dress survived into the 1930s, although very rare by then. In Herschel district Nguni and Sotho communities lived next to each 
other, and therefore cultural influences between the two were widespread. 98 T. Quinlan, 'Marena A Lesotho', p. 212. 
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celebrated Moshoeshoe Day 99 However, at least in Cape Town, rural/urban divides were 
becoming stronger bases for identity and differentiation than ethnic ones, although these 
divides could also become ethnicised. 100 Migrant labourers, however, had a vested interest in 
keeping a rural base in Lesotho, especially in the era of apartheid when it was difficult to gain 
a living base in South Africa. Indeed, migrant labour fundamentally shaped rural village life 
and marital relations in Lesotho in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Extramarital relations 
provided one of the routes by which migrant labourers' earnings could be diffused within rural 
communities. 101 Long-term extra-marital relationships, referred to as bonyatsi, also developed 
between migrant workers and women who were often the married partners of absent migrant 
workers themselves. Spiegel comments that many Sotho sought to justify these relationships 
in terms of older customs such as forms of polygyny. In other words they sought to regain a 
moral and social order within a fast-changing social and economic climate through calling 
upon past custom in order to explain the changes occurring in the present. The fact that 
monogamous marriages often broke down due to long periods of male absence and lack of 
financial support were generally not commented on. People sought to make sense of the 
present through the cultural building blocks of the past. 102 
Migrant labour has also recently led to an increased circumscribed independence for women 
(although this occurred to a lesser extent in the first half of the twentieth century - see above). 
The mass retrenchments of Sotho mine workers in the aftermath of the 1987 strike, the 
numbers of which increased still further in the 1990s, has led to many women trying their luck 
in South Africa in terms of employment and a new life. According to Coplan this has led to a 
new phenomenon in Lesotho - the male-headed, single-parent rural household - due to the 
fact that many women married to unemployed men left their homes ostensibly to find 
employment to support their families, but often never returning. 103 Indeed, Coplan's research 
suggests that women have gradually gained more independence through both migrating to 
South Africa, and the urban areas of Lesotho itself. 104 This has resulted in a fundamental 
challenge to the patriarchal system which, in a reformulated manner, has remained central to 
Sotho ethnicised identities throughout the twentieth century. Women's self-help networks and 
99 M. Wilson and A. Mafeje, Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township, London, 1963, p. p. 35-36. 
too_.. 
, nl 
Ibid, p. 140. See chapter 8 for similar examples in 1960s Durban. 
'°' See A. Spiegel, 'Rural Differentiation and the Diffusion of Migrant Labour Remittances in Lesotho', in P. Mayer (ed), 
Black Villagers in an Industrial Society: Anthropological Perspectives on Labour Migration in South Africa, Cape Town, 
1980. 
102 See A. Spiegel, 'Polygyny as Myth: Towards Understanding Extramarital Relations in Lesotho', in A. Spiegel and P. 
McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa, Witwatersrand, 1991. 
103 
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V. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, p. 174. 
"- However, this is a highly complex issue, involving the particular way that marriages and 'bridewealth' has evolved under 
the migrant labour system. See C. Murray, Families Divided, Chapter 6 for an in-depth analysis of the changing meaning of 
marriages resulting from migrant labour, and the effect these have had on the 'bridewealth' process. 
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the growth of part-time and informal sector jobs in Lesotho's rural areas, has also allowed 
women to pursue an increasingly independent life-style. 105 
It would seem that, in the aftermath of the crumbling of apartheid, Sotho identity is set to 
change even further. International development agencies, which helped prop up the fragile 
economy during the era of apartheid, are now increasingly turning their attention to South 
Africa, driven by Western budgetary cuts and the more global political and economic 
significance of the latter. 108 Migrant labour, a fundamental shaping factor of Sotho identity from 
the late nineteenth century onwards, is now in decline and this casts doubt on the viability of 
Lesotho as a nation-state. The bureaucratic, military and political elites still have vested self- 
interests in propagating Sotho nationalism, and some are actively pursuing policies of 
irredentism, laying claim to land lost to the Orange Free State in the nineteenth century. 707 
However, it is unlikely that these claims will produce results as the ANC has many land 
restoration claims with which to deal within South Africa's own borders. Coplan found that 
many migrant workers whom he interviewed just prior to the 1994 elections in South Africa, 
would willingly relinquish their Lesotho passports if a government 'good for blacks' came to 
power. 108 At the time of writing, Lesotho's future as a nation-state is in an uncertain, liminal 
phase. It is unlikely that the new ANC government, which is attempting to woo investment, 
would want to incorporate Lesotho, with its impoverished economy, within its own borders. 
However, the majority of the rural population do not seem to identify with the elite constructed 
nationalist identity propagated by Sotho politicians. Their own, ethnicised, identities seem to 
centre round the chieftainship, the future of which itself is in doubt due to the fact that chiefs 
have increasing difficulty in allocating land. This does not necessarily mean that Sotho ethnic 
identities will die out however. As illustrated above, these identities can transcend state 
borders and can take on 'a life of their own' without the buttress of the institution of the 
chieftaincy. Ethnicity is very malleable, and would seem capable of surviving the decay of 
Lesotho as a nation-state. Unfortunately, the poverty inherent in Lesotho could mean that 
Sotho identity could be manipulated towards violent ends. The potential for political tribalism 
remains, as the so-called 'race riots' of May 1991, in which Taiwanese and Korean 
shopkeepers were targeted by the Sotho urban underclass, demonstrates. As Coplan 
comments, '(h)owever little, or perhaps because there is so little that the nation state does for 
them, Lesotho's new underclass expressed revolt in nationalist terms'. 109 As with many 
desperately poor people, reified, ethnicised, identities (even if the actual elites who created 
105 D. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, chapter 6. For a similar example in 1980s Qwaqwa, and the subsequent violent 
response of the male underclass, see L. Bank, 'Angry Men and Working Women: Gender, Violence and Economic Change in 
Qwagwa in the 1980s', African Studies, Vol 53, No 1,1994. 
1V° See R. Love, 'Lesotho: Inner to Outer Periphery? ', p. 77. 107 See R. Weisfelder, 'Lesotho and the Inner Periphery', passim. 108 D. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, p. 250. 109 Ibid, p. 253. 
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them are despised) are the only secure anchors upon which many Sotho people can cling in a 
time of great uncertainty. 
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7. 'MOTHERS OF THE NATION', AND THE `THREAT' OF THE 'LOOSE' WOMAN: 
CONNECTIONS BETWEEN GENDER, MOTHERHOOD, SEXUALITY AND ETHNICISED 
IDENTITIES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY SOUTH AFRICA 
One of the most pervasive aspects of twentieth century ethnic and nationalist mobilisation is 
the specific role conferred on women. Concepts of motherhood, 'passivity' and 'honour' are 
often utilised in constructing women's positions in the culturally brokered versions of ethnic 
and nationalist narratives. ' Reified constructions of motherhood are deployed by male culture 
brokers in order to locate the position of women within a nation or ethnicised grouping. This is 
usually achieved by attempting to assign women a well-defined but circumscribed position in 
society, to which some status, honour and respectability are attached. 
In South Africa these ideological constructions of identity arose at specific historical junctures, 
especially at times of rapid socio-economic change resulting in considerable social dislocation. 
Older, rural, forms of identity were fundamentally altered due to colonial and capitalist 
penetration, and particularly the longevity of the migrant labour process. However, the very 
length of this process also provided the crucial space necessary for people to reformulate their 
identities, something which may not have occured in a situation of more rapid 
proletarianisation. This is not to suggest that proletarianisation was not rapid, but rather that 
the migrant labour process allowed for a reformulation of rural identities. This chapter sets out 
to explore how these factors in South Africa's history, together with the impact of 
segregationist and later apartheid policies, resulted in male nationalist and ethnic culture 
brokers, both African and Afrikaner, constructing more explicitly defined subservient roles for 
women within the ethnic or nationalist group. Reformulated roles, moreover, which often 
centred around particular conceptions of motherhood which often appealed to some women. 
However, these ideologies were not just passively accepted by women. Motherhood could 
include various meanings over the course of the twentieth century, depending upon the 
changing economic and social circumstances of the women involved. Cultural elements and 
attendant socialisation processes within particular communities also contributed to a myriad of 
conceptualisations of motherhood and women's particular roles in society, and women could 
re-work these identities to their own advantage. Furthermore, 'motherhood' itself was, and is, 
I See especially the insightful introduction to F. Anthias and N. Yuval-Davis (eds), Woman-Nation-State, Macmillan, London, 
1989. For the South African context see D. Gaitskell and E. Unterhalter, 'Mothers of the Nation: A Comparative Analysis of 
Nation, Race and Motherhood in Afrikaner Nationalism and the African National Congress' in the same volume. Also C. 
Walker (ed), Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945, London, 1990. For a comparison with late eighteenth century 
Britain, see L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, Pimlico, 1992, especially chapter 6. For an interesting 
exploration of the intertwining of eugenics and constructions of motherhood in early twentieth century South Africa see S. 
Klausen, ' "For the Sake of Race": Eugenic Discourses of Feeblemindedness and Motherhood in the South African Historical 
Record, 1903-1926', JSAS, Vol 23, No 1,1997. 
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more than just a political construction. This chapter aims to explore these issues, as well as 
some attendant and connected changes in sexuality and identity during the century. 
7.1 Idealised Motherhood, Female Independence and Ethnic Identities In Pre-1948 
South Africa 
It is now generally accepted within revisionist schools of historiography that the migrant labour 
process allowed older forms of identities the crucial space to reformulate themselves in order 
at least partially to withstand the impact of colonial domination and uneven capitalist 
penetration. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, Africans often mobilised around 
their chiefs in order to resist colonial land expropriation and complete Incorporation into the 
capitalist economy. These mobilised identities were often translated in an ethnicised sense? 
The fact that pre-colonial communities and their attendant moral values were not completely 
destroyed also entailed a reformulation of gender relations and identities, with a considerable 
overlap between pre-capitalist and capitalist values. 
Pre-colonial southern African identities were fundamentally divided in terms of gender and 
age. It has even been argued that the division between men on the one hand, and women 
and children/young people on the other, represented the major class cleavage in pre-colonial 
southern African societies. 3 However, this argument seems too reductionist, in that it assumes 
precolonial. southern African societies can be perceived primarily in class terms. It also raises 
issues with regard to the subjective consciousnesses of the historical actors concerned. For 
these gendered identities may well have been perceived in a different way by these 
communities than in class terms. Gender divisions were also fundamentally premised upon 
the lobola system. ` Pre-colonial southern African communities exhibited several forms of what 
could be perceived as patriarchal social control of women and young people. Themes of 
control, restraint and respect were central to their moral universes, and economic functioning. 
Young men and women were socialised and socially controlled through age-set groupings a 
Married women, especially when young, were tied to strict rules of etiquette, such as the 
2 See especially chapter 3. 
. 
]. Guy, 'Analysing Pre-Capitalist Societies in Southern Africa', JSAS, Vol 14, No 1,1987. 
4 The structure and value systems of pre-colonial southern African societies is too vast a subject to receive academic justice in 
one chapter. See Guy (footnote 3) for an interesting overview, which nevertheless should be read with caution due to its 
reductionist materialist approach. Also A. Kuper, Wives far Cattle, London. 1982, which analyses lobola systems in various 
rural African societies over time. Kuper should also be read with caution, due to his somewhat ahistorical approach, but he 
does provide a useful synthesis of earlier anthropological works concerned with the subject. This particular chapter section 
aims to analyse rural and urban communities in the first half of the twentieth century, and how these relate to ethnic and gender 
identities. However, there will be comparisons drawn with facets of pre-colonial communities in order to demonstrate how 
socialisation processes, and attendant identity formations, have been reformulated through such criteria as the migrant labour 
process. 
3 See chapters land 8 for a more detailed analysis of these socialisation processes. 
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hlonipha system. 6 Guy comments that the appropriation and control of women's productive 
and reproductive capacity by men was the axis on which these societies turned, although this 
argument does not properly take into account how these socialisation processes were 
interpreted by the people involved. Women were responsible both for homestead agricultural 
production and the reproduction of labour power. Marriage provided the prime institution 
whereby the male transfer of rights over women and their potential children was carried out, 
and this was legitimated through the social practice of bridewealth, or lobo/a. 7 
The gradual, uneven, but inexorable expansion of the migrant labour process was 
fundamentally to alter the basis of pre-colonial South African societies. Although initially 
chiefdoms were able to control the terms by which migrant labourers entered the workforce 
the discovery of diamonds, and especially gold, in the late nineteenth century, together with 
rinderpest and East Coast fever epidemics, and the implementation of colonial taxation, 
ensured the gradual accumulation of colonial control .8 
The predominance of young African 
men in the migrant labour force, especially in the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
was partially due both to male dominated colonial ideologies and the survival of African forms 
of rural patriarchy. Most women were thus entrenched in the countryside, working the land .9 
However, the ideologies espoused by colonial administrators and mineowners, together with 
rural African patriarchal structures requiring the retention of women to work the land, do not in 
themselves completely explain why African women remained in rural areas longer than men. 
African women often vigorously defended rural patterns of life. 10 and this strongly suggests a 
circumscribed status and prestige felt by women in rural areas during this time. Furthermore, 
this was often played upon by ethnic culture brokers in order to promote their own political 
agendas in the first half of the twentieth century (and indeed in the era of apartheid and 
beyond). 
Nevertheless, expanding cash needs and the start of a decline in rural production (although 
this did not present severe problems until the 1930s), due to the expansion of the migrant 
labour workforce and legislation which adversely affected the production capabilities of the 
South African reserves, meant older men began to become absorbed into the migrant labour 
workforce, and women were increasingly leaving their rural homes as well. This was in spite 
6 Ibid. This section of the chapter draws heavily upon Guy's above mentioned article, which provides a useful overview of 
these examples of pre-colonial social controls. 7 This is the essence of Guy's argument. He argues that 'labour power' was the fundamental driving force of these pre-colonial 
communities, and that the control of women's productive and reproductive capacities was the fundamental pivot around which 
labour power copuld be accumulated. This argument will be returned to later, when early twentieth century southern African 
communities will be analysed in a comparative fashion. 8 For a useful overview of this process, see W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, Oxford, 1994, especially p. p. 25-34. 9 
-See B. Bozzoli, 'Marxism, Feminism and South African Studies', JSAS, Vol 9, No 2,1983, p. 158. 
to See for example W. Beinart, 'Amafelandawonye (the Die-Bards): Popular Protest and Women's Movements in Herschel 
District in the 1920s', in W. Beinart and C. Bundy (eds), Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa, London, 1987. 
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of legislation aimed at reducing the flow of African women to urban areas in the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. Legislation, moreover, which had the support of diverse 
interest groups such as the colonial administration, and African chiefs and migrant labourers, 
all of whom had a vested interest in keeping women in the rural areas in order to perpetuate 
the rural subsistence economy (an economy coming under increasing pressure as the 
demands of migrant labour required men to remain absent from home for increasingly long 
periods as the twentieth century progressed). " 
The fact that women were leaving rural areas in increasing numbers from the beginning of the 
twentieth century was also becoming a matter of major concern for ethnic and nationalist 
culture brokers of the time. Most of their fears centred around the supposed disintegration of 
the rural economy, and of selective traditionalist values. 12 Additionally, there was a 
fundamental fear of loss of control over women, and it was within this context that more 
explicit ideologies concerning the position of women in society - 'Mothers of the Nation' 
ideologies - began to be constructed. Furthermore, these ideologies were 
fundamentally 
linked with the debates inherent in moral ethnicities. 
In an address to a teachers' conference at Amanzoti, Natal, in 1920 D. D. T. Jabavu, who 
promoted facets of both ethnic and nationalist Identities, centred a substantial part of his 
speech around the position of young African women in town. He situated his talk around a 
specific article by a Ms Hertslet, printed in the June 1920 edition of the South African 
Quarterly. Hertslet's article is quoted in Jabavu's talk as follows: 
The plight of Native women in Johannesburg is a burning question 
which affects everyone of us and the Bantu races in that the 
demoralising influences of the towns are threatening to spoil a large 
number of their Native women, who in their turn will harmfully 
influence their country cousins. Would that the Bantu might realise 
the evil for themselves, and stem the tide that sets townwards! 
Before they have gone but a short distance in their upward march 
towards a virile national life, the very foundations of their strength 
are threatened by the danger to their women. 13 
it For a useful summary of African women's changing positions within the migrant labour system during the first half of the 
twentieth century, and the legislation enacted in order to prevent women becoming urbanized, see C. Walker, 'Gender and the 
Development of the Migrant Labour System c. 1850-1930: An Overview', in C. Walker (cd), Women and Gender in Southern 
Africa to 1945. 
t See chapter 5 for an overview of 'selective traditionalism', which emanated from both elite ethnic culture brokers, and 
'ordinary' Africans intent on preserving facets of pre-colonial life-styles. 13 D. D. T. Jabavu, The Black Problem, Lovedale, 1921, p. 149. 
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Jabavu used the quote to make clear connections between constructs of virtuous womanhood 
and the health of the 'nation'. These ideologies appear in the rhetoric of nationalist and ethnic 
discourses of both African and Afrikaner culture brokers throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century, and beyond. 14 However, especially in the African case, these ideologies had 
to build upon the more cultural, 'passive' identities which had previously existed in rural, pre- 
colonial communities. Therefore before providing an in-depth examination of these more 
politicised ethnic and nationalist identities, both moral ethnic and politically tribalist, these more 
'passive' forms of identity need to be explored, in order to illustrate how these later more 
politicised identities resonated with peoples' prior belief systems and values. 
The position of women in pre-colonial, rural African societies was always ambiguous, and this 
was demonstrated to be the case by anthropologists working in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Many pre-colonial Southern African communities, especially those which practiced 
exogamous marriage, perceived newly married women as a potential danger to the clan into 
which she married. In some 1930s rural Mpondo communities married women posed 
considerable problems in terms of integration within the community of the exogamous clan: 
The real difficulty in the position of married women is that they are 
never fully absorbed into their husband's clan, but are always partly 
strangers and therefore dangerous. A woman, some months or 
years after her marriage, is sacrificed for and given the milk of her 
husband's cows. After that she ceases to drink the milk of her own 
clan's cattle. From the time of her marriage she may be made sick 
by her husband's ancestral spirits, but she never becomes a full 
member of his clan. A large percentage of the accusations of witch- 
craft are against women, but very rarely is the accused a daughter 
of the umzi; almost always she is a wife or a mother. When an umzi 
is dying out through consumption the normal diagnosis is that an 
ishologu (an evil spirit) has come in with one of the wives. 15 
14 For an examination of Zulu culture brokers' concern with the changing position of Zulu women in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and the supposed effect this had upon their conception of'Zuluness', see S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy 
and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness', in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, 
London, 1989. For an examination of similar ideologies amongst Inkatha ideologues in contemporary times, see S. I Iassim, 
'Family, Motherhood and Zulu Nationalism: The Politics of the Inkatha Women's Brigade', Feminist Review, No 43,1993. 
Also chapters 8 and 9. For Afrikaner 'Mothers of the Nation' ideologies, see J. Butler, 'Afrikaner Women and the Creation of 
Ethnicity in a Small South African Town, 1902-1950', in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism, and I. Hofineyer, 'Building a 
Nation from Words: Afrikaans Language, Literature and Ethnic Identity, 1902-1924', in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds), The 
Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, Harlow, 1987. For comparisons between Afrikaner 
and ANC ideologies of this nature, see D. Gaitskell and E. Unterhalter, 'Mothers of the Nation: A Comparative Analysis of 
Nation, Race and Motherhood in Afrikaner Nationalism and the African National Congress', and A. McClintock, 'Family 
Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family', Feminist Review, No 44,1993. 15 M. Hunter, 'The Effects of contact with Europeans on the Status of Pondo Women', Africa, Vol 16, No 3,1933. Also M. 
Hunter, Reaction to Conquest: Effects of Contact With Europeans on the Pondo of South Africa, London, 1964 (first edition, 
1936), p. p. 43-45. 
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This liminal, transitional state which women inhabited was common in many rural 
communities of the time, and even in some rural comunities of today. "' 
Douglas makes the following conceptualisation with regard to the need for human beings to 
classify, categorise and impose social order upon their social universes: 
(T)he yearning for rigidity is in us all. It is part of our human condition 
to long for hard lines and clear concepts. When we have them we 
have to either face the fact that some realities elude them, or else 
blind ourselves to the inadequacies of the concepts. The final paradox 
of the search for purity is that it is an attempt to force experience into 
logical categories of non-contradiction. But experience is not amenable 
and those who make the attempt rind themselves led into contradiction. 17 
There is an essentialist tone to this conceptualisation of human need to categorise and 
impose order which leads one to be cautious. However the need to overcome contradictions 
within the moral universes of particular human societies, and td re-impose order, does 
resonate with the ambiguous position of women in small scale societies: 
(I)deas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing 
transgressions have as their main function to impose system on 
an inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the 
difference between within and without, above and below, male 
and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created. 18 
States of transition and liminality were imposed on women in many rural, exogamous, 
southern African communities, In order to overcome the symbolic danger of introducing 
someone from outside the clan, thus re-imposing order. This relates both to small scale 
communities, and , in a somewhat reformulated sense, to larger, ethnicised, identities, and 
even ethnic nationalist movements. 
16 The anthropological literature concerned with this issue is too large to reproduce here. For useful overviews, which 
nevertheless should be treated with caution due to their ahistorical approach, see M. Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis 
of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, London, 1969, and A. Kuper, Wives for Cattle, especially chapter 2. Also A. Liebenberg, 
'Authority, Avoidances and Marriage: An Analysis of the Position of Gcaleka Women in Qwaninga, Willowvale District, 
Transkei', M. A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1994 and A. Berglund, Zulu Thought Patterns and Symbolism, London 1976. 17 M. Douglas, Purity and Danger, p. 162. 18 Ibid, p. 4. 
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The effect of so-called European 'culture contact' and urbanisation upon South African 
communities was a major area of study and concern amongst anthropologists in the 1930s, 
and often mirrored the moral panic of African ethnic and nationalist culture brokers regarding 
the position of women in changing socio-economic circumstances. 
19 Much of the concern 
centred around the fact that young women were increasingly leaving rural areas. Urban 
location marital relations were argued by some anthropologists to be unstable, due to the 
inability of older forms of rural marital custom to adapt sufficiently to the changes wrought by 
the penetration of a capitalist economy and European christianised morality. Krige argues that 
time limitations were one significant obstacle. 0 
Her research led her to the conclusion that the need for relatives to negotiate a marriage 
through such customs as 'bridewealth', which were often transacted between rural and urban 
areas separated by considerable distances, led to many potential marriages breaking down, 
often after the initial bridewealth was paid. She also argued that the breakdown of parental 
control in urban areas, which operated through social sanctions originating from the 
countryside, were not compensated for by newer social sanctions such as the church, adding 
to such perceived problems as unmarried mothers. 'A church member who has had an 
illegitimate child hardly connects the penalty of attending a purification class for six months 
with moral obliquity, and such purification has almost become a functional constituent of, or a 
necessary prerequisite to, baptism of the child. i21 She also argues that young urban black men 
were increasingly casting aside responsibility for their children conceived out of marriage. 
There can be no doubt that the ease with which all 
responsibility for an illigitimate child can be thrown 
off has very bad effects on young Bantu men in the 
towns. Many 'boys' in domestic employment will, 
with encouragement, tell of four or five girls by whom 
they have had children and will boast of the way in 
which they got rid of the girl's relations and their 
demands 22 
19 Some of the most interesting examples were published in the journal Africa, such as the following: I. Schapera, 'Pre-Marital 
Pregnancy and Native Opinion. A Note on Social Change', Vol 6, No 1,1933; M. Hunter, 'The Effects of Contact With 
Europeans on the Status of Pondo Women'; E. Hellman, 'Native Life in a Johannesburg Slumyard', Vol 8, No 1,1935; E. 
Krige, 'Changing Conditions in Marital Relations and Parental Duties among Urbanized Natives', Vol 9, No 1,1936; G. 
Culwick, 'New Ways for Old in the Treatment of Adolescent African Girls', Vol 12, No 2,1939. Also see M. Hunter, Reaction 
to Conquest, E. Hellman, Rooiyard: A Sociological Survey of an Urban Native Slumyard, Manchester 1969 (First Edition, 
1948), I. Schapera (ed), The Bantu Speaking Tribes of South Africa, London, 1937, E. Hellman, Problems of Urban Bantu 
Youth, Johannesburg, 1940. 
20 E. Krige, 'Changing Conditions in Marital Relations', p. 17. 
21 Ibid, p. 6. See also D. Gaitskell's insightful studies "`Wailing for Purity": Prayer Unions, African Mothers and Adolescent 
Daughters, 1912-1940', in S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds), Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa, 1870-1930, 
London, 1982, and "'Christian Compounds for Girls": Church Hostels for African Women in Johannesburg 1907-1970', JSAS, 
Vol 6, No 1,1979. 
22 Ibid, p. 9. 
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Krige comments that this was due to the custom of either marrying an unmarried pregnant girl, 
or paying damages, entailing no long term financial support which was desparately needed in 
an urban setting. 3 There is an interesting parallel here with the rise of indlavini male 
associations in rural Pondoland during the 1930s and after. These groups were often marked 
by 'their tendency to fight over women and their aggressive behaviour towards women' 
24 
Schapera notes similar tendencies amongst rural Kgatla young men of the same time period: 
Sometimes they will seize upon any girl whom they fancy, 
and ask her to sleep with them. She is by no means always 
unwilling, but, if she refuses, they whip her with the canes 
they habitually carry and force her to comply with their wishes. 
Often two... will copulate in succession with the same girl; they 
catch her when she is out alone, and compel her to accept 
their advances, or bribe her with gifts of beads and wooden 
spoons. 25 
However, not all anthropological research concerned with social change in the 1930$ 
propounded the argument that older rural customs were either disappearing ossified relics, or 
becoming hopelessly inadequate in terms of coping with the changes in sexual and marital 
relationships. Hunter (later Monica Wilson) provides several examples of reformulated custom 
which both reflected the social changes of the time, and provided some form of social 
sanction. 26 (Although, unlike Krige, she was studying predominantly rural communities). 
There is also a presumption in the anthropological literature of the time, including the work of 
Hunter, that marriage was the 'correct' way to cement a relationship. It Is important to 
question whether unmarried unions and single parenthood were simply signs of social and 
moral disintegration, or whether they could represent a reformulation of status for women, 
often allowing them more independence. Certainly the anthropological literature concerned 
j was permeated by the moral and social values held by the authors. 
The effect of partial urbanisation, and the partial breakdown of pre-colonial social controls, 
such as hionipha avoidances, initiation ceremonies for young people, and strict adherence to 
lobola custom, caused considerable concern to ethnic culture brokers of the time, resulting in 
23 Ibid. 
24 W. Beinart, 'The Origins of the Indlavini: Male Associations and Migrant Labour in the Transkei', in A. Spiegel and P. 
McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1991, p. 106. For a more thorough analysis of 
these male associations, and their relationship with changing forms of masculinity and ethnic identity, see chapter 8. 2 I. Schapera, 'Premarital Pregnancy and Native Opinion', p. 69. 26 6 M. Hunter, 'The Effect of Contact with Europeans', passim. Also see her book Reaction to Conquest. 
154 
moral ethnic debates also participated in by segregationist ideologues. The effects of 
westernised lifestyles were also becoming an area of increasing apprehension. For example, 
members of the Zulu Cultural Society were inveighing against the effects of European dance 
forms such as ballroom dancing, which were being increasingly taken up by young Zulu 
people in urban areas in the 1930s and 1940s. Many of these concerns centred around what 
was considered the appropriate behaviour of young Zulu women, again demonstrating how 
important the conduct and behaviour of women was in determining the boundaries of more 
explicit ethnicised identities? ' However these, mostly male-dominated, debates were never 
free from ambiguity. D. D. T. Jabavu explicitly advocated idealised forms of Europeanised 
middle-class womanhood, with all the connotations of essentialist 'passivity', domesticisation 
and subordination this entailed, when speaking against the effects of urbanisation on young 
women. 28 Members of the Zulu Cultural Society were also divided regarding whether 
traditionalist forms of Zulu dancing should be encouraged as a true representation of Zulu 
ethnic identity in a modernising milieu, or whether it pandered to the racist stereotypes of 
whites. Respectability had become a central issue for these elite culture brokers, wishing both 
to preserve selective facets of traditionalism, whilst simultaneously integrating with European 
concepts of individualism and capitalist economy 29 
The gradual process of urbanisation, slowed by the implementation of migrant labour and 
policies of segregation, was certainly leading to a plethora of different identities during the first 
half of the century. The inhabitants of slumyards, which were growing up around bigger 
conurbations such as Johannesburg and Pretoria, seem to have existed in a milieu where 
some forms of custom and sanction broke down, and others were reformulated. It is also 
interesting to note that concepts of ritual purity and inpurity were sometimes translated into a 
more cultural, ethnicised form. For example in 'Rooiyard', a slumyard existing in Doornfontein 
near the centre of Johannesburg in the 1930s, Zulu women would seclude their newly born 
babies for approximately one month in order to avoid 'Basotho sickness'. 
This `Basotho sickness, which is so greatly feared, is believed 
to be caused by any contact with Sotho. Adult Sotho have 
medicine which enters the stomach of the child and there turns 
into a snake. This snake eats away at the stomach of the child 
and causes its excreta to turn green. Even the breath of a 
Sotho may cause this evil result and it is also believed that the 
protective medicine given to Sotho children is so powerful that, 
27 These themes are explored, in relation to Zulu ethnicised identities, in S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity'. Also 
see chapter 7. 
28 ___ __ U. U. T. Jabavu, The'Black Problem, p. p. 149-153. 29 S. Marks, Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity, passim. 
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on contact with other children, it causes the `Basotho sickness ; 30 
Previously, in rural communities, both baby and mother were secluded for a certain period. 
Rural Zulu communities in the nineteenth century confined the mother due to ritual impurity, 
which meant she represented a danger to the other inhabitants. The child was isolated in 
order to protect it from any possible 'evil' influences emanating from the village itself. 31 In 
Rooiyard, however, women often ended periods of seclusion much earlier, due to domestic 
and work commitments. 32 
This suggests additionally that women were becoming increasingly independent of rituals and 
customs which emanated from the countryside. It also implies that ritual and custom were 
being reformulated in a more explicit ethnicised context, due to the contact between different 
peoples in a small, urbanised area. People were beginning to define themselves against the 
ethnicised 'Other' more often, and perhaps rituals and customs were being reformulated in 
order to accomodate this wider form of cultural identification from 'below'. This is not to 
suggest that ritual impurities with respect to women were being disregarded in an urban 
milieu, at least not in Rooiyard: 
Although many of the practices common under tribal conditions 
have fallen into disuse among the urban Bantu, the most salient 
feature of the ritual of birth, the seclusion of the mother and child 
is still rigorously observed by the Rooiyard Natives. It is interesting 
to note that where the crisis of life is physiologically intimately conn- 
ected with women, that is, at childbirth and at the onset of the menses, 
the woman is carefully secluded. 33 
It seems, rather, that some customs and rituals were being reformulated in order to 
accommodate the wider forms of consciousness evolving in these urban settings. Urban slum 
yards of the 1930s seem to represent a transitional stage between rural consciousness and 
'urban' values. Ethnic, as well as clan, identities could emerge as defining factors of identity 
(although these could be broken down in an urban setting as well). 
'Passive' forms of cultural ethnic identity were being defined on the boundaries between 
different ethnic groups, and ritual and custom were being reformulated in order to accomodate 
30 E. Hellman, Rooiyard, p. p. 59-60. 31 E. Krige, The Social System of the Zulus, p. p. 68-9. Similar rituals existed in many other southern African communities during this time. See footnotes 16 and 19 for other examples. 32 E. Hellman, Rooiyard, p. 60. 33 Ibid, p. 56. 
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this change. However, as ethnic identities became more explicit, it was still often women who 
defined the boundaries of the ethnic group. In Rooiyard many outbreaks of violence between 
men resulted from competition for women, and this violence was sometimes simultaneously 
ethnicised in its form, with men from different ethnic backgrounds fighting over women 34 
Similarly Sotho Ma Rashea on the Rand in the 1930s and 1940s sought to control women who 
were forging a circumscribed independence through participation in prostitution and illicit beer- 
brewing. 35 Thus ordinary migrant labourers, and more urbanised men, sought to keep control 
of women by reformulating the latters' position in a more explicit ethnicised sense. It was this 
fear of the loss of control of women which seems to have resonated with ethnic and nationalist 
culture brokers' attempts to reify the position of women within their own specific political ethnic 
projects - projects, moreover, which helped buttress the programmes of segregationist 
ideologues and facilitated the crystallisation of politically tribalist versions of ethnic identities. 
One of the major issues which arose concerning the welfare of women in the 1920s and 
1930s was the increasing prevalence of pre-marital pregnancies, and forms of sexual 
relationships outside of marriage. Pre-colonial social sanctions on sexual intercourse between 
young people were increasingly breaking down through the first half of the twentieth century, 
in both urban and rural areas. This was due not only to urbanisation, but to factors such as 
the spread of christianity and 'westernised' education systems. Peer group pressure, 
socialisation processes and public humiliation were powerful deterrents to pregnancies 
outside marriage in pre-colonial times. For example, young, rural unmarried Kgatla women 
who became pregnant outside marriage were subjected to considerable communal 
opprobrium: 
If the matter ever became general knowledge, the unfortunate girl 
was subjected to every possible humiliation. She was stripped of 
all her decorations and no longer allowed to wear them; she might 
not cut her hair, but had to wear it long as a sign of disgrace; she 
was not allowed to mix with other girls, lest she pollute them as well; 
she might not wash her head, nor smear her face and body with the 
usual ointment of fat; and if she had not yet been initiated she was 
not sent to the bojale (girl's initiation school) with the rest of her 
coevals, but was separately treated. It was even said that attempts 
would be made to bewitch her, so that she might die together with 
the child in the womb. 36 
34- .. __ lbid, p. 92. 
19 
-- These forms of gang formation often represented a type of ethnic reformulation of identity in a more urbanised milieu. See 
chapter 8 for a more comprehensive overview. 36 I. Schapera, `Premarital Pregnancy', p. p. 55-56. Note that themes of pollution and ritual impurity are readily apparent in this 
quotation. This reinforces the assumptions of Douglas, in that concepts of pollution and impurity facilitate the re-establishment 
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Initiation schools and the practice of non-penetrative sex were other means of control. These 
social control mechanisms began to break down due to missionary opposition and as women 
increasingly migrated towards towns, especially from the 1930s onwards, although there were 
exceptions. Hellman found that many women in Rooiyard still endeavoured to send their sons 
back to the countryside to participate in circumcision rituals. This was still seen as a major 
factor in the attainment of manhood 37 Hunter recorded that non-penetrative sex was 
practiced among both traditionalist and Christian communities in Pondoland during the early 
1930s, and that the rate of pre-marital pregnancies between the two were not markedly 
different. 38 One of the main reasons proffered with regard to this increased migration of 
women is the breakdown of rural marriages due to the migrant labour process, which meant 
men were absent from home for considerable lengths of time 39 Reasons for leaving included 
increasing rural impoverishment, searching for husbands who had not returned home and 
deserted their families, and the chance to elope with lovers. 0 Sotho women gained a 
particular reputation for migrating to towns on the Rand, and gaining employment in the illicit 
liquor trade and prostitution. 
Most Basotho women migrants had come to South Africa in 
a last desperate effort to save their marriages and find their 
men. Once finally rejected, many seem to have resolved never 
again to become wholly dependent on men. Beer-brewing 
and other informal activities provided this opportunity. 41 
The experience of poverty, abandonment and neglect, and the ability to earn an independent 
income in town, led to many women resolving to follow a more independent life-style. 2 This 
of the dominant moral universe when this is symbolically challenged by behaviour outside the socially sanctioned boundaries 
that exist. Although the forms these sanctions took differed slightly in different communities, they all broadly took the same 
form. See footnotes 21 and 24 for other examples. 37 E. Hellman, Rooiyard, p. 74. 
38. - -- - M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, p. p. 183-184. 39 Many anthropological articles published in the 1930s were specifically concerned with the breakdown of marriages due to 
the effects of the migrant labour system. See footnote 19 for just some of many examples. Contemporary historical works also 
stress the great strains imposed on African marriages due to migrant labour. See for example, C. Walker, 'Gender and the 
Development of the Migrant Labour System', and P. Bonner, "'Desirable of Undesirable Basotho Women? " Liquor, 
Prostitution and the Migration of Basotho Women to the Rand, 1920-1945', in C. Walker (ed), Women and Gender in Southern 
Africa to 1945. 
4 Ibid. 
41- -- F. Bonner, 'Liquor, Prostitution and the Migration of Basotho Women to the Rand', p. 247. 
42 Although this was particularly obvious in terms of women migrating from Basotholand and what was to become the Ciskei, 
due to particularly devastating rural deprivation, it does seem to have been a general trend. E. Mphalele's novel The Marabi 
Dance provides a vivid illustration of urban slumyard life in the 1930s, illustrating the poverty and neglect, but also the vibrant 
culture, and the strength of independent women. This somewhat contrasts to the anthropological literature of the time, and 
many more contemporary historical works, which seem to place far more stress on the disintegrative effects of migrant labour, 
and the loss of moral values. Bozzoli's recently published work is one exception. She argues, on the basis of oral informants, 
that many women migrated to urban areas at this time for positive reasons such as a wish for increased independence, and not 
just because rural marriages were breaking down. (B. Bozzoli, Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy and 
Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983, London, 1991). 
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was often reflected in dance forms and other social behaviour. A. S. Mopeli-Paulus, a Sotho 
traditionalist and writer, inadvertently demonstrates the independence of Sotho women who 
took up prostitution in his autobiography: 
I saw my Basotho women dressed in print skirts an inch below 
the knee, their blouses an inch above the navel, bracelets 
around their legs, running in the streets, swinging their coloured 
blankets in the air shouting 7f you are a man, come let me tell 
you keep away my boy! Go to the christians! Here is Benoni - 
Twatwa. We rule ourselves. ' Then throwing their skirts above 
their knees and crying 'Take and eat. A3 
This representation seems a complete inversion of prior social sanctions in rural communities. 
For example, young women who became pregnant outside of marriage in rural Kgatla 
communities were publicly mocked through songs by other girls and women. These songs 
included the use of the verb xo ja, 'to eat', which was also used for excessive copulation. 
Schapera notes that it was said of a 'loose' girl (his description) 'she Is eaten by everybody' 
44 
and this verb was utilised in these mockery songs. He also states that his informants argued 
that this form of mockery was one of the most powerful sanctions against premarital 
pregnancy, being the form most feared by girls. 45 Perhaps the women to whom A. S. Mopeli- 
Paulus was referring were deliberately inverting these older forms of social sanction In order to 
visibly assert and demonstrate their own form of newly found independence. These newly 
forged female identities were heartily frowned upon by authors such as Mopeli-Paulis, and led 
to more explicit attempts by moralising ethnic entrepreneurs to construct a form of 
womanhood which emphasised 'passivity', subordination and domesticity, whilst criticising 
increased individualism for women. Anthropologists also attacked these newly forged 
identities. Schapera himself inveighed against the emergence of a 'class of flappers' among 
45 Tswana women - the modern girl 'with her short European skirt and irresponsible behaviour' 
43 _. - .. ----° -- Cited in P. Bonner, 'Liquor, Prostitution, and the Migration of Sotho Women to the Kand', p. ZJ 1. 
44 1. Schapera, 'Premarital Pregnancy and Native Opinion'. p. 66. 
45 _.. -- lbld, p. 67. 
46 1Schapera, Migrant Labour and Tribal Life: A Study of Conditions, London, 1947, cited in C. Walker, 'Gender and the 
Development of the Migrant labour System', p. 189. There is a more recent anthropological literature concerning women's use 
of their sexuality and bodies in order to retain dignity and even political power. See for example the following: S. Ardener, 
'Sexual Insult and Female Militancy', in S. Ardener, (ed), Perceiving Women, London, 1975; D. Webster, 'Ethnicity and 
Gender in a Kwazulu Border Community', in A. Spiegel and P. McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa, 
Johannesburg, 1991; A. Berglund, Zulu Thought Patterns and Symbolism, London, 1976, p. p. 64-74. Also see New 
Internationalist magazine, May 1997, which reports upon a recent bare-breasted demonstration by Zambian women in protest 
against political corruption. This reflected similar demonstrations in late colonial times, when Zambian women protested 
against the colonial system. The Second Wave Feminist Movement of the 1970s in Europe and the United States also removed 
bras in order to symbolically reject patriarchy. All these examples demonstrate a fundamental challenge to patriarchy, or at 
least the carving out of a symbolic space which is not controlled by men. 
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The construction of Afrikaner ethnic identity in this period also involved reified images of 
'virtuous womanhood', centred around ideological portrayals of motherhood. Twentieth 
century constructions of Afrikaner 'Mothers of the Nation' ideologies - or volksmoeders - 
initially arose in the context of the 1899-1902 South African war. The ill-treatment and 
suffering of women and children in the British concentration camps 'were central to the 
emotive portrayal of the nation's agony since both were seen as blameless victims' 47 Notions 
of Afrikaner idealised womanhood had its roots in the nineteenth century, again in terms of 
defining itself against British oppression . 
48 But the South African war, and Milner's subsequent 
policies of anglicization, made these ideologies more explicit, as Afrikaner culture-brokers 
sought to mobilise Afrikaner ethnic identity vis-a-vis British hegemony. 49 The processes of 
urbanisation and industrialisation, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, sharpened the 
patriarchal edges of volksmoeder ideologies. As was the case with many African 
communities, these processes eroded previous social sanctions which aimed at controlling 
young women. The difference was that Afrikaner women were proletarianised much quicker, 
and thus were able to consolidate a more unified working class position than African women. 
White women were integrated into the capitalist economy, whilst black women at least partially 
avoided full proletarianisation through participation in such activities as prostitution and illicit 
beer-brewing. 50 
The effects of increasingly rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, especially in the 1920s and 
1930s, were of considerable concern to Afrikaner ethnic culture brokers. As older Afrikaner 
rural economies broke down, young Afrikaner women increasingly sought work in urban areas 
in order to supplement the family income. Whole Afrikaner families also moved to urban areas 
much earlier than African ones. The breakdown of rural economies, and the subsequent 
merging of poor Afrikaners with other Africans in slum areas, became a central focus of 
concern for an increasingly displaced Afrikaner intelligentsia consisting mainly of teachers, 
journalists and religious clergy. This group sought to construct a more exclusive Afrikaner 
identity than that proposed by Botha and Smuts, who advocated a white pan-South African 
form embracing both Afrikaners and English-speaking whites. English had now become the 
language of commerce, and this disaffected group sought to ressurect Afrikaans in 
importance. Family and home, for long the constructed realm of Afrikaner women, thus 
became a central focus for the dissemination of the new Afrikaner ideology of ethnic 
mobilisation. From the mid-1920s a plethora of popular magazines were produced, aimed 
47 D. Gaitskell and E. Unterhalter, 'Mothers of the Nation', p. 61. See also E. Brink, 'Man-Made Women: Gender, Class and 
the Ideology of the Volks moeder', in C. Walker, Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945, and J. Butler, 'Afrikaner 
Women and the Creation of Ethnicity in a Small South African Town, 1902-1950', in L. Vail (ed) The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, London, 1989. 
48- 
See E. Brink, 'Man-Made Women', p. p. 275-277. a9 
'" See H. Giliomee, 'The Beginnings of Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness, 1850-1915', and J. Butler, 'Afrikaner Women and the 
Creation of Ethnicity', both in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism. 50 See B. Bozzoli, 'Marxism, Feminism and Southern African Studies', especially p. p. 155-167. 
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specifically at Afrikaner women. These sought to define what was 'authentically' Afrikaans in 
terms of domestic and cultural life. 51 Thus women could gain a certain amount of prestige by 
adopting this ethnic identity, and instructing others in how to behave as 'Afrikaner women'. 
The fear of Afrikaner identity being swamped by English hegemony, cultural disintegration and 
economic deprivation often manifested itself most clearly in terms of the position of Afrikaner 
women in society. 'Poor whiteism' was becoming an increasing object of concern, and this 
was certainly a major focus of both Hertzog's Nationalist party, which broke away from Botha 
and Smuts in 1914, and Malan's Nationalist party, which itself broke away from the 'Fusion' 
government of Smuts and Hertzog in 1934. These splits amongst Afrikaner parties emphasise 
the divisions that existed regarding what best represented Afrikaner identity, and what best 
represented Afrikaner interests. Further splits occured in 1969 and 1982. Although there 
were differing reasons for these splits, they do emphasise that Afrikner identity was never the 
homogenous entity that politically tribalist ideologies portrayed. 2 Just as with many African 
communities, the 1920s and 1930s saw the growth of perceptions that working class Afrikaner 
young women were socially and sexually out of control. These fears were expressed most 
vociferously by professionals working in various capacities, providing another comparison with 
some African communities of the time. However this is not to suggest that these fears only 
arose from within these social and economic groupings. They resonated with the fears and 
anxieties emanating from various strata in society. Young Afrikaner women entering the 
workforce were becoming increasingly independent of parental control, as well as contributing 
considerably to the family household finances. Afrikaner women were particularly sought after 
in the burgeoning manufacturing industries of the 1930s. They were favoured above men 
because they could be employed at lower rates of pay, and often entered the world of wage 
labour a whole generation before the male members of their families. Ideological factors also 
played their part, with many employers considering women more suitable for factory work, due 
to supposed inborn abilities such as 'nimble fngers'. 53 The patriarchal authority of husbands 
and fathers was being increasingly defied as a result of these changes, and anxieties over the 
sexual conduct of young women was widespread in families 54 This, together with Afrikaner 
culture brokers' fears that urban deprivation was breaking down affiliations with an exclusive 
Afrikaner identity, resulted in increased pressure for legislation against so-called 
'miscegenation'. Housing crises exacerbated these fears in the 1930s. Indeed, the 1938 
51 For an insightful account of the importance of language and literature in disseminating this more exclusivist form of 
Afrikaner ethnic identity, see I. Hofineyer, 'Building a Nation from Words: Afrikaans Language, Literature and Ethnic 
Identity, 1902-1924', in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds), The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century 
South Africa, London, 1987. Also, H. Giliomee, 'The Beginnings of Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness, 1850-1915', in L. Vail, 
3ed), 
The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. s See H. Giliomee, 'The Growth of Afrikaner Identity', in H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds), Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can 
South Africa Change? Yale, 1979. W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, also provides useful overviews. 53 See for example J. Hyslop, 'White Working-Class Women and the Invention of Apartheid: 'Purified' Afrikaner Nationalist 
Agitation for Legislation Against 'Mixed' Marriages, 1934-1939', JAH, Vol 36, No 1,1995. 
54 J. Hyslop, 'White Working-Class Women', p. p. 62-63. Also E. Brink, 'Man-Made Women'. 
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election focused specifically around the differing views regarding legislating against 'mixed' 
marriages 55 
7.2 Ethnic Boundary Markers and Routes of Escape: Some Reflections Upon the 
Relationship Between Gender, Modernity and Ethnic Identity In Pre-1948 South Africa 
One of the most striking features of ethnicised identities in twentieth century South Africa is 
the increasingly explicit debates regarding the role of women. The debates inherent in moral 
ethnicities were often fundamentally concerned with this issue. Changes in womens' 
economic roles engendered changes in what constituted the meaning of 'womanhood', and 
this in turn challenged older forms of identity often based upon patriarchal relationships. 
Crucial to the re-definition of what represented 'idealised womanhood' was the primary role of 
motherhood assigned to women. Themes of purity, control and restraint permeate these 
ethnicised discourses, which originated largely from men. These themes also reflected a 
reformulation of older identities in order to accomodate the changes wrought by capitalism, 
urbanisation and segregation. 
African institutions of marriage underwent considerable structural transformations during this 
time, especially in the 1920s and 1930s as African urbanisation and migrant labour increased. 
The influx of individualist, christian and capitalist values all placed a fundamental strain on an 
institution centred upon reciprocity, kinship and the submergence of the individual within the 
collective. Ethnic and nationalist culture brokers became increasingly concerned with what 
they perceived as a breakdown in African marital and family values, and these concerns 
resonated with various sectors of the wider African communities. These issues were, 
moreover, increasingly debated in a moral ethnic sense. People sought to define what best 
represented a marital status within a particular defined ethnic group, and these discourses 
resulted in a wide diversity of conceptualisations reflecting the diverse routes followed towards 
modernity by black South Africans at the time. 
Bridewealth was often at the centre of both fundamental changes and vociferous debate, and 
reflected the ambiguous nature of moral ethnic and politically tribalist discourse of the time. 
These debates also reflected the ambiguous response of African women towards the 
institution. Various studies of urban locations in the 1930s found that lobola still represented a 
fundamental prerequisite in terms of community recognition of marriage. 56 Marriages could 
involve various combinations of church, state and lobola marriage rituals and custom. This 
reflected both the influence of christianity and urbanisation, together with the considerable 
55.... 
lbid, passim.. 
iR --See for example E. Hellman, Rooiyard, p. p. 79-8, E. Krige, 'Changing Conditions in Marital Relations', p. p. 11-23, and 
D. W. T. Shropshire, Primitive Marriage and European Law, London, 1970 (Ist ed 1946), especially chapter 6. 
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resilience of belief in the lobola system. Anthropologists of the time often found it difficult to 
define when a couple were actually married, due to the fact that there was no definite ruling on 
the matter in the locations themselves. 57 Added to this were the sometimes differing values 
held between couples from urban and rural areas, and different 'tribes': 
When attachments occur between boys and girls of different tribes 
... difculties tending towards delay arise: the negotiating parties, 
ignorant of one another's customs, are suspicious and difficult to 
please, and the dangers of eventually breaking off negotiations 
are much greater. 58 
Several factors were thus affecting African marriages at this time. Apart from 
misunderstandings of differing rural customs, these included the following: the absence of 
men for long periods of time due to the migrant labour process, often resulting in them 
abandoning their spouses; the breakdown of initiation systems for young people, to which 
missionary influence contributed considerably, and which ended an important element in 
socialising young people towards rural communal life-styles; the commercialisation of lobola in 
urban areas, which could entail it becoming a system of payment without the symbolic binding 
of the extended families involved. Related to this strain on marriages was the increase in pre- 
marital pregnancies, which also partially resulted from the reasons outlined as well as the 
breakdown of pre-colonial forms of non-penetrative sexual intercourse (again partially a result 
of missionary disdain), and the breakdown of social sanctions outlined in the previous 
section. 59 
People were thus selecting facets of pre-colonial custom in order to accomodate the social 
and economic changes wrought through the migrant labour system, the spread of christianity, 
and individualist ideology. Ethnic culture brokers seem to have responded to this by resorting 
to a combination of 'selective traditionalism' and Europeanised individualism. This was in order 
to forge an idealised concept of 'virtuous womanhood' which could counteract the perceived 
deterioration of marriages, and the rise in pre-marital pregnancies. The behaviour of women 
seems to have become extremely important to these - often male - ethnic entrepreneurs, as 
women were conceived as both embodying the cultural values of ethnic identities, and the 
main transmitters of these values to future generations through their perceived primary role as 
mothers. Thus ideological constructions of motherhood played a central role in these more 
explicit forms of identity. Furthermore, they resonated with the concerns of African men 
57 Ibid. 
58 E. Krige, `Changing Conditions in Marital Relations', p. 18. For a particularly illuminating example see S. Jingoes, A Chief 
is a Chief by the People, London, 1975, p. 75. 59 The anthropological literature on these issues is immense. Again, see footnote 19 for examples. 
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generally, who were becoming increasingly concerned with the breakdown of rural values and 
marriage forms due to the reasons outlined. It was in this milieu that specific 'Mothers of the 
Nation' ideologies materialised. In addition, these ideological constructions were forged in 
such a way as to appeal to some women, due to the fact that they offered a circumscribed 
form of freedom. However, the whole scenario was one of ambiguity, as these ideologies 
were being forged at the exact time that women were increasingly questioning patriarchal 
social structures, often reformulating them in order to forge a new life-style which itself offered 
a circumscribed form of independence from men. The first half of the twentieth century 
represented the growth of diverse routes towards modernity, as different identities, ethnic and 
otherwise, were forged, both for Afrikaners, Africans and others, such as Indians and 
'Coloureds'. It also entailed a more explicit division of men into the public realm of politics and 
the wider community, and women into the domestic and private (although this was also 
ambiguous). 
The 'selective traditionalism' exhibited by both male ethnic entrepreneurs and women in this 
period provides an interesting insight to the gendered nature of ethnic identities, as well as 
their ambiguous and diversified nature. Many women supported the institution of lobola. 
D. D. T. Jabavu noted this in his above mentioned address to an assembly of teachers In 1920, 
referring to the fact that a debate the previous night had resulted in many women supporting 
the institution, whilst many men had rejected it 60 This rejection may have resulted from these 
men's sense öf modernity being offended by the requirement to pay lobola. Jabavu himself 
rejected the institution, instead reifying idealised European conceptualisations of marriage and 
domestic motherhood, as already mentioned. Superficially, the abandonment of lobola would 
seem to have offered women more independence in terms of freedom of choice in marriage. 
However, this is to view lobola as a static, culture bound phenomenon. In fact, the process of 
migrant labour and the slowing of the urbanisation and proletarianisation processes had 
allowed women the space sometimes to reformulate this institution in order to carve out a 
more independent life-style for themselves. For example, the isolation of urban location 
families in the 1930s from their rural relatives, together with the fact that many men in urban 
locations abandoned their married partners and children without support or the formality of 
divorce, could result in women gaining a much greater independence in marriage negotiations 
than would have occured in a more rural context: 
(1)t is not uncommon for a woman to receive her daughter's 
lobola, since location men who have left their families without 
support seldom or never claim the lobola. Careful enquiries 
elicited no single instance in which such a claim has been made, 
60 D. D. T. Jabavu, The Black Problem, p. 143. 
164 
and it is said that public opinion would be strongly against such 
an action. In tribal life the father and his relatives are responsible 
for the support of his wife and children, and in the location there 
is thought to be no moral right to lobola where such support 
has not been forthcoming. The woman never, of course, enters 
upon marriage negotiations on her own: some male relative 
will be called to act for her, but she will generally contrive to 
receive a money payment which she will spend as she pleases. 
The old form is thus still adhered to, but where, in the absence of 
other relations, a son-in-law or distant cousin acts for the mother 
he is usually a mere figurehead. 61 
This reinforces the above argument that women were carving their own circumscribed 
independence in these urban contexts, with changing marital relationships combining with 
activities such as illicit beer-brewing and prostitution to allow women a form of freedom, albeit 
in very oppressive circumstances, which they had gained for themselves. The response of 
traditionalists to the growth of these strong female identities was to re-structure their more 
explicit, politically tribalist forms of ethnic identity in order to allow women a circumscribed 
freedom within a domesticated context, reifying the sanctity of marriage and motherhood 
(marriage being increasingly rejected by women who had often been abandoned by men due 
to the migrant labour process). Independent women, and the breakdown of traditional forms 
of marriage without being replaced by Christian versions, threatened the values of 
'respectability', 'purity' and patriarchy to which these ethnic entrepreneurs adhered, partially 
assimilated as they were within the moral and economic value systems of Europeanised 
middle class values. This is not to suggest that this elite group rejected previous rural values 
wholesale. Instead, they situationally selected those facets which could shore up patriarchy in 
the fast changing socio-economic climate of the time. Furthermore, these values had to 
resonate with women, at least women of the same social and economic grouping. 
One woman who embodied this reformulation of gendered ethnic identity was Sibusiswe 
Makhanya. Although a product of mission education, Makhanya reflected many of the values 
of male nationalist and ethnic culture brokers of the time, often positively promoting selected 
facets of Zulu traditionalism 62 Her work with the Bantu Purity League enabled her to gain a 
scholarship to the United States, from whence she returned as Natal's first black female social 
61 E. Krige, 'Changing Conditions in Marital Relations', p. 15. See E. Hellman, Rooiyard, for other examples of the 
reformulation of lobola custom in an urban slumyard context. 62 S. Marks, 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 228. For a comprehensive analysis of the merging of 'selective 
traditionalism' with European value systems amongst African culture brokers of the time see chapter 9. 
165 
worker. Her experience in the States entailed an encounter with the strong feelings of 'race 
pride' existing there amongst many black people. 
(S)he was no mere accepter of white middle class values. Her 
concern with 'purity' arose out of her own and her class's deeply 
felt experience. Her race consciousness was equally part of that 
deep experience, transmuted in the 1930s into a Zulu ethnic 
cultural consciousness. 63 
Makhanya's Zulu ethnic cultural consciousness evolved in the general context of marital 
breakdown, pre-marital pregnancies and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, in rural 
and urban areas, already described TM Her concern with the 'purity' of the Zulu 'race', resulted 
in her acting as the first female adviser to the Zulu Cultural Society, an elite group of Zulu 
culture brokers who were advocating the return to various forms of pre-colonial Zulu social 
sanctions, such as a reformulated version of hionipha custom. This would seem a blatant 
contradiction in terms, considering her independent personality and 'westernised' lifestyle. 
However, as the observation by Marks makes clear, Makhanya did not simply embody 
'westernised' individualism and christianity. The elite ethnic culture brokers of this period were 
as much a product of their own societies as they were of mission education and ideologies of 
individualism. As such they represented one of the many paths towards modernity existing in 
this period. Makhanya's career also demonstrates how women could be incorporated within a 
reformulated form of patriarchal discourse, through the milieu of more explicit forms of ethnic 
identification. The values of Non! Jabavu, a relative of D. D. T. Jabavu and another product of 
mission education, portray many similar ostensible ambiguities 65 The career patterns and life- 
styles of these highly educated women also demonstrate how women in general can be 
captured by patriarchal forms of ethnicised ideologies in order to police the boundaries of 
ethnic identities. 
Strong, independently minded, Afrikaner women were also co-opted into patriarchal forms of 
Afrikaner ethnic identity in the first half of the twentieth century, the price of this co-option 
being the granting of a circumscribed freedom within the cultural sphere of ethnic political 
mobilisation. The ideological division of men into the political sphere, and women into the 
cultural, domestic sphere of mobilised Afrikaner ethnic identity allowed middle class women 
considerable influence in defining Afrikaners as a self-conscious group. The activities of the 
Afrikaans, Christian Women's Association (ACW) in Cradock, a small town in the Karoo 
63 _ 
64 For an insightful overview of these issues, which also demonstrates how mission education could partially incorporate 
soicalisation processes emanating from pre-colonial African communities, see D. Gaitskell, "'Wailing for Purity"'. Gaitskell 
also refers to the work of Sibusiswe Makhanya (p. p. 345-346). 65 N. Jabavu, The Ochre People: Scenes from a South African Life, London, 1963. Also see chapter 9. 
S. Marks, 'Patnotism, Patriarchy and Purity', p. 228. 
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region of the Eastern Cape, during the first half of the twentieth century is a poignant case in 
point. 68 
(The ACW) ... trod a careful, non-party 
line between securing the 
interests of Afrikaners and identifying itself with the National party. 
One could, in fact, be ethnic in orientation without being nationalist 
in the party sense... (The ACW) ... were 
defining cultural symbols, 
particularly in religion and language, both wrapped up in the power- 
ful notion of the `yolk; protecting the community from loss by 
acculturation into other groups, and preserving an Afrikaner cultural 
base which could be defended in the political realm by men. 67 
This straddling of the cultural/political fence manifested itself In several ways. For example, 
the ACW carried out charity work for poor Afrikaners, whilst simultaneously pressurising the 
state to subsidise this provision. No other ethnic groups were helped in this manner by the 
ACW, implying that they were pursuing a policy of cultural ethnic 'survival' 88 They also 
promoted Afrikaner education, and ran several schools with state subsidies 89 Significantly, the 
field of education also provided an arena where Afrikaner women promoted a policy Initially 
differing from that of men. The ACW actively promoted forms of education for poor Afrikaner 
boys and girls which would prepare them for a future in urban areas. This differed markedly 
from the preferences of Afrikaner men, some of whom pursued a 'back to the land' policy 
which was clearly impractical due to the commercialisation of agriculture, the subsequent 
extreme difficulty of running a small-holding and the decline in the need for bywoners, which 
initially supplied some Afrikaner men with a form of employment at the beginning of the 
century. 70 The National party eventually embraced a policy of vocational and technical 
education which could challenge the ascendency of the English-speaking population in 
commerce. The support of more urban oriented forms of education provides another example 
of the circumscribed independence that Afrikaner women could gain through promoting ethnic 
mobilisation via the cultural sphere. The ACW funded schools utilising these forms of 
education within Cradock, and funds came from male benefactors due to the pursuasive 
abilities of these women. In this sense, they were indirectly Influencing the male-dominated 
political realm. These women were pursuing'a maternalism that concentrated on their "own"', 
66 This section is based on J. Butler's work, 'Afrikaner women and the Creation of Ethnicity'. 67 Ibid, p. p. 64-5. 
68 Ibid, p. p. 66,68-69. 
69 Ibid, p. p. 68-69. 
70 Ibid, p. p. 68-70. 
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71 but in doing so they carved out a considerable independence for themselves, and were able 
to influence political issues without fully crossing over from the cultural to the political sphere. 
It was not only relatively privileged Afrikaner women who reformulated ethnic identities and 
challenged concepts of female submissiveness. Working class Afrikaner women adopted the 
symbols of the volksmoeder and adapted it in order to define a distinct identity for 
themselves. 72 The clothing industry employed about half of all white women in manufacturing 
industry during the inter-war years, and the vast majority of these women were Afrikaans- 
speaking. Unlike women's organisations such as the ACW, these women were therefore 
'economically active' in the formal sense, and not completely tied to the ideological concept of 
the volksmoeder as created by male ethnic entrepreneurs. They did not achieve the status of 
volksmoeder through voluntary service for the volk, which was the accepted route for gaining 
this status for middle class women. 73 However, it seems that the concept of the volksmoeder 
had permeated downwards from the middle-classes into all sectors of Afrikaner society, and 
this raised questions regarding the perceived morality of young Afrikaner women working in an 
industrial environment. They had thus to re-work the definition of the volksmoeder ideology in 
order to integrate it with their own socio-economic situation. 
The volksmoeder ideal found resonance among middle-class 
women because it gave legitimacy to their role in society as 
wives, mothers and voluntary workers. Equally, it gave them 
a sense of stability and purpose in a rapidly changing world. 
So strong was middle-class acceptance of the concept of 
volksmoeder that it placed working-class women on the defens- 
ive. Working-class women adopted the symbols and terms of 
the volksmoeder and then proceeded to define it for themselves. 
In so doing they claimed their own legitimacy, as valid members 
of society. 74 
For example, Afrikaner women working as garment workers on the Rand sought to retain their 
Afrikaner identity whilst becoming integrated within a proletarianised workforce. Many 
Afrikaner women employed in this industry became members of the Garment Workers Union, 
one of the most militant unions during the inter-war years. Afrikaner women had entered this 
industry in the 1920s, when mass factory production was initiated. Previously, it had been 
71 Ibid, p. 70. 
72 E. Brink, 'Man-Made Women'. 
73 J. Butler, 'Afrikaner Women and the Creation of Ethnicity' and E. Brink, 'Man-Made Women'. 74 E. Brink, ibid, p. 291. See also I. Berger, Threads of Solidarity: Women in South African Industry, 1900-1980, London, 
1992, and E. S. (Solly) Sachs, Rebels Daughters, London, 1957. 
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dominated by European-trained male artisans. Women were taken on as semi-skilled 
operatives, displacing white men and deskilling the jobs they previously held. This met the 
needs of mass capitalist production, providing a cheaper labour force, but did not sit easily 
with the reconstructed patriarchal form that Afrikaner ethnicised identity had taken. The Union 
formed in response to a rift between these women workers and the skilled male workers, and 
was able to forge a socialist consciousness amongst the former, which partially transcended 
Afrikaner Nationalist ideology by absorbing and celebrating cultural facets of Afrikaner identity 
whilst working for better wages and working conditions for women workers. The Union also 
sought to forge a multiracial membership, and had early successes. However, with the 
expansion of the industry during and after the Second World War, and the subsequent 
increase in first 'coloured' and then African women into the workforce, the Union was forced to 
introduce separate branches for African, 'coloured' and white members. During the 1950s, as 
Afrikaner women moved into middle-class occupations such as secretarial work, the Union 
gradually pursued a much more narrowly economistic trade-union consciousness. 
Nevertheless, the Garment Workers Union's work in the 1930s had demonstrated that 
Afrikaner cultural identity could sit with a socialist consciousness, if somewhat uneasily. 
Proletarianisation and class conflict do seem to have offered a route of escape form tightly 
bounded notions of motherhood and idealised womanhood in this period, without entirely 
subverting the dominance of patriarchal, and ethnicised, discourse. Furthermore, these 
routes of escape often involved the mobilisation of ethnic identities in order to compete for 
scarce resources. Mobilised ethnic and class identities in this period also raised issues with 
regard to women's participation in violence, often perceived as primarily a male tendency 75 
The 1922 Rand Revolt illustrates this point. The threat to lower white wages, make fuller use 
of cheap African labour, and cut down on white supervisory workers, as a result of a financial 
crisis in mining, were the main reasons for what became one of the most militant moments of 
the white working class in South Africa. 76 Krikler has recently researched the participation of 
Afrikaner women in this revolt and has noted several instances where women participated In, 
and even led, violent acts against both the state authorities and strike breakers. 77 Implicit In 
his study is the suggestion that ideological gender divisions, such as the concept of the 
75 --- See chapter S. 
7F 
'- See J. Omer Cooper, History of Southern Africa, London, 1994, p. p. 171-172, for a good summary of the main causes. 
Although the revolt did not pivot solely around Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation, Afrikaner ethnicity did play a considerable 
factor. Many Afrikaner urban migrants had gained employment on the mines during the first world war as many of the original 
white labour force had signed up for military service. Afrikaner migrants began to fill relatively high-paid semi-skilled and 
supervisory jobs, and a 1918 agreement with management ensured that no position filled by a white worker would be given to 
an African or `Coloured' worker. The breaking of this agreement contributed directly to the revolt, and led to the formation of 
largely Afrikaner based working class 'commandos'. 77 J. Krikler, 'Women, Violence and the Rand Revolt of 1922', in JSAS, Vol 22, No 3,1996. 
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volksmoeder, at least partially break down in times of sharpened class conflict. Assaults on 
ideological constructs of masculinity were also apparent. 
(An) assault on masculinity is perhaps the best way to account 
for the tactic of enforced stripping to which some strike breakers 
were subjected. It might also be interpreted as a denial of 
adulthood, since it is part of the daily routine of small children that 
they are dressed and undressed by others. Strikebreakers could 
thus be insulted as men and infantilized by the process. 78 
However, in the final moments of the suppression of the strike by military forces and aerial 
bombardments, patriarchy re-asserted itself, as women and children were removed from the 
area about to be bombarded by the male participants of the strike 79 It seems therefore, that at 
times of particularly brutal conflict, often involving issues of ethnic Identity, gender identities 
can become debated. For at these historical junctures women are often able to partially 
invert male ideological dominance and gain a circumscribed independence. 
In sum, several important developments occurred during, and immediately prior, to this period 
in terms of gender and ethnic identity formation. Previous pre-colonial gendered and 
ethnicised identities were becoming increasingly debated, due to uneven capitalist 
penetration, urbanisation and the migrant labour process. Much as Bozzoli has argued 80 the 
particular way that the migrant labour system developed, with Afrikaner women being 
incorporated within the proletrianisation process much faster than African women, contributed 
fundamentally to the reformulation of gender identities in the twentieth century. The 
articulation between previous forms of patriarchy and the more explicit forms which arose in 
the wake of these processes was a major contributory factor in the shaping of the moral ethnic 
debates of the time. African women, who generally underwent a much later process of 
proletarianisation, often mobilised more explicit forms of ethnic Identity around a defense of 
pre-colonial rural forms of life, increasingly under threat from land expropriation and the 
penetration of the migrant labour process. Afrikaner women often mobilised ethnic Identities 
around their forming class positions, due to the more rapid proletrianisation process which 
Afrikaner people underwent. However, both resulted in the male construction of virtuous 
womanhood, often centred around various versions of 'Mothers of the Nation' Ideologies which 
sought to retain patriarchal control of women. This was in order both to contain the various 
forms of independence women were gaining through the uneven urbanisation process, whilst, 
in terms of ethnicity, giving women a form of circumscribed independence which allowed them 
78 Ibid, p. 355. See p. p. 355-358 for specific examples. 79 Ibid. 
80 B. Bozzoli, 'Marxism, Feminism and Southern African Studies', passim. 
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more explicit control of the domestic, cultural spheres. The threat of women breaking down 
ethnicised boundaries was therefore partially subverted. Women often ended up policing the 
very ethnic boundaries which they were perceived to be breaking, through the circumscribed, 
ethnicised freedoms granted them. These ideologies articulated with both the universalist 
form of civic nationalism espoused by the ANC, and the narrower, more exclusivist form of 
ethnic nationalism which arose as a result of mobilised Afrikaner ethnicity. 
7.3 Idealised Motherhood, Female Independence and Ethnic Identities In Post-1948 
South Africa 
A useful starting point in examining the relationship between gendered and ethnicised 
identities in this period is to analyse anthropological studies concerned with social change in 
post-war South Africa. These works often examined the same themes with which some 
anthropologists in the 1930s were concerned. The 'Red'-'School' division existing throughout 
rural areas of the Eastern Cape from the beginning of the century until its gradual erosion in 
the 1970s has been analysed by various anthropologists in terms of African responses to 
socio-economic change 81 In terms of marriage, and other gender relationships, this cultural 
ideological division represented a fundamental shaping force in the reformulation of moralities. 
Mayer's research found that considerable changes-in -terms of moral values regarding 
relationships first became apparent around the time of the Second World War, in what was to 
become the Transkei and Ciskei: 
It was in the 1940s that the 'sexual revolution' hit Blacks in the 
cities and School people in the reserves. Young people began 
to marry or just live together without waiting for parental initiative 
or even seeking for parental consent. Parents despaired of 
controlling their daughters, since, it seemed even draconian 
punishments were of no avail. 82 
He also refers to the migration of young women to town in order to supplement family 
incomes, the level of which were dire due to the historical reasons outlined above. Many fell 
pregnant with illegitimate children, and often the young male fathers did not feel morally 
obliged to support the mothers concerned, or indeed to pay the traditional fine. 3 This would 
81 There are several works which deal extensively with this issue. See in particular P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, Cape 
Town, 1965, P. Mayer, 'The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', in P. Mayer (ed), Black Villagers in an 
Industrial Society, Cape Town, 1980 (other individual contributions in this volume also refer to the 'Red'-'School' divide), M. 
Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, P. Qayiso, 'Xhosa Morality', Unpublished Paper, MS 16891/5, Cory Library Rhodes University. 
Also, chapter 3 for a detailed overview of the development of this divide and a more comprehensive analysis of its relevance to 
ethnic identities. 
82 P. Mayer, 'Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', p. 34. 83 Ibid. 
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seem to be a continuation of trends observed in the 1930s in other black African communities. 
Africans proffered several reasons for these social developments. An oral informant 
interviewed by Mayer's chief research assistant in the 1960s exemplifies this point: 
People of today 'baphelelwe yinyaniso' (have no truth left in them). 
Christian faith is gone from the people. They are just pretending to 
be Christians. Educated people and those who are Christians are 
worse in their manner of behaviour than the Reds. Nowadays there 
are very few girls who still... 'ukumetsha . The reason why we say 
so is because of the results (pregnancy) that we see. There are 
more cases of premarital pregnancy today than ever before. I think 
that the main cause for this is 'ukwanda kukhanyo' (widening of the 
horizons of enlightenment), 'nolwazi' (and knowledge). In the past 
children were not kept at school so long, so that they could attain 
high education. A standard VI pupil could become a lady teacher 
then... Moreover, today there are bioscopes that the children attend, 
where they see how tricks and 'izimanga' (surprising things) in love 
affairs are committed. As a result of bioscopes 'ubundlobongela' 
(felony) has increased. 84 
This particular informant, Mamntande, also argued that the 'corrupting' influence of town life in 
general, and the lessening of disciplinary procedures in the home, contributed to young 
women becoming pregnant outside marriage 85 
There are several issues arising from this testimony. Firstly, the decline of pre-colonial 
originating forms of non-penetrative sexual intercourse. - Reference has already been made to 
it in general terms, and it provides one of several criteria which differentiate between 'Red' and 
'School' communities in the 1950s. It seems young unmarried women from the rural 'School' 
sub-culture were far more prone to conceiving illegitimate children than those of predominantly 
'Red' rural communities. 6 
84 Evidence of Mamntande, P. Qayiso, `Xhosa Morality', p. p. 4-5. For similar observations in a different area see L. 
Longmore, The Dispossessed: A Study of the Sex Life of Bantu Women in Urban Areas in and Around Johannesburg, London, 
1959. 
85 Ibid. 
86 P. Mayer, 'Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', p. p. 34-5. P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, Cape Town, 1965, 
chapter 2,15 and 16, provide a comprehensive analysis of this issue. See chapter 8 for the relationship between 'Red' and 
'School' youth organisations and this imbalance of illigitimate births between the two sub-cultural ideologies. 
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Another issue raised by the above informant is the issue of education. The importance 
attached to education among broadly middle-class Afrikaner women has already been 
examined with respect to its influence in shaping ethnic identities. There are similarities in 
terms of black African communities, despite the difference in terms of historical shaping 
forces. Many of the first converts to christianity in the early part of the twentieth century were 
female, and this led many missionaries to take a special interest in raising the status of these 
women from the perceived 'barbarous state in which native women were kept practically in 
servitude' 87 Additionally more girls than boys tended to attend mission schools in the Transkei 
and Ciskei from their inception onwards. Girls also often remained in education longer. 
Mayer argues that '(a)s a result of this greater exposure to church and school, an ideology of 
change was often more firmly inculcated in them than in males'. 88 
Red women tended to be more conservative than their husbands 
while School women were the opposite. Having had equal status 
with boys at school, often better-educated than their husbands, with 
experience of town and the ability to earn their own money, and 
holding offices in church and women's organisations, School women 
showed a great deal of self-confidence and independence... Large 
numbers of women from School homes went to work in town, and 
lived a life of 'free women'. 89 
Women's self-organised prayer groups, or manyanos, generally seem to have allowed many 
christian African women to carve out a form of circumscribed independence for themselves in 
twentieth century South Africa, whilst contributing to a specific ideological form of motherhood. 
Motherhood was central to African women's personal and cultural 
identity as well as their social and economic roles long before the 
advent of christian missions in South Africa. But church groups 
sought to transform, elevate and entrench the importance of marriage, 
wifehood and motherhood for women. They were among the powerful 
87 Native Affairs Commission, 1903, pars 3608, quoted in P. Mayer, 'Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', p. 34. For an 
insightful overview of the development of African women's Christianity in twentieth century South Africa, and its relationship 
with various constructions of motherhood, see D. Gaitskell, 'Devout Domesticity? A Century of African Women's Christianity 
in South Africa', in C. Walker (ed), Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945. Also see B. Hutchinson, 'Some Social 
Consequences of Nineteenth Century Missionary Activity Among the South African Bantu', Africa, Vol 27, No 1,1957, which 
examines the motivations of southern African women in terms of turning to Christianity in the nineteenth century. ss P. Mayer, 'Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', p. p. 34-35. 
89 Ibid, p. 35. Mayer observes that this resulted in many School men resorting to a reformulation of pre-colonial forms of 
female respect and subservience, for example making their married partners crouch on the floor at mealtimes while they sat at 
the table. This seems to represent another example of'grass-roots' concern, and increasing debate, among males with regard to 
what was the rightful role of women in society. 
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ideological forces contributing to the ongoing centrality of the notion of 
motherhood in African women's organisation in the twentieth century. 9° 
Connections can be made between women's education and religious affiliation, and their 
possible co-option into politically tribalist forms of ethnic identity, especially during the second 
half of the twentieth century. Many manyano members used their organisations to express 
concern with the rise in pre-marital pregnancies, loss of control over daughters and the need 
for other social sanctions in the face of the decline of older forms. Mamntande was herself a 
manyano member, and her concern over the erosion of older forms of pregnancy prevention is 
readily apparent. There are many similarities here between her concerns and those 
expressed earlier, for example Sibusiswe Makhanye. Similar concerns were expressed by 
older 'School' women. This is not to suggest that these religious affiliations were themselves 
necessarily exclusive, 'backward-looking' and conservative. Many groups such as these can 
be conceived as radical in some senses. For example, women's prayer groups were involved 
in defending remnant chieftaincies and identities in a rural context, the essence of early 
twentieth century moral ethnicity 91 However, the values which they attempted to defend could 
easily be hi-jacked to promote the agendas of various ethnic culture brokers and apartheid 
ideologues intent on imposing a far more rigidified, politically tribalist version of ethnic 
identities in order to perpetuate their own various and varied political agendas. 
Central to this was the fact that women in both Afrikaner and African communities seem to 
have been the primary educators and inculcators of cultural values in their children, directly 
through their role as mothers. The growth of individualism, facilitated in no small way by 
mission christianity and education, had entailed a reformulation of how women fulfilled their 
role as cultural transmitters in twentieth century South Africa. The appropriate form of 
education for children in a fast-changing socio-economic climate became a prime concern for 
many women, as has already been illustrated with regard to middle-class Afrikaner women. In 
fact, 'western' education was one of the elements of European 'life-styles' which even 'Red' 
communities constantly debated in terms of how much of it they should adopt in the 1950s. 92 
Education was a very important issue amongst 'middle-class' African women in urban areas in 
the 1960s, both in terms of employment and increasing independence for themselves, and in 
terms of transmitting particular forms of morality into their children. An anthropological study 
of Langa township in Cape Town found that education was a major factor in re-structuring 
family relationships. 93 Women who took up employment commonly controlled the family 
90- 
--- -- -- U. Gaitskell, 'Devout Domesticity? ', p. p. 271-272. 91 
see for example, W. Beinart, 'Popular Protest and Women's Movements in Herschel District'. 97 
P. and I. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribemen, Cape Town, 1971 edition, p. p. 28-29, p. 35. 93 M. Wilson and A. Mafeje, Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township, London, 1963. 
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budget, and represented the primary figure in instilling the values of 'western' education into 
their children. Their increasing independence also led to them becoming a major driving force 
behind ambitious husbands. 'Whether working or not... the wife is often a personality. One of 
the fieldworkers reported that: "Almost every township leader has a wife of equal, if not 
greater, efficiency and drive" 1.94 Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that behind every 
successful man lay an exhausted woman. The small, but growing, male professional and 
social African elite situated in townships on the Rand in the 1960s also owed much to their 
mothers in terms of inculcation of the values of education. 
It would appear that, as a general rule, the father needed to be 
educated himself in order to be interested in his son's education; 
but, with the mother, whether she was educated or not was 
irrelevant to her decision that only by a complete break with tribal 
life could she become emancipated and released from her status 
of perennial minor, and that this could best happen through the 
education of her children. 95 
This seemed to have applied especially to widowed mothers who, by trekking to town and 
gaining employment, could escape the inferior societal position of a widow In rural areas and 
the institution of the levirate, which was still practiced In many rural communities of the time9e 
The possibility of escaping 'tribal' boundaries is implicitly obvious in this context. Women were 
migrating to town in order to gain an increasing independence, and to escape the moral 
universe and attendant individual constraints of rural communal life. However, many of these 
often ambitious women still adhered to selected rural values, and partially succeeded In 
transmitting them to their own children. In a statement made to one of the anthropologists 
working in the area, a member of the small professional elite made the following remark: 
It is very queer, Mrs Brandel. You can't really understand it. Why 
should it be mother? You see, there was, and still is, that old custom 
of harshness to children, even when the parents were christians. Now 
I was a naughty boy and father always beat me. But I did things for 
mother... Mother had a way of putting things so that they would stay in 
your mind forever. She was not an educated woman, but she had a 
fund of African proverbs and idioms. Native wisdom, you know. Even 
African custom had its own philosophy. 
94_. 
_ __ lb1d, p. 82. 
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And then, later in your life, it is those things that mother said and did 
which you remember. 97 
The testimony of Ms Mamntande further clarifies the point. It demonstrates an eclectic mix of 
concern over perceived loss of moral standards, an implied advocation of some form of 
reformulated pre-colonial social sanctions, and a criticism of individualist education and media 
implying that it was partially responsible for such issues as the growth in pre-marital 
pregnancies. Education was now an increasing arena of debate amongst Africans 
themselves, and many women seem to have advocated an eclectic mix of selective 
traditionalism and Europeanised education, ensuring the sanctity of the family. The brokers of 
politically tribalist versions of ethnic identity which arose In the apartheid years made much 
political capital out of these concerns, promoting idealised images of motherhood, and the 
perceived importance of mothers as cultural transmitters of the politically tribalist values to 
which these ethnic entrepreneurs adhered. 
A further issue which seems to have arisen, especially in the post-1948 years, was the 
increasing discrimination between rural and urban lifestyles and the concommitant effect upon 
marital relationships, which was increasingly commented upon in anthropological works 
concerned with rural and urban social change in the 1950s and 1960s. Brandel-Syrier's study 
of a small black township professional elite living on the Rand in the 1960s found that there 
was a high percentage of 'inter-tribal' (her term) marriages amongst the group concerned, 
which she argued was one of the major indicators of 'de-tribalization' In southern African 
societies. However she also discovered a parallel increase in the number of partners 
marrying from the same background, in terms of them being born in urban or rural areas. She 
argued that this represented a shift of emphasis from 'tribal' to urban-rural differences in terms 
of reformulated marital relationships 98 Marriage patterns in Langa, Cape Town, during the 
1960s exhibited similar patterns. 99 Nevertheless, it seems very possible that this rural-urban 
differentiation between black Africans could be transposed in an ethnicised manner. It did not 
mean a decrease in terms of ethnic affiliations, rather a reformulation of them within a specific 
rural-urban milieu. Certainly rural-urban stereotypes were arising in both rural and urban 
areas during the 1950s and 1960s, and these often did not correspond with ethnicised 
stereotyping. 100 But even in these instances there were underlying ethnicised stereotypes, and 
97 Ibid, p. p. 240-241. See also B. Hutchinson, 'Some Social Consequences of Nineteenth Century Missionary Activity', who 
found southern African women in the nineteenth century were also cultural transmitters of tradition, as well as pragmatically 
using Christianity when it provided social and economic benefits. 
ya_... __ lbid, p. 85. 
99 M. Wilson and A. Mafeje, Langa, p. p. 76-82. 100 See M. Wilson and A. Mafeje, Lange, p. 35, p. 128, and passim. For the rural Eastern Cape see the work of the Mayers, 
especially Black Villagers and Townsmen or Tribesmen. 
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these did not result from culturally brokered manipulation from above, but seem to have 
emanated from the historical experience of colonialism. In Langa during the 1960s Xhosa 
people were often stereotyped as precocious and a 'very hard people' (perhaps referring back 
to the considerable resistance Xhosa chiefdoms put up against the incursions of nineteenth 
century colonial forces). Mpondo people were sometimes stereotyped as 'wild' (perhaps 
having something to do with issues of circumcision and the development of specific youth 
organisations). Mfengu people were sometimes referred to as 'sell-outs' (again, referring back 
to the assistance some Mfengu people gave to the colonial forces in the nineteenth 
century). 101 However, there was always the possibility that they could, especially where 
communities who had been more rapidly incorporated into the migrant labour and money 
economy came into contact with communities who retained more facets of pre-colonial cultural 
traits and identities, due to a slower incorporation into these processes. 102 The sharpening of 
rural-urban divides also contrasts with African urban slum areas in the 1930s. Krige, for 
example, discovered no such divisions in her investigation of slum areas In the 1930s 
Transvaal, due in no small part to the frequency of inter-marriage between urban and rural 
originating people. 103 
Many Africans seem to have constructed different versions of what was meant by 'rural' and 
'urban' in the post-war years, and these could be consciously inter-linked with constructions of 
'tradition' and 'modernity'. Gender based conflict in marrage often involved conscious 
utilisation of these constructions as resources to either perpetuate patriarchy or to gain more 
female autonomy and independence. Township marriages in the Eastern Cape town of 
Grahamstown demonstrate these points. 104 Men could appeal to their own constructions of 
rural Xhosa 'tradition' in order to perpetuate patriarchal relationships, whilst women would 
often respond by arguing that these ideas were out of date, basing their conceptions of an 
ideal marital relationship upon a Europeanised, 'modern' model. However, these were not 
mutually exclusive divisions. Educated, urbanised, women sometimes situationally selected 
facets of reformulated Xhosa 'tradition' if this protected them from some of the worst excesses 
101 Ibid, p. 35. See chapter 8 for an analysis of the relationship between circumcision, the development of different youth 
organisations and ethnic identities. Mfengu and Xhosa identities are explored fully in chapter 3. The Mayers' work, although 
not primarily concerned with ethnic identities, also suggests that the differences between 'Red'. 'School' and 'Town' Xhosa 
values also evolved at least partially through Mfengu and Xhosa rivalry. In this sense, the rural 'Red'/'School' dichotomy can 
beperceived as part of the moral ethnic debate which arose in the wake of these fundamental changes and rivalries. 102 See L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie: Race. Class and Politics in South Africa, London, 1965, p. 86-88. Kuper refers here 
o the rivalry between Zulu and Sotho people (see chapter 9 for a comprehensive analysis). It is interesting that the rivalries to 
which he refers take place at an educational institution. This possibly suggests that education was often at the centre of rural- 
urban ethnicised stereotypes from below. Kuper also noted that these stereotypes often involved constant deriding of various 
peoples' 'manhood' (see chapter 8). As mentioned earlier, this form of derision also took place in the 1922 Rand Revolt, and 
was often at the centre of marital conflict in post-war African societies. Constructs of 'manhood' were just as important in the 
formation of political ethnicities as were constructs of 'virtuous womanhood' and 'motherhood'. : "' E. Krige, 'Changing Conditions in Marital Relations', p. 3. Hellman's study, Rooiyard, makes similar findings. 104 See V. Van Der Viiet, 'Traditional Husbands, Modem Wives? Constructing Marriages in a South African Township', in 
A. Spiegel and P. McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa: Festschrif! for Phillip and Iona Mayer, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1991. 
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of male behaviour, for example by utilising the ukuthe/eka custom. 105 Many, although certainly 
not all, men also accepted their marital partners working in paid employment, not least 
because this could contribute significantly to the family income. Conceptions of appropriate 
'manhood' also figured largely in Xhosa men's situational selection of Xhosa 'tradition', and 
this could materialise in terms of contrasting selective traditionalist forms of marital behaviour 
with that of 'modern' white forms. White men were often portrayed as emasculated for 
allowing their marital partners equality within the home, as were educated blacks who adhered 
to variations on this theme. 106 These manipulations of 'tradition' and 'modernity' ensured a 
plethora of patriarchies. 
The many forms of situationally selected identities arising in both rural and urban African 
communities were often situated within the arena of moral ethnicity. However, the values 
inherent in them could be appropriated by proponents of political tribalist versions of ethnicity, 
especially in the wake of apartheid. The introduction of the so-called 'Separate Development' 
policy and the attendant creation of 'Homelands', which gave so much purchase on political 
power to ideologues such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi, came at a time of considerable change in 
terms of consciousness and identity for many African people: 
The period from the 1960s to the 1980s marked a new phase 
of incorporation of the old African chiefdoms, so that they lost 
much of their distinctiveness and increasingly reflected the 
predominant urban and wage-based culture. In retrospect, 
the rural revolts and protests of the 1950s proved to be a last 
attempt to defend the autonomy of the reserves... Many 
elements of African culture did survive or were reinvented in 
some form both in town and countryside ... But the social bonds 
which some tate ideologue argued that they were attempting 
to preserve tended to erode. 107 
Many African people in rural and urban communities did situationally select facets of 
'traditionalism' in order to forge new moral ethnic identities and battle for scarce resources in 
this period. Gender roles were often at the centre of these debates. One of the best accounts 
of the situational nature of gendered ethnic identity selection in this period is Webster's 
analysis of identity formation in Kosi Bay, Kwazulu Natal. 108 Webster argues that both men 
105 Ibid, p. p. 122-223. 
106--"- 
Mid, p. 230. 
107 
, nQ 
W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, p. p. 206-207. ins -- D. Webster, `Ethnicity and Gender in a Kwazulu Border Community'. 
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and women drew upon selective forms of traditionalism in order either to justify patriarchal 
forms of relationships (for men), or to challenge these forms (women). The region in question 
lies midway between former centres of nineteenth and early twentieth century Zulu and 
Thonga states. Webster found that men and women drew upon these diverse forms of pre- 
colonial and early colonial identities in order to debate or justify gender roles. Men drew upon 
selected Zulu 'tradition' in order to justify rural forms of patriarchy, whilst women drew upon 
selective facets of previous Thonga custom, which allowed them to construct an identity not 
so disposed to the subservient female role which men envisaged. Thus the geographical 
location and specific historical development of the area allowed men and women to debate 
gender identities within a moral ethnic arena. Again, these identities were open, fluid and 
processual. Migrant labour was also a significant factor, as many migrant men perceived a 
Zulu identity as advantageous in terms of gaining employment, due to the ethnicised 
stereotypes of mine management. Therefore, perceived notions of appropriate forms of 
manhood were at the fore of these male identities, with Thonga versions being stigmatised. 
However, these 'imagined' identities were fluid, processual, and highly situational. It was the 
concerns inherent in them which both the apartheid state and politically tribalist culture brokers 
sought to hi-jack by crystallising ethnicised identities in a rigidified form which allowed for no 
debate. 109 The construction of appropriate roles for women, often centred around conceptions 
of motherhood, were important components of these imposed identities from 'above', the more 
so because they resonated with the every-day concerns of many people living in dire poverty 
and racist oppression. 
Politically tribalist versions of Zulu ethnicised identity perhaps provide the best example of 
imposed constructions of motherhood in the South African context. The Inkatha Women's 
Brigade was launched in May 1977. It promoted a seemingly contradictory discourse of 
empowerment and development 'shot through with conservative appeals to women's maternal 
responsibilities, their obedience to their husbands and their commitment to the church'. 
110 
However, it would be wrong to suppose that the female membership of this organisation 
perceived this ideological discourse as oppressive. In a very similar fashion to middle-class 
Afrikaner women who utilised the ACW in order to straddle the cultural/political divide In the 
first half of the twentieth century, members of the Inkatha Women's Brigade gained a 
circumscribed independence through joining the organisation. Additionally, many women 
members were also strong, independent characters, and often were not averse to participating 
in violence. 111 There were also material advantages in supporting Inkatha's policies and 
109 See chapter 3 for a systematic analysis, which also examines why some forms of politically tribalist identity were more 
successful than others in resonating with people's popular consciousnesses. 110 S. Hassim, 'Family, Motherhood and Zulu Nationalism: The Politics of the Inkatha Women's Brigade', p. 2. 111 Ibid, p. p. 12-13. 
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joining the Women's Brigade. Developmental projects were promoted in a way which was 
symbolically significant for many Christian Zulu women. For example, community garden 
organisations and sewing groups were organised which tapped into earlier forms of 
Zulu 
women's organisations, whilst simultaneously promoting class deference. 
' 12 
Ideological constructions of Afrikaner motherhood were also undergoing a process of 
reformulation from the 1960s onwards. Economic growth and the apartheid system had 
combined to ensure Afrikaners in general a more dominant place in South African society, with 
disparities in wealth between Afrikaner and English-speaking sections rapidly disappearing. 
Afrikaners were rapidly being absorbed into a more homogenous consumer culture, influenced 
by cultural values emanating from both the USA and Europe. ' 13 Indeed, the 'apartheid period 
was one of suburbanization and the spread of a rather derivative consumer culture spliced on 
to the gnarled old settler stock'. ' 14 This meant that earlier culturally brokered forms of 
Afrikaner motherhood, centred around the suffering of Afrikaner women during the Boer war, 
or within the context of ethnic mobilisation in order to avoid anglicization and the 
disappearance of a specific Afrikaner identity, were becoming irrelevant. Divorce and abortion 
increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s, representing just two indicators of Afrikaner 
women's increasing social, sexual and economic independence. This was a result of general 
economic growth, the increasing influence of American and European individualism, higher 
levels of education, increasing dissatisfaction with patriarchal dominance, and the fact that 
most of the domestic tasks often assigned to women were undertaken by black domestic 
workers. The increasing levels of affluence and individualist aspirations also meant that the 
home was no longer the pivot around which Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation turned. Indeed, 
Afrikaners had now reached a level of psychological security regarding their ethnic Identity 
which enabled them to increasingly debate the necessity of apartheid as constructed under 
Verwoerd. 15 
Events such as the 1976 Soweto uprising, the gaining of political independence from 
Portuguese colonial rule by Mozambique and Angola in 1974, and Zimbabwe's independence 
in 1980, combined with international condemnation of apartheid, the need of capitalist 
organisations for a more skilled workforce, and increasing internal unrest to force Afrikaner 
112 [bid, p. 3. Also see S. Meintjes, 'Family and Gender in the Christian Community at Edendale, Natal, in Colonial Times', in 
C. Walker (ed), Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945, for an overview of these earlier forms of women's identity 
formation. 
113 For an insightful overview of this process, see W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, p. p. 171-180. 
114 Ibid, p. 173. 
its This is broadly the argument of Giliomee in his article 'The Growth of Afrikaner Identity', in H. Adam and 11. Giliomce 
(eds), Ethnic Power Mobilised: Can South Africa Change?, Yale, 1979. However, this is not meant to suggest that the gradual 
breakdown of apartheid was easily undertaken. The Verligle-Verkampte split, the formation of the Conservative party in 1982 
from breakaway segments of the Nationalist Party, Botha's turn to a technocratic-militaristic form of rule in the 1980s, and the 
growth of neo-fascist Afrikaner based groups in the 1980s and 1990s all illustrate that what it exactly meant to be an Afrikaner 
was a highly debated contestation. For an overview of this, see W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, especially 
chapters 6,7 and 10. 
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ideologues to undergo a painful redefiniton of apartheid and Afrikanerdom. In terms of the 
volksmoeder ideology, this meant that women were now portrayed - from the 1980s onwards - 
as the 'spiritual' defenders of Afrikaner identity, upholding Afrikanerdom within the country's 
borders which Afrikaner men fought to preserve at the borders and beyond. However, with 
increasing unrest throughout the 1980s, it was becoming apparent that the more exclusive 
definition of Afrikaner ethnic identity was no longer tenable. Gaitskell and Unterhalter argue 
that ideologies of motherhood were adjusted accordingly, with an attempt to stress the 
common experiences of motherhood across 'race' boundaries. This was in order to pre-empt 
the ANC's own policy of stressing their version of universal experience of motherhood. For 
example in 1983, Frederica van Rooyen was appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs to 
chair a committee trying to bring 'coloured' and other groups closer. Thus when 'the 
boundaries of the political nation were about to be extended, Afrikaner women were enlisted to 
promote reconciliation'. ' 'a Afrikaner women were being portrayed as the domesticated 
defenders of the newly re-defined boundaries of Afrikanerdom. Nevertheless, and in partial 
contradiction of the arguments of Gaitskell, Unterhalter and other academics who stress the 
power of ideologies of 'Motherhood', these identity constructions increasingly failed to reflect 
the reality of women's lives as the second half of the twentieth century progressed. 
Motherhood could mean many things to women (and, for that matter, men) both in Afrikaner 
and African societies, and politically tribalist versions of motherhood could only capture part of 
this lived reality. Women were portrayed as policing the boundaries of ethnicised identities, 
but were increasingly able to escape them. 
7.4 'Motherhood' and the Gendered Nature of Ethniclsed Identities In Twentieth Century 
South Africa: Some Concluding Remarks 
A recent feminist analysis of nationalism, with specific reference to South Africa, has posited 
the argument that the temporal anomaly within nationalism, simultaneously looking 
nostalgically to the past and impatiently to the future, is typically resolved by figuring the 
contradiction as a 'natural' division of gender: 
Women are represented as the atavistic and authentic 'body' 
of national tradition (inert, backward-looking, and natural), 
embodying nationalism's conservative principle of continuity. 
Men, by contrast, represent the progressive agent of national 
modernity (forward-thrusting, potent and historic), embodying 
nationalism's progressive, or revolutionary principle of discontinuity. 
Nationalism's anomalous relation to time is thus managed as a 
116 D. Gaitskell and E. Unterhalter, `Mothers of the Nation', p. 66. 
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natural relation to gender. "? 
This also applies to ethnic identities. 118 Women were, and are, often portrayed as the'passive' 
cultural transmitters of ethnicised discourse, and the dynamic, public, political sphere as the 
prime preserve of men. There is an interesting comparison to be made here between the 
impulses ofpural African communities relatively unaffected by colonialism and capitalism in the 
early twentieth century, and the more explicit ethnicised forms which later arose. As 
mentioned above, women were often symbolically situated within a transitional, liminal state in 
many of these early communities, and thus represented a 'threat' to the survival of clan or 
'tribe' identity. They seem to have been placed on the borders of these rural, communal 
identities, both defining them and offering a potential threat to their existence. Thus elaborate 
social controls were incorporated which sought both to control the behaviour of women- 
especially in terms of sexual behaviour-whilst offering them a form of circumscribed 
independence. This seems to have been constructed in a more explicit, ethnicised sense by 
early twentieth century ethnic culture brokers, who were becoming increasingly concerned 
with the effect of urbanisation upon women (especially in the context of pre-marital 
pregnancies and the change in values concerning sexual intercourse and marriage). The first 
half of the twentieth century seems to have marked a reworking of the patriarchal construction 
of the position of women within various black African ethnic discourses. Furthermore, these 
reformulations occured in order to accommodate the changes wrought in peoples 
consciousnesses, as social scales widened with the introduction of 'westernised' education 
and individualist value systems. In Benedict Anderson's parlance, larger societies could now 
be 'imagined', and in a more explicit, debated sense. The fundamental need for human 
beings to categorise, and the attendant creation of symbolic, liminal states in order to 
overcome experiences which did not integrate with these categorisations, can be perceived as 
operating in a larger, reformulated sense in these more explicit forms of early twentieth 
century identities. Similar reformulations occured within Afrikaner communities, but these took 
a specific form, due to the quicker process of proletarianisation and the implementation of 
institutionalised racism. 
However, as has also been illustrated, women's roles did not fit neatly within this revamped 
form of ethnicised, patriarchal discourse. In direct contrast to the image of 'passive' cultural 
transmitters, both African and Afrikaner women sought to implement changes in the education 
systems available to them, which would resonate with the fast-changing socio-economic 
circumstances of the time. They were far more prominent than men in terms of forging these 
changes, and sometimes their ideas predominated in the face of male opposition. Elite groups 
of women from both African and Afrikaner communities were able to manipulate their imposed 
117 A. McClintock, 'Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family', Feminist Review, No 44,1993. 
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position within 'Mothers of the Nation' ideologies in order to carve a considerable form of 
independence for themselves within the sphere of education and welfare. Furthermore, these 
ideologies could be reformulated in order to partially resonate with specific class experiences, 
and women were often at the forefront of violent conflict, promoted as the specific sphere of 
men, at historically specific times of social and economic dislocation. As well as forging a 
circumscribed independence for themselves, albeit within the dominant ideological discourse 
of ethnicised patriarchy, women could also escape ethnicised boundaries completely. Women 
only adhered to politicised concepts of 'Motherhood' when it resonated with their own 
interests, and many - especially in urban areas - have taken up other forms of identity. 
119 
Nevertheless, politicised ideologies of 'Motherhood' retain a powerful pull on the 
consciousnesses of women, despite - or maybe more appropriately because of - the 
increasing globalisation of contemporary culture and economy. 
118 _. -- -- -. 
110 
The relationship between nationalist and ethnic identities is examined in chapter Y. 
- It is also important to recognise that 'motherhood' entails far more than just a politicised ideology, and thus is not 
necessarily easily amenable to ethnicised political messages. See C. Walker, 'Conceptualising Motherhood in Twentieth 
Century South Africa', JSAS, Vol 21, No 3,1995. 
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8. VIOLENCE, MALE SOCIALISATION AND ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
Violence, masculinity and ethnic identity are closely intertwined. Nationalist and ethnic 
ideologies are often patriarchal, and expressed in an aggressive, violent manner. Politicised 
ethnicity is commonly constructed as a male-dominated sphere, women often being placed 
outside politics and primarily conceived of as 'reproducers of the nation' and 'cultural 
transmitters' of a nation's or ethnic group's identity. ' This is not to suggest that women are not 
sometimes violent, 2 but most violence does seem to emanate from males, especially when 
issues of identity and ethnicity are involved. 
This chapter aims to explore the relationship between masculinity, violence and ethnic identity. 
Cultural factors, especially male socialisation, are particularly emphasised, and these are 
argued to be an important element in the formation of ethnic identities. Psychological and 
psychiatric ideas concerning violence are also explored in the South African context, whilst 
being situated within the wider socio-economic contexts of the time. This includes an analysis 
of Fanon's theoretical approach to violence, and how this offers explanatory potential 
regarding the relationship between ethnic identity, violence and male socialisation. Gender 
divisions, generational tensions, and the impact of 'modernity' will also receive critical 
analysis. There is a specific emphasis on reformulated Mpondo identities throughout the 
chapter. This is especially the case in the section dealing with the connections between 
migrant labour, ethnic 'faction fights' and pre-colonial forms of violence. The reason for this 
emphasis is due to the rich accumulation of material on youth and migrants among the 
Mpondo, allowing a thorough investigation of these interrelated issues 4 Comparative material 
concerning communities elsewhere in South Africa is covered in other chapters. 
See for example the introduction to A. Anthias and N. Yuval-Davis' Woman-Nation-State, London, 1989. 
2A 
contemporary example of women participating in violent genocide is reported in the British newspaper The Guardian, 
August 26th 1995. The paper quotes the findings of African Rights, a London-based human rights organisation, who found that 
educated women, particularly teachers and school inspectors, participated widely in the widespread murders of Tutsi peoples in 
Rwanda just prior to the fall of the Hutu dominated government. 3 The institution of chieftaincies were/are also important in contributing to ethnic identities and collective violence. This is 
explored in chapter 3. 
4 See especially the following: W. Beinart, 'The Origins of the Indlavini: Male Associations and Migrant Labour in the 
Transkei', in A. Spiegel and P. McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1991; W. Beinart, 
'Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism and Nationalism: The Experiences of a South African Migrant, 1930-1960', in S. 
Marks and S. Trapido (eds), The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism, London, 1987; W. Beinart, 'Political and Collective 
Violence in Southern African Historiography', JSAS, Vol 18, No 3,1992; P. Mayer, 'Introduction: Subcultures, Moralities and 
Migrant Labour', in P. Mayer (ed), Migrant Labour: Some Perspectives From Anthropology, 7 Vols, Typescript, Rhodes 
University Migrant Labour Project; T. Dunbar Moodie, 'The Moral Economy of the Black Miners' Strike of 1946', JSAS, Vol 
13, No 1,1986; T. Dunbar Moodie, ' Migrancy and Male Sexuality on the South African Gold Mines', JSAS, Vol 14, No 2, 
1988; T. Dunbar Moodie, 'Social Existence and the Practice of Personal Integrity. Narratives of Resistance on the South 
African Gold Mines', in A. Spiegel And P. McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa; T. Dunbar Moodie, 
'Ethnic Violence on the South African Gold Mines', JSAS, Vol 18, No 3,1992; T. Dunbar Moodie and V. Ndatshe, Going For 
Gold: Men, Mines and Migration, London, 1994; M. O'Connell, 'Xesibe Reds, Rascals and Gentlemen at Home and at Work', 
in P. Mayer (ed), Black Villagers in an Industrial Society, Cape Town, 1980; K. Breckenridge, 'Migrancy, Crime and Faction 
Fighting: The Role of the Izitshotzi in the Development of Ethnic Organisations in the Compounds', JSAS, Vol 16, No 1,1990. 
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8.1 Male Identity Crises, Youth Gangs, Socialisation and Violence in Early to Mid 
Twentieth Century South Africa. 
As explored in chapter four, the fragmentation of patriarchy was an important result of colonial 
capitalism. The dominance of older men over women and young people was being 
challenged. This entailed new definitions of masculinity, as young men sought to assert 
themselves in the space created by the breakdown of rural authority. However, these newly 
formed masculine identities shared many of the values inherent in pre-colonial societies, if in a 
reformulated manner. 
Traditional forms of male socialisation in the Eastern Cape corresponded with the 
'Red'PSchool' cleavage so prevalent in that area. 'Red' Xhosa held tenaciously to pre- 
colonial, if reformulated, customs and mores. What is particularly interesting is the fact that 
this adherence to facets of pre-colonial identity enabled 'Red' Xhosa communities to retain 
control over young people in a far more effective fashion than 'School' communities did. This 
included channelling male violence and sexuality. The Mayers have analysed these control 
mechanisms in considerable depth, and their work provides an interesting comparison 
between traditionalist and Indlavini male associations. For both in their own way illustrate how 
different societies sought to reformulate their identities, more or less successfully, in what 
Walter terms a 'crisis of integration'. 5 Furthermore, neither group managed to completely 
resolve the challenge to previous forms of identity. 
Many rural communities in the Ciskei and Transkei formed traditionalist stick-fighting groups, 
associated with wider traditionalist youth associations. The Xhosa have a strong military 
tradition, and this was still reflected in male socialisation processes at the time of the Mayers' 
studies in the 1960s. 6 Older members of 'Red' Xhosa societies largely managed to retain 
authority over young people in the Eastern Cape when traditional authority in societies in the 
north-eastern Transkei and southern Natal were being challenged by youth groups such as 
the Indlavini. Male violence and attendant control mechanisms were very much involved with 
both forms of identity. Furthermore, it can be argued that these forms of youth associations 
are examples of reformulated moral ethnicity, in the sense that they provoked debate over 
S E. Walter, Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence With Case Studies of Some Primitive African Communities, 
Oxford, 1969, p. 291. 
6 P. and I. Mayer. 'Socialisation by Peers: The Youth Organisation of the Red Xhosa', in P. Mayer (ed) Socialisation: The 
Approach From Social Anthropology. London, 1970; P. and I. Mayer. 'Self-Organisation by Youth amongst the Xhosa - 
Speaking Peoples of the Ciskei and Transkei', 2 Vols., unpublished typescript, 1972; P. Mayer. 'A Dangerous Age: From Boy 
to Young Man in Red Xhosa Youth Organisations', in P. Spencer (ed. ), Anthropology and the Riddle of the Sphinx, London, 
1990. For similar socialisation processes elsewhere in South Africa, and their reformulation in the wake of the migrant labour 
process and colonial land expropriation, see for example J. Clegg, 'Ukubuyisa Isidumbu - "Bringing Back the Body": An 
Examination into the Ideology of Vengeance in the Msinga and Mpofana Rural Locations, 1882-1944, in P. Bonner (ed), 
Working Papers in Southern African Studies, Vol 2, Braamfontein, 1981. Clegg, like the Mayers below, argues that stick- 
fighting was utilised in this period in order to contain 'faction fighting' over land shortages, and that serious violent 
confrontations only occurred where these control mechanisms were not in place. 
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what form of ethnic identity best represented the people at times of rapid socio-economic 
change. 'Red' youth groups in the Eastern Cape area were largely self-organised, but with 
traditionalist values and priorities instilled at particular junctures in young peoples' lives. Both 
fighting and sexual behaviour are singled out by the Mayers as areas which received much 
attention by 'Red' Xhosa society in terms of the implementation of socialisation processes. 
Early training for stick-fighting amongst boys was carried out by adults: 
In what is called `thelelekisa',. women will catch hold of the 
hands of two little boys, two or three years old, and make 
them hit each other in the face, until the children get excited 
and angry and start lunging out on their own account, 
scratching and biting for good measure. The women look 
on with loud laughter. 7 
Mothers similarly encouraged their children to participate in stick fighting In Mpondoland during 
the first half of the twentieth century. 8 Adult supervision and instilling of values regarding stick- 
fighting continued amongst 'Red' groups in the Eastern Cape until boys reached the age of 
eight or nine. Then the boys entered a series of self-policed stick-fighting activities. By this 
time boys had internalised a set of norms and rules which were aimed at avoiding excessive 
violence. However, the Intlombe stage marked the end of stick-fighting and the start of mature 
male adulthood, and this break was marked emphatically by the process of male circumcision. 
Young men who passed through the Intlombe stage were now expected to deal with disputes 
through discussion and debate, and left their stick-fighting associations. Intlombe members 
were then trained not only to respect communal and official law, but also to enforce it. The 
Mayers quote a headman's explanation of this change: 'These young men are expected to be 
future councillors and headmen. They are to deal with the inkundla, the headman, the chiefs, 
Bantu commissioners, and magistrates. These will not respect one for one's strength in 
fighting but for eloquence and skill in solving problems'. 9 This comment also reflects the 
paradoxical nature of 'Red' Xhosa resistance ideologies. Although they resisted full 
integration with western oriented custom and mores (albeit in a specific racist South African 
context), by the twentieth century there was a fatalistic acceptance of 'white' hegemony. 
The entrance into 'Red' Xhosa conceptions of 'manhood' was therefore marked sharply by 
circumcision and attendant socialisation. Furthermore, this entailed a restraint on violence, 
even the controlled violence pursued by the junior Mtshotsho groups. The training received by 
rural Xhosa through the remnants of the Intlombe socialisation process was valued by many 
7 P. and I. Mayer, 'Socialisation by Peers', P. 165. 
8 M. Hunter, Reaction to Conquest, London, 1964 (2nd ed. Ist ed 1936). 9 P. and I. Mayer, 'Socialisation by Peers', P. 174. 
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young men during the period of insurrection and ungovernability from 1985 to 1989, as their 
debating and oratorical skills ensured discipline in peoples' courts during a time of extreme 
violence. 10 
Respect, restraint and control were fundamental to 'Red' Xhosa male socialisation processes. 
In the context of the 1980s period of insurrection in East London, the Intlombe males' skills 
can be perceived as being utilised at a time when there was a definite 'crisis of integration', 
marked by widespread violence, crime and governmental oppression. Nevertheless, male 
'violence' was condoned in 'Red' Xhosa societies up to at least the 1960s in certain 
circumstances. Indeed, it was accepted and encouraged as part of the socialisation process 
as long as certain moral restraints were observed. The Mayers distinguished between two 
forms of stick-fighting; the closely controlled and regulated stick-fighting matches, and the far 
less frequent, and far more violent idhabi, or battles, which often reflected adult tensions 
between locations as well as tensions between Mtshotsho groups in different localities. " 
Amongst Mtshotsho groups, animosity over young women was often a cause of conflict as 
well, which perhaps illustrates again how women are ideologically conceived by men as 
shaping the boundaries of male identity. This suggests a certain difficulty in controlling male 
violence, but also - due to the fact that it was such a rare occurrence - the effectiveness of the 
'Red' Xhosa system of controlled aggression. 
The Indlavini groups also constructed a system of moral restraints, very similar to that of 'red' 
Xhosa, despite the fact that the associations were indicative of a trend towards a breakdown 
of traditional authority. Again, this would seem to be an example of an attempt to overcome a 
'crisis of integration'. ' Traditionalist youth associations, or bhungu, also existed In the north 
eastern Transkei and southern Natal in the early twentieth century. However, these groups 
were beginning to give way to different youth associations, such as the Indlavini, by the 1930s. 
The Indlavini arose in Pondoland due to the gradual permeation of migrant labour into Mpondo 
society particularly by the 1920s. 12 Although the Indlavini challenged patriarchal control over 
women and youths, and became socially disruptive, they did not fundamentally challenge the 
social constructs of rural life: They were constructing a new masculinity which was more 
violent and less respectful of elders, but many of them still paid bridewealth and married'. 13 
Indlavini norms of combat were still restrictive and rule-bound. The ex-Indlavini interviewed by 
Beinart insisted that they always fought with sticks. Major rural events such as weddings, 
10 L. Ntsebeza. Youth in Urban African Townships, 1945-1992: A Case Study of the East London Townships. M. A. Thesis, 
Department of Economic History, University of Natal, Durban, Nov, 1993. Ll_ .- __ Y. and 1. Mayer. 'Socialisation by Peers. ' P. 172. 
12 See chapter 3 for an overview of the reasons for the rise of the Indlavint. 13 W. Beinart. The Origins of the Indlavini', P. 123. 
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which were important gathering points for the Indlavini as they provided contact with women 
and a place to assert their group identity, were often disrupted. 
Age and gender were fundamental facets in shaping pre-capitalist identities as capitalism 
developed. Aspects of pre-capitalist societies were often retained in modified form, 
'fragmenting then moulding, recreating from older forms a new society in which aspects of the 
old are important but always deceptive - sometimes genuinely an older form which has been 
retained, and sometimes a new form appearing in an older guise'. 14 This is certainly the case 
with the emergence and decline of the indlavini and even the traditionalist youth associations. 
Both can perhaps be perceived as part of a debate concerning what best represents 
'masculinity' within given communities, a debate often centred around what was acceptable 
violence, and often itself marked by violence. Furthermore, these debates should perhaps be 
understood in terms of self-worth and integrity rather than solely in terms of changing, or 
forming, class conditions. 15 Peoples' core values and experiences were being renegotiated in 
the wake of colonial capitalism, and its attendant ideologies. This is the essence of the debate 
inherent in moral ethnicity. 
Phillip and Iona Mayer carried out a systematic study of the Indlavini in areas of Pondoland, as 
part of a larger project studying various youth organisations in parts of the Ciskei and Transkei 
during the 1960s. Much of this work is still unpublished. 16 Although their material-as that 
concerning the Eastern Cape above-refers to a later period it is worth analysing their findings, 
as they provide lucid insights into the importance of male organisations in socialising young 
men. It also points to the prevalence of violence, sanctioned and unsanctioned, among these 
organisations. Furthermore, these associations had changed little in terms of organisation 
and belief systems from their initial manifestations in the 1930s. The Mayers specifically 
linked the propensity to violence among Indlavini in Enkantolo (their place of field work) to 
cultural factors, especially the lack of a circumcision ritual and its attendant socialisation 
process. " 
The Mayers recorded several other aspects of Indlavini activity, especially concerned with 
violence, which contrasted with more traditionalist groupings in the Eastern Cape and 
Pondoland. Indlavini group relations were not confined to a regular area, usually within 
'location' bounds, unlike more traditionalist groupings. 18 Mtshotsho groups In the Eastern 
14 J. Guy, 'Analysing Pre-Capitalist Societies', P. 33. 
15 See the exploration of psychological factors below. 
16 P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth'. 
17 lbid, Vol 2, Chapter 7, p. 174. is Ibid, p. 173. See P. and 1. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth', Vol 1, Chapter 1, for the importance of territorial boundaries for traditionalist groupings in the Eastern Cape, and Vol 2, Chapter 5 for similar examples in Pondoland. 
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Cape were instilled with an intense awareness of local community allegiance, even though 
there was interaction between groups from different areas: 
Reciprocal visiting by umshotsho groups brings new contacts 
with outside age-mates; at the same time, it is very much a 
community business, the location or section group always 
going as a whole and identifying itself as 'the umshotsho of 
such and such a place. Outside the location, on the regular 
circuit, a lone visitor is not accepted. 19 
It was only after young men had passed through the circumcision ritual, and entered the 
Intlombi socialisation stage, that they began to travel much further afield, and as individuals 
rather than a communal group. As mentioned above, the Intlombl stage marks the passage 
into traditionalist 'Red' concepts of 'man-hood', where conflicts previously settled by violence 
are now resolved through the due process of law and rational debate. The Mayers link this to 
the development of a concept of 'nation'. 
Young men, then, at the same time as they lay their sticks aside 
in favour of `law', are supposed to lay aside the intense, suspicious 
local-group preoccupations of the umshotsho boys... Family and 
local community loyalties will always be important, but the youth 
organisation adds new possibilities for self-identification with something 
wider, namely with the Red Xhosa 'nation. Youth visiting provides 
an outlet for the youthful urge to roam... supplements the total networks 
of relations between families, and the networks of political relations, by 
adding a new network independent of either. It also gives ego first-hand 
experience of the community of expectations that exists among his age 
-mates... By the lntlombi stage he has achieved effective self-identification 
as a member of a category that extends `from across the Bashee to 
across the Great Fish River. 20 
The Indlavini did not experience these forms of socialisation processes. They were not 
confined to specific areas like the Mtshotsho groups, and travelled considerable distances 
without experiencing the socialisation process attending a circumcision ritual. The Mayers 
suggest that 'Red' Xhosa had a form of Xhosa 'nation-hood' instilled In them through the 
19 P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth', Vol 1, p. 16. 20 Ibid, p. p. 18-19. 
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gradual socialisation process experienced by young men, which allowed controlled forms of 
aggression whilst gradually developing a sense of responsibility and a widening concept of 
'imagined community'. The Indlavini did not experience these forms of socialisation. 
Additionally they were subject to the influence of urban life-styles through their migrant labour 
experiences, without interpreting them through the moral prisms of either 'Red' ideology, 
which evolved the process of 'encapsulation', or mission education? ' As such, they developed 
their own form of identity which nevertheless drew upon facets of pre-colonial custom. Apart 
from adhering to bridewealth and property relationships, Indlavini also retained a strict 
hierarchy within each group, much as more traditionalist groupings exhibited. 22 However, 
discipline was much harsher, and violence for transgressions of association rules much more 
likely to include violence. Indlavini groups tended to be much more tightly knit organisations 
even than traditionalist 'Red' organisations. The Mayers found that rivalries between Indlavini 
associations often centred around one attempting to incorporate the other into its organisation. 
This contrasted with Mtshotsho groups in Eastern Cape areas which, although often indulging 
in inter-group rivalries and alliances, did not tend to completely assimilate the defeated party. 3 
Thus Indlavini associations covered wider areas than Mtshotsho groups. This suggests a 
tighter, but larger scale identity, without the socialisation process of the Eastern Cape 
Intlombe associations which aimed at reducing tendencies to violence. This fits with the 
widening of concepts of identity inherent in moral ethnicity. Additionally, the Indlavini studied 
by the Mayers were the only male associations which indulged in violence against elders 
directly, thus partly breaking with the concepts of hierarchy and reciprocity so important to pre- 
colonial societies and traditionalist groupings. 24 
Later studies of the Indlavini confirm this tighter bonding of group identity. 25 Education and 
experience of compound life had caused many young men to become increasingly impatient 
with traditionalist groupings in Pondoland during the 1920s, resulting in the formation of 
Indlavini associations in the next decade. The development of these groups seem to reflect 
an increasing debate about what it meant to be Mpondo, which is directly analogous to the 
debate inherent in moral ethnicity. The Mayers place primary stress on cultural factors in 
determining these forms of reformulated masculine rural identity, and, as will be examined 
later, circumcision rituals in other parts of Africa could lead to increased tendencies towards 
violence. More emphasis on wider socio-economic factors also might have broadened their 
research findings. These factors are examined in more depth in later sections. However, 
21 - -- See Chapters 1 and 2. 27 
-- P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth', Vol 2, Chapter 7. For hierarchies amongst more traditionalist associations 
see P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth', Vol 1, and Vol 2, Chapter 5. 23 P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth', Vol 2, Chapter 7, p. 179. Compare this to the Mtshotsho Eastern Cape 
associations in P. and I, Mayer, 'Self Organisation by Youth', Vol 1. 24 P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth', Vol 2, Chapter 7, p. 174, and p. p. 195-197. 25 
-- W. Beinart, 'The Origins of the Indlavini'. This paragraph is based largely on Beinart's findings. 
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their unpublished research is extremely valuable, especially in terms of demonstrating that 
ethnic identities are not simply imposed 'from above'. Rural African agency contributed 
significantly to the reformulation of gendered rural ethnic identities. Similar groups to the 
Indlavini manifested themselves in other African societies during the inter-war years, such as 
the amagxagxa on various Natal farms28 and a wide variety of organised urban male 
associations arose in and around Johannesburg and Durban during the early twentieth 
century? ' Similar societies were also apparent elsewhere in southern Africa. 8 Many youth 
groups began to lose their rural identifications in the later inter-war years, 29 but, as 
demonstrated by the Mayers, both the Indlavini and more traditionalist groupings survived into 
the 1960s and beyond. 
The Indlavini began to decline in the 1960s, gradually giving way to a new male sub-culture, 
the amenene, who were far more integrated into capitalist, urban society, and were rejecting 
rural ethnic identifications, as well as constructing a looser form of organisation. This resulted 
in considerable conflict with the Indlavini, again demonstrating that reformulations of identity 
30 
can often be the nexus for violence. By the 1970s, the Indlavini were in serious decline, as 
urbanisation and wage labour undermined rural identifications based on homestead patterns 
of life. It seems that the Indlavini were a rural form of identification marking a transitional 
stage between rural and urban forms of consciousness, generated by the process of migrant 
labour. The work of the Mayers demonstrates how important cultural factors are in 
determining these forms of identification, and how they relate to changing forms of 
masculinity, ethnicity and violence. These forms of identity also seem to have a wider 
relevance than just the Eastern Cape and Transkei regions in early to mid-twentieth century 
South Africa. 
8.2 Migrant Labour, Ethnic Faction Fights and The Pre-Colonial Connection. 
Migrant labour, which has been fundamental in forging South African identities, is of coursenot 
unique to South Africa. It has been a feature of many industrialising societies, signifying a 
move from rural to urban life and work. However, what is unique to southern Africa is its 
longevity, and it is perhaps in this context that the 'uniqueness' of South Africa's economic, 
social and identity development becomes most apparent. 31 Proletarianisation was hindered, 
26 
A. Vilikazi, Zulu Transformations. A Study of the Dynamics of Social Change, Pietermaritzburg, 1965. 27 C. Van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, Vol 2, New Nineveh, 
Johannesburg, 1982. 
28 L. Vail and L. White, Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique: A Study of Quelimane District, London, 1980. 29 See chapter 4. 
30 
M. O'Connell, 'Xesibe Reds, Rascals and Gentlemen'. Also P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth', Volt, Chapter 
7. 
31 For a useful introductory discussion of the effects of migrant labour upon rural life see W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South 
Africa. Oxford, 1994. P. P. 25-34. There is a huge literature concerning migrant labour which is too large to reproduce here. 
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and rural, ethnic identities subsequently survived in a reformulated fashion. A gap was left for 
African people to forge their own identities in the face of labour oppression. This is the 
paradox of South African industrial and capitalist development, and their attendant racist 
ideologies. The very fact of this oppression allowed Africans to forge their own identities and 
retain a measure of self-worth and integrity, although this in turn hindered the development of 
a more inclusive nationalist consciousness. 
Moodie's work which, like that of Beinart, moves beyond structural analyses and allows 
historical actors to speak for themselves, has focused particularly on how South African mine 
workers maintained a sense of self-worth in the hostile environments of the twentieth century 
South African gold mines. 2 He infers that crucial spaces for identity formations open up, 
which can manifest themselves in violent conflict, but are also available for an inclusive form 
of identity based on personal integrity, often centred around the upkeep of the umzi or 
homestead: 
When life-worlds are breaking down and others have not yet 
been constituted to take their place, identity formations become 
fragmented... The potential for deeply divisive social conflict 
increase. In practice, however, resourceful persons create lives 
of integrity together as they build new life-worlds out of fragments 
of the old. 33 
Beinart's life-history of 'M' further elucidates this argument. 'M', a Mpondo male who lived in 
the Bizana region bordering southern Natal, had received a smattering of education in his 
youth, but had to finish his education prematurely due to family circumstance. He thus gained 
employment on the Natal sugar estates around 1939/40, and from 1941 to 1947 was 
employed as a migrant labourer in the East Rand gold mines. It was through these jobs that 
'M' became involved in indlavini activities. 'M's smattering of education, and his experience of 
migrant compound life, reflected the 'type' of youth who tended to be most attracted to these 
forms of group identities. 
Although Beinart is cautious in relating these youth associations to a wider debate regarding 
the changing ethnic identities of Pondo youth, it does seem that it specifically relates to the 
concept of moral ethnicity espoused by Lonsdale. As 'M' became more firmly entrenched 
Beinart's bibliography is a useful indicator for further reading. For a full periodisation of ethnic identities and 'faction fights' 
on mining compounds see chapter 3. 32 See especially the following: D. Moodie and V. Ndatshe. Going For Gold'; 'The Moral Economy of the Black Miners' 
Strike of 1946'; 'Migrancy and Male Sexuality on the South African Gold Mines'; 'Social Existence and the Practice of 
Personal Integrity: Narratives of Resistance on the South African Gold Mines'. 33 D. Moodie and V. Ndatshe, Going For Gold, P. 42. 
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within the mining compound, he became involved with the criminal Isitshozi gangs which 
existed on the mine compounds from the 1920s to the 1940s. It is perhaps within these gangs 
that themes of ethnicity, 'ethnic' faction fighting, and reformulated masculinity are best 
exemplified. Crime and violence seem particularly important factors in the reformulations of 
ethnic identity on the mine compounds, especially during these years. The Isitshotzi seem to 
personify this phenomenon. Before examining their emergence however, changing concepts 
of male 'crime' and 'violence' in the wake of colonial capitalism need to be analysed, as they 
seem to provide the foundations for these reformulated identities. 
A central problem in analysing violence amongst males, both in pre-colonial, colonial and post- 
colonial times centres around what is exactly considered 'violent' by the historical actors 
themselves. The Mpondo who, as will be illustrated below, gained a reputation for violence, 
belligerence and criminality on the gold mine compounds during the inter-war years, often did 
not necessarily conceive of themselves as violent. Moodie and Ndatshe interviewed several 
ex-indlavini and amaqaba ('Red') Mpondo in the late 1980s, and specifically asked them if 
there was any connection between their concepts of Mpondo manhood (ubudoda) and 
violence. The interviewees denied categorically that strength in combat had anything to do 
with ubudoda. Rather the essence of manhood 'had to do with competent and benevolent 
management of the umzi, aiding in homestead decision-making, settling disputes, and 
generous sharing of homestead resources with guests and visitors'. 34 Migrant labour on the 
mines, furthermore, was perceived as a test for true manhood, in terms of staying power, 
consistency, solidarity and maintaining the homestead. Beinart's studies of Indlavinl 
disruptions of weddings in the 1930s and 1940s also found that the Indlavinl did not 
necessarily perceive of themselves as inherently violent 35 This relates to male socialisation 
processes which sanctioned controlled violence through, for example, stick-fights. 'Violence' 
and 'sport' seemed to merge. Novels and autobiographies of pre-colonial societies stress the 
socially sanctioned elements of violence inherent within them . 
36 The Mayers' work examined 
above also illustrates the continuance of socially sanctioned violence into colonial and 
apartheid times. 
Moodie records that both Setswana and Xhosa languages have two words for work, one for 
referring to working for wage labour and 'whites', and the other referring specifically to building 
the umzi or homestead 37 Furthermore, the Xhosa word for 'working for whites', pangela, 
originally meant to 'seize' or 'grab'. This 'provides linguistic support for the argument that 
migrant labour was seen by migrants in the early years as in their interests, as a seizing of 
34 D. Moodie and V. Ndatshe, Going For Gold, P. 38. 
35 W. Beinart, 'The Origins of the Indlavini, ' P. P. 118-119. 36 W. Beinart, 'Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography', P. P. 469-472. 37 D. Moodie and V. Ndatshe, Going for Gold, P. 24. 
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booty to maintain their ideal existence' 38 It also illustrates that African migrant labourers were 
not passive agents in the process of migrant labour, but reworked their own identities in order 
to accommodate their integration into the money economy. Furthermore, and following from 
this, it also seems reasonable to posit that, in some cases, 'criminality' may not have been 
perceived as such by all Africans, as they sought to define themselves within an oppressive 
environment. Rather, criminality could be interpreted as a way of resisting capitalist, and later 
apartheid, oppression . 
39 Additionally, this resistance could take the form of moral ethnicity. 
The Isitshotzi can be perceived in this light, although this in no way condones the extreme 
forms of violence in which they indulged. 
The Isitshotzi themselves evolved from both the mine and prison compound worlds. 40 They 
aimed to control allocation of jobs and sexual relationships through coercion and favours, 
usually consisting of stolen goods. The Isitshotzi also appear to have consisted mainly of 
Mpondo migrants, and therefore can perhaps be perceived as an organisation mobilised on an 
ethnicised basis in order to procure the best available living standards and opportunities in a 
harsh, oppressive environment, much as Sotho ethnic organisations on the mines in the first 
half of the twentieth century. 41 As with the Indlavini, the Isitshotzi adhered to a rigid 'moral' 
code. However, they differed in that they were not exclusively ethnic Mpondo based in terms 
of their membership, but also recruited from non-Mpondo criminals. This fact could account 
for the increased hierarchical nature and violence of the rural indlavini gangs in the 1950s, for 
Mpondo youth were recruited by Isitshotzi organisations, although there is no evidence to 
suggest that Isitshotzi culture permeated back into the rural areas, unlike the Indlavini culture 
which bridged both worlds. 2 The Isitshotzi could in fact be perceived as a further 
reformulation of Mpondo identity as men were further integrated into the mine migrant labour 
world. The Isitshotzi also bridge the gap between ethnically based compound groupings, and 
the emergence of urban-based, criminal, non-ethnic tsotsi gangs. For the opposition of other 
workers and mine management to the presence of Isitshotzi gangs, due to their tendency to 
participate in murder and attempts to control homosexual relationships, led increasingly to 
their expulsion from the mine compounds by the end of the 1930s, and their subsequent 
merging into the criminal 'underworld' of urban life. 43 Therefore, they may not only represent a 
38 Ibid. 
39 See also C. Van Onselen, 'The Regiment of the Hills-Umkosi Wezintaba: The Witwatersrand's Lumpenproletarian Army, 
1890-1920', in C. Van Onselen, Studies in the Economic and Social History, Vol 2. In a series of unpublished interviews with 
Xhosa speaking people during the 1960s P. Qayiso-one of the Mayer's chief field work assistants-also records a very 
interesting response from a teacher who argues along exactly the same lines. See P. Qayiso, 'Xhosa Morality', Unpublished 
Paper, MS 16891/5, Cory Library, Rhodes University, p. 41. 40 For an in-depth discussion of the emergence and decline of the Isttshotzi in the inter-war years see K. Breckenridge. 
'Migrancy, Crime and Faction Fighting'. Also W. Beinart, 'Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism and Nationalism'. 41 See, for example, J. Guy and M. Thabane, 'Technology, Ethnicity and Ideology: Basotho Miners and Shaft-Sinking on the 
South African Gold Mines', JSAS, Vol 14, No 2,1988. 
42 -_ -- .- K. Breckenridge, 'Migrancy, Crime and Faction Fighting'. P. 75. Al 
'" Ibid. P. P. 75-76. Sexuality, which was and is also central to masculine concepts of ethnic identities, is analysed in chapter 7. 
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reformulation of ethnic identity, but also a gradual erosion of rural ethnic ties. Breckenridge 
argues that the Isitshotzi provided a worldview and structure to some Mpondo migrants. 
Additionally, although not all Mpondo migrants were involved in Isitshotzi criminal activities, 
'they played an important role in shaping perceptions of the Mpondo among management, 
state officials and particularly other workers. When the mineworkers complained of Isitshotzi 
behaviour they did not separate them from the wider ranks of Mpondo workers'. 44 Ethnic 
stereotypes of Mpondos as 'wild' and 'belligerent' were thus reinforced, and led to the 
construction of other ethnic groupings on the mine compounds. Therefore the crime and 
violence perpetrated by the Isitshotzi can perhaps be partly viewed as a form of resistance to 
the oppressive and violent conditions of compound life (once the Isitshotzi had penetrated the 
compounds), albeit understood by the historical actors involved in a vague and ill-defined 
manner. 
The process of mine management ethnic stereotyping, changes in the ethnic composition of 
the mine workforce, and how this contributed to ethnic faction fights have already been 
periodised and analysed. However, the widespread presence of male violence in both pre- 
colonial rural societies, on mine compounds, and (as will be analysed later) In the period of 
'unrest' in the late 1980s; all of which involved ethnic identification, suggests additional 
causes of male violence. The link between violence and male identity would also seem to 
allow further insights into the linkage between 'passive', cultural ethnicities and the more 
politicised versions which arose from the impact of colonial capitalism. This immediately 
raises the questions of what exactly ethnicity is, and can 'passive' ethnicity be conceptually 
analysed, as the historical actors living it on a day to day basis may well not be conscious of 
this identity in an ethnic sense. However, if 'passive' ethnic identities are accepted as a reality 
in the lives of Africans, and indeed elsewhere in the world, this could perhaps go some way in 
explaining the male penchant for collective violent behaviour in some contexts. Furthermore, 
it could further elucidate the link between ethnic culture brokers of a politically tribalist bent, 
and the availability of people in responding positively to their divisive, conflictual message. 
Migrant labourers interwove their experiences of migrant mine labour with their concepts of 
manhood rooted around the umzi. Songs and stories reflected this accommodation of migränt 
labour into male concepts of integrity. Migrant cultures 'came alive in such narratives as 
quests, epics of resistance to proletarianization built into the very self-formation of black 
mineworkers' 45 Traditional Xhosa had rituals of departure for the mines46 Only with the 
44 Ibid. P. 78. 
45 _ __ _. - U. Moodie, Going For Gold, P. 30. 
46 
.- See especially the following works by P. McAllister: 'Work, Homestead and the Shades: the Ritual Interpretation of Labour Migration Among the Gcaleka', in P. Mayer (ed), Black Villagers in an Industrial Society, Oxford, 1980, and 'Using Ritual to Resist Domination', in A. Spiegel and P. McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1991. 
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gradual erosion of migrant labour, and the increasing proletarianisation of the mine workforce, 
did this form of male identity slowly disappear, and it was at this juncture that violence often 
broke out 47 Indeed the Kriges, in their study of 1930s rural Lovedu society, argued that 
migrant labour had very little effect on the customs and culture of the Lovedu 48 Interestingly, 
the Kriges observed that one of the reasons for the negligible impact of migrant labour in 
Lovedu culture was the pivotal role of women both in the public as well as the homestead 
sphere, something which did not exist in many other South African societies. This again 
demonstrates that different African societies responded differently in terms of cultural 
adjustment with the impact of migrant labour, segregation and capitalist penetration. The 
piecemeal urbanisation of African peoples, which continued despite the oppressive nature of 
apartheid policy and the attempts at 'separate development' through the 'Homelands' system, 
also contributed to male violence, as rural concepts of masculinity, rooted In the umzl and 
patriarchal relations, came under increasing threat in a fast changing socio-economic climate. 
Violence often became the response to this threat to rural male integrity because of male 
concepts of self-worth which date back before the impact of colonialism and capitalism. 
Indeed, concepts of male self-worth and integrity are central themes of anthropological works 
concerned with analysing African societies in the 1960s, and these provide interesting Insights 
into the threat to masculine identities, the violent' response to which becomes Increasingly 
apparent, often in an ethnicised sense, during the period of insurrection throughout the 1980s. 
8.3 Male Self-Worth, Gender and Morality: The Breakdown of Rural Consciousness 
Circa. 1950s-1970s 
The challenge to concepts of self-worth originating in rural areas was becoming Increasingly 
apparent by the 1960s. Educated and politically aware urban Africans, although in a minority, 
were beginning to reject rural values. However, as Kuper notes in his study of 1960s Durban, 
'ideological rejection of tribal values and identification is by no means equivalent to exorcism, 
and there is ample evidence of the persistence of tribal divisions in intertribal situations'. 49 He 
refers, amongst other examples, to friction between Sotho and Zulu students at the Ohlange 
Institute at Inanda which resulted in violent confrontations. 'Transvaal students referred to the 
Natal Zulu students as amabari (barbarians); the Natal students retaliated with the name 
osiyazi (know-ails). Local residents apparently armed the Natal students, and, on their arrest, 
threatened to burn down the school' S0 It is difficult to conceptualise this form of violence as 
arising from the manipulations of ethnic culture brokers. Sotho, Zulu and Xhosa also 
verbalised their animosity in terms of deriding each others' 'manhood'. Kuper records the 
47 See chapter 3. AR 
E. J. and J. D. Krige, The Realm of a Rain Queen: A Study of the Pattern of Lovedu Society, Oxford, 1965, P. 323. 49 
so 
L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa, London, 1965, P. 86. so Ibid, P. 87. 
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experiences at a Presbyterian Mission School of a postgraduate student at the University of 
Natal, who illustrates this point: 
The predominant group was Sotho and the groups used 
derogatory words about each other. Zulus used the word 
'isilwane , meaning an animal, Sothos used the word 'letebele' 
about the Zulus. The Zulus themselves were few. The Xhosas 
referred to the Zulus as 'inkwenkwe, that is to say, one who 
has not been circumcised, or in other words, equivalent to a 
dog. 51 
It is interesting to note the constant deriding of various peoples' 'manhood', and the fact that 
the ethnic stereotyping could often take the form of perceived rural-urban divisions. The Zulu 
in particular were stereotyped as ethnocentric, tribal and submissive to authority. 52 The 
deriding of people perceived as rural and unsophisticated took place In other areas of South 
Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. The Eastern Cape provides one such example. Ntsebeza 
refers to the bullying of rural youth by tsotsi gangs in East London in the 1950s. This 
provoked two differing responses from the former. They either totally refused to integrate into 
urban areas, reinforcing ties to rural bases and remaining within their own circle of 'home- 
friends', 53 or they became like the tsotsis themselves, often becoming more violent than the 
originals. 54 This suggests a reformulation of 'manhood' in two senses; either reinforcing rural 
concepts of masculinity rooted in the umzi ('selective traditionalism') which bases itself on 
considerable restraint in refusing integration into urban life, or a complete liberation from this 
way of life by taking up the life of a tsotsi. As Ntsebeza notes, this latter approach Is marked 
by an exaggeration of violence, as if the young men involved have to prove their 'manhood' by 
outdoing their new companions. Although this does not relate directly to ethnic violence, there 
are parallels. As I have already argued, the socialisation process of rural Xhosa is Integral to 
a 'passive' cultural ethnic identity, and the abandonment of this identity, at least in this 
example, was marked by a violent transformation. This is also reflected in the various 
reformulations of masculine identities in rural areas at different times - such as the Indlavini 
and amenene. It seems that reformulations of rural masculinities (due to migrant labour and 
the disjointed manner in which urban values gradually permeated), often rooted In cultural 
ethnic identities, play a major part in ethnic, and other forms, of male dominated violence. 
This is also apparent in the violent conflicts which erupted in the 1980s/90s. 
51 Ibid, P. P. 86-87. 
52 Ibid, P. 88. 
53 _- __ See P. Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, Esp. chap. 5. U 
L. Ntsebeza, Youth in Urban African Townships, P. P. 30-48. 
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Generational tensions and crises in masculinity were a continual occurrence throughout the 
twentieth century, as outlined above. Qayiso found that many of his Xhosa respondents made 
indirect references to the erosion of perceived notions of masculinity in the early 1960s. His 
interview with a 67 year old 'Red' Xhosa male is particularly illuminating, demonstrating as it 
does the deep sense of loss with respect to the erosion of patriarchal authority: 
My wife should not know all my thoughts because as soon 
as she knows what I'think' (my personality) she will 'lawula' 
(rule or control) me. It was never meant that a woman should 
rule a man. That never happened in the times of our forbears. 
I have no 'ubuncoko' (holding conversations) with a woman 
when I am at home. 'Ubuncoko' (holding conversations) with 
women makes them despise you. 55 
Hammond-Tooke's general overview of Southern African peoples' moral universes expounds 
upon this perceived need for social distance between men and women: 
The importance of lineage solidarity is reflected in the husband 
-wife relationship. It is somehow thought wrong for a man to be 
too closely involved with his wife, as this may conflict with his 
loyalty to his kinsmen. Husband and wife do not spend their 
leisure time together (men and women are segregated at beer 
drinks and other functions) and a man who walks beside his 
spouse or shows too much affection for her in public is suspected 
of being bewitched. This cluster of moral prescriptions... is based 
on the values of kin solidarity and fertility. 58 
Qayiso's respondent continues with a comparison between male values of his time and those 
of former times, linking the differences to the contraction of the homestead: 
They were ever carrying weapons and women would never 
dream of ruling their husbands then. The homesteads of today 
are no longer as big as they used to be then, when any man 
who appeared to be under the petticoat government would be 
rebuked thus: why don't you thrash this woman? In those days 
55 _-. __ F. Qayiso, 'Xhosa Morality', P. 47. 
56 W. D. Hammond-Tooke. 'World-View Two: A System of Action', in W. D. Hammond-Tooke (ed), The Bantu-speaking 
Peoples of Southern Africa, London, 1974. For an in-depth analysis of how'Red' and 'School' Xhosa differed in their 
approaches to increasing (if severely circumscribed) opportunities for female independence (itself a result of migrant labour 
processes) see P. Mayer's Townsmen or Tribesmen, passim. 
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there would be a number of men with their wives living together 
in the same homestead. Today things are different. The wife 
knows how to rule her husband. 57 
The patriarchal authority which men enjoyed in the pre-colonial extended homestead was thus 
disappearing, and this caused a crisis of masculinity for older males. Moreover, the economic 
precariousness of the homestead in the 1960s - due to the discriminatory measures of the 
apartheid government and the process of migrant labour - not only undermined male authority 
and modified male roles, but also boosted up the independence of their sons to the extent that 
the position of older males became economically insecure within the homestead itself. 
Qayiso's above respondent elaborates: 
If today you should sell a beast without consulting your wife first, 
she might report you to her sons and tell them that you are finishing 
the stock. Sometimes the stock or some of it belongs to the sons 
and if you do not want to listen and heed their advice, they might tell 
you never to touch it again without their knowledge. If the father ignores 
this warning the sons would tell him 'siya kukavalela ngendlala' (literally, 
we will shut you up in starvation) in this homestead. They would leave 
the father and build up their own homesteads, and since the father 
sold most of the stock he would be left with nothing with which to plough 
the fields when they take the stock away. The wife might elect to live 
with the son she loves best. Every man fears this because they might 
even stop sending him money but leave him to suffer. 58 
Male grievances and anger are very apparent in Qayiso's interviews, and are also readily 
perceived in published anthropological studies emanating from the same period. Berglund, 
whose work is based on a study of a particular Zulu rural community in the late 1950s/early 
1960s, argues that themes of male anger, fertility and restraint/control provide key concepts 
for gaining an understanding of the thinking of rural Zulu men 59 For example, he argues that 
the Zulu are unanimous 'that the power of fertility is a very great power in a man. Because of 
its potency and exalted position in society it has to be controlled... "If it is let loose it can kill a 
man"` 60 Furthermore anger, like fertility, is argued to be perceived by Zulu as 'innate to the 
57 P. Qayiso, 'Xhosa Morality', MS 16891/5. P. 48. 
58 Ibid. P. P. 49-50. Many other male respondents to Qayiso's interviews, especially from 'Red' Xhosa communities, 
expressed similar grievances. 59 A. Berglund, Zulu Thought Patterns and Symbolism, London, 1976. 60 Ibid, p. 254. 
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lineage and clan, and peculiar to each individual member of the lineage. Like fertility, the 
power which expresses itself in anger is a characteristic of men. "If men did not have anger, 
they would not be men" '. 61 According to Berglund, the perceived power inherent in fertility and 
anger entailed the need for strict social rules and regulations, for example the regulation of 
sexual relations. This enabled the perceived 'primordial' characteristics to be controlled B2 The 
Mayers' work on male socialisation processes in the Eastern Cape during the 1960s made 
similar findings, their oral informants arguing that young men are aggressive by Instinct, and 
that socialisation processes are required to channel these emotions. 
Xhosa hold that boys are naturally pugnacious, 'like dogs', and 
'always like to settle things by the stick. To that extent (they 
suggest) boyish fights and battles are to be tolerantly ignored, 
within very broad limits. -However, with the attainment of 
manhood the fighting urge is supposed to be sublimated... Adults 
expounding on the merits of youth organisations seldom forgot to 
mention that umshotsho stick playing is good, 'inter alia , because 
it allows boys to exhaust their natural urge to fight. 63 
Themes of man-hood, anger, restraint and sexuality were central to many rural African 
communities during the 1950s and 1960s, as indeed they were throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Circumcision rituals and socialisation processes played a part in 
channelling these emotions through marking the entry into a particular constructed concept of 
man-hood, as illustrated above. However, these rituals could exacerbate violent tendencies 
as well. In her study of the Gisu of East Africa, Heald comments that Gisu pre-colonial ethnic 
identity was centred around their concept of man-hood, which itself was indistinguishable from 
the ritual of male circumcision" This particular articulation between masculinity, ethnic 
identity and circumcision remained at the time of her study In the 1960s. Heald relates these 
socialisation processes to the widespread reputation of the Gisu for violence. She specifically 
refers to the Gisu concept of Iirima. 65 This is perceived as a pre-eminently manly quality, and 
manifests itself as a violent emotion which overwhelms a man and can become uncontrollable. 
Heald stresses the contradictory liberatory and restraining elements of rural Gisu society, 
elements which are often involved in ethnic violence. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid, p. p. 258-270. 
63 
P. and I. Mayer, 'Self-Organisation by Youth'. Vol 1. n. 55. 64 1 
S. Heald, Controlling Anger: The Sociology of Gisu Violence, Manchester, 1989, p. p. 18-19. Also see S. Heald, 'The Ritual 
Use of Violence: Circumcision among the Gisu of Uganda', in D. Riches (ed), The Anthropology of Violence, Oxford, 1986. 65 S. Heald, Controlling Anger, Chapter 3, and S. Heald, 'The Ritual Use of Violence', passim. 
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For the Gisu, who do not think of reason and emotion as 
opposed modalities embattled within the personality, 'lirima' 
can not only be volitional but an aspect of the control a man 
should assert over himself and the world, a quality or 
capacity to be mustered by the individual to achieve or serve 
his purposes. If a man can be in the grip of'lirima' he can 
use it to steel himself too. In this way 'lirima' not only has 
negative but also forceful and positive connotations, the force 
behind that strength of character which makes men 
66 courageous and determined. 
Furthermore, lirima was found to be central to the overcoming of fear of the circumcision ritual, 
as it is at this time that boys are perceived to first display this emotion. Heald states that 
thereafter the emotion is 'as much a part of his manhood as the circumcision cuts 
themselves' 67 
There are interesting comparisons and contrasts to be made between Gisu concepts of anger, 
manhood and the perpetration of violence, and those of South African communities, such as 
the Zulu and Mpondo. Mpondo males had gained a reputation for violent behaviour on mine 
compounds through the course of the twentieth century. 68 A recent research project which 
explored the connections between Mpondo conceptions of manhood and violence, found that 
older men, whether ind/avini or traditionalist, strongly denied that strength in combat had 
anything to do with manhood 69 Rather it centred around the competent management of the 
umzi, or homestead, settling disputes amicably and sharing resources with guests. 'The 
mines were a testing ground for true manhood, manifested in presiding over a rural 
homestead'. 0 Similarly the Gisu, whose communities exhibited a high percentage of individual 
male violence in the 1960s, did not conceive of violence as a positive statement of the 
achievement of manhood. At the end of the circumcision rituals, elders strictly admonished 
initiates to use their adult status to upkeep their homestead wisely, and not to indulge in 
violent behaviour. 71 Ritual admonishments in southern African communities during the 1960s 
and after reflected similar concerns. 72 
66 S. Heald, Controlling Anger, p. 59. 
67 ... _ -- lbld, p. 60. 
FA 
_" See above. Also D. Moodie, 'Ethnic Violence on South African Gold Mines'. 
69 _ __ -- U. Moodie, Going For Gold, p. 37. The references to Mpondo men in the rest of this section draws heavily on this work. 70 Ibid, p. 38. 
S. Heald, The Ritual Use of Violence', p. 81. 72 For example see the following: P. and I. Mayer, 'Socialisation by Peers: The Youth Organisation of the Red Xhosa'; P. 
McAllister, 'Using Ritual to Resist Domination in the Transkei', in A. Spiegel and P. McAllister (eds), Tradition and 
Transition. 
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Many Gisu were very concerned about the prevalence of individual violence and murder within 
their communities, but approached it in terms of an almost fatalistic acceptance. 'After a 
murder a commonly voiced sentiment was not just that the killer was a bad man but that the 
Gisu were just bad people and what could one do? This capacity for violence is attributed to 
lirima. r73 As has been demonstrated, Zulu, Xhosa and Mpondo rural communities in the 1960s 
also linked the capacity for male anger and violence to inherent biological and psychological 
traits. 74 
Nevertheless, there are contrasts between these communities. Both Zulu and Mpondo men 
do not circumcise, and yet migrant labourers from both ethnic communities gained a 
reputation for collective violence through the course of the twentieth century75 It is also 
interesting that Mpondo men argued that anger was not an inherent part of their conception of 
man-hood, in complete contrast to Berglund's respondents. 76 It is therefore worth exploring 
psychological factors, and how these may have linked up with changing socialisation 
processes, themselves set within a changing socio-economic context. 
8.4 Psychology, Male Violence and Ethnicised Consciousness. 
Fanon's concept of a Manichean psychology underlying human violence and oppression 
provides some theoretical insights into the nature of violence and ethnicised consciousness, 
despite being primarily concerned with the development of a violent anti-colonial nationalism. 
Fanon argues that the presence of the 'coloniser' in the land of the 'colonised', and the 
oppressive rule of the former over the latter, produces a Manichean psychology which 
buttresses colonial rule through psychological oppression. Everything is divided into 
dichotomised opposites, to the advantage of the coloniser, and the disadvantage of the 
colonised. This duality permeates the very value systems of both. 'The oppressor identifies 
himself in terms of the sublime and beauty while depicting the oppressed in terms of absolute 
evil and ugliness... On his part the oppressed assumes his role in the Manichean psychology 
thrust upon him'. " However, this acceptance of psychological oppression hides an underlying 
73 S. Heald, 'The Ritual Use of Violence', p. 73- 
74 It is interesting that both the Gisu studied by Heald, and the Zulu studied by Berglund, located the seat of anger and violent 
emotions in the throat ('The Ritual Use of Violence', p. 71, Zulu Thought Patterns, p. p. 255-256). Berglund found that death by 
strangling was therefore considered a very serious offence, due to the fact that, because anger was inherent in a man, it was a 
direct attack on his human dignity. 
75 See chapter 5 for an examination of the significance of tha lack of circumcision in terms of shaping male Zulu identity, and 
its possible connections to outbreaks of ethnicised collective violence. 76 This differentiation may partially be due to differences in interviewing techniques between Moodie and Ndatshe on the one 
hand, and Berglund and his assistants on the other. However, the difference is striking, and illustrates the diverse array of 
constructed rural masculinities amongst black South Africans. 77 H. Bulhan, Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression, London, 1985, p. 141. The key text in which Fanon develops 
this theory is The Wretched of the Earth, New York, 1965. This chapter is primarily concerned with the explanatory value of 
Fanon's theory regarding the relationship between male violence and ethnicised consciousness. Readers are advised to consult 
the latter text for the wider context of Fanon's work on violence and nationalism. 
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violent rage amongst the colonised, which is denied an outlet due to the dominance of the 
colonial power. The self-worth of the colonised is undermined through this process of 
psychological dehumanisation, and results in the eruption of violence within the community of 
the colonised, being the only available outlet for pent-up resentment and aggression. 
The settler keeps alive in the native an anger which he 
deprives of outlet; the native is trapped in the tight links 
of the chains of colonialism. but... inwardly the settler 
can only achieve a pseudo petrification. The native's 
muscular tension finds outlet regularly In bloodthirsty 
explosions - in tribal warfare, in feuds between sects, 
and in quarrels between individuals. 78 
Fanon refers to this form of violent psychological release as 'displaced aggression'. This has 
some theoretical value in terms of explaining the outbreak of ethnic faction fights on mine 
compounds, and in rural and urban areas. For mine management and colonial administrators 
did attempt to manipulate identities in order to perpetrate colonial rule and ensure a quiescent 
labour force. However, as has also been demonstrated, violence did not originate solely from 
the imposition of colonialism. Pre-colonial African communities were no strangers to violent 
behaviour, and channelled forms of violence were part of many African male socialisation 
processes, which in turn shaped particular forms of collective rural identities. Fanon can also 
be criticised for assuming that anti-colonial nationalism was an inevitable end stage In societal 
development. Nevertheless, his concept of the potential liberatory aspects of violence offers 
potential insights into the relationship between ethnicised consciousness, the breakdown of 
rural identities, and male violence. 
As has been illustrated, the reformulation of male socialisation processes, in rural, compound 
and urban areas, were often marked by (sometimes partially condoned) outbreaks of violent 
behaviour in the first half of the twentieth century. Structural economic, political and social 
change were intrinsic to these outbreaks, but this does not in itself completely explain why 
violence, often in an ethnicised form, occurred. The threat to self-worth, stressed by Fanon 
and implied in the examples above, allows a deeper analysis which takes into account the 
psychological upheavals of these changes, especially in the context of the threat to rural forms 
of masculine identity. Horowitz similarly emphasises the importance of self-worth in shaping 
ethnic conflict. He dismisses the argument, posited by Marxist historians of the 1970s, that it 
was simply the result of manipulations by elites intent on pursuing their own political 
78 F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 43. 
203 
agendas 79 Rather, the threat to self-worth emanating from a dominant ethnic group entails an 
erosion of self-esteem amongst the non-dominant group, and an introspective questioning by 
the latter concerning their moral code and world-view. 
Since the individual sense of identity is the feeling of 
being a worthy person because he fits into a coherent 
and valued order of things, ego identity depends heav- 
ily on affiliations. A threat to the value of those affilia- 
tions produces anxiety and defense. For this reason, 
people often express hostility towards those who create 
uncertainty about the correctness of their own behaviour 
and that of the groups to which they belong, and they 
often do so out of all proportion to the character of the 
threat that presently confronts them 8° 
This can be applied in a qualified manner to the proliferation of rural identities examined 
above, themselves an example of the moral ethnic debate. Although the communities did not 
respond 'out of all proportion to the character of the threat' to their identities, the growth of 
different male associations, themselves a reformulation of ethnic identities, were marked by 
violence and conflict, as people increasingly debated the value of their moral universes in the 
face of colonial and capitalist penetration. 
Horowitz also connects this concept of violent conflict, emanating from cultural rather than 
political factors, to the political realm. 
If the need to feel worthy is a fundamental human require- 
ment, it is satisfied in considerable measure by belonging to 
groups that are in turn regarded as worthy. Like individual 
self-esteem, collective self-esteem is achieved largely by 
social recognition. Everywhere, but especially in developing 
countries, where the sphere of politics is unusually broad 
and its impact powerful, collective social recognition is con- 
ferred by political affirmation. For this reason, struggles 
over relative group worth are readily transferred to the political 
system 81 
79 See chapter 2. 
RA 
-- D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, London, 1985, p. 181. 81 Ibid, p. 185. 
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Social identity theory, a branch of social psychology developed in the 1970s, also suggests 
that people need to identify with a group or collectivity in order to meet their needs and 
increase their self-esteem. Membership of these groups shapes and limits the behavioural 
options of its individual members, providing 'recipes for living'. 82 
This can be related to the politicised political tribalism which became increasingly apparent 
amongst black communities as the twentieth century progressed. As patriarchal authority and 
institutions such as the chieftaincy were central to many pre-colonial societies, and the 
chieftaincy itself was manipulated first by colonial administrators and later by apartheid social 
engineers, their symbolism became increasingly important in terms of representing the moral 
order of the communities concerned within a more specifically political arena. This may have 
suited the agendas of political elites and institutionalised racism, but it also resonated with the 
requirements and fears of those who were facing severe challenges to their moral order and 
way of life. Reformulated identities which earlier in the twentieth century hardly distinguished 
between the cultural and the political were now becoming increasingly politicised. Patriarchal 
authority was being more comprehensively challenged, and the anger and resentment felt by 
men was becoming more conspicuous. 
The erosion of the rural patriarchal order, and the consequent rising resentment amongst 
mainly rural migrant men, seems to have had a considerable effect on male constructed 
gender roles. Mpondo men interviewed in 1988 perceived man-hood and woman-hood in 
markedly different ways, and these differences were divided. in terms of generation 83 Older 
Mpondo men, who had worked as migrant labourers in the gold mines during the mid- 
twentieth century, agreed that ubododa (the Mpondo concept of the essence of man-hood, 
centred around the upkeep of the umzi) could also be inherent in women. This reflected the 
fact that many women in this period looked after the rural homesteads in the absence of 
husbands working on the mines. These older men still believed in patriarchal authority, but as 
they defined man-hood morally rather than biologically, there was no contradiction in the 
argument that women could possess ubododa. However, the gradual proletarianisation of the 
workforce, together with the massive resettlement schemes of the 1960s and the growth of 
rural slums, meant that women found it nearly impossible to upkeep the umzi. They became 
increasingly reliant on men's wages, and the complementary gender roles of earlier 
generations were eroded. 
(F)or the present generation of Mpondo, maleness and female- 
82 D. Abrams and M. Hogg, Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances, London, 1990. The term 'recipes for 
living' is drawn from C. Campbell, 'Learning to Kill? Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal', JSAS, Vol 18, No 3, 1992, p. 615. 83 This section is based on D. Moodie, Going For Gold, p. p. 37-41 
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ness have been dichotomized again. The suggestion that women 
might have ubododa is categorically denied, if not ridiculed.. Ubododa 
... denoted 
biological maleness and ubufazi (womanhood) biological 
femaleness. 84 
Divisions were thus occurring in both gender and generational terms, but within a new context 
of increasing proletarianisation. The proliferation of fluid, processual identities (moral 
ethnicity) which emerged from the migrant labour process were being eroded. This could 
produce a longing for a return of the moral code of past rural communities amongst older men, 
and a greater potential for support of ethnic entrepreneurs of a politically tribalist bent. The 
anger and frustration produced amongst older men, who adhered to remnants of old value 
systems and identities which were being increasingly challenged, could result in domestic and 
ethnicised violence, as the next section explores. Psychological analyses seem to offer useful 
insights into this aspect of ethnicised consciousness. 
8.5 Masculinity, Ethnicised Conflict and the Demise of the Apartheid State 
The 1984-6 insurrections, the rise of the UDF and opposing right-wing vigilantes, and the 
eventual demise of the apartheid state signalled a new stage in terms of violent conflict in 
South Africa. Outbreaks of violence in Natal from the mid-1980s onwards have been 
responsible for the deaths of approximately 6000 people, and these conflicts transferred 
themselves to the industrial heartland of the Rand in the early 1990s where, in July and 
August 1990, more than 500 Africans were killed in a matter of days. Although the 
responsibility for these events remains an area of debate, 'it seems clear that Inkatha 
supporters, mobilised around a specific Zulu ethnic identity, have been the source of most of 
the aggression' 85 The fomenting of violence by elements in the army and police is now 
beyond question, and the reification of Zulu militarism and political tribalist tendencies of ethnic 
culture brokers such as Mangosuthu Buthelezi were also indispensable elements in this mass 
suffering. However, these two elements alone do not explain why people were available for 
perpetrating these atrocities. Chapter four has explored the social, economic and political 
elements which contributed to the mobilisation of peoples towards violence, but these 
explanations in themselves also fall short of a complete explanation of why people (mostly 
men) partake in these extreme forms of violence. An approach which examines the 
84 Ibid, p. 41. RS 
-- S. Marks. 'The Origins of Ethnic Violence in South Africa', in N. Etherington (ed), Peace. Politics and Violence in the New 
South Africa, London, 1992, P. 122. 
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psychological threat to male concepts of masculinity seems to offer further explanatory 
88 insights. This in turn relates to male socialisation processes. 
Campbell has recently explored the connections between changing gender and generational 
relationships in working class Zulu families' and the tendency of older males to support the 
more violent activities of Inkatha. Drawing on the discipline of social psychology, and 
especially social identity theory, she argues that older males were losing their 'traditional' 
authority in the family and in the community - twin pivots of masculine identity, as illustrated 
above - and were seeking to replace it through affiliating with Inkatha. 
67 In tandem with the 
findings of radical historians in the 1970s and 1980s, Campbell refers to the fact that apartheid 
and capitalism limited the power of working class men in the wider community, but they still 
retained power within the family. However, increasing unemployment and low wages were 
leading to the undermining of their socially defined role as breadwinner by the 1980s, and 
Campbell found that women and young members of the family tended to look down upon men 
who were unable to provide for the family by their income alone. Furthermore young people 
were increasingly dominating community decision making and the shaping of community 
opinion, a role previously the sole preserve of older males. 
This was not a phenomenon exclusive to Zulu people, or indeed to the 1980s. Campbell's 
1980s study transfers this crisis in masculinity onto a more specifically urban context. Here, 
with the nuclear family becoming more and more the norm, and rural ties being further eroded, 
the challenge to prior patriarchal relationships is even more pronounced. It is also more 
specifically class based, with more and more Africans relying solely on wage labour at a time 
of increasing unemployment and poverty. Campbell's use of social identity theory leads her to 
conclude that there were three ways that men sought to reassert themselves in this particular 
period of crisis in masculinity. Some older men sought doggedly to reassert their authority 
and what they believed were their rights in the family by recourse to domestic violence; others 
withdrew from their family and sought to reassert their 'manhood' through extra-marital affairs 
and heavy drinking (although this behaviour was not confined to the 1980s. Similar tendencies 
were apparent among men many decades before); thirdly, (as stated above) and directly 
relevant to the violence in 1980s Natal, she argues that the behavioural option of violence 'as 
a socially sanctioned. "recipe for living"' opened up opportunities for a reassertion of male 
dominance. 'The opening up of the political arena to grassroots working class people, 
particularly over the last five years, has created an important space for the reassertion of male 
dominance via the current emphasis on violence as a means of solving political conflicts' 88 
86 There are of course many other examples of ethnicised violence in this period which did/do not involve the Zulu Inkatha 
movement. However, an examination of Zulu male concepts of masculinity seem to offer a particularly rich field in exploring 
male tendencies to violent behaviour in an ethnicised sense. 87 C. Campbell. 'Learning to Kill? Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal', JSAS, Vol 18, No 3,1992. 88 C. Campbell. 'Masculinity, the Family and the Current Natal Violence', P. 623. 
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Due to the ahistorical nature of Campbell's article she does not fully explore the reasons why 
violence so readily became an option for masculine reassertion in a particular historical 
context, only referring briefly to the fact that social science literature often refers to the role of 
male socialisation processes in the family as contributing to male tendencies to violence 89 
However, the socialisation processes referred to above, which span the entire twentieth 
century, demonstrate that reformulated socially sanctioned male violence was very much a 
part of African societies. There is a vast primary source literature which refers to the 
prevalence of masculine socially sanctioned violence, often towards women, in pre-colonial, 
and early colonial, southern African societies (although these have to be read with caution, 
containing as they do the ingrained prejudices of the mostly European authors who, as 
mentioned above, often portrayed Africans as intrinsically violent and 'barbaric'). 90 However, 
this is only part of the story. Moodie's theoretical conceptualisation of migrant labourers' 
concepts of male integrity and self-worth brings out the very different ways that male and 
female roles were conceptualised in rural African societies compared to 'westernised' 
individualist and feminist approaches to the subject. This is not to reduce the argument to a 
cultural relativist standpoint, nor is it to condone the violence perpetrated by some African men 
towards some African women. Rather, it is to demonstrate that gender relationships were 
understood in a different idiom to that of industrialised societies, and that this relationship was 
central to the formation of masculine and feminine identities, subsequently being both 
threatened and reinforced by male and female socialisation processes. As mentioned earlier, 
many migrant labourers centred their identity in the first half of the twentieth century largely 
around 'building the umzi'. Women were an indispensable element in the perpetuation of 
these concepts of manhood, for they looked after the umzi in the absence of male migrant 
labourers. Thus male constructions of masculinity and femininity were centred around 
cultural, not biological factors. 
This reciprocal, if patriarchal, relationship seems to have broken down with the gradual 
erosion of migrant labour, and the increasing reliance upon permanent wage labour, in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Women and young men took advantage of this erosion 
of rural patriarchal values, and this is particularly evident in the attitudes towards education. 
Brandet-Syrier found that mothers were central figures in encouraging their sons to continue in 
89 Ibid. P. 625. 
90 'Cetshwayo's Evidence', especially pages 65-72, provides a useful insight into the socially sanctioned violence towards 
women in the late nineteenth century Zulu state. The evidence of John Kumalo, in C. Webb and J. Wright The James Stuart 
Archive of Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and Neighbouring Peoples. Vol. 1, Pietermaritzburg, 
1976, is also particularly illuminating in this respect. Also see A. Booth. "'European Courts Protect Women and Witches": 
Colonial Law Courts as Redistributers of Power in Swaziland 1920-1950', JSAS, Vol 18, No 2,1992. Booth's article is also 
useful in demonstrating the ambiguous nature of womens' position in Swaziland as pre-colonial patriarchal controls were 
challenged only to be replaced by new constraints. 
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education in her study of elite African groups in the Rand in the 1960s. 
91 She argued that 
mothers were major figures in the break-up of tribal life and the main progressive force which 
pushed the next generation into modern twentieth-century life' 
92 Campbell notes that older 
married women had different attitudes to the more politicised youth in 1980s Natal than did 
older married men: 
While older married women (mothers) also referred to inter- 
generational tensions, they did not appear to be as threatened 
by the younger generation as their male counterparts. Some 
mothers even expressed veiled pride for the boldness and 
assertiveness of their teenage offspring. Overall the growing 
assertiveness of the youth is much less stressful for older women 
who were not socialised to expect to play dominant roles (in the 
family or in the broader community) in the way that their husbands 
were. 93 
This suggests that women's support for the erosion of older rural, patriarchal identities cut 
across classes, as Brandet-Syrier's study was concerned with what could be considered 
middle classes and Campbell's piece was concerned with working class communities. 
Education and Christianity were central catalysts in this endeavour. 
94 
This again raises the importance of status, self-worth and integrity in South African peoples' 
identity formation, and how these integrate with other forms of identity such as class and 
nationalism. King Goodwill Zwelithini, referring to Zulu violence in Natal in July 1990, 
demonstrates the importance of (often male) concepts of self-worth in contributing to 
ethnicised violence: 'Everything Zulu is being ridiculed. Our cultures are now being torn 
apart. .. the Hlobane violence was triggered off 
by Cosatu members who stated that when 
... Nelson Mandela was released, my uncle... and 
I would be his cook and waiter respectively . 95 
It is not hard to discern how this resonated with older working class Zulu men who were 
seeing their own patriarchal forms of authority being eroded. 'An escape into a mythical past 
of pride and success in battle provides the dignity that most of the hostel dwellers and 
91 M. Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, P. P. 234-241. There is a connection between this tendency and the role of mothers in 
earlier, more rural, situations - for the role of women in socialising children and young people seems of central 
importance in 
constructing identities, including ethnic ones. See Chapter 7. 92 Ibid. P. 235. 
93 C. Campbell, 'Masculinity, the Family and the Current Natal Violence', P. 620. 
94 Afrikaner women displayed similar tendencies in supporting educational reforms, and in reformulating Afrikaner ethnic 
identity, in the first half of the twentieth century. See J. Butler. 'Afrikaner women and the Creation of Ethnicity in a Small 
South African Town, 1902-1950', in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in Twentieth Century South Africa. Virginia Van 
Der Vliet also explores Xhosa women's attempts to erode older concepts of patriarchy in the institution of marriage in 
contemporary times. See her article 'Traditional Husbands, Modem Wives? Constructing Marriages in a South African 
Township', in Tradition and Transition. 95 H. Adam and H. Moodley, 'Political Violence, "Tribalism" and Inkatha', JMAS, Vol 30, No 1,1992. P. 501. 
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unemployed migrants have lacked'. 98 Of course, support for Inkatha did not only emanate from 
older working class male and elite male culture brokers. Some Zulu women and young men 
also supported lnkatha policies and the often attendant violence for various reasons. These 
included the threat to older forms of culture, the very real material gains in terms of jobs that 
could be gained by supporting Inkatha and the appeal to young men of Inkatha's rhetoric 
regarding martial prowess and Zulu identity. 97 The interpretation of the violence in Natal as 
primarily a conflict between a Zulu-based Inkatha movement and an allegedly Xhosa 
dominated ANC serves to mask a proliferation of evolving and declining cultural groupings, in 
competition with each other in a time of rapid socio-economic change. 98 
I 
The demise of the apartheid state allowed these competing sub-cultures more political 
prominence, creating a space for violent conflict. It is a paradox of recent South African 
history that the demise of the National party-with all its attendant violence towards Africans 
both in institutional and every-day forms-should have initiated a new era of male-dominated 
violence, although this has to some degree subsided. 
8.6 Male Socialisation, Collective Violence and Ethnic Identity: Some Theoretical 
Reflections 
In a recent study of male collective violence in South Africa, Crais stresses the need for 'a 
history of the multiple sites of political imagining, the hidden arenas within which society and 
polity is made and remade in thought, conversation and action. '99 It is in the often trivial day- 
to-day interactions between people that the structure of larger society is wrought. Culture Is 
central to this, embodying as it does socialisation processes which produce the moral 
universes to which people adhere for meaning in life. This of course interacts with political 
economy, but it is too simplistic to argue, as many radical historians and other academics did 
with regard to South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, that structural processes shape peoples' 
consciousnesses in a passive sense. People reinterpreted these structural impositions in 
order to forge their own, new, identities in a fast-changing socio-economic climate. Central to 
these formations were-and are-male concepts of integrity, self-worth and prestige. These 
values were very much tied to the homestead in pre-colonial Southern African societies, but 
were not completely eradicated by the penetration of colonialism and the capitalist economy. 
This provided fertile ground for the growth of moral ethnicities, rooted in a threatened, but still 





-- S. Marks, 'The Origins of Ethnic Violence', P. P. 127-8. Why Zulu ethnic identifications should be the most prominent in 
terms of ethnic violence in this period is the subject of chapter 5. 99 C. Crais, 'Of Men, Magic and the Law: Masculinity, Violence and the Imagination in South Africa', Unpublished Paper, 
Personal Copy, P. 33. 
S. Marks, Personal Interview, May 1996. 
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As has been demonstrated, men in southern African societies were often socialised 
to 
participate in socially sanctioned violence. However, it was not necessarily perceived as 
'violent' by the historical actors involved-rather, it was one aspect of 'man-hood' which was 
centred around the umzi or homestead. The impact of colonialism and capitalism involved 
successive 'crises of integration' for males, as patriarchal authority began to be challenged. 
Nevertheless, this often resulted in violent reformulations of patriarchal authority, rather than a 
complete erosion. The examples of the differing youth associations mentioned above seem to 
be prime indicators of these reformulations. 
Identities spring from people's core experiences, but not from any primordial 'essence'. They 
are constructed around concepts of self-worth which are informed by people's perspectives of 
a narrow or broader locality. Migrant labourers, often identifying themselves In an ethnic 
sense, could integrate these identities within a broader, more inclusive identification with the 
mineworker's union. 100 However, conflicts over definitions of identity 'are often violent. At the 
personal level this stems from the hurt felt when an outsider has the power to define identity in 
ways which deny the individual's own expert knowledge, composed as it is of core 
experiences, desires and yearnings and strategic plans for life'. 
101 Perceived psychological 
threats to, often male dominated, ethnic identity and status do seem to be of prime importance 
in instigating collective, ethnicised; violence. 
This certainly offers a partial explanation of the conflicts between differing male 
youth 
associations, each one an example of reformulated masculinity. They also represent 
the 
debate inherent in moral ethnicity, as each one represented a version of what it meant to be 
Mpondo, Zulu, Xhosa etc (although they did not all necessarily entail an identity reformulation 
in an ethnic sense). Each of these reformulations threatened the 'correctness' of the world 
view offered by the previous group. Education was a significant factor in instigating these 
reformulations, as it entailed a wider choice of identities in which people-especially men-could 
plan strategic life choices. 
These moral ethnic debates could, however, also degenerate into political tribalism. The 
manipulations of the apartheid state, and the deliberate creation of ethnic culture brokers, 
entailed a hardening of these fluid, if somewhat violent, male-dominated ethnicised 
boundaries. However, this imposition of ethnic identities from above had to resonate with the 
bulk of the people 'below'. Again, it seems the very threat to older forms of masculinity and 
ethnic identity centred in the moral ethnic debate actually contributed to the reinforcement of 
100 D. Moodie, Going For Gold, Esp. the conclusion. Also W. Beinart, 'Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism and Nationalism'. 
101 F. Wilson and B. F. Frederiksen (eds), Ethnicity, Gender and the Subversion of Nationalism, London, 1995. P. 2. 
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these crystallisations of ethnic identity. Buthelezi's version of 'Zuluness', for example, could 
resonate with the threat to older working class males' concepts of masculinity due to both the 
poverty arising from apartheid ideology and the fluctuating cheap labour requirements of 
modern capitalism, and the perceived threat emanating from a more radical agenda often 
captured by young men who no longer adhered to concepts of reciprocity, respect and 
patriarchal authority. 102 
The customs adhered to by pre-colonial societies seem to have imposed such a hegemonic 
hold upon the psyches of the community members that they were often taken for granted as 
an unquestioned, natural way of life (much as in 'passive' forms of ethnic identity). Thus they 
provided the pillars of support needed for people to interpret their moral universe. With the 
impact of colonialism, capitalism and the oppression wrought by apartheid these moral 
universes were increasingly questioned and identities redefined. In an ethnic sense this 
represents the-moral ethnic debate. However, this fluid processual form of identity 
reformulation could be transformed by culture brokers and the apartheid state by invoking 
calls to a 'lost past' and traditional values. The uncertainties and psychological insecurities 
inherent in change, whilst also offering the chance for ethnic identities to reformulate and 
breakdown, were ossified by these elements. People were available for this crystallisation of 
identities due to the fact that their life world was increasingly insecure in a fast-changing socio- 
economic climate. Class, gender, ethnic and other forms of affiliation were all being 
reformulated and people need something 'solid' with which to identify. 
Thus these identity reformulations were marked by-often ethnicised-violence. Men were both 
socialised to carry out the political matters appertaining to the community, and in terms of 
'warrior' status in pre-colonial societies. As these elements were central to concepts of rural 
manhood, they remained central elements in reformulated ethnic identities throughout the 
twentieth century, as is especially evidenced by youth associations. As each stage 
challenged previous concepts of 'manhood' and ethnic identity, there were inevitable violent 
episodes. This violence can be perceived as liberatory in content, in that it represented a 
debate regarding how best ethnic identities-in a male dominated environment-could be 
reformulated in order to adjust to the rapid social and economic changes introduced. 
Therefore it reflects Fanon's concept of the liberatory elements of violence. Combined with 
the fact that socially sanctioned violence was a central element to many pre-colonial forms of 
society, it is perhaps not surprising that identity reformulations-which could be extremely 
hurtful to people as their whole way of life was being questioned-were often marked by violent 
confrontations, as people sought to redefine who they were. The restraining element of 
102 Patriarchal authority in this context refers to the particular concept of `manhood' to which older working class men 
adhered. Younger men were just as prone to patriarchal concepts of authority, but in a different sense, as Campbell's article 
bears out. 
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violence is best evidenced in the crystallised forms of political tribalism, invoked by first British 
colonialism, then the apartheid state, but also by intellectual culture brokers from among black 
South African communities. The longevity of the migrant labour process provided the ideal 
milieu for these identity reformulations to take place, as it allowed older, rural forms of ethnic 
identity (and thus male concepts of self-worth) to reformulate and adjust to the changes 
wrought. However, this also hindered the development of broader, more inclusive identities 
and allowed the transforming of the processual forms of ethnic identity inherent in moral 
ethnicity by the various and varied proponents of political tribalism, whether in terms of their 
own class or ethnic interests. 
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9. ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM: DIFFERING PATHS TO MODERNITY IN TWENTIETH 
CENTURY SOUTH AFRICA 
The global resurgence of ethnic and nationalist affiliations in the late twentieth century is now 
rivalled by the plethora of multi-disciplinary academic literature analysing the phenomena. 
I 
Definitions of ethnicity and nationalism have blossomed accordingly, reflecting the elusive 
nature of these identities and the difficulty, or even impossibility, of providing an adequate 
generic theoretical explanation for their appearance. The broad debate between 
instrumentalists and primordialists has now broken down into a kaleidoscope of differing 
interpretations, each seemingly selecting facets of these broader explanations in order to 
construct a more flexible conceptual framework of both contemporary and historical ethnic and 
national identities. However, it is only comparatively recently that academics have begun to 
examine the connections between ethnicity and nationalism? 
Comparing and contrasting ethnic and national identities in the South African context is 
particularly useful in that it illustrates the similarities and differences between the two, 
demonstrates the connections between them, and provides a useful analytical process 
whereby peoples' changing social, cultural and political consciousnesses can be explored. 
Twentieth century South Africa provides a veritable laboratory of differing consciousnesses in 
this respect, due largely to the longevity of the migrant labour process in the country. This 
allowed identities, often rural in nature, the crucial space needed in which to reformulate 
themselves in the wake of colonial capitalism, a space which may not have existed in a 
situation of more rapid proletarianisation. The existence of these identities, and the attempt by 
nationalist culture brokers to capture them for their own political projects at specific historical 
junctures, provides a rich field for exploring the changing consciousnesses and identities of 
Africans and Afrikaners. The comparison of the two distinct forms of nationalism existing in 
South Africa allows a further analysis of how differing nationalist ideologues attempted to 
harness more parochial identities in order to further their own agenda, whilst being re-shaped 
by the latter in the process. This chapter thus sets out to explore the relationship between 
ethnic and national identities in South Africa throughout the course of the twentieth century. It 
concentrates on changing forms of consciousness and identities and what these actually 
meant to both ethnic and nationalist entrepreneurs and the majority of the people in this time 
of rapid socio-economic change, and by doing so attempts to tentatively provide more 
generalised insights, applicable elsewhere, into how differing paths to modernity are forged by 
I For a useful summary of recent works covering ethnicity and nationalism see J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (eds), Nationalism 
Oxford 1994, J. Hutchinson and A. Smith (eds), Ethnicity, Oxford, 1996 and T. H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: 
Anthropological Perspectives, London, 1993. 2 See A. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, 1986, for a theoretical approach which at times verges on the 
primordialist. For Africa in general see B. Davidson, Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, London, 1992. For South 
Africa in particular see G. Mare, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa, London, 1993, and S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds) The 
Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, London, 1987. 
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the interaction between ideological culture brokers and the majority of the people with whom 
they promote their agendas. Anthropological works, biography and autobiography are drawn 
upon as they provide the raw data for an examination of changing forms of consciousness and 
identity 
.3 
9.1 Strangers in the Land: A Brief Overview of Pre-Colonial Southern African Societies, 
Identity Formation and Treatment of 'Strangers'. 
It seems very difficult to ascertain whether ethnic identities existed to any large extent prior to 
the full impact of colonial capitalism. Certainly, identities were generally far more fluid and 
permeable than those which arose in the wake of nineteenth century imperialism and the 
discovery of diamonds and gold in the late 1800s 4 Afrikaner identity was no exception. 
Indeed it is questionable whether some Afrikaner peoples living on the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century 'frontier' in the Eastern Cape adhered to an Afrikaner identity at all. 
The encroachment of modernity and the extension of imperial law and order, whether from the 
Dutch East India Company or the British who arrived later in the early nineteenth century, 
threatened their entire way of life. Afrikaners sometimes allied with African chiefs in opposition 
to British expansion. These alliances could break down identities into fluid, permeable forms .5 
This merging and blurring of identity boundaries also has a long history among African 
peoples. The arrival of Bantu-speaking peoples in what became South Africa in the fourth and 
fifth centuries A. D. precipitated a gradual merging between them and the indigenous Khoisan 
peoples in terms of culture, language and political organisation. This is not to suggest that 
there were no conflicts between the two, but absorption and inter-marriage were common. 
The Xhosa chief, Sandile, was the son of a San woman and descendants of his lineage 
amputated the top joint of the little finger on the right hand in accordance with San custom as 
s a sign of their royal descent Analysing the treatment of 'strangers' from outside the moral 
3 This is not meant to imply that these sources represent a kind of 'true' representation of the identities of the people with 
which they are concerned. The autobiographies of various early nationalists had their own political agendas, and 
anthropologists are now ac eng that it is impossible to access an unmediated account of peoples' culture, social life and 
history. As Coplan argues, people cannot speak for themselves, the very relationship between anthropologist and 'subject' 
distorts and changes the information elicited (see D. Coplan, In the Time of Cannibals, London, 1994. P. 260. Interestingly, 
this contrasts with the work of such anthropologists as the Mayers, who centred their work entirely around the concept of 
allowing people 'to speak for themselves'). Nevertheless, the combination of both, integrated in an historically contingent 
manner, can, I believe, still go a long way in providing a useful explanatory paradigm concerning the relationship between 
ethnicity and nationalism in South Africa. 4 Most revisionist schools of historiography stress the fundamental effect of industrialisation after the gold and diamond 
discoveries, the activities of missionaries in forging new identities through codifying vernacular written languages, and the deliberate manipulations of African identity by colonial administrators in crystallising ethnic identification in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - see chapter five. S See for example M. Legassick, 'The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography', in S. Marks and A. Atmore, 
Economy and Society in Precolonial South Africa, London, 1980. Also N. Mostert's analysis of the life of Coenraad de Buys in his book Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa People, London, 1993. This is not to 
underestimate the racialised divisions that existed at this time. 0 J. D. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, London, 1994. P. 16. 
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economy of the 'tribe' at this historical juncture provides useful insights into the roots of 
twentieth century ethnic and nationalist identities. Writing in 1974 Hammond-Tooke provides 
the following analysis: 
Strangers, being defenceless, are particularly under the protection 
of the chief or headman and are accorded special privileges. Bantu 
maintain that today moral behaviour, such as hospitality, respect 
and truthfulness, is expected among all Bantu, of whatever tribe. It 
is only the white man who is outside the moral community. 7 
He further argues that the virtues of a 'good' member of a 'tribe' are 'respect for seniors, 
loyalty to kinsmen, assistance to neighbours, freedom from the suspicion of witchcraft, 
generosity, meticulous observance of custom, loyalty to chief and political officers, kindness 
and forbearance'. 8 
Anthropologists pursuing field research not so far removed from the time of pre-colonial South 
African societies promote similar perceptions of southern African societies. Writing in 1908, 
Kidd argues the following: 
It is the Kafir's primary obligation to sacrifice, if needs be, 
everything for the good of the clan, and his individual rights 
are wholly subservient, contingent, and secondary to the 
performance of his obligations. This sound basis of the social 
state is undoubtedly one of the main causes of the stability of 
Kafir society. 9 
Thus 'individual self-consciousness is not fully developed, though the clan consciousness is 
amazingly strong'. 10 
Although these are perceptions from anthropologists who did not take into account historical 
contingency (Hammond-Tooke and Kidd), or who conflated the diversity of experience 
contained in African societies (Kidd)" several themes become apparent here which perhaps 
feed into the development of later ethnic and nationalist identities. For example, there is the 
emphasis on the submergence of individualism within the context of the clan or 'tribe'. 
7 W. D. Hammond-Tooke, `World-View 2: A System of Action', in W. D. Hammond-Tooke (ed), The Bantu-Speaking Peoples 
of Southern Africa, London, 1974. P. 363. 
9s 
Ibid. P. 362. 
D. Kidd, Kafir Socialism, New York, 1969 (originally published 1908). P. 11. to Ibid. P. 17. 
ti Kidd's work was particularly influenced by the perceived threat of socialism taking hold in rural African communities. 
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Although this was portrayed by Kidd at the time in a teleological, racist sense, with Africans 
portrayed as somewhere lower down the supposed 'evolutionary' ladder than Europeans, and 
with the growth of individualism through contact with Europeans entailing an erosion of this 
communal moral world view, there is a marked similarity between the loyalties portrayed by 
pre-colonial Africans to their 'tribe', chief and clan and that portrayed by members of 
ethnicised nationalist groups in the twentieth century. For in all these cases, there is a 
submergence of the individual in order to accommodate the interests of the wider group. 
Furthermore, members of more contemporary ethnic and nationalist groups receive many of 
the same benefits previously accruing to members of these pre-colonial communities, in terms 
of mutual assistance, sharing of scarce resources, and a common identity. The difference is 
in the scale and size of the groups concerned. It is interesting to note that, at the time of 
Hammond-Tooke's writing, treating of strangers was set very much in an anti-colonial tone. 
Kidd, however, found that this treatment of strangers was set in a much smaller clan, or 'tribal', 
context. Identities only become available if there are the resources to 'imagine' them, and the 
incursions of colonialism had much to do with this widening of consciousness. 
12 However, 
there were strands within these pre-colonial societies which may also have been drawn upon 
by African nationalist culture brokers of a more inclusive bent. 
Drawing on the work of Fritz Kramer, Marks has recently attempted an analysis of pre-colonial 
African perceptions of strangers in the South African context, which focuses on both the 
potentially exclusive and inclusive elements contained therein. 
13 This expands the points 
made by both Kidd and Hammond-Tooke. Marks cautiously takes up the argument put 
forward by Kramer that there were basically two ways that Africans perceived strangers. 
Firstly, through the contrasting of the 'culturally identical stranger' with the 'apparently 
uncultured barbarian' (the former allowed residence, land and sometimes civil rights, the latter 
denied basic human rights and possibly enslaved or forcibly incorporated through adoption), 
or alternatively through the rules of exogamy: 'here a foreigner is anyone whose sisters and 
daughters one may marry. Whereas the one scheme of excluding the other from the politico- 
jural system justifies adoption and enslavement, here it legitimates marriage'. 14 The former 
produces heterogenous and stratified societies; the latter far more homogenous societies. 
Marks then tests this theory against Southern African pre-colonial societies, arguing that 
Tswana communities - endogamous and with membership of political units 
defined by 
allegiance to a chief and not by birth - differed from Xhosa communities in the Eastern 
Cape. 
Tswana chiefdoms therefore allowed individuals who had broken away from their parent 'tribe' 
to be absorbed within the chiefdom's structure, these individuals frequently being allowed to 
12 I am using the term 'imagination' here in the same conceptual vein as that first advocated by B. Anderson in his book 
Imagined agined Communities, London, 1991(2nd ed). 
S. Marks. 'The Tradition of Non-Racism in South Africa', p. p. 14-17. t4 Ibid. P. 14. 
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retain their own customs and differences of dialect. They generally received land and full civic 
rights, but without the same political influence as the original members of the chiefdom. 
However, peoples of wholly different origins, such as the Kgalagadi, formed an impoverished 
underclass of hereditary servants. Xhosa-speaking peoples were exogamous. Therefore 
although, like the Tswana, 'people who lived outside of the range of Xhosa social relations 
were regarded as outside of the moral community... this social distance could be reduced by 
marriage, or through the incorporation of aliens into the Xhosa nation'. 
15 The difference 
between Tswana and Xhosa communities has perhaps been over-emphasised, for Xhosa 
communities were also political. However the differentiation is suggestive, and points towards 
elements of inclusion and exclusion which could later be incorporated by both inclusive 
nationalists and exclusivist ethnic entrepreneurs in order to promote their political agendas. 
As has already been mentioned, this had happened between 'Bantu'-speaking peoples and 
Khoisan for over a thousand years, and it perhaps also explains the assimilation of what 
became known as Mfengu peoples into Xhosa communities from the early nineteenth century 
onwards. 16 Marks utilises this concept of relating to strangers in order to demonstrate the 
fluidity of identity boundaries at this time, and the possibility of erasing them, thus arguing that 
this represented one of several 'threads' of non-racism which have existed at various times 
throughout South African history, both in black and white communities. " However, it can also 
be applied to the various forms of nationalist and ethnic identities which began to emerge 
more rapidly in the South African state from the 1910 Act of Union onwards, and which also 
demonstrate alternating fluid and rigidified identity boundaries. In order to illustrate this 
linkage, which also relates to how nationalist and explicitly politicised forms of ethnic identity 
appealed to the mass of ordinary people, it is first necessary to define the two major strands of 
nationalism which seem to to have existed - and still exist - within both South Africa and in 
many other parts of the world. 
Broadly speaking, there seem to be two forms of nationalist ideology which have dominated 
throughout the twentieth century; civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. 18 These have been 
defined as follows: 
15 _. _ Ibid. P. P. 15-16. 
c 
'" However, see chapter five for the recent academic controversy concerning Mfengu origins. For contemporary comments 
referring to inter-marriage between Mfengu and Xhosa peoples see 'Report of the Select Committee 2nd July 1863', in Cape Parliamentary Papers chapter four, 1863, and chapter 3. 1 7,. 
N. Marks. `The Tradition of Non-Racism in South Africa', P. 17. it 
'° See especially A. Smith, National Identity, London, 1991, and M. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, London, 1993. For a 
recent application of these themes to the South African context, see H. Adam, 'The Politics of Ethnic Identity: Comparing South Africa', in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 18, No 3,1995. There is also a third form of nationalism which celebrates 
multi-culturalism, as can be found in the United states and Australia. These differing forms also demonstrate the differing 
routes to modernity taken up by varous nation-states in their formation, illustrating the importance of making any analysis of identity construction historically contingent. 
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The ideology of 'non-racism'rejects an ethnic nation in favour of 
a civic nation, based on equal individual rights, regardless of origin, 
and equal recognition of all cultural traditions in the public sphere. 
The civic nation is based on consent rather than descent. Citizen- 
ship in ethnic nationalism on the other hand is based on blood and 
ancestry. Laws of return, as in Israel or Germany, guarantee instant 
citizenship to members of an imagined ethnic family, even though the 
returnees are 'de facto' cultural strangers. 19 
The inclusive, universalist, liberal values inherent in civic nationalism very much represent the 
nationalism espoused by the ANC - although this was internally contested at specific historical 
junctures. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, represented the culturally -brokered form of 
Afrikaner identity, before and during the apartheid era, although this again was historically 
internally contested. It can also be applied to the politically ethnicised construction of Zulu 
identity as promoted by Mangosuthu Buthelezi 2° Both civic and ethic nationalism set 
boundaries. Ethnic nationalism sets boundaries through notions of birth, blood and descent, 
whereas civic nationalism is an abstract liberal ideal which automatically sets boundaries if 
ethnic groups do not wish to merge within this universalised form of identity construction? ' 
Additionally the latter sets boundaries of state citizenship, not everyone having equal access 
to state resources. 
It is very difficult to merge different identity groups - historically sharply differentiated in socio- 
economic terms, as well as culturally - within a universalist ideal. For civic nationalism in its 
pure sense is an abstract ideal, and not a human passion (although perhaps it can be 
developed as such-certainly the 1960s civil rights movement in the United States, and 
movements for democracy in South Africa contained considerable passion). Emotional, 
affective and cognitive elements need to be taken into consideration when forging a nationalist 
identity, or indeed any identity, and this certainly seemed to be the case in pre-colonial African 
societies, which based their identities around 'imagined' communities in many ways 
representing enlarged metaphorical families. Furthermore, the treatment of 'strangers' by 
these two forms of nationalism ('strangers' in this sense represented by identity groups 
existing outside the boundaries drawn by the two sets of nationalist culture brokers) suggests 
interesting continuities with the treatment of 'strangers' in pre-colonial African societies. For 
both in pre-colonial polities and the polities emerging from the impact of colonial capitalism, 
real tensions existed between egalitarianism and inequality, tensions which seem similar in 
19 H. Adam. 'The Politics of Ethnic Identity', P. 459. 20 Politicised Zulu identity demonstrates the difficulty of defining what is nationalism and what is ethnicity, for this culturally brokered form of identity has been conceived of in both terms, as will become apparent. 21 For a useful discussion of this, and related, issues in a contemporary and more general context see J. Glenn, 'The Interregnum: the South's Insecurity Dilemma', Nations and Nationalism, Vol 3, No 1,1997. 
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many respects, despite the vast differences existing in socio-economic and political terms. 
Furthermore, there were often more connections between twentieth century nationalist culture 
brokers and older forms of identity than is often made apparent in many historical works. 
Continuity is as important as change in the formation of twentieth century South African 
identities. 
I 
9.2 Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pre-1948 South Africa 
The discovery of gold and diamonds in late nineteenth century South Africa, the 1899-1902 
South African war, and the 1910 Act of Union were all significant landmarks in terms of the 
formation of nationalist, and more explicit ethnic, forms of Identity in South Africa. These 
events initiated the formation of both the ANC and the National party who, in a sense, 
represented the same political phenomenon. The members of both originated from the black 
and white professional intelligentsias of the time, all the leaders were men, and both aimed to 
mobilise a wider support base in order to overcome their exclusion from power as a result of 
British hegemony. They were also historically forged at a chronologically similar time, the 
South African Native National Congress (later renamed the ANC) formed in 1912, and the 
National party founded under General Hertzog in 1914. There were, however, fundamental 
differences between the two; the former promoting non-racial, inclusive ideals, while the latter 
eventually developed an inward-looking, exclusive, racist ideology. Additionally, the early 
ANC was not strongly anti-imperialist, unlike the Nationalist party. The South African political 
economy after the 1910 Act of Union was dominated by English-speaking South Africans, who 
had little interest in forging a nationalist consciousness. The dominance of English-speaking 
people in this sphere contributed to Afrikaner ethnic nationalism due to the prior grievances 
held regarding British imperialism by many Afrikaners. The former therefore represented civic, 
as compared to the other's ethnic, nationalism. In order to understand the relative appeal of 
these ideologies, it is necessary both to examine how they resonated with earlier forms of 
identity and consciousness, and how these earlier identities actually contributed to the 
formation of the former. For, as has been stressed throughout this thesis, nationalist and 
ethnic identities are not just forged through the ideological manipulations of ethnic and 
nationalist culture-brokers. They are shaped from 'below' as much as from 'abover 23 It is also 
22This 
chapter is primarily concerned with theorising the connections between mass and elite forms of consciousness in the 
formation of ethnic and nationalist identities in a social, rather than a politcal, historical context. Therefore there is not a 
detailed historical treatment of the political developments which contributed to their formation. See chapter five for a more in- 
depth analysis of the origins of Afrikaner twentieth century nationalism For recent works which analyse the origins and development of both forms of nationalism in a comparative format see the following: S. Marks, 'Black and White Nationalisms in South Africa: A Comparative Perspective', in P. Kaarsholm and J. Hultin, Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism. Occasional Paper No 11, Roskilde, Denmark, 1994, and S. Marks and S. Trapido, 'The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism', in S. Marks and S. Trapido, The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, London, 1987. 23 In chapter 3, stress was placed on the ambiguous nature of moral ethnicity, and how it represented an arena of constant debate with regard to what best represented the identity of a people in the context of rapid, but incomplete, socio-economic 
change. It thus represented the search for the 'ideal type', without ever realising this ultimate goal. Political tribalism, the 
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important to examine how nationalist culture-brokers were themselves partially forged through, 
and influenced by, these more popular diffuse forms of identity. For it is through this 
interaction that nationalist and politicised ethnic identities were, and are, forged. 
African Nationalism had particular problems in relating to more rurally based, localised 
identities in this period. Rural people often consolidated their identity around their chief, 
partially because they could often provide the focus for resistance to land expropriation by the 
British and by Afrikaners 24 This did not easily resonate with African Nationalists' concerns 
regarding political equality, and a broadly inclusive form of national identity. In fact, especially 
during the 1920s, other organisations, such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union 
(henceforth, the ICU), were far more successful in terms of popular mobilisation due to their 
greater readiness in incorporating these more localised grievances within a broader political 
objective . 
25 The very process of forging a populist form of nationalist consciousness was itself 
fraught with difficulties and tensions, as - just as in pre-colonial societies - it ran a thin line 
between egalitarianism and inequality. Nevertheless, there were individuals who sought to 
bridge this gap, and an analysis of how they endeavoured to achieve this demonstrates the 
difficulty of projecting an abstract concept of either class or civic nationalism onto the popular 
consciousness of rural people. The most successful of these individuals were also not so far 
removed from the more populist forms of rural identity which they sought to overlay with a civic 
nationalist or class consciousness. This demonstrates the often ambiguous, multi-faceted and 
debated natures of identity formation in twentieth century South Africa. 
Migrant labour was a central factor in the formation of ethnicised identities in this period, and 
also influenced the development of the two nationalist movements mentioned above. In the 
1970s, structural Marxist interpretations of the migrant labour process focussed primarily on 
the advantages accruing to mine owners through promoting and perpetuating this form of work 
pattern 26 This somewhat functionalist view was revised in the 1980s by social historians who 
attempted to go beyond the concept that migrant labour was solely the product of the needs of 
capitalism. 27 This revisionist school sought to demonstrate that rural Africans were not passive 
victims of the machinations of capitalism, but initially endeavoured to manipulate the migrant 
manipulation of ethnic identities by the state, hijacked this ambiguous search through the crystallisation of identities in a 
rigidified format, allowing no debate. This appealed to people who were looking for certainties in the midst of a rapidly 
changing society. This argument can also be applied to the form of ethnic nationalism promoted by the Nationalist'party. For 
it too sought to construct a monolithic form of Afrikaner identity. To this extent, Afrikaner nationalism was very much a form 
of ethnic identity aiming at capturing control of the state. 24 See chapter 3. 
25 See for example H. Bradford, 'Lynch Laws and Labourers: The ICU in Umvoti, 1927-1928', in W. Beinart, P. Delius and S. 
Trapido (eds), Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930, 
Johannesburg, 1986. 
26 Perhaps the most well-known example of this approach is H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: 
From Segregation to Apartheid', Economy and Society, Vol 1. London, 1972. However, it is important to recognise that Wolpe 
only examined the process of migrant labour when it was well established. 27 See for example, W. Beinart, 'Chieftaincy and the Concept of Articulation: South Africa Circa 1900-1950, Canadian 
Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol 19,1985. 
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labour system in order to upkeep pre-capitalist forms of social and political communities. As 
African initiative was central to this approach, changing African consciousness became a 
central theme to be explored. However it seems that it is precisely within this realm of 
changing consciousness that both moral ethnicity and political tribalism were produced, and, 
in the first half of the twentieth century in particular, it was with this changing consciousness 
that nationalist culture brokers had to work. Afrikaner ethnic nationalism developed somewhat 
differently, due to the more rapid proletarianisation of rural Afrikaners 28 However, changing 
forms of Afrikaner consciousness also provided the cultural building blocks with which 
Afrikaner culture brokers had to work in order to forge a wider, more exclusive, Afrikaner 
identity. Therefore there are also many similarities between the historical formation of both 
forms of nationalism. 
In addition to migrant labour, two factors seem to have been of central importance to changing 
forms of African consciousness in this period - the changing institution of chieftaincy and the 
codification of vernacular languages. The interaction between these three criteria began to 
forge a wider African consciousness, which in turn led to increasing debate within African 
societies with regard to what best represented African ethnicised identities - moral ethnicity. 
This also entailed a proliferation of differing paths towards modernity, something which 
modernisation theorists of the 1960s failed to recognise when they argued that ethnic 
identities were an archaic hangover from the pre-colonial African past, soon to disappear in 
the supposed inevitable tide of `progress' 29 African culture brokers of this period, nationalist or 
otherwise, grew up and were socialised within this rapidly changing socio-economic climate, 
and an examination of their beliefs, identity formation and consciousness shed theoretical light 
on both the forging of nationalist and ethnic identities. 
The importance of language in the forging of nationalist consciousness is evident in the lives 
of many early nationalist culture brokers. Solomon Plaatje, who became the first secretary of 
the South African Native National Congress in 1912, was fluent in eight different languages, 
both African and European, and wrote regularly in half of these3° D. D. T. Jabavu, son of the 
founder of the Eastern Cape African newspaper Imvo Zabantsundu John Tengo Jabavu and 
one of the coordinators with the ANC in order to form the All Africa Convention in 1935, was 
fluent in seven vernacular languages, Afrikaans and English. 31 Stimela Jason Jingoes, a 
resident of Lesotho and an ardent advocate of the institute of Sotho chieftaincy (which does 
28 _- See B. Bozzoli, 'Marxism, Feminism and Southern African Studies', JSAS, Vol 9, No 2,1983. 79 
-- See chapter two for a more comprehensive analysis of the modernisation approach which dominated the 1960s in one guise 
or another. It is important to mention here that I am not completely dismissing all the findings of this approach. There do 
seem to be distinct historical paths towards modernity in South African societies, which directly impinged on identity making 
processes. However, the diverse paths towards modernity, and the forging of both moral ethnic and political tribalist versions 
of ethnicity, are not taken fully into account. Nor is the fact that modernity does not necessarily equate with 'progress'. 30 
-- B. Willan. Solomon Plaa je: South African Nationalist, 1876-1932, London, 1984. P. vii, preface. 31 
"' N. Jabavu. The Ochre People: Scenes From a South African Life, London, 1963. P. 253. 
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not mean that he was not critical of it), although not at the forefront of ANC activities in South 
Africa, can also be perceived as an early nationalist culture broker in a sense, and was fluent 
in several of the Sotho and Nguni language groupings as well as English and Afrikaans 
32 
Usually products of mission education, early African nationalists often synthesised African and 
European world views, which to them was not a contradiction in terms. An overview of the 
lives of these three personalities, as well as others, demonstrates the importance of language 
in bridging the gap between smaller scale rural African communal consciousnesses, and that 
of a wider nationalist bent. It also demonstrates that African nationalist culture brokers were 
just as much a product of the rural African societies from which they originated, as that of 
European education and a growing capitalist economy. Nationalist culture brokers were just 
as much shaped by their own points of origin, as shapers of a wider, nationalist identity which 
they intended to impose from above onto the mass of rural African communities. This reflects 
the argument of revisionist social historians in the 1980s that African rural communities were 
very involved in the reformulation of ethnic and national identities in the wake of colonialism 
and capitalism, and were not just passive recipients. 
Jabavu, Jingoes and Plaatje all worked hard to preserve the customs of the peoples from 
whom they originated. In later life Plaatje was very much involved in attempts to preserve 
Tswana language, custom and folk-lore through the medium of the written word. 
3 Jingoes 
consistently argued for the preservation of the Sotho chieftaincy, despite the seeming paradox 
of being at one time a committed, leading ICU member. 34 D. T. T. Jabavu spent much time in 
attempting to preserve Xhosa tradition 35 it is perhaps this eclectic approach that differentiates 
earlier advocates of African nationalism from the more radical versions which arose in the 
wake of apartheid, 36 although even in that era a certain eclecticism existed. Male initiation into 
manhood, hlonipha customs, patriarchal constructions of family life, the significance of the 
ancestors, the importance of chieftaincy, and moral values such as reciprocity, the 
submergence of individualism among the community, treatment of 'strangers' and the 
importance of upkeeping 'tribal' tradition all figured variously but prominently in the lives and 
32_- 
S. J. Jingoes. A Chief is a Chief by the People, London, 1975. P. p. xii-xiii, preface. 
B. Willan. Solomon Plaa je. Chp 14. 
33 
IA 
S. J. Jingoes. A Chief is a Chief by the People. Chps 5 and 7. 35 N. Jabavu. The Ochre People. Esp. p. p. 114-119, and p. p. 253-256. 36 Willan makes the following point with respect to Plaatje's finally largely unsuccessful attempts to gain recognition for his 
version of written Tswana language: 'The tragedy is not simply that so much of what he wrote was lost, but that the effect of 
subsequent political developments in South Africa was to turn his natural successors away from anything which appeared to 
give sustenance to ethnic nationalism. In Plaatje's mind there was no conflict between his devotion to the Tswana language 
and the furtherance of its literature, and the wider political ideals for which he strove. But for those who came after him, who 
lived under a government intent on dividing the African people along ethnic lines, the contradiction became too great: untold 
damage was done not only to setswana but to the literary development of all the other African languages of South Africa'. See 
Solomon Plaatje, p. p. 390-1. 
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works of Jabavu, Plaatje and Jingoes, as with other prominent early members of the nascent 
African nationalist movement. 37 
Although set in the era of early apartheid, Non! Jabavu records a poignant observation made 
by one of her aunts at a social gathering which lucidly portrays the eclectic approach of these 
early nationalists: 
We are conservatives, we; and cling to custom; but at the same time 
learn and adapt. No longer do we cling like a grasshopper to the barbed 
wire fence on which it is impaled in flight, and remaining static only 
because dead! ' She looked around for the ironic applause that would 
greet this, and it came, for she had trotted out the well-known figurative 
chestnut that illustrates the difference between constructive tenacity on 
the one hand and sterile ossification on the other. 38 
Here, Jabavu's aunt seems to be touching on the ability of Africans to utilise custom in a 
reformulated sense in order to forge an identity situated in a rapidly changing social, political 
and economic climate. This was similarly achieved by many rural societies in an ethnicised 
sense during the 1920s, when people often mobilised around their chiefs in order to oppose 
colonial land expropriation. Histories of resistance to colonial rule were important to many 
early nationalist culture brokers'39 and this perhaps heightened their sense of the need to 
preserve pre-colonial customs - or at least those which did not too overtly contradict their 
mission school upbringing and christian religious affiliation. 
Most historians have seen the 'modernist' civic element in early African nationalism as 
dominant. But recently, some historians have argued that this somewhat Janus-like aspect of 
early nationalists promoted hardened, politically tribalist, versions of ethnic identities. The 
Mfengu/Xhosa divide which became apparent in the first half of the twentieth century provides 
a useful example with which to illustrate this point. Stapleton has argued that D. D. T. Jabavu 
implicitly promoted Mfengu ethnic identity above that of Xhosa, through his support of a 
centenary celebration of 'Fingo emancipation Day' in a mission-controlled newspaper. ao 
However, it seems that Stapleton has misunderstood the content of the article, confusing 
37 See A Chief is a Chief by the People, esp chps 1,6,7,8; The Ochre People, esp p. p. 61-70,85,87,104,109, p. p. 114-119, 
p. p. 127-139,177-8,220-21, p. p. 249-261; Solomon Plaa je, esp chp 14. For other examples see S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth Century Natal, London, 1986, and 'Patriotism, Patriarchy and Purity: Natal and the Politics of Zulu Ethnic Consciousness', in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, London, 1989. 38 - I he Ochre People, p. 236. 39 
40 T. Stapleton, 'Gathering Under the Milkwood Tree: The Development of Mfengu Tribalism in the Eastern Cape (1878- 1978), unpublished paper, 1995. P. 15. 
See footnote 37 above. 
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Mfengu/Xhosa divisions with - the admittedly similar but not same -'Red'/'School' divide which 
emerged in the Eastern Cape in the aftermath of the colonial wars waged against the Xhosa. 41 
Stapleton concentrates on the following extracts from the article in promoting his argument: 
If there be any rivalry, let us impart to it a new orientation to 
produce the maximum in furthering the cause of christianity, 
education and the social betterment of our backward brothers 
... we can join with the Fingoes annually on the 
14th May in 
recalling the triple vow of loyalty to our government, to our religion 
and to the cause of education. 42 
f, 
Stapleton understands 'backward brothers' to refer exclusively to Xhosa peoples as against 
Mfengu. However, I believe that the term refers to a different, if sometimes related, set of 
identities. Jabavu is specifically advocating the 'cause' of 'christianity, education and social 
betterment', something which stems from his own mission school education. He is therefore 
not referring to rigid definitions of Mfengu and Xhosa, as Stapleton seems to imply, but rather 
to the 'Red'PSchool' cleavage. There were also 'Red' Mfengu communities which existed well 
into the twentieth century, for example in Peddie district. 43 What Jabavu seemed to be 
attempting was to forge a wider consciousness amongst African peoples in the Eastern Cape, 
set in the context of the area's past history and through the idiom of European education and 
religion. He was primarily promoting these issues, and not that of some perceived Mfengu 
superiority. In the article itself, Jabavu stresses the need, not only to celebrate the 'Fingo 
Centenary', but also 'Ntsikana Day' which celebrates the conversion of the first Xhosa 
christian convert. Furthermore, much of Jabavu's article is concerned with dismissing the 
then popular argument among many colonial historians that the colonialist government 
liberated the Mfengu peoples in 1835 from slavery under the Xhosa chief Hintsa. This is not 
to deny that celebration of this centenary could promote ethnicised divisions, especially as 
many Mfengu predominated in professional posts within the colonial hierarchy, originating 
from their assistance to British colonial forces in suppressing Xhosa resistance In the 
nineteenth century and the subsequent opportunities made available to them through 
education. However, it seems that Jabavu was attempting to weld together these divisions 
under the banner of education, religion and a nascent nationalism - rather than Imply a Mfengu 
41 For an analysis of the 'Red'/'School' divide which takes into account the historical context see P. Mayer, 'The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', in P. Mayer (ed), Black Villagers in an Industrial Society, Oxford, 1980. Also 
see L. Switzer, Power and Resistance in an African Society: The Ciskei Xhosa and the Making of South Africa. London, 1993, and J. Peires, 'Ethnicity and Pseudo-Ethnicity in the Ciskei', in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. 42 __ 
- See P. Mayer, 'The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance Ideologies', in P. Mayer (ed), Black Villagers in an Industrial society, Cape Town, 1980. 
D. D. T. Jabavu, 'The 'Fingo Slavery' Myth', in South African Outlook, June Ist, 1935. Al 
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'superiority' - in advocating a celebration of this event, however mistaken this may have been 
in hindsight. 
Nevertheless, there were instances where Jabavu did display a somewhat 'essentialist' view 
of 'tribal' identities. For example, his daughter Noni records a conversation with a relative who 
recites a letter from Jabavu in his youth, itself referring to a conversation between him and his 
friends with regard to the supposed characteristics of different 'tribes': 
Zulus are good at war, experts at medical herbs, but not dependable 
at all. .. too swift-tempered and reckless. 
Xhosa... are far too fond of this 
stick-fighting; too haughty and defiant of authority... Then we discussed 
the Basutho. More than any race in the world, they love arguing, 
arguing: never stop. But we agreed they are buoyant, humorous; and 
for that we liked them. On the other hand they are hard-hearted, steely- 
eyed, calculating even while smiling... And as for that cousin-marriage 
system of theirs - brothers and sisters being married, oh, 
it made our flesh 
creep to think of living like that. 44 
Of course, Jabavu may have altered his opinion regarding these stereotypes as he grew older 
and became more involved in politics. However, it does serve to illustrate the assumptions 
with which he grew up, and implicitly the difficulties of overlaying a democratic nationalist 
consciousness upon African peoples at the time. For there were divisions and stereotypes 
among African peoples which cannot solely be put down to colonial manipulation, 
'retribalisation', and 'divide and rule' policies. Nevertheless, in the final analysis nationalists 
such as Jabavu vigorously sought to diminish divisions amongst Africans, and to promote an 
African Nationalism which they perceived as all-embracing 45 
Both Afrikaner and African nationalism in South Africa were shaped 'by the uneven 
development of its political economy and the disintegrating effects of industrialisation, 
urbanisation and modernity on older values and moralities . 48 The South African political 
economy after the 1910 Act of Union was dominated by English-speaking South Africans who 
had little interest in the promotion of Afrikaner identity. Many sought rather to construct a 
broad, white South African identity, including Afrikaners, but maintaining close links with the 
British Empire 47 However, this English-speaking hegemony provoked an ethnicised 
44 The Ochre People, P. 251. 
45 -- see for example L. Switzer, Power and Resistance in an African Society, London, 1993, Chapter 6. AA 
S. Marks, 'Black and White Nationalisms in South Africa: A Comparative Perspective', P. M. 47 See for example the following: P. Merrington, 'Pageantry and Primitivism: Dorothea Fairbridge and the "Aesthetics of 
Union" ', JSAS, Vol 21, No 4,1995; J. Carruthers, 'Creating a National Park, 1910 to 1926', JSAS, Vol 15, No 2,1989. 
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mobilisation among the Afrikaner intelligentsia, who already had grievances about colonial 
domination as a result of the 1899-1902 South African war and earlier British colonial reforms, 
such as the ending of slavery in the 1830s which partly contributed to the so-called 'Great 
Trek'. Similarly, there was no place for the mission-educated African intelligentsia in the new 
system of political power. This group, denied a political presence in the newly forged union, 
attempted to promote a universalistic, democratic form of nationalism - an approach which 
resonated with the assimilationist ideals of the British colonial power before the advent of 
social Darwinism and a more systematic racism in the late nineteenth century. 48 
Language, custom and the institution of chieftaincy became central pivots around which 
people sought to re-define and mobilise themselves in response to this newly evolved colonial 
hegemony. Language preservation became a central concern among ethnic and nationalist 
culture brokers, and led to the formation of politically tribalist versions of ethnic identity. 49 
Indeed, the codification of language was a highly ambiguous exercise. It could be utilised In 
order to promote civic nationalism and a wider, more inclusive, nationalist identity, although 
this was very difficult in the case of most rural African people at the time, who were largely 
illiterate and therefore adhered to more readily available parochial identities reinforced by the 
particular spoken language in which they had been socialised. 50 However, it could also 
harden identities into a more exclusivist form. Religion could play a major part in defining 
ethnic identities in this period, and the codification of languages facilitated this role. There are 
also interesting comparisons to be made in this respect with regard to the formation of various 
African ethnic identities, and Afrikaner ethnicity. 
Mission education meant that the small African nationalist intelligentsia used English as the 
medium through which a pan-African identity could be forged. However, as mentioned, this 
was not available to the majority of the African population and contributed to the difficulties of 
early African nationalists in forging a nationalist identity, especially as they concentrated on 
abstract principles such as the right to vote and equality before the law, whereas the bulk of 
48 For an in-depth analysis of how Social Darwinist theories were developed by segregationist ideologists in the early twentieth 
century, thus further limiting any possibility of African political participation at state level, see S. Dubow, Racial Segregation 
and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, c. 1919-1936, London, 1989, Chapter 1. Also S. Dubow, Scientific Racism in 
Modern South Africa, Cambridge, 1995. 49 Benedict Anderson's concepts of'print capitalism' and 'imagined communities' have been important influences upon the 
work of historians concerned with Southern Africa (B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Ref ections On the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, London, 183,1991). See for example T. Ranger, 'Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika: The 
Invention of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe', in L. Vail (ed), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, and I. l Iofineyer, 'Building 
a Nation from Words: Afrikaans Language, Literature and 'Ethnic' Identity, 1902-1924', in ., tar on( S. Trapido (eds), The Politics of Race. Class and nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, London, 198.. ro meyer s rk illustrates how 
the codification and promotion of Afrikaans language as central to Afrikaner identity enabled the displaced Afrikaner intelligentsia of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to forge a hardened Afrikaner ethnicity. Ranger's work, as 
mentioned in chapter four, turns Anderson's concept 'on its head', in that it demonstrates how the codification of vernacular languages by missionaries in this period could facilitate the production of a plethora of ethnicised identities, rather forging a 
single nationalist one. 50 However identities could form within language groups. For example, the Mpondo and Mpondomise of the 'Nguni' language group (see the introduction by M. Wilson in A. M. Duggan-Cronin, The Bantu Tribes of South Africa, Vol 3, Section 2, The Mpondo and Mpondomise, Cambridge, 1949). 
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the African peoples were concerned primarily with colonial land expropriation and being able 
to survive. Codification of languages also led to culturally-brokered constructions of history 
which served to harden ethnic identifications. Concepts of 'special destiny', 'sacred vows' and 
`chosen people' evolved through these re-interpretations of historical events. 
To utilise just one example, there were some intriguing similarities between culturally brokered 
concepts of Mfengu identity and that of Afrikaners in this period. The Afrikaner language, 
although mainly based on Dutch, had diverse origins including Malay, Portuguese, Khoisan, 
and elements of German, French, English and Southern Nguni languages. 51 Therefore, there 
was originally a great diversity of dialects amongst Afrikaner communities in South Africa. 
This became the focus of widespread political attention in the early twentieth century. 
Rinderpest, agrarian reform and change, the South African war and the subsequent rapid 
urbanisation of formerly rural Afrikaners led to a process of assimilation in which poorer 
Afrikaners merged with other peoples, ethnic boundaries breaking down and becoming more 
fluid. In addition, the upper strata of Cape Afrikaner society was becoming Increasingly 
anglicised as British rule entrenched itself in the nineteenth century. Many Cape Afrikaners 
took up the economic opportunities which became available, and in the process came to 
support the imperialist project. 52 This alarmed the more radical amongst the Afrikaner 
intelligentsia, who sought to promote a more exciusivist Afrikaner Identity in order to protect 
their own interests, as set against the economic and political hegemony of the English- 
speaking population. By the second decade of the twentieth century, the Second Language 
Movement 
-a body of Afrikaner intellectuals who sought to maintain the Afrikaans language 
and preserve Afrikaner identity - had codified the Afrikaner language. By the mid-1920s, the 
bible had been translated into Afrikaans, and it had also become the second official language. 
The Afrikaner Nationalist Party, which had split away from Smuts' and Botha's more inclusivist 
notion of South African identity, sought to define Afrikaners as a 'chosen people'. People such 
as General Hertzog and Dr Malan (a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church who was later to 
lead the National party to victory in the 1948 election) perceived language as of primary 
importance in avoiding the submergence of Afrikanerdom within a more inclusivist context 53 
The codification of Afrikaans led to the creation of a sacred history which reinforced this notion 
of Afrikaners as a people with a sacred destiny. Much of this sacred history centred around a 
51 
- See I. Hofineyer, 'Building A Nation From Words', P. 96. 
52 For an interesting examination of Cape Afrikaner identity at the end of the nineteenth century, and the influence of Cecil 
Rhodes in its construction, see M. Tamarkin, Cecil Rhodes and the Cape Afrikaners: The Imperial Colossus and the Colonial Parish Pump, London, 1996. Also see M. Tamarkin, 'Nationalism or 'Tribalism': The Evolution of Cape Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness in the Late Nineteenth Century', Nations and Nationalism, Vol 1, Part 2,1995. 53 See H. Gil iomee, 'The Growth of Afrikaner Identity', in H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds), Ethnic Power Mobilised: Can 
South Africa Change? Yale, 1979. In this article, Giliomee quotes Malan, a Dutch Reformed Minister who later led the National party to victory in the 1948 election: 'Raise the Afrikaans language to a written language, let it become the vehicle for our culture, our history, our national ideals, and you will also raise the people who speak it... The Afrikaans Language Movement is nothing less than an awakening of our nation to self-awareness and to the vocation of adopting a more worthy 
position in world civilisation. ' 
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supposed sacred vow, and it is at this juncture where the similarities between culturally 
brokered Mfengu identity and culturally brokered Afrikaner identity become apparent. 
The centennial celebration of the 1838 'Great Trek' involved a celebration of the 'Day of the 
Covenant'. This referred to the vow undertaken by Boer 'Trekkers' a few days before the so- 
called battle of Blood River, when the former gained a crucial victory over the Zulu army. The 
original vow involved an undertaking that if God gave the Trekkers' victory they would ensure 
that the day would be celebrated as an anniversary ever after, and a church would be built in 
order to worship him. The reenactment of this vow a century later became a significant factor 
in crystallising a more exclusivist, politically tribalist version of Afrikaner ethnic Identity. The 
vow, together with the interweaving of particular events in Afrikaner history - such as the 
'Battle of Blood River' itself, the 1899-1902 war and the suffering undergone in the 
concentration camps - into a 'sacred history', led to the culturally brokered version of Afrikaner 
identity aimed at by the Broederbond and other cultural organisations promoting a reification of 
an exclusivist Afrikaner identity 54 It became something of a 'civil religion', with Afrikaner 
people being projected as a 'chosen people'. Afrikaner identity was portrayed In terms of 
blood, descent, and 'special calling', an exclusivist form of spiritualised Identity very much in 
the mould of nascent ethnic nationalism. 
Conversely, the celebration of the centenary of 'Fingo Emancipation Day', which occured only 
three years earlier, was couched in different terms. As illustrated above, the central themes 
promoted in pursuing this celebration were mission education, christianity and a type of 
Victorian concept of 'evolutionary progress', much in vogue with early African nationalists. 
Nevertheless, there are striking similarities between the two. Both the culturally brokered 
Afrikaner identity adhered to by radicalised members of the Afrikaner intelligentsia, and the 
'Fingo Emancipation' celebrations implied a form of 'special destiny': the former couched in 
terms of separation from the perceived destiny of others (especially English speakers, British 
imperialism being the significant 'other' against which Afrikaner ethnic culture brokers 
identified themselves), and the latter in terms of 'evolutionary progress' and 'enlightenment'. 
The contrast between the two demonstrates the difficulty of providing an overlying civic 
nationalist identity amongst Africans at this historical juncture, and the qualified success of 
promoting Afrikaner ethnic nationalism. However, in order to illustrate this fully, it is necessary 
to take into account the consciousness of the bulk of ordinary people, Afrikaner and African, 
and how they perceived these newly reformulated identities. For the machinations and 
rhetoric of ethnic and nationalist culture brokers cannot be relied upon to supply the complete 
complex reality of how ordinary people perceived these identities. 
54 See D. Moodie, The Rise ofAfrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, chapter 9. also L. 
Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid, London, 1985. 
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Language was also a limitation in terms of promoting civic nationalism among African peoples. 
African ethnicised identities certainly seem to have focussed around the various remnant 
chiefdoms in this period, partly as this was the only available source of identity which could be 
mobilised in order to resist colonial incursions. Wider identifications were curtailed by such 
criteria as language barriers. It can be tenuously suggested that there was a link between 
civic nationalism, class and multilingualism. Of course many ordinary blacks spoke more than 
one language, but these were utilised in day-to-day interaction, and not codified, standardised 
and entrenched within the parameters of a political project. The interaction of colonial and 
indigenous peoples, however, also held the possibility of wider affiliations and identities 
becoming available. 
9.3 The Changing Nature of Ethnicised Identities Prior to 1948: Some Theoretical 
Reflections 
Before examining the development of ethnic and national identities in the second half of the 
twentieth century, it is worthwhile reflecting upon the connections between pre-colonial forms 
of consciousness and those which evolved from the late nineteenth century onwards. What is 
perhaps most apparent is that the ideology of individualism implicitly promoted by early 
mission schools was not entirely upheld by the early African nationalists who emerged from 
them. There does seem to have been a need for the submergence of the individual within 
kinship relationships, and the overlaying of Christian values did not necessarily contradict this. 
Additionally, migrant labour and policies of segregation seem to have provoked a 'freezing' of 
African identities in this period, Africans selecting different facets of European modes of living 
and belief patterns, synthesising them with indigenous African moral world views, and 
adhering to these syncretic identities years after the European components of these identity 
constructions had largely disappeared from European societies. The fact that these eclectic 
identities varied considerably, often reflecting generational, gender, and early class divides, 
demonstrate the markedly different paths towards modernity which Africans trod in these 
years. Noni Jabavu poignantly comments on certain aspects of life of some of her Christian, 
mission educated relatives, noting that they consciously refused to update certain household 
equipment, preferring to use much older types. She argues that this was because they 'were 
wedded to the Victorian way of life, the kind of 'Westernization' that seemed to have truly 
penetrated' 55 As Jabavu'was writing in the era of early apartheid, this demonstrates the way 
European cultural facets were selected, 'frozen' and re-worked in order to synthesize with 
reformulated African identity formations, providing an example of 'selective conservatism'. 
55 N. Jabavu, The Ochre People, P. 157. 'School' women also appropriated forms of Victorian dress, and these remained an 
important form of cultural identity marker into the 1950s. See P. Mayer, 'The Origin and Decline of Two Rural Resistance 
Ideologies', in P. Mayer (ed), Black Villagers in an Industrial Society, p. p. 27-28. 
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Male associations such as Indlavini groups56 also selected facets of European life-styles, such 
as clothing. 'Oxford bag' style trousers were adopted and adapted by Indlavini members in 
the 1930s as a mark of reformulated identity. A 'European' fashion, 'itself an expression of 
social freedom in the 1920s, was adopted, adapted and then retained as a relatively fixed 
style for the next half century' S7 Furthermore, in both these widely differing examples, 
previous African customs were reformulated rather than eradicated. The individual was also 
submerged within the context of the 'group', the former in terms of a religious affiliation 
translated into a complete life-style, and the latter in terms of a reformulated male association 
which, influenced by the process of migrant labour, broke away from traditionalist youth 
organisations whilst retaining a considerable amount of traditionalist custom, including 
submerging individual interests for the group. 58 Although simplifying a complex situation, it 
seems reasonable to generalise that it was only with more permanent migration to urban 
areas in the later inter-war years that this eclectic form of identity formation began to break 
down 59 Altruistic tendencies towards the group only then began to erode significantly. 
Altruism was a significant factor in pre-capitalist African societies, at least within the 'tribe'. 
There were also mechanisms for assimilating peoples from outside the 'tribe' or clan, as 
illustrated above. These altruistic tendencies among small-scale societies have been the 
focus of many anthropological and social scientific studies in the past, which sought to 
conceptualise. the changes which the impact of colonialism, capitalism and the growth of 
individualism wrought on these moral universes 60 The need for mutual cooperation In terms 
of agriculture, hunting, foraging and defense was high in parts of these societies due to a 
relatively low level of technology and a relatively simple division of labour. Reciprocity and 
mutual cooperation seem to have been reinforced through symbolism, ritual and religious 
beliefs. To take just one example, ancestor worship was extremely important in terms of 
bonding communities, and directly influenced altruistic motives amongst peoples of the same 
clan or 'tribe'. Indeed, ancestors were very much part of everyday reality for many Southern 
African peoples, and they would often be perceived as shaping the day-to-day lives of the 
people concerned. Kidd's portrayal of African rural societies in the early part of the twentieth 
56 See chapter 8 for how Indlavini groups represented a possible example of moral ethnicity. 57 W. Beinart, 'The Origins of the Indlavini: Male Associations and Migrant Labour in the Transkei', in A. Spiegel and P. 
McAllister (eds), Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 1991, P. 116. 58 Again, see chapter 8 for a thorough analysis of the development of these male associations, their relationship to ethnic 
identities, and the effect of migrant labour upon their formation. 59 See W. Beinart, 'Political and collective Violence in Southern African Historiography', in JSAS, Vol 18, No 3,1992, P. 479. 
Beinart also records a section of Dikobe's novel The Marabi Dance (London, 1973), which refers to a member of an urban 
street gang in the 1930s: 'He could speak neither Sesuthu, which was his father's language, nor Afrikaaans, his mother's 
language, well. He could not finish a sentence in a single language'. This implicitly demonstrates the importance of 
vernacular languages in maintaining rural ethnicised identities, for in the urban slum context at least, the breakdown of 
language barriers resulted in different forms of allegiance. 60 For just four of many examples over a wide span of time see the following: F. Tonnies, Community and Society, Michigan, 
1957, G. and M. Wilson, The Analysis of Social Change Based on Observations in Central Africa, Cambridge, 1944, M. 
Wilson, 'Change in Scale', in M. Wilson (ed), Religion and the Transformation of Society, Cambridge, 1971, D. Kidd, Kafir Socialism. 
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century reflects this closeness of the ancestors. This is despite his tendency to conflate the 
lived experiences of different African communities, and his assumption that they were mostly 
unable to adapt to 'western' life styles: 
The Kafirs live in a very circumscribed environment, and the memory 
of an old man's personality would pervade all associations of the kraal 
in which he lived... the power of association would bring him to their 
thoughts a thousand times a day, and the spot close to the cattle kraal 
where they buried him would seem to be the focus of these memories. 
The natives draw omens from every trifling incident of life, and would 
connect the memory of the old man with all their fortunes... All their 
joys, fears, hopes and sorrows would be connected with this dead man's 
personality. 61 
Incurring the wrath of the ancestors through, for example, neglecting their worship or pursuing 
individual interests to the detriment of the wider community, could thus invoke serious 
consequences62 
The effect of Christianity and its attendant individualism did not eradicate this form of 
community bonding. Jingoes places great stress upon the importance of the ancestors in 
shaping his life, arguing that there is no contradiction between being a Christian and ancestor 
worship: 
When I am in trouble, or when I pray for anything, I pray first to 
my ancestors, and ask them to take my prayer to the Lord Jesus. 
Many Basotho say that Roman Catholics are worshipping their 
ancestors in the saints; why, they ask, should one appeal to 
ancestors who never knew one, and who are not of one's lineage, 
when one's own ancestors are there? I have never felt guilty, just 
83 
because ministers say it is a sin to worship the ancestors. 
61 D. Kidd, The Essential Kafir, London, 1925 (2nd ed, first published 1904), P. 79. Kidd further comments that such issues as 
food crops or drought were perceived as primarily due to the pleasure or displeasure of the ancestors (ibid). 2 lbid, P. p. 137-40. For a useful overview of the way ancestors shaped the lives of the many diverse rural African communities 
of the first half of the twentieth century , synthesising the work of many 
different anthropologists, see the following: W. D. 
Hammond-Tooke, 'World-View One: A System of Beliefs', and 'World View Two: A System of Action', in W. D. llammond- 
Tooke (ed), The Bantu Speaking Peoples of Southern Africa, London, 1974. There is an element of ahistoricity in these works 
but, when made historically contingent, they offer valuable insights which are generally not forthcoming in historical works 
which reify materialist analysis to the detriment of everything else (see chapters two and three for a discussion concemir+g these 
themes). 
63 S. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief by the People. P. M. 
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D. D. T. Jabavu similarly upheld many aspects of African custom which aimed at avoiding 
individualism and promoted reciprocity, as did Solomon Plaatje (see above). The ambiguities 
which resulted from this eclectism had important repercussions in terms of the development of 
ethnic identities. This was especially apparent in Natal and Zululand during the 1920s and 
1930s. 64 
What seems to have been sown in the first half of the twentieth century were the seeds of civic 
and ethnic nationalism, as well as moral ethnicity. But it is important not to conceptualise 
these movements in terms of binary opposites. Civic and ethnic nationalism evolved from the 
same social and cultural origins. Nationalism has historically always been an ambiguous 
phenomenon, and in the nineteenth century allied with most nineteenth century ideologies, 
such as socialism, liberalism and conservatism. 65 In the South African context, it seems to 
have been synthesised with selected facets of African cultural world views in an ecletic 
manner by early twentieth century African nationalists. Products of both mission school 
education, but fully aware and sympathetic towards facets of indigenous African culture, this 
nascent civic nationalist movement contained the seeds of both an inclusive, fully developed 
civic nationalist ideology, but could also deteriorate into ethnic nationalism due to the possible 
reification of older pre-colonial identities into a more ossified, politically tribalist ethnicity, as 
sometimes happened in the era of apartheid. The arrival of literacy and 'print-capitalism' 
allowed the growth of 'imagined communities' based on these criteria, as it also allowed 
culture-brokers to widen the appeal of an ethnicised Afrikaner identity. However, as Afrikaner 
identity became more explicit, it also became more debated In terms of what actually 
represented an identity. As Giliomee states, 'sacred histories' might have been important to 
ethnic culture brokers such as the Broederbond, but it was enough for many ordinary 
Afrikaners 'to be told that they were a separate people with particular interests that could best 
be promoted through mobilisation'66 It was only after Smuts took South Africa into the 
Second World War on the side of Britain that the concept of a more inclusive English and 
Afrikaans speaking identity was shattered as old anti-British and anti-imperialist feelings were 
re-awoken 67 
For many Africans, especially those who lived amongst remnant chiefdoms such as the Zulu 
or Mpondo, kinship identities were still a powerful force, and this sense of a family kinship was 
widened through mobilising ethnicised identities. 68 Although this was partly ideological, and 
with the advent of a more widely available print readership could be defined in numerous 
64 
See chapter S. 
See chapter 3. 
65 
66 H. Giliomee, 'The Growth of Afrikaner Identity', in H. Adam and H. Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa 
Change? Yale, 1979. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See chapter 3. 
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different ways, this widening also entailed what previously were implicit, 'passive' identities 
into explicit, mobilised, political forces. However, once these 'passive' identities became 
more explicit, as they did both through the dissemination of newspapers and through the 
contact of different peoples on the mines, they at once formed ethnicised boundaries, as 
people began to define themselves against others. Cultural differences became politically 
salient, especially where resources were scarce and a mobilisation of putative characteristics 
could ensure a greater share of these - something that mine management positively 
encouraged on the mines in order to avoid the possibility of a more cohesive and united 
workforce. 69 The incorporation of 'strangers' into smaller pre-colonial chiefdoms was no longer 
possible, peoples' consciousness having been altered through increasing contact with others, 
in a rapidly changing, incomplete and unequal socio-economic climate. People were now 
more conscious of ethnicised identities, and as such, where these identities could matter, as 
they often did in an era of segregation, boundaries were drawn and the inclusive metaphoric 
family of pre-colonial clans and 'tribes' became more exclusivist in nature. These identities 
therefore remained important despite the arrival of ideologies of individualism through mission 
education and a nascent capitalist economy, or maybe even because of them, as 
individualism itself allowed a far greater, more explicit debate concerning what exactly 
represented, for example, Zulu or Mpondo identity. The eclectism of African communities in 
terms of reformulating ethnic identities by adapting certain aspects of European originating 
ideologies and life-styles, and then re-investing them with different symbolic - sometimes 
ethnicised - meanings, is an example of this debate. African nationalist culture brokers had to 
deal with this proliferation of debated identities in the era of apartheid (and indeed, in the 
aftermath of its demise), whereas Afrikaner identity, due in no small part to the more rapid 
proletarian isation of Afrikaners, was less complicated in terms of being manipulated by ethnic 
nationalist culture brokers of a more exclusivist bent. 
9.4 Ethnic and National Identities In Post 1948 South Africa 
The coming to power of Malan's Nationalist party, and the subsequent growth of apartheid 
policy, is perhaps an obvious juncture in South African history. As will be discussed, politically 
ethnicised identities began to assume increasing importance from 1948 onwards, and were 
increasingly manipulated from 'above'. Apartheid legislation such as the 1953 Bantu 
Education Act, the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-government 
Act, and the 1970 Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, all sought in various ways to manipulate 
divisions amongst Africans, and socially engineer ethnicised identities In order to subvert a 
growing African Nationalism. However, it is important to recognise continuities between the 
era of apartheid and earlier forms of segregation. For example, the 1927 Native 
69 Ibid. 
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Administration Act similarly sought to promote 'retribalization' in order to subvert African 
national political organisation. 70 
Afrikaner nationalism had itself been forged through a process of ethnic mobilisation in the first 
four decades of the century. However, although the gaining of power by the National party 
led 
to a monolithic construction of the Afrikaner volk for more than two decades, Afrikaner 
ideologues were never completely united, and the exigencies of the political economy, and 
increasing political opposition from both inside and outside the country, led to a more 
technicist discourse of capitalist rationality being emphasised from the late 1970s onwards, 
something which did not resonate with advocates of Afrikaners' 'special destiny'. In fact, the 
Afrikaner elite was split from the early 1970s onwards. 
" African Nationalism meanwhile had 
to contend with the social engineering of apartheid, and the manipulation of ethnicised 
identities which sought to play on the powerful emotional pull of remnant older 
forms of identity 
construction. African nationalism itself followed several paths towards modernity 
in this 
period72, in tandem with powerful forms of political tribalism, such as a growing 
Zulu ethnic 
nationalism. 
The difficulties of unifying African people within a broad, inclusive nationalism still remained 
in 
this period. Migrant labour, and the policies of segregation pursued in the first half of the 
twentieth century, had combined with the still powerful unifying force of remnant chiefdoms - 
themselves originally a focus of resistance to colonial rule - in order to produce many differing 
identity constructions. Popular consciousness was both shaped by, and shaped, these 
elements, and portrayed many of the tensions between egalitarianism and inequality which 
existed in pre-colonial African communities. African popular consciousnesss in this period 
evolved through the idiom of class, ethnicity and nationalism, intertwining these with older 
forms of consciousness which had evolved in rural areas, thus creating a plethora of eclectic 
identities. Changing identities were also inextricably gendered, even for elites. For example, 
Nelson Mandela implies in his autobiography that his concept of 'manhood' changed with his 
developing national consciousness. From initially conceiving of himself as a man through the 
process of male initiation in his youth, he argues intermittently throughout that he only really 
became a man through this widening of consciousness. 
73 
70 
See S. Dubow, Racial Segregation, Chapter 4. 
71 
This split was embodied in two main modes of thought, 'verligtes' (the enlightened) and "verkramptes' (conservatives). 
The former sought to revise some of the petty apartheid legislation in order to make white nationalism more internationally 
acceptable. 
72 As evidenced by the breakaway of the Pan African Congress in the early 1960s, which sought to promte a more explicit 
Africanist notion of South African identity, excluding whites. 73 N. Mandela, Long Walk To Freedom, London, 1995. P. 36, p. p. 750-1, and passim. 
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Despite the policy of 'separate development' which grew through the 1950s and 1960s, black 
urbanisation still occured. The inevitable, but highly uneven and limited, growth of black 
capitalist consumption, individualism and the erosion of many facets of rural and migrant 
values, meant that many ethnicised divisions broke down in some black urban areas. 
Ethnicised conflict and identifications were few in the township of Langa, Cape Town in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, and anthropologists working in the area at the time found that 
divisions based on language were rare due to the ability of Xhosa speakers (who 
predominated) to integrate Engish and Afrikaans terms when in town. 74 This reinforces the 
observations made by Noni Jabavu, mentioned above, who observed that languages also 
merged easily in the more rural context of the Eastern Cape. Language could therefore be 
inclusive as well as exclusive in terms of identity and social interaction. In Langa, National 
party policies of 'ethnic grouping' fostered most of any ethnicised cleavages which did occur: 
'Left to themselves people from the same district tend to live together when they first come to 
town, but gradually they are absorbed into the wider community. Compulsory 'ethnic 
grouping' slows up the process of absorption'. 75 Rural-urban divides were found to be far more 
important in dividing African communities. 76 
Rural-urban divides in the 1950s and 1960s were widespread amongst many African 
communities and, although in Langa they did not primarily mirror ethnicised divides (although 
there were overlaps), in other areas these divides often corresponded with ethnicised 
identities which arose originally in the wake of colonial and capitalist penetration. It seems 
that this form of division, which was exacerbated by the longevity of the migrant labour 
process, was responsible for the many differing routes to modernity which Africans undertook 
in the first two decades of apartheid. Perhaps the example par excellence of this divide 
existed in the Eastern Cape, where it remained prevalent from colonial times until at least the 
1970s. 77 However, although the rhetoric of adherents to 'Red' or 'School' ways of life 
presented a scenario of insoluble divisions between adherents to'selective traditionalism' or a 
type of 'frozen' Victorian belief in 'Westernised' education and 'enlightenment', in practice 
there were many overlaps, with each sub-culture taking part in certain activities and rituals 
which were primarily perceived to be in the moral realm of the other. 78 This mirrors the 
attempts by nationalist culture brokers such as D. D. T. Jabavu to integrate certain African 
customs with a wider, European originating nationalist consciousness. 
74 
M. Wilson and A. Mafeje, Langa: A Study of Social Groups in an African Township, London. 1963. P. 34. 75 75 
-- Ibid. 
76 
 ___ 1bia, P. 35. 
77 
See chapter 3. 
78 Ibid. 
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These increasing forms of debate regarding what best represented a people in a fast changing 
socio-economic climate could lend itself equally easily to either ethnic or civic nationalism. In 
fact, the nature of the' ANC in the 1970s and 1980s, with most of its senior ideologues either 
exiled or imprisoned, meant that - during these decades - they became divorced from the 
majority of the people in terms of aspirations and grievances. As mentioned earlier, people 
could only mobilise identities around what was available to them. The centralised nationalism 
of the ANC, promoting abstract concepts of a unified South Africa, and dismissing (much as 
Marxist academics did in the 1970s) ethnic identities as solely the creation of apartheid and 
the 'homelands' policy, did not allow for an empathetic relationship with the very real 
identifications of many uneducated rural people, unschooled in abstract principles of 
democratic nationalism. Earlier civic nationalist ideologues, despite often antagonising 
ethnicised divisions, did try to merge nationalist ideology with localised forms of identity and 
custom. This, despite the fact that they still sought eventual cultural assimilation. The failure 
to take on board the fact that many people did mobilise around ethnic identities in order to air 
their grievances could lead to the capture of these people by ethnic nationalist ideologues, 
intent on pursuing political projects which had very little to do with democratic nationalism. 
In certain areas of South Africa, ethnicised divisions existed amongst even educated African 
elites. Again, this often corresponded with rural-urban divides. 79 It seems reasonable to 
suggest tentatively that rural-urban divides were often at the root of ethnic stereotypes 
between different African peoples. In urban areas, 'such traditional criteria of evaluation as 
family line, relationship to the chief, possession of cattle, and ancestral 
graves ... (were)... largely irrelevant for placing the stranger'. 
8° Thus older forms of identification, 
differentiation and assimilation between different peoples and communities were breaking 
down. Certainly, anthropologists working among a range of different African urban 
communities in the 1950s and 1960s found that loyalty to the institution of chieftaincy, so long 
the pivot of 'tribal' society and resistance to colonial rule, was rapidly disintegrating 81 On mine 
compounds, loyalty to the chieftaincy had long been eroding due to the process of migrant 
labour, the consequent growth of independence for young men, and the manipulation of 
ethnicised identities by both mine management and migrant workers themselves for mutually 
79 See L Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, London, 1965, chp 8, which refers specifically to the case of Durban. The issue is 
also discussed in chapter seven of this thesis. Although set a little earlier, in the 1940s, Ezekiel Mphahlele's experience of 
Adams College, Durban, reinforces Kuper's points: 'I left Adams with a nagging memory of the strong spirit of tribalism that 
prevailed in Natal... The province is predominantly Zulu country, and the bulk of the students at Adams have always been 
Zulus. They did not like non-Zulu boys and girls coming to the college. They regarded us as foreigners, to be avoided. They 
regarded us from the Transvaal as dangerous rascals and they had the superstitious belief that we carried deadly knives in our 
rockets' (E. Mphalele, Down Second Avenue, London, 1959. P. 148). 
8o L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie. P. 84. 
81 Ibid, p. p. 84-86; M. Wilson and A. Mafeje, Langa, p. p. 37-38; M. Brandet-Syrier, Ree. town Elite: A Study of Social Mobility 
in a Modern African Community on the Reef, London, 1971. P. 111. 
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exclusive reasons. 2 In this context, the institution of chieftaincy was often replaced by that of 
culture. 83 
Aspects of pre-colonial African moral value systems were still important to many people 
however, both in rural and urban contexts. Brandel-Syrier's study of a small urban 'location' 
in 1960s southern Transvaal found that many people expected the small educated African 
elite to behave in similar ways to rurally based headmen and chiefs, in terms of reciprocity and 
hospitality. She argues that status in the community depended not so much on any perceived 
prestige inherent in any high status professional job or business, but on how this status was 
reciprocated back into the community. What counted in the original communal society was 
not status as such 'but status communally expressed, status socially operative, status 
actualized in society. Only when status was displayed in overt conduct, in concrete and 
visible signs, did it 'serve' the community'. 84 She compares the expected reciprocal duties of 
rurally based headmen to those of urban teachers, quoting extensively from informants. 
As with the chiefs and headmen of old: `the headman has to 
put up a show. he has to make a display of social activities, 
that is he must give beer parties and extend hospitality. He 
must kill more cattle than others for his guests. He must 
receive more people and go and visit more people. If he does 
not show his headmanship in such ways, his people do not 
consider him a real induna. So with the teachers. As the 
teachers were the first group to represent prestige in the new 
order, and certain problems of this new kind of status had to 
be first faced with reference to them, they were always quoted 
as examples. It was said for instance, 'A teacher must behave 
like a teacher, otherwise we do not recognise him as a teacher, 
or 'Teaching ability in itself means nothing. You must give the 
display due to your status as a teacher, then Africans will respect 
you; only then will they think you are somebody. 85 
This very much reflects Lonsdale's concept of the expected reciprocities inherent in the pre- 
colonial moral economies of Africa, albeit in a more class-defined sense. 
86 Later other 
82 See chapter 3. 
83 Ibid. 
84 M. Brandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite: A Study of Social Mobility in a Modern African Community on the Reef, London, 1971, 
p. 96. 
8s Ibid. 
86 Brandel-Syrier's study is particularly useful in that it attempts to analyse how Africans themselves perceive their structural 
positions in South Africa's developing capitalist economy. She demonstrates in her introduction that Africans in her area of 
study perceive far more subtle differences in terms of 'class' position than was perceived from 'outside', either by Europeans or 
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Africans followed suit, as more professions became open to Africans to suit the needs of the 
capitalist economy. 
Earlier members of the African elite, such as Jabavu, Plaatje, and others, also endeavoured to 
support this form of societal reciprocity. However, the elite in Brandel-Syrier's study was 
increasingly cutting itself off from community service and contact with people situated in other 
socio-economic groupings. 87 This reflected an increasing class consciousness, but set within 
a particularly Southern African social setting. The upper echelons of Reeftown society were 
becoming increasingly divorced from the concerns of the majority of the African population, 
and thus began to lose the latter's respect-respect being one of the central pillars of rural 
moral values. This may also have made the growing elites more available for incorporation 
into the de-politicised middle-class 'buffer zone' created by Botha in the 1980s in order to 
divert a growing African nationalist consciousness. The manipulations of chiefly genealogies, 
and the institutions of chieftaincies themselves, by the apartheid regime also evoked various 
responses from African peoples. Many rural Africans still identified with the institution of the 
chieftaincy well into the 1970s, and many still do so today. This was despite the fact that the 
policy of 'separate development' promulgated by the National party manipulated chiefly 
institutions in order to 'retribalise' Africans, and avoid both a complete proletarianisation of the 
black workforce and subvert the growth of African nationalism. The support for the chieftaincy 
from rural people did not, however, necessarily entail support for the National party's 
manipulations of it. Pre-colonial chieftaincies involved reciprocity and accountability to the 
people, although this is not to suggest that they could not be autocratic and harsh 88 The 
apartheid regime rode rough-shod over this fact, attempting to create a rigidified institution. 
The fact that many rural Africans regretted this imposition as an indication of the eventual 
demise of the chieftaincy, demonstrates not only their opposition to apartheid, but also that 
they centred this opposition around rural identities and ethnicities rooted in the pre-colonial 
era. 
The survival of loyalties emanating from pre-colonial times also lent themselves to African 
ethnic culture brokers. The historical development of Zulu nationalism has been dealt with in 
other Africans. Furthermore, as is demonstrated by the quote in the main text, she also argues that culturally-based status is 
just as important in 'Reeftown' Africans' self-definition as a purely structural class analysis. Interestingly, she utilises the life- 
history approach which later social historians such as Moodie and Beinart also utilise. this seems to bring out the self- 
perceptions of Africans without conflating their experiences to that of an abstract, structural concept of class position. The 
attempt to 'let people speak for themselves' seems to be one of the major contributions of radical social historiography in the 
late 1980s, and in this sense can be seen to have followed in the tradition of anthropological works such as that of Brandel- 
Syrier, Hellman, the Mayers and others. It is important to note, however, that these forms of anthropological approaches were in the minority in South Africa until recently. R7 
M. Iirandel-Syrier, Reeftown Elite, p. 295. 88 For example see the following: J. Comaroff, 'Chiefship in a South African Homeland: A Case Study of the Tshidi Chiefdom 
of Bophuthatswana', in JSAS, Vol 1, No 1,1974; S. Jingoes, A Chief is a Chief by the People, Chps 7 and 8; W. Beinart, 'Chieftaincy and the Concept of Articulation'; S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism 
and the State in TwentiethCentury Natal,, London. 1986. 
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an earlier chapter, and therefore will not be reiterated here. However, it is important to re- 
emphasise the fact that this was not just an imposition of constructed ethnic identity from 
'above . 89 The fact that the ANC only belately addressed the fact that Inkatha could represent 
real grievances of poverty stricken people demonstrated its inability to address the issues 
confronting black South Africans on a day to day basis. Abstract concepts of democratic 
nation-building did not take fully into account local grievances, which often hardened into 
ethnicised conflict. This was perhaps best illustrated in the conflict between township youth 
and hostel dwellers, both in the 1976 Soweto uprising, and the later insurrections of the 
1980s. Perhaps in this context, the 'Black Consciousness' movement was more successful 
than the ANC. For it did attempt to link older forms of African custom and identifications to a 
more pan-African identity, whilst simultaneously attempting to overcome the sense of 
inferiority engendered by apartheid ideology and earlier missionary proseletyzing. 
Afrikaners themselves had been more rapidly proletarianised than Africans, and the gaining of 
power by the National party in 1948 seemed to have ensured the survival of the volk. The 
1960s and 1970s saw a rapid increase in the rate of urbanisation for Afrikaners, and whites 
generally. European and American consumer patterns also permeated deeply. The apartheid 
period was 'one of suburbanization and the spread of a rather derivative consumer culture 
spliced on to the gnarled old settler stock' 90 Although the gaining of Afrikaner wealth and 
security was one of the main aims of early apartheid culture brokers, and this was now 
achieved, this may have been a somewhat pyrrhic victory. Despite the fact that there has 
been little research into the contemporary consciousness of Afrikaners, it could be argued that 
this increase in urbanisation, and the attendent increase in wealth and entry into a society 
dominated by consumerism, laid the groundwork for a reformulation of Afrikaner ethnic 
identity. Many urbanised middle-class Afrikaners in the 1960s and 1970s still held to 
apartheid, and defended its racist tenets, but the considerable growth in wealth certainly 
influenced the changes which later resulted from international sanctions and internal unrest 
within the country. The verlig/verkramp split during the late 1960s to the 1980s, economic 
stagnation during the 1980s and international pressure in the aftermath of the Cold War, all 
combined with this growth in wealth so that some Afrikaners were willing to accept the end of 
apartheid. Furthermore, they were willing to undergo a painful redefinition of Afrikaner identity 
in order to protect their privileged position. By the 1980s apartheid had become an economic 
and social obstacle to many Afrikaners seeking to protect their economically privileged 
position. Many were therefore prepared to undergo a painful redefinition of Afrikaner identity. 
89 Many pro-ANC academics made this mistaken assumption. For just one example, see Mzala, Buthelezl: Chief With a Double Agenda, London, 1988. Mzala recognises no form of unforced support for the ethnic nationalism represented by Inkatha. However, as Marks argues, reconstructions of the past have a powerful emotional pull on people, including young 
men and women, especially in a climate of social poverty and political unrest (personal interview, May 1996). 90 W. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, P. 173. See chapter 7 of the same work for an insightful overview of South African economy and societies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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It was for these reasons that de Klerk sought to dismantle apartheid in the early 1990s. This 
very act was an attempt to ensure the ethnic survival and privileges of Afrikaner identity 91 
The demise of apartheid has not led to an immediate erosion of ethnic identifications in South 
Africa. It is interesting to note that both the National party and the ANC are now accepting the 
need to capture the 'ethnic' vote. The Deputy Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Mohammed 
Valli Moosa, was quoted in a recent newspaper article as follows: 
If we make the mistake made by the left in many other parts 
of the world - simply to ignore ethnicity or claim it does not 
exist - we run the risk of ethnicity rearing its head in a divisive 
form, as in other African countries and central Europe. 92 
Ths same article has as its centre piece a photo of de Klerk, replete with Sotho blanket and 
hat, promoting the National party's policy of cultural pluralism. It is one of the ironies of South 
African history that the universalist, civic nationalism espoused by the ANC, is now attempting 
to come to terms with ethnic identities, at the same time as the National party is attempting to 
promote a concept of equality through cultural pluralism only a few years after promoting 
ethnicised divisions through the 'homelands policy' (although cultural pluralism still retains 
echoes of separation of peoples due to ethnic categorisation). The effects of migrant labour, 
apartheid and remnant pre-colonial concepts of identity have all contributed to the tenacity of 
ethnic identifications. Intertwining with other forms of identity construction, they have 
represented a myriad of different paths to modernity in twentieth century South Africa. 
'Selective traditionalism' has been used by both elite ethnic culture brokers such as 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in order to pursue his own political agenda and mask structural 
economic, class and gender inequalities, but also by many ordinary people. The process of 
migrant labour has ensured that people can revert to supporting the institution of chieftaincy, 
and uphold ethnic identifications as a last existential redoubt in a fast-changing socio- 
economic climate in which the ANC may, or may not, be able to deliver the promises of 
rectifying the structural inequalities which exist. Political tribalist versions of ethnic identity 
have entrenched themselves in the latter half of the twentieth century, but they may not be 
perceived as undemocratic and oppressive by people who are looking for a way out of the 
structural economic impasse which is the legacy of colonial rule, apartheid and the particular 
path of global economic development. Identifying with the structures of remnant chiefdoms in 
91 IL Giliomee, ' "Broedertwis": Intra-Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid', African Affairs, Vol 91,1992. 
Also see D. O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994, Randburg, 
1996, although O'Meara does place such stress on ethnic survival as a factor in these reforms. 92 Mail and Guardian, May 24 1996, P. 27. 
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an ethnicised sense allows for the upkeeping of a form of personal integrity in uncertain times. 
New forms of contemporary ethnic identifications are also developing throughout the world, 
and South Africa is no exception to their development. Many of these forms of identity are 
linked to a growing globalised consumer culture which tends towards standardisation and 
media representation of ethnicity. Some of these identity constructs are shallow. 
For 
example, some elements of the middle classes in the United States have attached themselves 
to selected facets of ethnic symbolism in order to 'spice up' a rather standardised, uniform 
lifestyle. - 'Ethnic chic' has become increasingly popular in the United States, producing a 
shallow form of voluntary, symbolic ethnic identification, which can be selected and 
dropped at 
will. Quoting Delbanco, Pieterse illustrates this form of superficial ethnicisation with respect to 
contemporary 'Italian-Americans' rather well: 
The ancestors of people who (now) wear the "Kiss me, I'm 
Italian" T-Shirt never thought of themselves as such-but as 
Sicilian, or Calabrian, or Neapolitan-and would be mystified 
by their 'Italian American' children... Likewise the Italian food 
served to visitors at home maybe fashionable north Italian 
cuisine quite unfamiliar to their ancestors. 
93 
The fact that ethnicity is still a political hot potato in South Africa perhaps precludes 
the 
development of this form of 'Hollywoodised' ethnicity wholesale, but media celebratory 
portrayals of certain ethnic groups contain facets of this form of Identity formation (although 
not in such a shallow sense). Recent ethnic identity construction in West Africa has involved 
Non-Governmental Organisations and some commercial companies, which attempt to pursue 
a business policy which takes into account environmental and human rights concerns. 
Survival International and The Body Shop are just two examples. Both effectively utilise 
media sources in order to promote what they portray as the positive aspects of ethnic 
mobilisation and identification, but in the process sometimes inadvertently construct forms of 
celebratory, essentialised forms of ethnicity. The recent interest amongst these forms of 
organisations regarding the plight of the Ogoni people in Nigeria, who at the time of writing are 
being systematically exploited by the oil company Shell, provide two examples. 
s4 Probably the 
93 J. Nederveen Pieterse, 'Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity Discourse', in E. Wilmsen and P. McAllister (eds), The 
Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power, London, 1996, p. 31. Pieterse is part quoting A. Delbanco, 
'Pluralism and its Discontents', Transition, Vol 55,1992. 94 A. Campbell, 'Ethical Ethnicity: A Critique', JMAS, Vol 35, No 1,1997. Campbell is extremely critical of the work of 
these organisations in this article, arguing that they promote a version of the colonial myth of the 'Noble Savage'. However, 
this completely ignores the very valuable work that these organisations carry out in conjunction with the people they work 
with. 
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best-known similar case in southern Africa is the example of the people of Namaqualand in 
the Northwest Cape. Many of the inhabitants here have deliberately invoked an essentialised 
pre-colonial Khoikhoi identity in order to retain access to land. The media has sympathetically 
constructed and disseminated this form of essentialised ethnicisation. 
95 -There are similar 
examples among the so-called 'Bushmen' of Botswana96 
In some respects these forms of ethnic mobilisation contain positive elements, as outlined by 
Cynthia Enloe. 97 However they can challenge the legitimacy of the national state within which 
they exist. This may not be a detrimental factor in some instances, as at least one prominent 
Africanist historian has recently argued. 98 However, entrenching of ethnicised identities in 
South Africa is problematic, due to the legacy of the apartheid state. These forms of 
identification can also open up opportunities for politically tribalist manipulation of ethnicity by 
ethnic entrepreneurs. Media portrayals of Zulus as 'Noble Savages' could promote the 
agendas of politicians such as Mangusutho Buthelezi, whilst constructing a form of ethnic chic. 
For example the 1986 film Shaka Zulu, which simultaneously lent support to the apartheid 
policies of the National Party and Buthelezi's reified version of Zulu identity, also provided a 
powerful symbol around which young black Americans defined themselves. 
99 Although the 
latter is a problematic example of ethnic chic, as it is not just based on middle class selection 
of ethnic identity, the example of Shaka Zulu does illustrate that media portrayals can bolster a 
number of diverse interests. Ethnic chic can be subverted by ethnic entrepreneurs, and 
western human rights and environmentalist groups could inadvertently contribute to this form 
of political tribalism through their simplistic interpretations of various ethnic identities. As 
environmentalism becomes an increasingly important issue in an over-populated and over- 
polluted world, agencies such as Survival International and Amnesty International may 
inadvertently become ethnic culture brokers themselves, thus bolstering the very exclusivism 
which they vehemently oppose. 
It may be that future ethnic identity constructions will evolve along these themes of 
environmentalism and development. These forms of ethnic identity reformulation also 
illustrate the main theoretical thrust of this thesis. Ethnic and nationalist identities cannot be 
rigidly classified in terms of 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalism. For both grow from the same 
social, cultural and economic seedbed. Similarly, moral ethnicity and political tribalism are 
95 J. Sharp, 'Ethnogenesis and Ethnic Mobilization: A Comparative Perspective on a South African Dilemma', in E. Wilmsen 
and P. McAllister (eds), Ethnic premises. 
96 A. Campbell, 'Ethical Ethnicity', p. 61. 01 97 See chapter 2. 9A 
B. Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, Oxford, 1992. 
P. Davis, In Darkest Hollywood: Exploring the Jungles of Cinema's South Africa, Ohio, 1996, p. p. 167-182. Recent 
popular histories also distort and esentialise South African identities: see, for example, S. Taylor, Shaka's Children: A History 
of the Zulu People, London, 1995. These forms of history should also serve as a salutary lesson to academia that it is important 
to produce works which reach the wider general public and not just the 'Ivory Towers' of academe, and thus challenge the dubious essentialism of the former. 
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intimately connected. There were, and are, constant interconnections and fluid boundaries 
between and amongst ethnicised identities in southern Africa during the twentieth century. 
The main changes seem to have involved an increase in scale, as the moral ethnic 
identifications of the early twentieth century metamorphosised into the various forms of 
political tribalism, and civic and ethnic nationalisms of later decades. These were constantly 
intertwined with other forms of classification, such as gender and class, and are continuously 
evolving. The malleability of ethnic and nationalist identities suggests that marxian theories 
which argue the global economy will eventually erode their relevence are mistaken. 
100 They 
are likely to remain prominent factors of identification for a considerable time to come, 
although it is difficult to predict in what context, and this is anyway beyond the realms of 
historical investigation. 
100 Eric Hobsbawm is a major proponent of the argument that nationalism and ethnicity will become increasingly irrelevent in 
a growing global, consumerist society. See E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge, 1990, and E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-199/, London, 1994. Proponents 
of similar views in the southern African context have been discussed throughout this thesis. 
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